Writing society: politics and history in the work of D.H. Lawrence by Simmonds, Roger
Simmonds, Roger (2004) Writing society: politics and 
history in the work of D.H. Lawrence. PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/14448/1/403916.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
JWRITING SOCIETY:
POLITICS AND HISTORY IN
THE WORK OF
D. H. LAWRENCE'
by Roger Simmonds, BA.
Thesis submitted to the University of
Nottingham for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
October 2003
For my parents, with love
ii
Acknowledgements
This thesis could not have been completed without the help, encouragement
and constructive criticism of others, and I wish here to show my deepest
gratitude to all of those who gave me such support. I hope that the result is
worthy of the breadth of support upon which it depended.
Firstly, I am especially beholden to Dr Macdonald Daly of the
University of Nottingham for supervising me during the writing of this thesis.
His detailed criticisms, his encouraging guidance, and (not least) his sense of
humour, were invaluable, making the work highly enjoyable as well as
intellectually rewarding. At the same time, I was fortunate enough to receive
for six months the supervision of Dr John Phillips of the National University of
Singapore. Despite the brevity of this arrangement, I am highly grateful to him
for the extent of his help at a particularly nerve-racking stage in the thesis'
production, and the way in which he encouraged me to explore new critical
territories.
I would also like to thank the staff of the Hallward Library at the
University of Nottingham for their friendly assistance, and those friends and
fellow scholars who either commented on particular chapters or discussed the
material with me on various occasions: namely, Harry Acton, Valeria
Faravelli, Dr Phil Skelton, and Professor John Worthen. Moreover, I am also
extremely grateful for the intellectual debating skills, the emotional support,
and the Dionysian capacities of Christine Achinger, Paul Elliott, Corinne
Fourny, Mark Freestone, Kate Gannon, Alex Harrington, Alex Leicht, Bram
Mertens, Julian and Emma Moyle, Sarah Newsome, Simon Sadler, Pete
Shepperson, Jan Wagstaff, and' Sarah Young. I would also like to thank
Professor Charles Watkins for his often eccentric and always entertaining
Derby Hall Senior Common Room at the University of Nottingham.
Gratitude is also greatly due to Ronald and Susan Amann for their
substantial help in allowing me to complete this thesis: for their generosity,
their patience, and their ever-entertaining company, I am truly thankful.
Also, I would, of course, like to give my heartfelt thanks to my parents,
John and Brenda Simmonds, and my grandmother, Joan Green, for all their
love and wonderful support throughout the years, and their ability to set aside
their incredulity at the magnitude of a doctoral research project.
Finally, and above all, my thanks to Jessica for everything - for her
help, understanding, and critical vigour, and for her love, warmth, and humour.
To her I am forever indebted.
iii
Abstract
This thesis is a cultural materialist exploration of the trans-generic work of
D. H. Lawrence. Combining formalist analyses with this historical approach, I
provide perspectives on Lawrence which attend to the particularity of his texts'
form while revealing their constitution as historical and material products. The
consequence is neither a "radicalized" Lawrence nor a right-wing caricature of
him, but a politically hybrid Lawrence whose texts are sites of struggle with
the socio-historical contradictions of modernity. In chapter 1, I show how
Lawrence can critique bourgeois culture and its material foundations more
profoundly than has been assumed. Pansies, whose dialogical poetics
undermines conventional literary genres and assaults a bourgeois "literature"
which suppresses _itsmateriality, is read as a critique of its own conditions of
production. In chapter 2, I illustrate how Lawrence's post-war work is more
embattled than· is usually realised, in its intense exploration of the
contradictions of liberal capitalism; the notion of Lawrence's post-war texts as
largely monologic and reactionary is radically undermined. In chapter 3, I
argue that Lawrence's life as an exile does not signify, as it is normally
understood to, a sustained hostility to England and nation-ness. Rather,
Lawrence's articles on Englishness offer an abstract, bourgeois myth of
England which occludes the conflicts of class and gender. Finally, in chapter 4,
I illuminate the darker cultural roots of Lawrence's unconscious, which is
commonly perceived as a liberatory force, opposing hegemonic cultural
ideologies. While Lawrence critiques the hypocrisy and repression of modem
democratic idealism, his positing of an extra-cultural unconscious is haunted
by an intensified version of the very cultural repression he assaults.
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Introduction
It is well known that Lawrence's work is saturated with contradictions, and
chameleon-like in its rhetorical virtuosity. While recognising this quality of
Lawrence's oeuvre, critics have nonetheless frequently been at odds in their
persistent attempts to form some totalising view of this extremely hybrid set of
texts. Lawrence's writing has been regarded as both humanistic and hedonistic,
fascistic and socialistically class-conscious, irredeemably sexist and sexually
liberating, a prime example of "high modernism" and a radical series of
discourses subversive of Western meta-narratives.
This thesis aims, therefore, to avoid the inescapable reductionism
inherent in a totalising analysis of a writer whose individual texts each possess
such a peculiar level of particularity in their specific combination of
languages, forms, ideologies, and areas of historical and critical engagement. I
.hope to avoid this trap through a particularist approach to Lawrence's texts
which does not attempt to promote the illusion of Lawrence's work as a single,
unified whole or a process of organic growth. Rather, the objective of the
current study is to produce new perspectives on Lawrence's work, while
coming to terms with the specificity of the texts analysed. In fact, I hope to
show how the composite nature of Lawrence's oeuvre reveals a new Lawrence
. characterised by political hybridity, not by totality or linearity. This is a
reading which, I hope, breaks away from the binary structure of past critical
debates over Lawrence.
Such specificity is evident in the trans-generic nature of Lawrence's
work. Yet in spite of the existence of numerous critiques of his assessment of
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Lawrence, F. R. Leavis's claim that Lawrence was primarily a novelist and,
therefore, that the critic should focus on his novels, has gone largely
unchallenged. This is often because, with the exception of his short stories and
some of his poems, Lawrence's various works in genres other than the novel or
novella - poems, plays, psychological studies, educational essays, newspaper
articles, travel sketches, philosophical works, literary criticism, and even
paintings and a school history book - are perceived by Lawrencian critics as
aesthetically or politically embarrassing and, therefore, unrewarding of
attention. However, one of the assumptions on which my analysis rests is that a
writer is more than the few "great works" for which he is posthumously
acclaimed by criticism. Firstly, while he lives the writer produces, and is
culturally received through, many other works which are written with no less
faith than those which later become canonic. To manufacture, through
criticism of a canonised selection of texts, the Lawrence which most concords
with our aesthetic and political perspectives is' not only intellectually
irresponsible but evasive of historical reality. Secondly, a writer produces
some works primarily in order to earn a living. These works should not be
merely dismissed as beyond the pale of critical analysis because of the more
substantial economic motivation behind them. On the contrary, our conception
of the writer cannot legitimately be distilled from the economic realm into the
writer of "great works" when such works would not have been written without
such material concerns being attended to. As a professional writer with no
other regular income (and even his writing did not often earn him regular
sums), Lawrence frequently wrote for material reasons as much as cultural
ones. This is, however, not a point made to demean him - in a world in which
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cultural production is fettered to the marketplace, it is historically falsifying to
assume the possibility of a utopian transcendence of the material factors
involved in professional writing.
The following argument will, then, engage with Lawrence across
several of the genres in which he worked: namely, poetry, drama, the novel,
the newspaper article, the educational polemic, the psychological theory, and
the short story. For reasons of space, I will not discuss the travel sketches, the
metaphysical works, literary criticism, the history book, or the paintings. Such
. limitation of my own study is by no means intended to preclude the
examination of such works; rather, it is hoped that the trans-generic attention
of this thesis will initiate further exploration of these largely neglected genres
which also constituted Lawrence as a cultural producer. I should also
emphasise, in what I have already acknowledged is a thesis dealing largely
with "minor" works (with the exception of Women in Love and ''The Woman
Who Rode Away"), that the following is not intended as a renovation of these
texts for the modernist canon. This should be clear from the fact that this study
is not a "critical appreciation" but a critical analysis. It is a critical analysis in
the widest sense of the phrase, examining Lawrence's texts for the particular
explorations of the social - sometimes insightful, sometimes deeply
problematic, but always illuminating - which they provide. In this sense, the
current study is, again, an unconventional approach. By contrast, criticism of
Lawrence, perhaps partly because of the emotionally powerful and
idiosyncratic quality of both his writing and life, has tended to divide into the
dual categories of "for" or "against". However, this reading of Lawrence
differs radically from conventional approaches in many other senses, which I
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will now delineate by conducting a brief survey of the general branches of
Lawrence criticism.
The most persistent mode of Lawrence criticism has, of course, been
"for" Lawrence - that is, Lawrencian. Since the 1950s liberal humanist critics,
such as F. R. Leavis, Frank Kermode and Graham Hough, have helped to
establish a large base of Lawrencian critics who treat Lawrence's texts and
Lawrence himself as quasi-sacred objects to be protected from both the forces
of modern "theory", with its historicising proclivities, and from Lawrence's
own textual transgressions from Lawrencian orthodoxy. While criticism of this
nature still thrives, the Lawrencian project has, in the last quarter of a century,
.turned to scholarly rather than critical endeavour in its production of the
Cambridge Edition of D. H. Lawrence's works and a three-volume Cambridge
.Biography of his life. Lawrence's "genius", we might say, speaks for itself in
its very objectification as a monolithic and forbidding collection of black,
biblically intimidating volumes, each emblazoned with a phoenix. Such
reification of literary value in the face of a growing b09Y of Marxist and,
particularly, feminist critiques of Lawrence is a paradoxical refuge in
materiality for an idealist criticism intent on maintaining a Lawrence untainted
by his insistent explorations in the socio-historical.' By contrast, the present
study will not shy away from critically grounding Lawrence's texts within the
society of which they write and of which they are a product. Instead, by
1 It is also ironic that the Cambridge Edition is the product of the historical and economic
imperative of maintaining copyright for the Lawrence Estate, since it attempts to establish as
"authoritative" texts which are fundamentally ahistorical and supposedly free from the material
constraints of early twentieth-century publishing. For an extended discussion of the
contradictions inherent in the Cambridge project, see my article. "Freedom under Capital: The
Ideal of the Artist/Critic and the Laws of the Market". New Comparison: A Journal of
Comparative and General Literary Studies. forthcoming.
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focusing on texts which Lawrencian critics have neglected, or dismissed for
their aesthetic and political weaknesses, this analysis will reveal the extent to
which Lawrence was deeply interested in exploring historical and material
issues which preoccupy the fields of critical theory and cultural studies today.
Thus, this thesis will explore a Lawrence seldom acknowledged by critics
antipathetic to literary "theory" - a Lawrence whose writing illuminates such
diverse critical areas as money and the materiality of cultural production,
ideology and class conflict, gender and national identity, and cultural and
instinctual violence. Naturally, an historical reading of this kind cannot
justifiably adopt the obsequious approach of the "critical appreciation" by
assuming the author's artistic or moral rectitude. Nor, moreover, can it simply
annihilate those texts of Lawrence's which fail to meet some arbitrary set of
aesthetic or ethical criteria (a point which I will examine in more detail in the
first chapter).
From an opposing yet similarly reductive stance, orthodox Marxist and
feminist critics have produced a sizeable volume of criticism which tends to
assault Lawrence variously as a misogynist, fascist, or bourgeois individualist
- a simplifying yet persuasive critique which threatened to extinguish
Lawrence from the literary canon," While my own approach is influenced by
both feminism and, particularly, Marxism, it differs radically from such
manifestations of these critical currents in the following ways. First, it does not
adopt a reflectionist theory of literature as, in particular, many Marxist
2 The most well-known examples of such modes of criticism are Kate Millett, "D. H.
Lawrence", Sexual Politics (1971; London: Abacus, 1972), pp. 237-93, and Christopher
Caudwell, "D. H. Lawrence: A Study of the Bourgeois Artist", Studies in a Dying Culture
(New York: 1938), pp. 44-72, reprinted in D. H. Lawrence: Critical Assessments: Poetry and
Non-fiction; The Modern Critical Response 1938-92: General Studies, vol. IV, ed. David Ellis
and OmelIa De Zordo (Mountfield: Helm Information, 1992), pp. 351-65.
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critiques of Lawrence do, by assuming that the text in some way mirrors
historical reality. The relation between text and history is here understood as
. highly mediated though concrete. Second, this thesis adopts a more
sophisticated notion of ideology. While Lawrence allows explicit political
pronouncements (which are often right-wing, misogynist or individualistic) to
enter his texts, his texts possess a deeper ideological structure which is
frequently more complex and which can often problematise the politics of
those more overt pronouncements. It is this deeper ideological structure which
this thesis grasps as the proper object of an ideological analysis. This is not
however to ignore the explicit "politics" of the text, but to contextualise it
within the text's wider field of ideological signification.' Finally, unlike most
Marxist and feminist approaches, the following argument will not rely solely
on sociological and historical methods of analysis. Rather, it will combine such
methods with formalist techniques, which attend to the specificity of the text's
genre, use of language and formal structuring. However, this does not mean
that such methods will be used in isolation from an otherwise sociological and
historical reading. One reason for such a combination of critical techniques is
to avoid the characteristic reductionism of orthodox Marxist and feminist
readings, which tend to deny the formal specificity of the text in its particular
reshaping and crystallisation of the socio-historical.
3 This is also relevant to more recent, less reductive, approaches to Lawrence's politics. For
example, Rick Rylance, in "Lawrence's politics", Rethinking Lawrence, ed. Keith Brown
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990), pp. 163-80, emphasises the complexity of
Lawrence's politics, yet his reading lacks the depth which an ideological analysis would have
- that is, an analysis which situates the texts ideologically without reducing them to literary
versions of fixed ideological positions. As a result of Rylance's substitution of "politics" for
ideology he attempts to renovate Lawrence for an anti-capitalist perspective largely because of
his anti-industrialism. An ideological approach however, such as the one I will conduct in
chapter 2 of this thesis, would show how a merely anti-industrial perspective can be connected
with liberal thought.
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Yet this combinative approach is also adopted in order to demonstrate,
contrary to the idealist belief that form should be privileged over historical
determinations, how literary form is historically constituted - even in its
particularity and complexity.
For example, in my first chapter I will show how Pansies, in its
subversion of conventional generic boundaries, alienates both the critic who
seeks to commodify the work by reducing it to a single, normative generic
category, and its own conditions of production (which depend upon such
commodification). In my second chapter, I will examine how Lawrence's so-
called "leadership" writing is in' fact structured less by hierarchies than by
dichotomies, which reveal the inherent contradictions of post-war liberalism.
In my third chapter, I will use structuralist and semiotic approaches in order to
illuminate how Lawrence constructs images of Englishness which, even at
their (seemingly) most politically innocent, suppress the fissuring forces of
class and gender, creating a bourgeois myth of England. In my fourth chapter,
finally, I will conduct a comparative' analysis of Lawrence's explorations in
psychology alongside the psychoanalytic writing of Sigmund Freud and
Melanie Klein. This will show how psychoanalysis's different sense of the
relation between culture and the unconscious sheds light upon the historical
nature and political significance of Lawrence's rigidly structured, yet
seemingly extra-cultural and politically ambiguous, theory of the self. While a
socio-historical approach is necessary, then, in order to illustrate how literary
forms are embedded in, and therefore can only be fully understood within the
context of, material history, formalist approaches are necessary in order to
address the full complexity of the text's highly mediated relationship to the
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socio-historical. In this way, the reduction of the text to a rigid ideological
category, in the hasty pursuit of a clear historical analogue, is avoided.
This thesis also distinguishes itself from post-structuralist criticism of
Lawrence, most of which tends to attempt a "radicalization" of Lawrence's
works, often drawing on Lawrence's interest in the fluidity of unconscious
desire in order to reveal how his texts undermine the dominant ideologies of
capitalist society. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, for example, while
apparently seeing desire as thoroughly implicated in the socio-political, adopt a
conception of "real desire" as "revolutionary" which is supported throughout
their Anti-Oedipus by Lawrence's arguments for the non-ideal fluidity of
desire." What such a reading ignores, however, is the way in which Lawrence's
abstract notion of a non-cultural, instinctual desire is, ironically, deeply
implicated in an extreme version of the very modem cultural violence it
purports to critique. Yet Deleuze and Guattari have spawned a whole body of
post-structuralist readings which have, conventionally, endorsed Anti-
Oedipus's emphasis on Lawrence's promotion of a shifting and chameleon-
like, impulsive self which evades the exploitative restrictions of cultural
significations.S What such arguments do not account for, however, is that
Lawrence's positing of a non-cultural mode of being is the very process of
abstraction which conceals and facilitates the naturalising of reactionary,
cultural positions of sex- and class-domination. By contrast, the materialist
4 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972), trans.
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (1977; London: Athlone Press, 1984), p. 116.
s For some examples of such an approach, see Robert Burden, Radicalizing Lawrence: Critical
Interventions in the Reading and Reception of D. H. Lawrence's Narrative Fiction
(Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000), and Paul Poplawski, ed., Writing the Body in D. H.
Lawrence: Essays on Language, Representation, and Sexuality, (London: Greenwood Press,
2001).
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approach to Lawrence which is advanced in the following thesis will seek to
"
situate even such amorphous concepts as the unconscious (see chapter 4)
within their historical dimension. This task is undertaken in the belief that a
criticism which assumes such concepts to be extra-cultural or essentially
progressive (and the latter assumption involves the former) can only produce a
radically reductive and idealist analysis. In abstracting the concept of the
unconscious from its socio-historical context, such criticism dangerously
idealises the unconscious, and does so in a manner which mimics the texts
from which it requires critical distance.
Another typical characteristic of post-structuralist readings of Lawrence
is their frequent insistence on the "radical indeterminacy" of his texts." Such an
insistence, while emphasising the 'need to address the full linguistic complexity
of a text, frequently allows Lawrence's texts to escape a proper historical
analysis, since the fact of the text's deconstructibility allows it to acquire a
multiplicity of meaning which explodes its historical determinations. The
'simple fact that the text can be read as self-critiquing permits the text, in a
typically postmodem irony, to evade the consequences of such a critique - the
radicalism of the approach endowing the text with a radicalism it had
6 See Gllmini Salgado, ''Taking a Nail for a Walk: on Reading Women in Love" (1976), D. H.
Lawrence, ed. Peter Widdowson (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 137-45, 138. Though .
Salgado's phrase speaks of Women in Love alone, Lawrence's work has been read by many
recent critics as insidiously defiant of, and resistant to, the disempowering and imprisoning
structures of language, despite his texts' overt attempts to harness what is seen as Western
thought's deluded sense of its own epistemological authority. For examples of this
interpretative strategy, see Lydia Blanchard, "Lawrence, Foucault and the Language of
Sexuality", D. Hi Lawrence's "LAdy": ANew Look at LAdyChatterley'S Lover, ed. Michael
Squires and Dennis Jackson (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1985), pp. 17-35;
Burden; Deleuze and Guattari; Anne Fernihough, D. H. LAwrence: Aesthetics and Ideology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Poplawski; and Roger Poole, who writes of the
''undecidability'' of SIMawr's textual significations in "Psychoanalytic Theory: D. H.
Lawrence, St Mawr', Literary Theory at Work: Three Texts, ed. Douglas Tallack (London:
Batsford, 1987), pp. 89-113.
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previously not possessed! This is, then, an approach unable to historicise
Lawrence because it reads the writer as a politically radical unconscious rather
than as an individual using all of his critical faculties in order to grapple with
and understand his society. This is not to deny the "unconscious" of the text: it
is only that such a "radicalizing" approach denies the struggles, the ideological
conflicts, and the sense of history as a process which an historicising criticism
must acknowledge as inherent to the act of writing if it is to understand it
historically. This thesis, then, will attempt to read Lawrence's texts,
historically, as sites of struggle. Lawrence was, for example, tom between the
social and the individual; a struggle which I will, on one level, situate within
the parameters of liberalism and, on another level, illustrate as an exposure of
historical contradictions. To re-read this conflict, in post-structuralist terms,
merely as a radical illumination of liberal capitalism's ideological incoherence
is evidently to produce a distorted historical view of Lawrence's writing as a
mechanical reflex of postmodem radicalism.
The approach with which this study most closely associates itself is that
of cultural materialism. However, this thesis hopes both to go beyond the
limitations of cultural materialist debates over form and commitment, and to
expand the critical territory of cultural materialism. Some criticism of
Lawrence has been undertaken from a cultural materialist perspective: most
significantly, Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton have employed critical
methods which have brought Marxist literary criticism of Lawrence away from
the reflectionism which had previously characterised it. However, their debates
on Lawrence's work have avoided close readings and have, perhaps as a
consequence, tended to focus on a binary opposition between the forms of
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realism and modernism: in short, Lawrence's work is evaluated according to
whether or not the critic is a Lukacsian or a Brechtian. This has meant that
Williams has tended, from a Lukacsian standpoint, to reduce the later, more
modernist works of Lawrence to a redundant form of individualism; while
Eagleton has adopted an unelaborated Brechtian approach which assumes
formal fragmentation to be ideologically radical," This thesis, however, aims to
go beyond these rather unproductive dichotomies since it views such blanket
evaluations of form as highly reductive: we need to examine the particular
effects of both formal fissuring and formal realism by situating them in their
particular textual and historical contexts. Hence, this study will assume neither
that the text should embody some kind of social totality, nor that it should
enact some kind of formal radicalism - since both positions deny the full
historical implications of the literary form in question. More attention needs to
be paid to the specificity of the text's use of the structures which it employs.
Consequently, the following argument will attend, without prejudice, both to
the ways in which the text registers post-war historical change and to the
methods, however anti-realist, by which it seeks to challenge historical reality.
The present study also aims to release cultural materialist criticism of
Lawrence from its confinement, on the one hand, to the analysis of class and a
narrow conception of "politics", and, on the other hand, to an examination of
7 For Raymond Williams's Lukacsian approach to Lawrence, see "Social and Personal
Tragedy: Tolstoy and Lawrence", Modern Tragedy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), pp.
121-38; "0, H, Lawrence", The English Novelfrom Dickens to Lawrence (1970; St Albans:
Paladin, 1974), pp. 137-49; and "The Border Again", The Country and The City (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1973), pp. 264-71. For Terry Eagleton's Brechtian discussion of
Lawrence, see Criticism and Ideology: a Study in Marxist Literary Theory (1976; London:
Verso, 1978). It should be noted here, however, that one of the best cultural materialist
approaches to Lawrence, Graham Holderness, D. H. Lawrence: History, Ideology and Fiction
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1982), is nonetheless also torn between these competing,
formally reductionist positions, sometimes appealing to a Lukacsian notion of the social
totality while, at other times, appealing simply to the radicalism of formal open-endedness,
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the "major works" (which are usually novels)," Firstly, my analysis intends to
broaden the field of cultural materialist study of Lawrence by examining the
politics of Lawrence's treatment of a diverse range of issues: from literary
form itself and such conventionally dehistoricised concepts as the unconscious
and violence, through the often emotionally indistinct terrain of national
identity, to money, liberal ideology and gender. By conducting such a hybrid
study, "politics" takes on a wider, more substantial meaning - and one which
cannot be reduced and marginalised to issues of class and political affiliation
alone. Here, politics will be seen as penetrating all spheres of representation,
from the representation of instinctual violence to the representation of such
seemingly "natural" and politically innocuous events as a train journey through
rural England.
Secondly, this extension of the field of political criticism and debate is
enabled by the trans-generic attention of this thesis which should reveal a
Lawrence who is more hybrid in his approaches, as well as his interests, than is
normally assumed. Lawrence's oeuvre crosses numerous genres, arid for a
materialist analysis persistently to neglect the vast body of alternative modes in
which Lawrence wrote, for the sake of focusing on a received, idealist notion
of Lawrence's "major works" or "major novels", is to produce a highly
selective and ahistorical version of Lawrence's work. Such a construction
glosses over those texts which do not serve successfully to support the abstract
concept of the "great writer" of "great works". Moreover, since the neglected
8 For some recent cultural materialist discussions of Lawrence and class, see Graham Martin,
"D. H. Lawrence and Class", D. H. Lawrence, ed. Peter Widdowson (London: Longman,
1992), pp. 35-48, Jeremy Hawthorn, "Lawrence and working-class fiction", Rethinking
Lawrence, ed. Keith Brown (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990), pp. 67-78, and
Peter Scheckner, Class, Politics, and the Individual: A Study of the Major Works of D. H.
Lawrence (London: Associated University Presses, 1985).
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texts discussed here still possess a great deal ..of relevance to contemporary
critical debates, it is a criticism which is profoundly indifferent to .such debates
which would dismissively brand such works as "minor" rather than critically
engaging with them.
The following thesis should, then - through the unconventionality of its
approach as outlined in relation to the main strands of Lawrence criticism -
shed fresh light upon Lawrence's work. Lawrence critics have, for example,
never before recognised a radical critique of capitalism and bourgeois literary
culture in Lawrence's Pansies - on the contrary, they have generally either
attacked the poems or contemptuously ignored them. Neither has Lawrence
criticism realised the extent to which Lawrence's late fiction, such as Aaron's
Rod, engages with, and is confined by, the ideological parameters of post-war
liberalism; rather, it has tended to label this fiction with terms such as
"authoritarian" or include it in the so-called "leadership novels". Equally,
Lawrence critics have tended to emphasise Lawrence's anti-nationalism,
reading his departure from England in 1919 as a Romantic repudiation of his
. '. ..' .' .
. .nationalidentity: in this thesis, however, (will read Lawrence's late newspaper
articles and essays as offering sentimentally bourgeois images of an
emotionally undivided nation. Furthermore, the notion of Lawrence's version
of the unconscious as deeply implicated in the very culturally repressive
violence which he is known for critiquing is one which flies in the face of most
critical conceptions of Lawrence, old and new. In short, it is a non-reductive,
cultural materialist approach that combines sociological analyses with
formalist analyses, while attending to the particularity of the text, which is able
13
to historicise Lawrence while accounting for both his textual complexity and
his continuously changing ideological relationship to modernity.
The Particularity of the Text: An Explanation of Methodology
While the readings in this thesis possess the overall consistency of a
cultural materialist approach whose object is to situate the texts within their
historical and material relationships as both cultural contributions and
historically constituted material products, I have adopted specific critical
methods in each chapter in order to do this. This is because it is the assumption
of this thesis that the particularity of the text requires a particular set of critical
tools of analysis. I have already spoken of the general need to combine
formalist analysis with sociological analysis. This synthesis of approaches is
particularly striking, however, in my first chapter, which will read Mikhail
Bakhtin's theory of the novel alongside Lawrence's poems in order to
illuminate the specificity of the text's use of languages, and then show how
such formal strategies can be understood as realising a poetics of estrangement
from the conditions of capitalist production. My particularly sustained use in
this chapter of structuralist critical tools is, however, not merely accidental -
the need to use such methods is derived from the particularity of the text in
question. In other words, given the text's historical alienation of its critics and
their difficulty in examining the text's use of conventionally non-poetic
discourses, the analysis requires critical tools which will explain such
paramount formal issues before it can situate the text historically.
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The same applies to the other chapters in this thesis: that is, the choice
of which methods to adopt is derived from the object of study. To repeat, each
reading has the consistent objective of grounding the text in its historical and
socio-material conditions. However, the specific character of each text requires
different tools of analysis in order to conduct this historicising approach. This
hybridity is, then, not merely a postmodem eclecticism; rather, it simply
attempts to show a sensitivity to the text's specificity which conventional
readings commonly lack.9 Hence, the blatant focus of such works as Touch and
Go and Aaron's Rod (explored in chapter 2) upon problems of political
ideology means that they lend themselves to ideological analysis. My reading
of these texts, therefore, while still attending to literary form and conducting a
cultural materialist analysis, also depends specifically on an analysis of
ideology in order to engage with what is particular to the texts examined.
Similarly, literary representations of such slippery concepts as national
identity and violence demand new tools of analysis. To doggedly rely solely
upon methods derived from historical materialism as a means of explicating all
. literary texts is to neglect the specificity of the text in question. Inmy third and
fourth chapters, for example, the social and material determinations of literary
explorations of such amorphous concepts as Englishness and destructiveness
are highly mediated and complex. Therefore, new lines of enquiry must be
opened in order to bridge the gap between text and history. Lawrence's late
constructions of Englishness do have a relationship to ideologies of both
British national and imperial power, and containment (of class conflict and the
9 This includes even Lawrencian formalist approaches which, despite their concern with close
readings, dogmatically disparage the use of all "theory" even where the text evidently lends
itself as an object of study to certain theoretical forms of knowledge.
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women's movement). An understanding of the particular position of the writer
in his complex relation to the nation -he depicts is of course necessary.
However, this oblique and complex relationship can only be understood by
also situating such constructions of Englishness within a wider culture of
literary representations of English national identity, and by examining the
distinct politics underlying seemingly similar and "natural" images of place. In
other words, literary constructions of national identity bear a subtle relation to
political ideology and material history which cannot easily be deduced by a
purely socio-historical reading. Structuralist and semiotic approaches must
flesh out such a reading since national identity - being felt in myriad ways,
from a whole range of political positions, and under various economic
conditions - is distinguished by its virtuoso linguistic adaptability to mutually
antagonistic modes of thought. The same signs can signify opposing values
according to their relations to the signs surrounding them.
. Equally, the texts on which I focus in chapter 4 exhibit a particular
preoccupation with the relation between culture and the unconscious. fu these
texts, it is clear that Lawrence's. engagement with the problem of modem
violence contains a critique of the denial by liberal democratic and left-wing
politics of their own repressive violence. and that his idealisation of the
destructive instincts resonates with the ideology of fascism. However, an
analysis which aims critically to evaluate, rather than merely pin political
labels to, such amorphous notions as instinctual and cultural violence must
clearly attend to the specifically psychological focus of these texts. In chapter
4, then, I will read Lawrence's texts alongside those of inter-w~
psychoanalysis: frrstly, because they explore the same historical and political
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problem of the unprecedented violence of modernity; and, secondly, because
they explore it by examining the same psychological relation within the self
between cultural and instinctual determinations. Such a comparative analysis
enables me to illuminate, on the one hand, the historical and cultural
situatedness of Lawrence's idealised unconscious and, on the other, the
psychoanalytical power of Lawrence's critique of liberal capitalism and left-
wing humanism's idealist repression of the instinctual foundations of culture.
. This particular approach therefore fully attends to the particularity of the text's
(psychological) focus, while situating this analysis within a broader critical
assessment of Lawrence's contribution to the understanding of a particular
historical and political problematic. My use of the cultural contexts of
psychoanalysis and modem literary writing on Englishness to analyse
Lawrence's work is not, then, a way of abstracting cultural analysis from
history through the application of one cultural text to another. Rather, it is a
method of exploring how that history can be comprehended in the light of
competing cultural versions of it.
A Note on Period
This thesis focuses solely on texts from Lawrence's post-1918 period.
My reasons for this choice are as follows. Firstly, Lawrence's output was vast
and no critical analysis can be comprehensive. This fact leads me to focus on a
particular period which has been neglected, and the post-1918 texts form one
substantial area of such neglect. Excluding analyses of Women in Love (1920)
and Lady Chatterley's Lover (1928), little work has been done on the
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numerous works produced in this prolific later period of Lawrence's writing
life. By comparison, a relatively large body of work has been devoted to the
study of Lawrence's less expansive body of early, pre-1918 writings.
Secondly, the works in this period tend to have been neglected by criticism.
Thirdly, and finally, because this thesis does not seek to produce a totalising
study of Lawrence which summarises the character of the whole individual and
his oeuvre, it is not my intention here that the coverage of texts be uniformly
distributed across the writing life.
Lawrence and Modernism
The following analysis also contributes to the recent revival of debates
surrounding the concept of modernism. In recent years definitions of
modernism have become more flexible as critics have challenged the common
notion of modernism as elitist, ahistorical and right-wing (if politically
. committed at all). The result has been a new conception of modernism as more
plural and diverse in its manifestations - less unified and monolithic, than the
selective construction of modernism as (mainly Anglo-American) "high
modernism" had suggested.l" Nonetheless, the perception of Lawrence's work
as limited to the traditional notion of modernism as self-consciously aesthetic,
reactionary, and disengaged or critically aloof from contemporary history and
mass politics, is still dominant in readings of modernism: Peter Brooker
10 See, for example, Peter Brooker, "Introduction: Reconstructions", Modernism /
Postmodernism, ed. Peter Brooker (Harlow: Longman, 1992), pp. 1-33; Peter Nicholls,
Modernisms: A Literary Guide (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); and Vassiliki Kolocotroni,
Jane Goldman and Olga Taxidou, eds., "Introduction", Modernism: An Anthology of Sources
and Documents (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp. xvii-xx.
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appears content with the restriction of Lawrence to the conservatism of what
he terms "Traditionalist Modernism";'! for Randall Stevenson, "Lawrence's
ultimate evasion of issues of political or historical change is particularly
disappointing - given the extent of social awareness his fiction shows - but not
unusual,,;12 while Todd Avery and Patrick Brantlinger include Lawrence
within a modernism which "inherited from Victorian aesthetes and decadents
such 'asWalter Pater and Oscar Wilde the idea of 'art for art's sake"'.13
However, this thesis, by conducting a cultural materialist examination
of texts of Lawrence's which are generally ignored, should demonstrate that
his oeuvre is deeply committed to the exploration of "issues of political [and]
historical change". This is not to say that Lawrence's works are incapable of
temporary evasion of such issues. However, Lawrence persistently returned to
them in a variety of ways (often through different genres) which the label of
"reactionary" fails to explain. The texts discussed here reveal a Lawrence
engaged' with the changing historical and political. climate of modernity
through investigations of such diverse-issues as economics, industrial politics,
/
the crisis of post-war liberalism and the rise of mass movements, national
identity, and the unprecedented destructiveness of modernity. What emerges is,
I hope, a writer incapable of tearing himself away from, or sustaining
transcendent solutions for, the tumultuous world of the post-war period - in
spite of frequent attempts to do so. This is a Lawrence not readily compatible
with the "high modernism" with which he is conventionally associated. What
11 Brooker, pp. 5-6.
12 Randall Stevenson, Modernist Fiction: An Introduction (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 21l.
13 Todd Avery and Patrick Brantlinger, "Reading and Modernism: '''Mind hungers' common
and uncommon", A Concise Companion to Modernism, ed. David Bradshaw (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2003), pp. 243-61, 245-6.
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this thesis should show, through the originality of both its selection of texts and
its non-reductively materialist approach, is that Lawrence was critically
engaged with his era in more direct and substantial ways than through the
conventional modernist methods of mythopoeia and alienated subjectivity. The
texts analysed here (such as Pansies, for example, which has embarrassed
Lawrencian critics by its unabashed immersion in the discourses of modem
politics and propaganda) place Lawrence in the position of problematising the
conventional opposition between modernism and what is seen as the more
politically engaged writing of the 1930s.
While this necessarily revises conventional conceptions of Lawrence's
texts as "high modernist" conservatism, this thesis does not, however, view
them as representative of the kind of self-deconstructionist radicalism which
Astradur Eysteinsson argues is typical of modernism: 14 a manoeuvre which
Robert Burden makes in his recent argument for Lawrence's texts to be seen as
an example of "radical Modemism't.f Burden's interpretation of Lawrence is
one of several recent re-readings of Lawrence as a prime example of
modernism's hithert~ suppressed post-structuralist radicalism: Lawrence's
texts, such post-structuralists argue, resist their own meta-narratives through a
self-conscious approach towards their power to contain truth, and challenge the
cultural construction of existence under modem capitalism." However, while
many of these post-structuralist accounts have brought necessary new
14 See Astradur Eysteinsson, The Concept of Modernism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1990). While Eysteinsson argues for the self-deconstructionist radicalism of modernism, he
provides, however, an excellent critique of the widespread critical view of modernism as
ahistorical. Furthermore, Eysteinsson rightly rejects an alternative, though less common,
reading of modernism as a reflection of social modernity and modernisation.
1~Robert Burden, Radicalizing Lawrence: Critical Interventions in the Reading and Reception
of D. H. Lawrence's Narrative Fiction (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000), p. 356.
16 See Burden and, once again, Blanchard, Deleuze and Guatarri, Poplawski, and Salgado.
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emphases, they tend to privilege what, in psychoanalytic terms, we might call
the text's unconscious - its instabilities and transgressions of its own intended
meanings - over its more overt significations. Thus, while a deconstructionist
approach might fruitfully reveal, in a Machereyan fashion, the text's absences
in order to read the text against itself, post-structuralist critics of Lawrence
have tended to read the text's absences as the text itself, arguing that these
reveal the inherent political radicalism of the text. Thus, the text escapes the
full consequences of its historical determinations - it becomes "radicalized" in
spite of them. The text, while rightly seen as possessing no inherent unity,
becomes a void: Lawrence's texts become defined by their absences,
transgressions, and Freudian slips.
By contrast, this thesis aims to employ a conception of ideology,
derived from Althusser, which not only takes ideology to be deeper than the
politics of the text's explicit pronouncements, but gives the concept sufficient
width to deal with the different levels of the text's significations - its
"presences" as well as its absences. The ideological structure of the text is thus
. .
. not confined merely to textual instabilities and transgressions which, after all,
only have meaning in relation to the dominant ideologies they subvert. Such a
mode of analysis paves the way, I believe, for a truly historical reading which
allows Lawrence's texts to be read in the full complexity of their engagement
with modernity. In this way, Lawrence's work is not reduced, in a travesty of
historical relationships, to a form of deconstructionist radicalism: rather, the
sense of its production as a lived, historical process is retained. In the
subsequent argument I will emphasise, therefore, the way in which Lawrence's
texts are the products of historically constituted conflicts and struggles - not
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reified, and hence ahistorical, moments of an inadvertent subversion of meta-
narratives and essentialist selves.
Lawrence is shown here to be more complex than conventional
readings of him as a modernist allow - that is, more complex than either a
straightforward reactionary or an unwitting writer of radically subversive texts.
Scepticism should, after all, be aroused when a writer is transformed from a
politically regressive monolith to a fluidly post-modem and radical
transgressor of the values of Western civilisation. His texts should be seen, in
more complex terms, as sites of struggle - and this thesis charts a range of such
struggles. For example, in my discussion of Pansies I will show how the text
enacts a material contradiction (in the conditions of its publication) at the level
of literary form, producing a radical anti-aesthetic which critiques both the
capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois culture of which it itself is a
part. In my discussion of Touch and Go and Aaron's Rod Lawrence is seen to
shift from a position wh~chenacts the ideological containment of class conflict,
to a position in which, though itself confined by the problematic of a divided
.; . . . .
, liberalism, .threatens to' explode that liberalism through ,the exposure of its
ideological and .historical contradictions, Assorted Articles, by contrast, show a
Lawrence more engaged than ever with the notion of nation-ness and England,
yet (ironically) indulging in the simplified, bourgeois abstractions of the tourist
- a paradox, I will argue, symptomatic of Lawrence's position as an exile
writing of home. Similarly, in my analysis of Lawrence's post-war
interrogation of modem violence I will reveal how a conflict between culture
and the instincts in Lawrence's writing produces a double-edged examination:
on one level, a devastating critique of liberaVprogressive humanist hypocrisy
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in relation to its own destructiveness and repression; on another, a proto-
fascistic idealisation of the unconscious.
Throughout my thesis I will, then, attempt to show, through a cultural
materialist analysis, how Lawrence's texts reveal a complex relationship, of
critical engagement and idealist rejection, to the period in which they were
written. However, what will perhaps surprise readers of Lawrence, and of
modernist texts in general, is the extent to which Lawrence's work is
perpetually drawn back towards the social and material rigours of history
despite its frequent attempts to transcend them through the evasions of
idealism, Burkean parochialism, utopian affirmation, or prophetic claims of
epistemological authority. Such perpetual shifting between the ideal and the
material reveals a different Lawrence in each text. Here, I hope, is a Lawrence
who - though not politically committed in the conventional sense - stubbornly
committed himself to a politically colourful engagement with the crises and
contradictions of liberal democratic capitalism. Moreover, this commitment
was sustained in spite of self-contradiction and a proclivity towards
transcendence, and the result is a politically engaged body of work which has
lost none of its contemporary relevance. Such a cultural contribution is greater.
than that which recent post-structuralist critics grant Lawrence - their reward
for Lawrence being the spuriously radical denial of all discourses dependent on
a notion of truth. The issues discussed here, which Lawrence examined
without surrendering to a cynical relativism, of money, capitalism, radical
aesthetics, class, ideology, gender, national identity, the unconscious and
.violence, are all still with us as we begin the twenty-first century. Lawrence's
modernism is, then, politically relevant to a greater extent than a disquisition
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on the progressivism of the instability or plurality of its meanings would
suggest; and cannot be reduced, therefore, to a mere interrogation of so-called
meta-narratives.l" This point is strikingly illustrated in my chapter on Pansies,
where I discuss how the dialogic interaction of multiple and competing
languages creates a democratic poetics. However, this is not a democratic
poetics in form alone. For Lawrence's inclusion of a vast array of populist and
demagogic languages shows an awareness that democracy is more than either
the empty formalism of post-modem relativism and liberal pluralism, or the
half-hidden subversion of an otherwise hegemonic discourse.
Moreover, Lawrence appears in this thesis as a rather unconventional
modernist in many other senses. The modernism of Lawrence's Pansies is, for
instance, at odds not only with the older view of modernism as more elitist
than demotic; it challenges particularly, as in less spectacular ways the other
texts discussed do, a certain conventional conception of modernism as more
committed to formal experimentation and artistic autonomy than historical
.exploration, and more l~nguisticallyand morally subtle than directly polemical
(as the literature of the ·1930s is ordinarily perceived).18Similarly, modernism
has almost always been associated with political extremes. The recent shift in
the view of modernism, from right-wing elitism to post-modem, leftist
radicalism, underscores this tendency. Yet my second chapter shows that
17 Such a procedure often leads, moreover, to contradiction. For example, a recent, well-known
study of Lawrence and ideology, by Anne Fernihough, concludes that the contrariness of
Lawrence's writing means that his "stance" is "in the final analysis, apolitical" (D. H.
Lawrence: Aesthetics and Ideology [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993], p. 187).
Nonetheless, Femihough is willing to describe Lawrence's aesthetics as "'anti-imperialistic'"(r' 188).
1 In fact, as I will illustrate, Lawrence's poems actually critique the literary values of
modernism, by employing an innovative formal dialogism to satirise the experimental
aestheticism of contemporary forms such as Imagism. Formal radicalism is here united with
political radicalism in a manner which undermines the notion of an aesthetic grounded in its
distance from history and society.
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Lawrence, as commonly charged with political extremism as any other
modernist writer, was frequently confined, as well as inspired, by the
. contradictions of a crisis-ridden liberalism in his post-war work. Furthermore,
Lawrence - like most other modernists - is conventionally perceived as an
exile, disparaging of the bourgeoisie and its nationalism. However, as I hope to
show in my third chapter, his late articles on Englishness reveal a very
different character who, having renounced native experience for the isolation
of the national exile, created nostalgic images of a bourgeois England largely
devoid of the divisive effects of class and gender.
'"
. Finally, Deleuze and Guattari have given new life to the notion of
Lawrence's modernism as a celebration of the politically subversive powers of
the instinctual life. Only recently, Peter Childs has argued that Lawrence's
. modernism "championed deeply problematic but liberating sexual and spiritual
aspirations towards new relations, self-responsibility and the emergence of a
free individuality rooted in a recognition of otherness [my italics]".19 However,
~y fourth chapter examines the way in which Lawrence's very championing of
the individual unconscious as an extra-cultural realm of being leads him into
the very culture of violent repression he critiques.
Thus, my thesis raises the question of whether we need to revise, yet
. again, our conception of modernism; or, whether we need to read Lawrence as
offering forms which cannot be reduced easily, as they are conventionally, to
even the lately expanded paradigm of modernism(s), and which might be
placed in critical dialogue with modernist writing as a way of assessing the
19 Peter Childs, Modernism (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 145.
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peculiarity of their contribution to the period/" My own feeling is that, while
the former might achieve some re-definition of modernism if more non-
reductive materialist readings of modernist writers were undertaken,
Lawrence's oeuvre is peculiar for its period in its exploration of a vast
spectrum of historical problems, and in that exploration's continued relevance
to contemporary society.21
"j
20 Tony Pinkney has already begun this process of re-reading in D. H. Lawrence (Hemel
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), a book which analyses some of the complex
relationships in which Lawrence stood to cultural modernism, but which also "post-
modernises" Lawrence very questionably. .
21 It is hoped, however, that Kolocotroni, Goldman and Taxidou's call for a "reappraisal of the
[pre-1930] years, traditionally designated a period of apolitical 'High Modernism"', will be
acted on (p. xix), Certainly, I share with Lawrence Cahoone the belief that "social modernity is
the home of modernist art, even where that art rebels against it" ("Introduction", From
Modernism to Postmodemism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Cahoone, 2nd ed. [1996; Oxford:
Blackwell, 2003], pp. 1-13,9) ..
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1: Double Alienation: The Revolutionary Methods of Pansies
A Critigue of Criticism
[Lawrence's] hatred could not flow into the neat
channels of epigram - petty, malicious anger made him
dull, and the visions that he held in his mind's eye
dissolved into yellow waters that fed a sewer. Nettles
and Pansies are dull reading matter, and the odour that
rises from them is the smell of a world that is "tainted
with myself," a sick world that was to bury a dead
prophet.'
The weaknesses in Lawrence's poetry are so obvious
that it seems unnecessary to dwell on them. In brief, at
times he was downright bad in the very matters in
which at other times he was superbly good....in much
of Pansies there is a pathetic straining after rhyme
which defeats its own purposes, an ensuing serio-comic
effect which fails to be either comic or serious[....]2 .
Although extreme examples, these two extracts are characteristic of the bulk of
criticism which has paid attention to Lawrence's Pansies (1929). If critics have
not dismissed the poems with the neglect of analysis evident above, they have
maintained similar aesthetic ·criteria while arriving at more complimentary
. judgments. In recent years, the small quantity of criticism that has been written
on the poems has tended towards the latter type. This, in turn, falls broadly into
two strains of thought. Jay Dougherty and Thomas M. Antrim have tried to
justify Pansies by arguing that the poems form a constitutive whole and that
the numerous weaker poems (which they insist are the majority) are vital for
their contribution to the definition and explication of the few stronger ones.'
1Horace Gregory; Pilgrim of the Apocalypse: A Critical Study of D. H. Lawrence (London:
Martin Seeker, 1934), p. 113.
2 D. J. Enright, "A Haste for Wisdom", New Statesman, 30 October 1964, p. 654.
3 See Jay Dougherty, "'Vein of Fire': Relationships Among Lawrence's Pansies",
D. H. Lawrence Review (hereafter DHLR) 16 (2), 1983, pp. 165-81, and Thomas M. Antrim,
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The other strategy has been to attempt, like Sandra M. Gilbert, to site the
poems within an "honourable tradition"," comparing them with poetry such as
that of Swift, Blake, Shelley, Pound, Ginsberg, Horace, and Whitman; in short,
poetry which has already been accepted as Literature worthy of teaching and
study in academic institutions.
The obvious problem with all of these approaches is that none of them
takes sufficiently into account the aesthetic preconceptions that motivate the
poems; they prefer to impose their own assumed aesthetic norms upon them
(although "poems" is a poor term for them: Lawrence explicitly stated in one
letter to Aldous and Maria Huxley that Pansies are "meant for Pensees, not
poetry, especially not lyrical poetry").s A rather comic example of this is
Dougherty's examination of what he calls the "exclamatory" poems in
Pansies, where he insists that "such technique - or, rather, lack of it - is not
normally associated with good poetry", as if Lawrence was oblivious to what
people "normally" considered "good poetry''J'' Moreover, it is important that
. we recognise the instability of the theoretical foundatlons upon which such
forms of analysis rest. Pierre Macherey has explained the precarious nature of
criticism's tendency to appropriate certain "rules" and "norms" external to
itself:
As a general rule, those critics who have adopted the
role of the technician of taste are never mistaken; but in
the attempt to define the average realities of taste they
are always and inevitably mistaken because their work
evades rationality and does not produce a knowledge in
the strict sense of the word. The rule guarantees an
"Lawrence's Wild Garden", in DHLR 17 (2),1984, pp. 111-25.
4 Sandra M. Gilbert, Acts of Attention: The Poems of D. H. Lawrence (Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 2nd ed., 1990), p. 260.
S The Letters of D. H. Lawrence, vol. VII, ed. Keith Sagar and James T. Boulton (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), IS December 1928, p. 64.
6 Dougherty, pp. 166-7.
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activity which is both normative and approximative ...
this activity could be termed contradictory in that it is
unable to produce its own justifications, thus it receives
its norms from elsewhere. Obviously a criticism which
pursues an activity based on rules treats literature as a
commodity [....] It organises and controls the uses of a
given reality which has offered itself empirically to the
attention.'
Gilbert's categorization - an "honourable tradition" - depends,
similarly, upon a notion of such arbitrary "norms". As Terry Eagleton has
argued, "Literature, in the sense of a set of works of assured and unalterable
value, distinguished by certain shared inherent properties, does not exist": we
cannot rationally and objectively say which works should fall into this
category and which should fall into another.' Furthermore, to assimilate
Lawrence's Pansies into the construct of a literary "tradition"," forging some
extremely arbitrary literary links along the way (for instance, with Pound's
..... 4• •
Cantos simply because they are "fragmentary''j.i'' involves an undue amount
of selectivity and reduction in approaching the poems which, somehow, has
not. perturbed critics. Dougherty has recognised the selectivity, making a
telling calculation:
Of the232 Pansies [...] only some 47 could be
considered, by my definitions, "illustrative"; and yet in
.discussions in which Pansies are considered at any
length - namely. in those of Gilbert. Pinion, and Murfin
- quotations of illustrative poems outnumber those of
non-illustrative poems by roughly two to one. And. as
with Pinion and Murfin especially. quotations of non-
illustrative poems are usually made to point out
negative rather than positive aspects of Lawrence's
Pansies. I I
7 Pierre Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production (1966), trans. Geoffrey Wall (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p, 13.
8 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd ed., 1996),
r·9.
Eagleton, p. 10.
10Gilbert, p. 258.
11 Dougherty, p. 181.
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Although Dougherty's "definitions" ("illustrative" and "non-illustrative") are
.vague, the point he is making (which is clear when he explains his
"definitions") is that the majority of the Pansies are not conventionally poetic
and have, as a consequence, not been addressed at all except to dismiss them
with standard references to the "norms" of art. Strangely, considering her
appeals to a "tradition", Gilbert has noted the most common aesthetic norm
referred to, that of obliquity, commenting that critics "seem really to dislike the
polemical or confessional directness that gives the poems their power".
However, she obviously does little to dispel this feeling with the limited choice
of poems she examines. What Gilbert points out, however, is vital to
understanding the poems. The negative response to Pansies has rested upon the
presuppositions that art should be indirect, subtle ("they sacrifice all subtlety
on an altar of urgent necessity"),'! relativist,'! undogmatic" and unrepetitive in
theme. IS Macherey's concept of the critic who commodifies the work,
propo~ing only "rules of consumption" and, therefore,. assigning supremacy
over the work to both himself and the general reader, is clearly pertinent to the
12 Ross C. Murfin, The Poetry of D. H. Lawrence: Texts and Contexts (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 228. . .
13 See M. J. Lockwood, A Study of the Poems of D. H. Lawrence: Thinking in Poetry
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 155-6: ''What the design of Pansies is intended to follow
[ ... J is the essential relativity of truth, in all its swan-like shiftings [....J it is committed to no
unity of idea and no message." However, "Lawrence [...J falls into the trap a number of times
of trying to codify a trust in 'real living' so as to give it a status compatible with other '-isms',
political or philosophic. These policy statements fall flat [....].. It is interesting to note that
Lawrence sent six of his poems to Charles Wilson (under the heading "New Years Greetings to
the Willington Men"), writing "Here are three scraps of a sort of poetry, which will perhaps do
as a 'message' [....J The whole scheme of things is unjust and rotten, and money is just a
disease upon humanity" (Letters, vol. VII, 28 December 1928, pp. 98-99).
14 See Philip Hobsbaum, A Reader's Guide to D. H. Lawrence (London: Thames and Hudson,
1981), p. 138: "there is a limit to the amount of protest and admonition one can take, even
when it is trenchantly expressed".
IS F. B. Pinion, A D. H. Lawrence Companion: Life, Thought, and Works (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1978), p. 115: "[Lawrence] may not have been guilty of nagging in Pansies, but he
did not avoid becoming a bore; he had a few leading ideas, and seems to have assumed that
saying the same thing repeatedly in slightly different ways made tactical sense."
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critical history of Pansies.
Such an evaluative manoeuvre is nowhere more striking in the critical
and publishing history of Pansies than in David Ellis' edition of the poems,
tellingly entitled Pansies: A Selection." This selection demonstrates not only
the difficulty of commodifying Pansies'? but the extent to which a critic can
take his mediatory role between literary works and their markets. Ellis'
extraordinary "Introduction" speaks volumes:
When Yorick Books published its edition of Tortoises
six years ago, it was in deference to what we assumed
to have been Lawrence's original intentions for those
six poems [....J one of our chief motives was the
traditional 'respect for the author's wishes' .
The word 'selection' on our title page demonstrates
that this cannot be the case here. The poems in this
book are taken directly from two volumes of poetry
published in 1929 and from the one edited by Orioli
and Aldington in 1932 (Last Poems), two years after
Lawrence's death. Of the more than five hundred
pieces in these three volumes, only fifty have been
retained. The number of Pansies printed here is small in
comparison with the number Lawrence wrote and one
of them - 'Red Herring' - appears without its last two
stanzas because we think that their omission makes it a
much more successful poem: So much for respect.
The primary purpose of this publication is
.nevertheless the same as that which inspired Tortoises.
Convinced that Lawrence is a much more considerable
poet than is generally allowed, we want to secure him a
. better hearing than is possible through the anthologies
currently available or the unwieldy Complete Poems.
Tortoises is a sequence of uniformly high quality....The
quality of those poems Lawrence wrote in his last years
and chose to call Pansies is not at all uniform.
Encountered en masse, they tend to suggest that he was
responsible for no poetry of merit after the triumph of
Birds, Beasts and Flowers apart from one or two pieces
[ • ..• JIt is to combat this common view more effectively
16 Pansies: A Selection, ed. David Ellis (Canterbury: Yorick, 1988).
17 It should be noted that following the two British editions (and Knopfs American edition) of
Pansies published by Lawrence in 1929, the text has been published only three times
(excluding its incorporation in Complete Poems), and only twice in full. Moreover, although
Heinemann's 1939 edition actually includes some unpublished Pansies, the other complete
edition is a privately printed edition of only 1000 copies.
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than do the Pansies which habitually arpear in the
anthologies that we publish this selection. I
Ellis goes on to affirm that "each of the items has been chosen on its literary
merit" and that it is an attempt to "disengage from an unwieldy mass the
essential animating presence'V" One presumes that he has effectively
disengaged this "essential animating presence" from those poems written on
censorship: '''Conundrums' seems to me the only poem Lawrence wrote about
censorship which is any good".2oSince the reader of Ellis' selection would not
get the opportunity to decide for herself, could a critic be more ironic? The
necessity of such heavy editing with Pansies - selecting the few pieces of
"literary merit" and even cutting lines out of those chosen - is perhaps not
surprising considering the criticism the poems have received and the still
dominant conception of aesthetic "norms": moreover, for the publisher, the
poems must sell. However, such an egregious handling of Lawrence's work for
. such blatantly commercial purposes is surely indicative of the powerlessness of
even the scholarly world of literary criticismto defend itself from a sch~me of
production which esteems exchange-value over use-value - especially when we
consider the eminent position of the scholar in question. How are we able to
take such a scholar's treatment seriously, grounded so firmly as it is in the
process of marketing Lawrence's work? Furthermore, how Ellis is able to
perceive his "primary" role as that of serving the task of rehabilitating
Lawrence as a poet is uncertain, since this explicitly involves a radical
demolition and extension (the selection includes posthumous poetry) of the
work Lawrence published (and.. one suspects, intended to publish) in his
18 David Ellis, "Introduction", Pansies: A Selection, p. vii.
19 Ellis, "Introduction", Pansies: A Selection, p. xi.
20 Ell' "I trod ' "P , A SI' ,IS, n uction", anstes: e ection, p, IX.
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lifetime. Evidently the critic's job unavoidably entails some mediatory role
between the text and its market, whatever the critic's motives might have been.
However, if this role becomes primary to a critical analysis and even goes' as
far as to literally vandalise the work in order to transform it into an acceptable
commodity, then the critic has effectively substituted exchange-value for use-
value: his task is merely to secure the continued production of the commodity,
not to make any analysis which may be valuable in itself.
Such a treatment of Lawrence's work will not be undertaken here. The
following analysis is dual in purpose: I intend to combine a thorough enquiry
into the nature of Lawrence's new form with an account of its personal and
socio-cultural historical origins. Unlike previous critics of Pansies, I envisage
these two approaches as being interdependent. Furthermore, in discussing the
poems I intend to illustrate how their form is inextricably linked to their
content and that any truly historical account would recognise that the new form
established by Lawrence in Pansies is a response to the need of the writer to
.', express new feelings. There will thereforebe no attempt to measure the work
against the irrational and illusory concept of an aesthetic model, as past critics
of the poems have done. However, conversely, this study will not speculate on
authorial intentions since these can never be fully known, not even by the
writer. Instead,' the preconceived ideas and retrospective thoughts Lawrence
had about his Pansies must be judged alongside the poems themselves. Neither
the reader nor the author must dictate to one another.
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A New Linguistic Space, A New Literary Space
Arguments concerning the formal coherence of Pansies as a whole
work have been attempted in the accounts of Dougherty and Antrim mentioned
above. Certainly there are thematic continuities and even relationships between
themes: poems about peace (such as "Peace and War"),21 exploring the
complex nature of peace, develop into poems about personal welfare (such as
"Poverty"),22 contrasting a welfare dependent upon riches and a welfare based
on an individual's sense of peace and "natural abundence'f" - and these, in
turn, form a link with the poems which tackle issues of money and class more
specifically. However, what such a reduced formal analysis does is to ignore
the individual poem's form and, in doing so, looks at the poems, as it were,
through the wrong end of a telescope. For although this kind of criticism is
helpful in order for us to see the overall coherence of Lawrence's work, it
inevitably eradicates the characteristics fundamental to the individual poem's
form :-such as the poem's overt discontinuity (in its customary refusal to obey
. .
formal poetic conventions), and its persistent refusal to be questioned.
Although there are of course exceptions to them, such tendencies are prevalent
ones. For criticism to ignore the dominant characteristics of a work is to
sacrifice aesthetic predilections for a true knowledge of the text. Dougherty's
attempt to justify the presence of these dominant features as simply a
foundation for understanding a minority of untypical poems in the work
depends entirely upon such personal tastes, and therefore evades the task of a
21 D. H. Lawrence, Complete Poems (1964), ed. Vivian de Sola Pinto and F. Warren Roberts
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), p. 495. .
22 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 498.
23 Lawrence. Complete Poems, p. 498.
34
thorough analysis: the dominant techniques of the work are written off from
the very beginning of the study as subsidiary, merely helpful.
Evidently the widespread inability to conduct a rigorous examination of
Pansies has been due to the deep-seated prejudice that it is simply not
Literature. In order to understand this prejudice and the poems themselves
better, it is perhaps helpful to take a look at a movement in literary criticism
which actually attempted to formulate rationally what exactly is meant by the
concept of a literary language.
The Russian Formalists theorised a very common notiorr" that literary
language is a "deviation from the norm", a "strange" language, created through
the manipulations of artistic devices, in contrast to a hypothetical "ordinary"
language." Though the Formalists saw this language as a relative one,
dependent upon the linguistic norms of the social and historical context of the
moment, their general notions of literary language are significant, both for
their emphasis on its estranging poetic qualities and for their description of the
. contrasting "ordinary" language which enabled it. to exist. Victor Erlich
summarises the Formalists' conceptualisation of literary language:
It is [the] inexorable pull of routine, of habit, that the
artist is called upon to counteract. By tearing the object
out of its habitual context, by bringing together
disparate notions, the poet gives a coup de grace to the
verbal cliche and to the stock responses attendant upon
it and forces us into heightened awareness of things
and their sensory texture. The act of creative
deformation restores sharpness to our perception,
giving 'density' to the world around US.26
24 See Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History - Doctrine (1955) (The Hague: Mouton, 4th
ed., 1980), p. 179: "As Wellek and Warren pointed out, the criterion of 'strangeness' was
anything but novel."
25 Erlich, p. 178.
26 Erlich, p. 177.
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Literariness, for the Formalists, is "strangeness'v" produced by the rupture of
the object from its conventional surroundings. Furthermore, the "creative
process" is a "tension between ordinary speech and the artistic devices which
shape or deform it".28 This "ordinary speech" is seen as "habitual" and
"routine".
A major movement of literary criticism in the 1920s, Russian
Formalism provides an index of the predominant conceptions of the literary in
this period. For although the Russian Formalists did not intend to define
literature itself, their ideas illustrate what they believed was typical of literature
(though not exclusive to it) - a refreshing estrangement from the impoverished
perspectives ineluctably produced by the dull and hackneyed qualities of
"ordinary" language.
It is interesting therefore that Lawrence's collection of poems is so
contradictory in nature to this significant contemporary critical conception of
what constituted poetry. The poem "Money-Madness" will serve as a good
example of both the typical style of Pansies and its contrast to the literary
qualities outlined and promoted by the Russian Formalists:
Money-Madness
Money is our madness, our vast collective madness.
And of course, if the multitude is mad
the individual carries his own grain of insanity
around with him.
I doubt if any man living hands out a pound note
without a pang;
and a real tremor, if he hands out a ten-pound note.
27 Erlich, p. 179.
28 Erlich, p. 190.
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We quail, money makes us quail.
It has got us down, we grovel before it in strange
terror.
And no wonder, for money has a fearful cruel
power among men.
But it is not money we are so terrified of,
it is the collective money-madness of mankind.
For mankind says with one voice: How much is he
worth?
Has he no money? Then let him eat dirt, and go
cold.-
And if I have no money, they will give me a little
. bread
so I do not die,
but they will make me eat dirt with it.
I shall have to eat dirt, I shall have to eat dirt
if I have no money.
It is that that I am frightened of.
And that fear can become a delirium.
It is fear of my money-mad fellow-men.
We must have some money
to save us from eating dirt.
And this is all wrong.
Bread should be free,
shelter should be free,
fire should be free
to all and anybody, all and anybody, allover the
world.
We must regain our sanity about money
before we start killing one another about it.
It's one thing or the other."
In contrast to the literary norms promulgated by the Russian Formalists -
which ar:e,paradoxically, patterns of estrangement from "ordinary" language -
this "poem" uses several kinds of "ordinary" language (it is clear and simple in
both its terms and meaning) in a thoroughly estranging way. The words are
29 Lawrence, Complete Poems, pp. 486-7.
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entirely unusual to the context of a poem. However, their layout upon the page
presents them as if they do form a poem and they do contain an occasional
poetic device. They cannot therefore be received by the reader in the way he
would a discourse addressed to him in the street. Moreover, the reader is being
asked to read according to the unspoken yet conventional codes and
procedures of reading a "poem" and, simultaneously, having this reading
protocol smashed by the text's aberrant mode of address and use of language.
The reader is being hailed in a very personal tone, particularly in the use of
both ocr' and "We", and yet is simultaneously being told, by the material
dimension of the text, that he is reading a "poem" in a published collection by
a "literary" author. The Formalist categories of the "ordinary" and the
"literary" are thus exploded, the critic's answer to the question "What is
literature?" radically destabilised. For the critic or general reader, the poem
immediately upsets all hopes and expectations of a complicated, unfamiliar,
and deformed language while also refusing to give anything cliched or insipid;
the reader is, so to speak, doubly alienated.
In "Money-Madness" there are barely any poetic devices. The poem
works through a good degree of imagery and repetition - which helps to
intensify the effect of the simplest of words and phrases - but does not depend
upon any of the typical poetic techniques of, for example, metre, rhyme, or
assonance .' Language is not "deformed" or made "strange" as the Russian
Formalists insisted it must be in order to be alienating. Perversely however, the
poem is alienating (to which the critical response over the years surely
testifies), not merely in its abandonment of the conventionally "strange"
techniques of poetry, but in its unorthodox use of "ordinary" language. The
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poem develops out of its initial direct, generalising assertion, "Money is our
madness, our vast collective madness", expressing ideas that are not normally
voiced by either the poet or the man in the street. Any reader familiar with
poetry in the slightest would certainly not expect such a direct form of
expression to be adopted by the speaker (phrases such as "of course", "I
doubt", "no wonder", "it is") without any form of irony; such matter-of-fact
language is disconcertingly "unpoetic". However, this ordinariness (an
ordinariness inherent in the poem's personal quality - the speaker does not
appear to conceal his feelings and the reader feels that he is being addressed
directly and even incorporated into a collective identity with the speaker as
"We") is counterpoised by clear yet unusual images such as "grain of insanity"
and "we grovel before it in strange terror".
The phrase "grain of insanity" plays cleverly, but almost imperceptibly,
on the meaning of "grain" (which can mean both a small particle and the fruit
or seed of a cereal), indicating the source of the individual's morsel of
.dementia - the fight for food, now abstracted into a fight for money. Similarly,
the idea of grovelling before money "in strange terror" is an arresting and
macabre one and forms a focal point for two vitally connected and significant
images; it implies a religious fear, humility, and pleading for benevolence or
forgiveness before an omnipotent god, and a prostrate posture of sexual
humiliation and obsequiousness. The figure itself, in connecting and
containing these two images, fuses together seemingly disparate socio-cultural
territories (also apparently separable from the central economic problem the
poem addresses) in its dramatic and graphic vision of the relationships inherent
in a society bound to a free market economy. Such an image is capable of
39
describing the multiple ways in which capitalism affects individuals and their
relationships; the power of money enters, exploits and corrupts the world of
social and cultural instincts - sexual and religious needs are perverted to the
ends of historically specific economic objectives.
Of course, the above paragraph offers the kind of literary analysis that
can only be applied to poetry as it is conventionally understood. This kind of
analysis requires poetic devices to reveal and poetic images to explicate. In a
poem such as "Money-Madness", however, the two images discussed above
are almost all the critic who adopts this strategy has to work with. This is a
further illustration that this form of analysis is not sufficient as a
comprehensive or just means of examining Lawrence's Pansies. The poems
are, perversely, too complex to be reduced to the evaluation an orthodox
literary criticism would provide. Moreover, to begin to understand this
complexity, the languages of Pansies have to be discerned and interpreted in
relation to one another and the world of discourse that exists external to (yet in
a "dialogic" relationship with) those languagesr'" I will therefore continue by
examining the interaction of languages between poems, returning to "Money-
Madness" later for a more detailed study of the internal dynamics of language
within the individual poem form.
30 See M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (1975), ed. Michael Holquist,
trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), in
which Bakhtin explores the "dialogic imperative" conditioning all utterance. "Dialogism" is a
term coined by Bakhtin which the editor defines as the following: "Dialogism is the
characteristic epistemological mode of a world dominated by heteroglossia. Everything means,
. is understood, as part of a greater whole - there is a constant interaction between meanings, all
of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do
so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic
imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current
inhabitants, insures that there can be no actual monologue. One may, like a primitive tribe that
knows only its own limits, be deluded into thinking there is one language, or one may, as
grammarians, certain political figures and normative framers of "literary languages" do, seek
in a sophisticated way to achieve a unitary language. In both cases the unitariness is relative to
the overpowering force of heteroglossia, and thus dialogism" (p. 426).
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For Mikhail Bakhtin, this kind of linguistic examination is specific to
the study of the novel. InBakhtin's view, poetry is outlawed from undergoing
such analysis. The novel is reserved for special treatment owing to the nature
of its language:
The author participates in the novel (he is omnipresent
in it) with almost no direct language of his own. The
language of the novel is a system of languages that
mutually and ideologically interanimate each other. It
is impossible to describe and analyse it as a single
unitary language."
Language in the novel is "represented ...as a living mix of varied and opposing
languages". Specifically, it attempts to both "overcome the superficial
'literariness' of moribund, outmoded styles and fashionable period-bound
languages" and "renew itself by drawing on the fundamental elements of folk
language".32 Finally, novelistic language is radically materialised (without
being reified):
[ ... J every novel is a dialogized system made up of the
images of "languages", styles and consciousnesses that
are concrete and inseparable from language. Language
in the novel not only represents, but itself serves as the
object of representation. Novelistic discourse is 'always
criticising itself.33 ,
In contrast to this use of language, poetic discourse lacks this
reflexivity and dynamism. However, Bakhtin's description of why this is so
has direct relevance to the distinguishing features of Pansies I have been
exploring:
Poetic style is by convention suspended from any
mutual interaction with alien discourse, any allusion to
alien discourse.
Any way whatever of alluding to alien languages, to
the possibility of another vocabulary, another
31 Bakhtin, p. 47.
32 Bakhtin, p. 49.
33 Bakhtin, p. 49.
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semantics, other syntactic forms [...] to the possibility
of other linguistic points of view, is equally foreign to
poetic style. It follows that any sense of the
boundedness, the historicity, the social determination
and specificity of one's own language is alien to poetic
style, and therefore a critical qualified relationship to
one's own language (as merely one of many languages
in a heteroglot world) is foreign to poetic style - as is
[...] the incomplete commitment of oneself, of one's
full meaning, to a given language."
If poetry were to open itself up to such relationships it could not do so without
"destroying" the "poetic style" of the work, "without transposing it into a
prosaic key and in the process turning the poet into a writer of prose". 35
Bakhtin's description of "poetic style" clearly does not apply to
Pansies." Furthermore, his suggestion that "poetic style" would be destroyed
if it escaped its self-preserving linguistic limitations and consequently become
prosified is vividly manifested in Lawrence's poems. Even the seemingly more
"poetic" Pansies, which critics have isolated and reduced to objects suitable
for an orthodox literary analysis, contain a complexity of language that could
be called, by Bakhtin's definitions, novelistic. The opening poem of the
collection, for example, adopts a poetic register yet does not offer any complex
and distorting imagery or skilful metrical strategy:
Our Day Is Over
Our day is over, night comes up
shadows steal out of the earth.
Shadows, shadows
wash over our knees and splash between our thighs,
our day is done;
we wade, we wade, we stagger, darkness rushes
between our stones,
34 Bakhtin, p. 285.
35 Bakhtin, p. 285 ..
36 Interestingly, Bakhtin does allow for a "certain latitude for heteroglossia" in poetry, but
"only in the 'low' poetic genres- in the satiric and comic genres", (p. 287). The Pansies'
sharp satire, their undermining of "literariness", and their refusal of convention in both form
and content, strongly associate them with these more novelistic of poetic genres.
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we shall drown.
Our day is over
night comes Up.37
The poem is allegorical, yet the language is reduced to a simplicity and
directness which is both prophetically assertive and crudely reticent in its
uncompromising reluctance to develop, to explain, or to enrich its declarations
with deeper meaning. The poem demands to be read as poetry yet
simultaneously defies the reader to understand it as such, through its
undermining lack of "poetic" suggestion. Through this method of controlled
limitation even the isolated poem becomes self-critical after the manner of a
"Bakhtinian" novel.
However, this "unpoetic", symbolist poetry is not the sole language of
Pansies, to which the style of "Money-Madness" testifies. There are "opposing
voices" which deny one another any autonomous authority. "Literariness", in
particular, speaks (as in "Our Day Is Over"), but is continually mocked,
emasculated, and denied the monopoly it conventionally possesses in poetry:
Pansies are poems in dialogue with poetic language itself. We can see the
beginnings of this "dialogic" process in "Elephants In The Circus" (only two
poems later):
Elephants InThe Circus
Elephants in the circus
have aeons of weariness round their eyes.
Yet they sit up
and show vast bellies to the children."
This very short poem, in its limited focus and meditation upon the nature of
elephants in a single scene, resembles the haiku - and thus partly associates
37 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 425.
38 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 425.
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itself with a literary form and style fashionable within the Imagist movement
of the previous decade. However, the poem is not a lyric and does not therefore
adopt the haiku convention of suggesting feelings through a natural
phenomenon, as Imagist poetry had done. Furthermore, it has the concision of
the haiku form without the explicitness: instead of providing a sense of neat
encapsulation, it leaves the reader feeling that something has been omitted.
Opposing itself to both the declarative poetic mood of "Our Day Is Over" and
the haiku lyric so admired by the Imagists, "Elephants In The Circus" attempts
to "overcome the superficial 'literariness' of moribund, outmoded styles and
fashionable period-bound languages". 39
This undermining opposition to "poetry" is not always such a serious
and subtle affair in Pansies, however. The next poem immediately counteracts
(while paradoxically supplementing) the opposing voice in "Elephants In The
Circus" through straightforward silliness:
Elephants Plodding
Plod! Plod!
And what ages of time
the worn arches of their spines supportl''"
While combining with the subversive voice of the previous poem in its
integration of a selective use of haiku elements with a conflicting set of
linguistic choices, "Elephants Plodding" also mocks and parodies the
seriousness of both "Our Day Is Over" and "Elephants In The Circus". The
onomatopoeic "Plod!" is an absurd fusion of poetic device with nalve
childishness, while the ridiculously "unpoetic" title undermines the style of the
poem's conclusion: the declarative utterance ("And what ages of time") and
39 Bakhtin, p. 49.
40 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 426.
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the reading codes of poetry (the structure of the language implies a deeper
meaning than is superficially present) are all vital to the technique of the
poem's final words, yet are dialogically ridiculed by their surrounding
"heteroglot" context."
Bakhtin describes two elements of "decisive importance" in the
formation of novelistic language in his account of the "prehistory of novelistic
discourse": laughter and polyglossia. He elaborates:
The most ancient forms for representing language were
organised by laughter-these were originally nothing
more than the ridiculing of another's language and
another's direct discourse. Polyglossia and the
interanimation of languages associated with it elevated
these forms to a new artistic and ideological level,
which made possible the genre of the novel. 2
This synthesis of laughter with the dynamism of polyglossia constitutes the
central foundation for novelistic discourse. In Pansies we can see this
discourse in action: no language is ever allowed to stand alone, without
illuminating or being illuminated by another's language, and no language is
preserved from the subverting force of laughter.
Languages continue to shed the light of ridicule upon one another in
"Destiny". "Literariness", "period-bound" language, and seriousness, as
before, are objects for attack in this poem - the affirmative phraseology of the
Romantic lyric being the specific target here. However, this parodied lyrical
language is not simply and completely reified since the language that serves to
undermine it is, in turn, animated by the declarative style of the lyric:
41 Bakhtin, p. 428: "all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces
practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve". Bakhtin insists that the
poet denies the heteroglot nature of the utterance, treating his own individual poetic language
as "a pure and direct expression of his own intention" (p. 285).
42 Bakhtin, pp. 50-51.
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Destiny
o destiny, destiny,
do you exist, and can a man touch your hand?
o destiny
if I could see your hand, and it were thumbs down,
I would be willing to give way, like the pterodactyl,
and accept obliteration.
I would not even ask to leave a fossil claw extant,
nor a thumb-mark like a clue,
I would be willing to vanish completely,
completely.
But if it is thumbs up, and mankind must go on
being mankind,
then I am willing to fight, I will roll my sleeves up
and start in.
Only, 0 destiny
I wish you'd show your hand."
The Romantic convention and lyrical style of addressing an abstract concept is
played down by the dissonant mixture of language and the resultant absurdity
of the images that disharmony creates: "destiny", personified, with its "thumbs
up". However, the colloquial language (which refers to the Roman games) that
provides this mockery is itself illuminated by the prevailing force of the
poem's plea, a combination of Romantic lyricism and simple, informal
entreaty: "Only, 0 destiny I I wish you'd show your hand." Through this
technique of linguistic "interanimation" the poem displays both the power and
the inadequacy of poeticism and colloquialism alike - and thus the effect is to
deconstruct the conventional polarities of the literary and the ordinary,
solemnity and comedy, which we have seen as vital to the "dialogic"
confrontation of poems such as "Our Day Is Over" and "Elephants Plodding".
"Destiny" is therefore a supplementing voice to an incomplete dialogue of
43 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 430.
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languages.
This process can be seen more succinctly if we examine what happens
to the more marginal elements of a poem when they become more dominant in
other Pansies. The brief serio-comic treatment of scientific language and fact
in "Destiny" (in the archaeological image of the "fossil claw extant") is
extended into a more comprehensively dialectical treatment in the interaction
of the two scientifically-orientated poems, "The Third Thing" and "Relativity".
These poems mix scientific language and ideology with a combination of naive
discourse and the language of Romanticism, which concomitantly undermines
and strengthens the scientific discourse with powerful results:
The Third Thing
Water is H20, hydrogen two parts, oxygen one,
but there is also a third thing, that makes it water
and nobody knows what that is.
The atom locks up two energies
but it is a third thing present which makes it an
atom."
Relativity
I like relativity and quantum theories
because I don't understand them
and they make me feel as if space shifted
about like a swan that can't settle,
refusing to sit still and be measured;
and as if the atom were an impulsive thing
always changing its mind.45
Unlike the employment of scientific language in "Destiny" (where it mainly
serves the aims of novelistic laughter and self-criticism), scientific discourse in
these poems is focused upon and thus used with a more developed
44 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 515.
45 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 524.
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ambivalence and dialectic, owing to its increased contact with heteroglossia.
On the one hand, there is the school teacher's statement of scientific fact
("Water is H20") and the ordinary, straightforward expression of a personal
regard for certain scientific theories ("I like relativity and quantum theories").
On the other hand, however, there is both the assertive language of naivety and
bluntness ("nobody knows what that is" and "because I don't understand
them") and the poetic, philosophical/psychological language of Romanticism
("the third thing", space as a "swan that can't settle", and the atom as "an
impulsive thing" ). This unorthodox fusion of poeticlRomantic and narve
discourse simultaneously enriches and undermines the language of science -
and, in doing so, conjoins conventionally disparate ideological worlds.
Consequently,these two poems constitute a subversive response not only to
the tendency in both poetic and scientific languages to isolate and purify
themselves in an attempt to become the dominant ideological discourse, but
also to the Romantic, organicist language of poems such as "New Houses,
New Clothes" and "Work" which sets itself polemically against the
technological advances of science. Such a clash of languages over the
contentious issue of scientific knowledge and its applications is productive - in
this case, the dialogue between poems such as "Relativity" and "Work" allows
important distinctions to be made between science as reductive materialism
and as an imaginatively liberating field of exploration, and technology as a tool
for human exploitation and as a force harnessed for the satisfaction of human
needs.
Perhaps the most radical aspect of Pansies, however, is their persistent
focus upon what are, for poetry, unorthodox subjects: the poems explore the
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highly "unpoetic" issues of class, money, and politics, and provide a
discomfiting interrogation of aesthetic practice itself. By allowing these issues
to enter into the world of poetry, Pansies also admits the various discourses
and ideologies that are inevitably bound to any discussion of them. Such an
invasion into the monologic realm of poetry dramatically increases the
potential for dialogue in poetry - in particular, dialogue with poetic language
itself since, owing to the simple fact of its common isolation from everyday
linguistic practices, it is conventionally either irrefutable (between the pages of
the book) or easily ignored (by those who choose not to read poetry). In
contrast, Pansies' novelisation of language creates a "sense of the
boundedness, the historicity, the social determination and specificity of one's
own language" - whether it be poetic or political - and hence opens the work
up to the debates and conflicts of everyday life.
A poem such as "Altercation" is at the centre of conflicts of language,
culture, class and politics, both within its textual confines and without: it is an
embodiment, in fact, of the arbitrariness of such linguistic divisions. The
simple fact that it is contained within a book of poems and yet is a prose
dialogue, immediately sets it apart as a text in formal conflict. However, the
conflict is deeper than an abstract, formal one:
Altercation
Now look here,
if you were really superior,
really superior,
you'd have money, and you know it!
Well what abaht it?
What about it?
what about it?
why, isn't it obvious?
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Here you are, with no money,
and here am I, paying income tax and god-knows-what
taxes
just to support you and find you money,
and you stand there and expect me to treat you like an
equal!-
Whereas, let me tell you, if you were my equal
you'd have money, you'd have it, enough to support
yourself, anyhow-
And there you stand with nothing, and expect me to
hand it you out
as if it were your dues, and I didn't count at all-
All right, guvnor! What abaht it?
Do you mean to say what about it?
My God, it takes some beating!
If you were a man, and up to my mark, you'd have
money-can't you see it?
You're my inferior, that's what you are, you're my
inferior.
And do you think it's my business to be handing out
money to a lot of inferior swine?
Eh? Answer me that!
Right ch'are, boss! An' what abaht it?46
The most striking aspect of the conflict here is the opposition of languages:
both speakers have a different idea of what constitutes "ordinary" language.
However, these contrasting notions of "ordinariness" are bound up with class
differences - the "ordinary" middle-class man's language against the
"ordinary" working-class man's language. These oppositions, which fuse the
formal with the ideological, dissolve the whole notion of "ordinariness" itself,
revealing the concept as a tool of artificial reconciliation. This is most
strikingly demonstrated in the working-class speaker's refusal to participate in
effective dialogue. The gap between discourses here is such that all attempts at
communication on behalf of the middle-class speaker break down: we are left
46 Lawrence, Complete Poems, pp. 546-7.
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with a fractured verbal exchange which marks the limits of dialogue.
. Nonetheless, from the portrayal of such a dispute we can see the kind of
differences required in order for these limits to be reached. This is no
superficial conflict of words but one deeply rooted in the integrated realms of
language and belief. For example, the bourgeois notion of "ordinary", decent
behaviour in this poem is connected with financial independence and what is
described in the poem "Trust" as "the narrow little / bargaining trust / that
says: I'm for you! if you'll be for me".47 It is, furthermore, bound up with the
conservative belief in the capitalist economy and disdain for the welfare
system. In contrast, the opposing speaker can only perceive his opponent in
terms of power relations: the words "boss" and "guvnor" eclipse the desired
objectivity of the middle-class individual. By placing these languages not only
in conflict with each other within the poem, but with the other languages of
Pansies and the conventional language of poetry the reader expects to find in a
volume of poems, the dialogue is extended: the middle-class and working-class
discourses represented here are associated or contrasted with other discourses.
Thus, the political consciousness of the middle-class man of "Altercation" is
connected, through poems such as "Don'ts" and "Nottingham's New
University", with a certain kind of cultural consciousness (one promoted
through society's institutions):
Don't be sucked in by the su-superior,
don't swallow the culture bait48
From this I learn, though I knew it before
that culture has her roots
in the deep dung of cash, and lore
is a last offshoot of Boots."
47 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 561.
48 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 459.
49 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 489.
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However, these associated forms of consciousness are ironically displayed
within the cultural medium of poetry, albeit an intentionally "unpoetic" form
of poetry. Through this method, Pansies not only connects multiple "linguistic
consciousnesses'V'" but also, with an alienating power, sets them off against
each other. More "poetic" poems such as "Our Day Is Over" and even
"Destiny" are, in the light of the language of "Altercation" and "Nottingham's
New University", made to look both feebly vague and narrowly restricted to a
literary idea of what constitutes appropriate subject-matter for poetry.
To suggest that the conflicts that structure Pansies constitute only, in
ideological terms, a war between middle-class and working-class values and,
in linguistic terms, a war between poetic and folk language, would be,
however, a gross simplification. The "dialogic" interaction and clash of two
poems creates an ideological space which is often partially filled by other
poems. The linguistic and ideological space between poems such as
"Altercation" and "Our Day Is Over" is, for example, invaded by a poem such
as "Democracy":
Democracy
I am a democrat in so far as I love the free sun in men
and an aristocrat in so far as I detest narrow-gutted,
possessive persons.
I love the sun in any man
. when I see it between his brows
clear, and fearless, even if tiny.
But when I see these grey successful men
so hideous and corpse-like, utterly sunless,
like gross successful slaves mechanically waddling;
then I am more than radical, I want to work a
guillotine.
soBakhtin, p. 359.
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And when I see working men
pale and mean and insect-like, scuttling along
and living like lice, on poor money
and never looking up,
then I wish, like Tiberius, the multitude had only one
head
so that I could lop it off.
I feel that when people have gone utterly sunless
they shouldn't exist."
Formally, "Democracy" resembles a conventional poem to a greater extent
than "Altercation" but to a lesser extent than "Our Day Is Over": it contains
many metaphors and similes and uses a poetic register, yet it has little poetic
rhythm or structure and it can be read as prose. In terms of the "social
determination and specificity" of the poem's language, its dominant linguistic-
consciousness contains both the poetic, apocalyptic language-consciousness of
"Our Day Is Over" and the "ordinary", straightforward language-
consciousness of the unemployed man of "Altercation". Operating in an
ideological gap between these poems, "Democracy" provides the apocalyptic
language-consciousness of "Our Day Is Over" with a genocidal element, and
yet simultaneously shows traces of that compassionate language-consciousness
("when I see working men" contrasts with "grey successful men") inherent in
"Altercation" with its mockery of the "superior" conservative and its final
defiant words "What abaht it?".
Dialogue in Pansies, therefore, creates conflict, and the space that
emerges from the discordant clash of two mutually contradicting discourses is
occupied by new voices, which regenerate the cycle of dialogue. Such a
process involves what Bakhtin describes as the specific task of the novelist: the
SI Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 526.
53
"process of coming to know one's own language as it is perceived in someone
else's language, coming to know one's own belief system in someone else's
system;,.52One language is regularly seen in the light of another in Pansies, as
dialogue occurs between the multiple languages of its many different poems: it
is through this method that Lawrence's poetry becomes novelised. However,
how can this novelised quality of the poems as a whole be reconciled with their
. frequently polemical aspect? Does this not substantially diminish any claims
we make for the poems as novelistic in their manipulation of discourse? In
order to answer these questions I must now undertake a more detailed analysis
of the internal "dialogism" of the individual poem form, taking as my example
the highly didactic "Money-Madness". It will be shown that the internal
dialogue of "Altercation" is in fact only a more explicit example of the
dynamic quality inherent to any individual poem in Pansies.
The Poem as Novel
The amalgamation of discordant languages, perspectives, semantics,
codes and registers in "Money-Madness" allows the text to move outside the
conventional categories of the "poetic" and the "ordinary" (as we saw in my
brief discussion of the poem earlier) and into a novelised, "heteroglot" world
of competing discourses. It incorporates disturbing and unique "poetic" images
within a so-called "ordinary" language, destroying both the orthodox
conception of a unitary poetic language and the Formalist assumption that
"ordinary" language is stale. Different types of language blur into one another
52 Bakhtin, p. 365.
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and, paradoxically, throw one another into relief.
At the beginning of the poem we have what could be the self-assured
voice of a philosopher, psychologist or socialist, telling the reader
dogmatically and repetitively that "Money is our madness, our vast collective
madness." Then, in the next line, this "high" tone of didactic righteousness is
diminished and overshadowed by the more informal register of the journalistic
essay (the language here is reminiscent of Lawrence's own journalism): "And
of course, if the multitude is mad...." However, by the end of the sentence we
are confronted once again with "high" language in one of the poem's few
poetic images, already discussed: the individual's "grain of insanity". This
interchangeability of languages and registers in the poem creates an internal
dialogue of voices continually checking, supplementing, and qualifying one
another, taking up different perspectives on the subject as they do so.
The more colloquial and self-conscious observation of the next voice to
enter the poem continues this process: "I doubt if any man living hands out a
pound note without a pang; I and a real tremor, if he hands out ~ ten-pound
note." The hint of self-mistrust in"these phrases marks out a new voice in the
poem, suggesting something felt from everyday experience (perhaps personal
or in observing others' behaviour), speculating in a conversational,
unauthoratitive tone on a collective psychology. If the language of the poem
was attempting to be unitary in the style of the first line, these words would
read differently, perhaps as: 'No man exists who does not hand out money with
pain and fear.' Even the specificity of the "pound note" represents an
everyday, very "unpoetic" manner of speech, inappropriate to this style. The
second line, emphasising the point with reference to a "ten pound-note", could
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not be included, being too trivial for such a grand and declarative style to
incorporate (the effect would be to undermine the poem's declarations).
Moreover, the fact that these phrases seem more like speech than written
language illustrates their obvious contrast with the poem's earlier "collective
madness" and "grain of insanity"; phrases which are more likely to be seen
than heard.
Following this very personal observation, the poem once again adopts
the self-identifying and all-encompassing mode of address peculiar to the
propagandist: "We quail" mirrors "our madness". However, this voice has now
merged with the poetic, journalistic, and "ordinary" languages previously
described to produce a "multi-Ianguaged'V' discourse in which we hear the
different resonances of a crowd of individuals, each of whom speaks a
different language:
We quail, money makes us quail.
It has got us down, we grovel before it in strange
terror.
And no wonder, for money has a/earful cruel power
. among men. [my italics]
The 'social critic's "We" is followed by the poet's repeated "quail", this
followed by the colloquial "got us down", which is substituted in tum for the
macabre poetry of "grovel" and "strange terror". Both "ordinary" and
journalistic voices combine in "no wonder", while poetic, propagandist and
journalistic languages are made compatible in "fearful cruel power". By the
end of the three lines we have also moved from "We" to "men", denoting a
move outwards from a voice vitally connected to and acting within a social set
of relationships to an objective, externalised voice, setting itself apart from
53 Bakhtin, p. 326.
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those relationships in order to see them from anew, perhaps less painful and
conscience-ridden, perspective.
Following this deviation into an objectifying register, a qualifying
voice is introduced, with a similarly objective tone, to insist: "But it is not
money we are so terrified of, / it is the collective money-madness of mankind."
It is as if the former speaker had begun to stray from the poem's initial aims -
to target not money itself but the "collective money-madness of mankind" -
and a new speaker is introduced to retrieve the poem's direction and power of
attack. Although the language here is mainly a mixture of the previously
adopted languages of journalism and philosophy, it differs from the poem's
earlier uses of such languages in that it destabilises the poem. The "But" at the
beginning of this section, playing down the significance of the preceding five
lines with no intended irony or underlying subtlety of meaning, is compatible
with the style of a journalistic essay but not the style of a poem. The result is a
sense that the poem is now completely open to debate. It is not merely a
selection of discourses manipulated and governed by a presiding authorial
intention, for the poem makes the reader aware that there is confusion and
multiplicity at the heart of this dialogue; just as in all living dialogues there is
no programme of events, no definitive outline of what is going to be said, or
whether or not it will reach its objectives (if it has any). The poem is more
appropriately seen as a site for debate and the confrontations and
disagreements that go with those debates - and the reader is not excluded from
this site. The destabilising effect produced by this part of the poem appears to
open up a space for the reader to fill with his contribution, while the
multiplicity of discourses which invade "Money-Madness", and their
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"dialogic" "interillumination"S4 of each other, in fact immediately deter any
attempt at reading the poem as a self-contained and autonomous entity.
The next two lines of the poem show the speaker producing an
imaginary representation of the thoughts of "mankind" which combines a
representing "linguistic consciousness", using a fairly "ordinary" language of
dissent, with the represented collective consciousness of a ruthlessly right-
wing people. This is achieved by using short and simple words to produce
pompous, discriminating and reifying class and status judgments: "How much
is he worth? / Has he no money?" Form and content here fuse together
disparate ideological "linguistic-consciousnesses" in a single "utterance". The
"double-voiced'v" nature of this language allows it to be "simultaneously
represented and representingv." There is, however, a third "linguistic
consciousness", contained in the words "let him eat dirt, and go cold". Here,
the conservative consciousness is infiltrated by an alien proverbial language
with its own intention of subverting the ideology of its surrounding linguistic
world. This "linguistic. consciousness" . charges the aggressive words of
mankind's wilful repudiation of responsibility for other's basic welfare with a
conflicting emotive, proverbial discourse, which further undermines the
represented judgment of mankind: alternative "ordinary" discourses are in
dialogue. The multi-voiced nature of discourse here means that languages
combine and "ideologically interanimate" one another. Such a discourse
incorporates the "ordinary", accusative voice of the afflicted individual, the
voice of the callous, judgmental conservative, and the proverbial voice of the
54 See Bakhtin, pp. 429-30, for a gloss on this concept.
ss Bakhtin, p. 354.
56 Bakhtin, p. 45.
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social critic. Through this method, the text enacts a dialogue across boundaries
of class and social position.
By analysing this blend of conservative, "ordinary", dissenting, and
proverbial languages in this part of the text, we can see that it is impossible
technically, word for word, to distinguish one from the other: the "utterance"
itself is a site of struggle for competing "language consciousnesses't." The
dissenting voice, for example, is part of the "ordinariness" of "For mankind
says with one voice [....]", part of the represented language of the capitalist,
"How much is he worth?", and part of the proverbial "let him eat dirt" image.
Languages are not "pure" in this poem; multiple "language-intentions'Y'
interweave with one another, actively displaying their fundamental
interdependence. According to Bakhtin, this quality of language only manifests
itself in the novel. He describes it as a means of distinguishing novelistic
discourse from poetic:
[... ] double-voicedness in the novel, as distinct from
double-voicedness in rhetorical or other forms, always
tends toward a double-languagedness as its own
outside limit. Therefore novelistic double-voicedness
cannot be unfolded into logical contradictions or into
purely dramatic contrasts. It is this quality that
determines the distinctiveness of novelistic dialogues,
which push to the limit the mutual nonunderstanding
represented by people who speak in different
languages.59
S7 Bakhtin, pp. 354-5: "Within the arena of almost every utterance an intense interaction and
struggle between one's own and another's word is being waged, a process in which they
oppose or dialogically interanimate each other. The utterance so conceived is a considerably
more complex and dynamic organism than it appears when construed simply as a thing that
articulates the intention of the person uttering it, which is to see the utterance as a direct,
single-voiced vehicle for expression." Such a "reified" conception of the "utterance" has in
fact been predominant in conventional literary criticism on Pansies. As we saw earlier, the
multiplicity of discourse in Pansies is reduced by critics to the single voice of Lawrence
himself, dogmatically propounding his own autonomous and integral creed.
ss Bakhtin, p. 359.
S9 Bakhtin, p. 356.
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This dialogue of "mutual nonunderstanding" is continually enacted in
Lawrence's poem. The lines following the image of a conservative discourse
are a striking example of this:
And if I have no money, they will give me a little bread
so I do not die,
but they will make me eat dirt with it.
I shall have to eat dirt, I shall have to eat dirt
if I have no money.
It is that that I am frightened of.
And that fear can become a delirium.
It is fear of my money-mad fellow men.
These lines introduce a whole new "language-intention" into the poem. It is a
voice containing fear and isolation as experiences, not merely as concepts. It is
the image of a language which perceives an impersonal "they" sadistically
desiring the bearer of that language to suffer the ignominy of eating "dirt". The
repetition in these lines, combined with the extremely personal register, makes
this language the language of nightmare. In relationship to the former self-
authorising language of harsh judgment and dismissal, this new language cru:t
neither understand nor be understood by its predecessor. This is mainly owing
to their opposite positions in relatio~ to the problem being addressed; one
perspective comes from inside experience, the other outside of it, treating it
purely as an idea ("How much is he worth?"). Significantly however, the voice
speaking from within experience still maintains an element of middle-classness
reminiscent of many earlier moments in "Money-Madness" (compare, for
example, the earlier "fearful cruel power" with "And that fear can become a
delirium."). This is peculiar since the subject of the poem, the style of the
poem, and the perspective of the speaker at this point in the poem are all
extremely antagonistic to conventional middle-class ideology. The
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disorientating mixture of a very personal form of register, a clear middle-class
overtone, and a language directing itself towards and opposing itself to an
orthodox middle-class belief-system, all contained within a very "unpoetic"
poem, allows many voices to meet and clash; and the reader's resulting sense
of alienation parallels the alienated voice of the poem here, where a
bewildering "ordinariness" of language ("It is that that I am frightened of')
meets both a middle-class experience of "delirium" and the powerful voice of
dissent ("my money-mad fellow men"). The confusion created by these
multiple "language-consciousnesses" appears to be both the product of middle-
class disillusionment and ideological disintegration and the source of the
reader's alienated experience of Lawrence's poem.
Estrangement is a continual process in Lawrence's poem - we have no
time to adapt to the language since the language is continually shifting in point
of view, register, and the code by which it needs to be read. Every moment in
the poem has a sense of immediacy and unexpectedness:
.We must have some money
to save us from eating dirt ..
. And this is all wrong.
. The three lines preceding these are three single sentences but they do not,
however, have the abruptness of these very short, simple lines which reduce
language to a bare minimum: it is the brief, straightforward language of
propaganda. Discourse is now entirely stripped of its circumlocutory
tendencies and we are left with two forceful statements which are given as if
they were indisputable facts. The first statement insists that "We" (once again,
the speaker subsumes himself and us under a collective identity) are in an
economic system which will compel us to eat "dirt" if we have no money, and
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the second statement morally denounces this system. The first of these
declarations brings a fresh tone into the poem since it represents itself as the
concluding words on the poem's subject. It is separated from the rest of the
text as the shortest section of the poem so far. This is demagoguery at the
climax of its assault. It is both a language that presents itself as irrefutable and
a language that appeals to the simplest of issues (the need for money to live) in
the crudest of terms. However, the second pronouncement goes one step
further - five short words standing alone, containing the first direct, absolutely
unequivocal moral judgment of the poem. The first sentence having described
how society is, the next judges how society is. The world of heteroglossia
seems now to be entirely shut off from the poem, all dialogue exiled.
According to Bakhtin's theory, this assumption would be definitively
made. Polemical language, for Bakhtin, excludes heteroglossia and dialogue.
Bakhtin ironically attacks polemic, a mode of discourse which he relates to the
rhetorical genres; genres which he describes as inferior to the novel:
Double-voiced discourse is very widespread in
rhetorical genres, but even there - remaining as it does
within a single language system - it is not fertilized by
a deep-rooted connection with the forces of historical
becoming that serve to stratify language, and therefore
rhetorical genres are at best merely a distanced
echo of this becoming, narrowed down to individual
polemic/"
Furthermore, Bakhtin contrasts the novelist's technique with this limited
employment of discourse:
[...] double-voicedness makes its presence felt by the
novelist in the living heteroglossia of language, and in
the multi-languagedness surrounding and nourishing
his own consciousness; it is not invented in superficial
isolated polemics with another person.61
60 Bakhtin, p. 325.
61 Bakhtin, pp. 326-7.
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However, when these theoretical statements are applied to the case of
Lawrence's Pansies an obvious contradiction arises, for Bakhtin's conception
of polemic and heteroglossia as mutually exclusive entities. Pansies are
agitatory in the extreme and yet they are "multi-languaged", How can this
radical inconsistency be explained?
One of the reasons for the coexistence of these seemingly incongruous
qualities in Lawrence's poems is that any didactic language adopted is
continually undermined by alternative infiltrating languages, and that other
didactic, yet ideologically distinct and often opposing, languages work against
it in other poems in the collection. Lawrence himself, in fact, wrote of the
poems that they contained "merely the breath of the moment, and one eternal
moment easily contradicting the next eternal moment".62 I have already
examined the dynamics of the relationship between these clashing, discordant
voices in my discussion of the poems as a whole and their "dialogic"
interaction.
However, it is Bakhtin's preconceptions of what polemic is which are
. the main cause of the contradictions that arise from an application of his theory
to Pansies. Polemic is seen as "isolated" from heteroglossia and "narrow" in
its capacity to describe the world. However, not only is a didactic voice always
one of many voices vying for attention within Lawrence's work, but Pansies
are vying for attention within the real world of myriad, conflicting languages
and, consequently, myriad, conflicting Weltanschauungen; and the reason for
this is that the actual concerns of polemical language in Pansies are at the
62 Lawrence, "Foreword" to Pansies, Complete Poems, p. 424.
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centre of real social conflicts (as is the case with all polemic). Bakhtin
describes the "object" of prose discourse in terms that would be highly
appropriate if applied to Lawrence's poems:
For the novelist working in prose, the object is always
entangled in someone else's discourse about it, it is
already present with qualifications, an object of
dispute that is conceptualized and evaluated variously,
inseparable from the heteroglot social apperception of
it. The novelist speaks of this "already qualified world"
in a language that is heteroglot and internally
dialogized. Thus both object and language are revealed
to the novelist in their historical dimension, in the
process of social and heteroglot becoming.f
"Money-Madness" is saturated with this world of heteroglossia at the height of
its propagandist force:
Bread should be free,
shelter should be free,
fire should be free
to all and anybody, all and anybody, allover the world.
We must regain our sanity about money
before we start killing one another about it.
It's one thing or the other.
The fact that "bread", "shelter", and "fire" are not "free" gives the words their
meaning. The fact that Lawrence's society is one in which these essentials are
not "free" makes this subject a point of contention. The highly polemical
language of the poem exists only in relation to the reality that opposes it and,
therefore, to the fact that other people oppose it with different languages and
perspectives of their own. Heteroglossia is therefore absolutely essential to the
existence and meaning of the poem's words at this point, which direct
themselves to an "object of dispute that is conceptualized and evaluated
variously". Consequently, the text is in dialogue with a surrounding "already
63 Bakhtin, p. 330.
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qualified world"; its intrinsically oppositional nature ("Bread should be free")
assumes a conflicting consensus and reality.
Unlike the self-contained, unitary discourse of the epic which is, for
Bakhtin, extra-historical and removed from the world of heteroglossia, polemic
is "internally dialogized". By its nature, polemic knows itself as one voice and
one perspective among many. Polemic assumes opposition in order for it to
speak in the first place: the word "should" contains the "linguistic
consciousness" that there is a contesting voice saying "should not". The
agitatory nature of polemic, clear in Pansies, does not mean that the voice
successfully excludes opposition. It is, in the first place, a response to an
already produced and "qualified" world - the beginnings of dialogue.
Furthermore, as critics of Pansies have illustrated in their passionate and
unanalytical responses, agitation provokes debate, not simple agreement.
When reading Pansies our reactions are very likely to vary widely from rage or
irritation to enlightenment or rebellion, but are more likely to be extreme than
indifferent. Such a range of response creates fertile foundations for dialogue.
The didactic voices of Pansies are an aid to dialogue not a hindrance - they
provoke a response. Lawrence himself knew this when he said that the poems
"shall rouse hostility".64Pansies are poems that bring into the poetic genre the
"multi-languagedness" of the world which Bakhtin reserves for the novel. In
doing so they bring voices into poetry that were previously excluded, voices
which embody values that could not previously be contained within the genre.
In Lawrence's poems, these values are frequently anti-middle class, populist
and socialist. This is not, however, to give primacy to one ideological
64 Letters, vol. VII, 31 December 1928, p. 111.
65
discourse alone in the world of language, above that of the others that Pansies
introduces. It is to redress the balance of languages and beliefs. It is to provide
a voice for the hitherto voiceless which is able to speak against the established
world of literary discourse from within a form that, in Bakhtin' s view, could
only contain a "single unitary language,,;65a form which refused contradiction.
The anti-literary form, discourse and ideology of Pansies transform poetry into
another genre that is not a genre. Poetry is thus novelised and rendered open
for dialogue to invade its replenished linguistic world. Like the novel,
Lawrence's Pansies make:
[...] available points of view that are generative in a
material sense, since they exist outside literary
conventionality and thus have the capacity to broaden
the horizon of language available to literature, helping
to win for literature new worlds of verbal perception, .
worlds that had been already sought and partially
subdued in other - extraliterary - spheres of linguistic
life.66
The dominant languages of Pansies - unpoetic, propagandist and demotic -
utter what was then (and still is) "subdued" in .both poetry and "extraliterary"
linguistic worlds. Even the conventional criticism levelled at Pansies - that of
being too "polemical" - provides an example of such linguistic censorship, in
its blatant attempt to exclude polemic from literature as if it were a form of
language that did not exist. This kind of criticism tries to deny didactic
language (and the range of Weltanschaungen that it inevitably embodies) a
place in literature to be represented and to represent - and to dialogically
interact with other languages: this denial, ironically, possesses the kind of
Draconian quality often ascribed to polemic.
65 Bakhtin, p. 47.
66 Bakhtin, p. 323.
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Contrary to Bakhtin's theoretical distinctions, then, the exclusion of
polemical discourse from literature would constitute a reduction in that world's
heteroglossia. As the single poem "Money-Madness" demonstrates, polemic -
like novelistic discourse - "deals with discourse that is still warm from [social]
struggle and hostility, as yet unresolved and still fraught with hostile intentions
and accents"." It is more peculiar therefore that it should be found in poetry,
contrary once again to Bakhtin's theory.
Conclusion: A Deviation of a Deviation
I have tried to suggest a new way of reading Lawrence's Pansies. This
has involved a method of selectivity since criticism, by its nature, cannot be
all-embracing. Thus, my analysis is not intended to attack selection ipsofacto,
but a certain kind of selection which re-writes and evaluates the work
according to arbitrary criteria and refuses to adequately address dominant
elements. My intention here has been to redress the balance which has, by
necessity, involved a bias in my attention towards the substantial political,
demotic and propagandist aspects of Pansies, since they have been so
obviously neglected.
This examination has also entailed a rejection of two major,
conventional assumptions about poetry: namely, that it is neither novelistic nor
polemical. Correspondingly, I have attempted to show that any theoretical
reduction of Pansies into such categories as the "honorable tradition" of
literature ignores the complex variety of discourses which are fused together in
67 Bakhtin, p. 331.
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the work. Criticism's tendency to impose limits upon form - whether it be for
the ends of appraisal or attack - is fundamentally flawed: the "poetic" is
continually blending into the "ordinary" and the "ordinary" blending into the
"poetic", language is naturally shifting, and to assume a set of linguistic limits
to a discourse is to posit an abstraction. Moreover, to describe Lawrence's
Pansies purely either as poems or as pieces of propaganda is a substantial
reduction of form. "Money-Madness" is a good example of this, with its
slipperiness of language and rhythm. Through such means the poem as a whole
denies any attempt at subsumption under a linguistic or literary category.
It seems reasonable to argue that Pansies is generally ignored because
of this transgression of boundaries, which alienates critics and readers alike:
the merger of poetic discourse with a substantial quantity of conventionally
"extraliterary" discourses seems to have led critics either to reject them on the
grounds of their lack of poetic qualities or to discuss merely those "using
various poetic techniques't.'" while staying embarrassingly silent on the
remainder. In this final section, I aim to show how, from an historical
.perspective, such a subversive work might have arisen. As we have seen
through a comparison with the Russian Formalist notion of "literariness",
Pansies' deviation from the conventional deviatory tactics of poetry can
account for much of its estranging effect. However, as I hope to illustrate, it is
not only in the formal qualities of Pansies that the poems are deviatory and
alienating, but in the very choices (inseparable from those formal qualities)
that Lawrence made in terms of subject matter and treatment of that subject
68 Dougherty, p. 166. Those few "illustrative" poems which Dougherty says critics most
concentrate upon are described in the following terms: "those which illustrate a point, using
various poetic techniques [...] rather than expounding a point". Dougherty does not endow the
largely ignored "non-illustrative" poems with any poetic attributes in his classification of the
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matter. In short, Pansies speak of the very things poetry must not speak of in
order for it to be read or even exist at all: Pansies are poems which refuse to
deviate where they should.
The most startling aspect of these poems - for even the reader well-
acquainted with the rest of Lawrence's artistic output - is their clear and
persistent focus upon political issues, ranging from a preoccupation with
broader ideological questions, through problems of class and education, to
issues of work, money and property. Although some of Lawrence's readers
would be aware of his profound interest in politics through his essays and
novels (in particular the Aaron's Rod (1922), Kangaroo (1923), The Plumed
Serpent (1926) line), never before had Lawrence allowed himself to be
committed, in his so-called artistic work, to such a frank and sustained
engagement with these problems. The novels allow him to slip in and out of
political issues through their exploration of individual lives in a whole
complex of social relationships.
Certainly Lady Chatterley's Lover (1928) had paved the way for
Lawrence openly to use art as a means of simply and confrontationally
conveying his thoughts ("Pensees") on society. As John Worthen has pointed
out, Lawrence's discovery of the world of private publishing allowed him to
re-write the novel in a whole new manner:
Knowing that he had a plan which would 'fling it in the
face of the world' (vi, p. 293), his revision could also
address itself directly to the stultifying social world
which would directly oppose any such publication or
venture. The book would also address itself to modern
men and women as a pamphlet might address them: it
would take its chance of saying exactly what Lawrence
wanted to say about modern sexuality. The book would
poem types of Pansies.
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in fact become a devastating attack upon Lawrence's
contemporaries: 'a kind of bomb: but a beneficent one,
and very necessary' (vi. p. 316). It was revised in the
white heat of that new conception; Lawrence, a rather
ill man, wrote every word of. a new 724-page
manuscript of it in less than six weeks."
There are two extremely relevant points in this small passage. Firstly, Worthen
explicitly connects the new method of private publication with the new,
blatantly direct method of Lawrence's writing - he has gained a greater
freedom of expression since there is no need to worry about the fears of a
publisher. Of course, Lawrence published Pansies both with his publisher,
Martin Seeker, and privately, but he was now much more confident that he
could sell his poems regardless of their content (or form), both because he
knew he could now publish privately and because he was aware of the new
market for his work (created by the scandal of Lady Chatterley's Lover).
Astonishingly, for a writer normally so desperately dependent upon his
publisher's approval, he even told Seeker (his English publisher since 1918),
"don't touch them if you don't like them." 70
Secondly, there is Worthen's important description of Lawrence's
novel as addressing itself to "modern men and women as a pamphlet might
address them". We can clearly see in the form, tone and content of Pansies that
Lawrence not only adopted this new "pamphlet" -type approach to the novel
but to his subsequent collection of new poems also. Furthermore, there are
frequent references in his letters which suggest that he knew many people
69 John Worthen, "D. H. Lawrence and the 'Expensive Edition Business", Modernist Writers
and the Marketplace, ed. Ian Willison, Warwick Gould and Warren Chemaik (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1996), p. 118. This passage's reference to Lawrence's poor health at the time of
writing his 724-page novel is relevant to the critical heritage of Pansies: many critics have
made excuses for the poems by referring to Lawrence's illness, even suggesting that it
accounts for their brevity as well as their quality.
70 Letters, vol. VII, 7 January 1929, p. 123.
70
would resent this kind of deliberately provocative method: to Mabel Dodge
Luhan he wrote, "I've done such an amusing book of rag poems [...] make
them all cross again";" to Nancy Pearn, "a number of them I guess you'll
hate";72 to Seeker, "You may just dislike them as you disliked Lady C'; 73 to
Pollinger, "They may just displease you, so be prepared"; 74 and to Charles
Lahr, "[the Pansies] shall rouse hostility". Indeed, having already written what
he himself called an "anti-middle-class" novel and received such an
unwelcoming reception from its predominantly middle-class readership,
Lawrence knew perfectly well what he was doing when he wrote his "very
anti-middle-class" poems.75 It is not therefore unfair to suggest that the
thoroughly unsympathetic response to Lady Chatterley's Lover only
encouraged Lawrence to raise the level of his attack to the degree of the
didactic, bitingly satirical and often virulent Pansies.
Moreover, Lawrence even wrote to P. R. Stephensen in the midst of the
poems' construction: "We must make a hole in the bourgeois world which is
the whole world of consciousness today. If your mandrake is going to grow, let
71 Letters, vol. VII, 25 December 1928, p. 95. It is interesting to note the use of the word "rag"
by Lawrence here, since it says a great deal about his vision of the poems. Here are some
definitions of the word "rag" particularly relevant to the style of Pansies: "A small worthless
fragment or shred of some woven material; esp. one of the irregular scraps into which a piece
of such material is reduced by wear and tear"; "Used (esp. in negative phrases) to suggest the
smallest scrap of cloth or clothing"; "A fragment, scrap, bit, remnant; a torn or irregularly
shaped piece"; "of immaterial things"; "Applied contemptuously to things"; "An act of
ragging; esp. an extensive display of noisy disorderly conduct, carried on in defiance of
authority or discipline"; "A musical composition written in ragtime, a ragtime tune"; ''To
scold, rate, talk severely to. Also to examine or question"; "To annoy, tease, torment; spec. in
University slang, to annoy or assail in a rough or noisy fashion; to create wild disorder"; and
"To wrangle over a subject", The Oxford English Dictionary: Volume XIII, prep. J. A.
Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 113-5. The
definition of "rag" as a ''ragtime'' composition is interesting with specific regard to one of the
definitions of "ragtime" itself: "Ragged; irregular, inferior, disorderly; disreputable, mean",
f,. 122.
2 Letters, vol. VII, 15 December 1928, p. 65.
73 Letters, vol. VII, 7 January 1929, p. 122.
74 Letters, vol. VII, 7 January 1929, p. 122.
7S Letters, vol. VII, 31 December 1928, p. 111.
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him shove up under the walls of this prison-system, and bust them.,,76Perhaps
even more curious is the echo in these words of Lawrence's remarks on poetry
in an essay written earlier that year:
This is the momentous crisis for mankind, when we
have to get back to chaos. So long as the umbrella
serves, and poets make slits in it, and the mass of
people can be gradually educated up to the vision in the
slit: which means they patch it over with a patch that
looks just like the vision in the slit: so long as
this process can continue, and mankind be educated up,
and thus built in, so long will a civilisation continue
more or less happily, completing its own painted
prison. It is called completing the consciousness [....]
[Poets] show the desire of chaos, and the fear of chaos.
The desire for chaos is the breath of their poetry. The
fear of chaos is in their parade of forms and
technique.,,77
The freedom granted to Lawrence by his first venture into the private book
trade, combined with the consequent discovery of a new conception of his art
and its objectives - like those of a "bomb", to make "chaos" or, at the very
least, a "hole" in the "prison" of middle-class "consciousness" - helped to
create the form, or rather "chaos", and subject-matter of Pansies; there was,
after all, a method behind the madness.
However, there is still a significant change in the direction of the attack
in Pansies from that of Lady Chatterley's Lover which has yet to be addressed:
Pansies' peculiarly relentless attack on the political and economic situation.
For Lady Chatterley's Lover focuses predominantly on issues of sex and
morality and, while it does carry out a high degree of political or (as Lawrence
76 Letters, vol. VII, 20 December 1928, p. 79.
77 This passage is from "Chaos in Poetry", written 17-29 April 1928 as the introduction to
Harry Crosby's Chariot of the Sun. See "Chariot of the Sun, by Harry Crosby", Phoenix: The
Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence, ed. Edward D. McDonald (London: Heinemann,
1936), pp. 255-62, 256-7.
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described it) "class analysis",18such analysis does not dominate the work as it
does in Pansies. Conversely, the poems can and do close in on specific
political issues with an uncomfortable persistence. What are the origins of this
new focus? Inorder to answer this question, we must examine some significant
changes in Lawrence's life in the four-year period leading up to the publication
of Pansies.
In March I925, Lawrence was officially diagnosed as having
tuberculosis. That same year, after a period of relative prosperity, he had split
with his American publisher, Seltzer, who was slowly subsiding into financial
collapse. As a consequence, Lawrence's market was radically reduced at a
time when he most needed financial security.79It was not only, as Lawrence
himself pointed out to Curtis Brown in November 1927, "not cheap, being ill
and doing cures"so, but there was Frieda's future to consider now that
Lawrence knew that his time was short. Hence the financial pressure of these
last years was one major reason why Lawrence was particularly attracted to the
idea of publishing Lady Chatterley's Lover privately. Helen Stone outlines
some major advantages of such a venture:
the British Government's introduction of a new 20%
royalty tax to be levied on the earnings of expatriate
British subjects was a major blow to an author with
earnings like Lawrence. Coupled with the usual 10%
18 Letters, vol. VIT, 31 December 1928, p. 111.
79 See John Worthen, "D. H. Lawrence and the 'Expensive Edition Business' tt, p. 109:
"Lawrence's income from 1925 to 1930 was savagely reduced, as his whole American
publishing career ran into the sand [.... ] For the first time in four years he was having to rely
primarily upon his English sales, which had never been very good; and, for the first time in his
life, he knew that his health was seriously in danger [.• • .J The doctor in Mexico City who had
told him [that he had TB] in March 1925 had in fact given him at most two years to live; and
although he lived for nearly five, his health - never good at the best of times - was
henceforward to be a constant problem. Not only would he simply not be able to work so hard
(and therefore earn so much) as a writer; he was increasingly going to have to pay doctors'
(and/or sanatorium) bills; and would also live the relatively expensive life of the European
who requires sun and warmth during the winter - along the shores of the Mediterranean."
80 The Letters of D. H. Lawrence, vol. VI, ed. James T. Boulton and Margaret H. Boulton, with
Gerald M. Lacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 18 November 1927, p. 222.
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deduction claimed by his literary agents, Lawrence felt
pessimistic at the possibility of making much money
from his work, particularly now his failing health had
made him noticeably less prolific."
Indeed, privately producing the novel gave Lawrence his best chance of
providing for both his and Frieda's thoroughly precarious future. As Worthen
elaborates:
The usual financing of a book would be turned upside
down: Curtis Brown would not be involved; Orioli, as
helper, would get 10% of the profits of the Florentine
publication ...Lawrence, as author, organiser and
paymaster, would get 90%. And as the book was
published outside England, there would be no 20% tax
for the British government either.82
Furthermore, Lawrence's financial position had especially deteriorated during
the course of 1927 and, as we can see from his letters towards the end of that
year, had evidently begun to worry and irritate him. He wrote to Richard
Aldington, "I damn well ought to have enough to live on - so 1 have, by living
like a road-sweeper.?"
This sense of bitterness and anxiety over his position as a professional
writer was further heightened at this time by a chance meeting with his former
acquaintance, Michael Arlen, a highly successful novelist as a result of his
best-selling The Green Hat of 1924. This encounter, which involved a
discussion of their highly contrasting fortunes, must have deeply affected
Lawrence, for following the meeting Lawrence commented: "Definitely 1 hate
the whole money-making world, Tom & Dick as well as en gros. But 1 won't
be done by them either.?" This expression of frustrated anger at the
81 Helen E. Stone, "The Lost Ladies: The Marketing and Sale of the Florentine Editions of
Lady Chatterley's Lover" (MA Dissertation, University of Nottingham, 1995), p. vii.
82 John Worthen, D. H. Lawrence: A Literary Life (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 144.
83 Letters, vol. VI, 18 November 1927, p. 220.
84 Worthen, D. H. Lawrence: A Literary Life, p. vi. Worthen gives his source as
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contradictory situation of a radically anti-bourgeois writer within a capitalist
scheme of production is pertinent to the focus of many of the Pansies
("Money-Madness" being an obvious example), which intensify the criticism
of capitalism which had become so prevalent in Lady Chatterley's Lover
(particularly in the treatment of the character Michaelis, who was based on
Arlen).
Lawrence's almost simultaneous encounter with Norman Douglas
helped to confirm his feeling of angry acceptance: an acceptance of the only
means by which he could realistically tackle an increasing inability to earn his
livelihood. Helen Stone has described the significant influence of Douglas's
methods of publication upon Lawrence's own:
For Douglas, too, shortage of money had prompted him
to publish his work privately; the turning point in both
his life and career was perhaps the establishment of his
friendship with Pino Orioli in 1922. Douglas milked
the tourist trade for all it was worth with his expensive,
collectable deluxe editions. By 1927, he was marketing
. In The Beginning, one of his particularly lucrative
novels. It is probable that Lawrence gained the idea of
700 copies at 2 guineas each from this novel [....] [in
the event, Lawrence published 1000 copies at £2 each]
In Late Harvest, Douglas gives advice that Lawrence
was to follow to the letter:
....print your book in a small signed edition
handsomely and expensively...then, when the
edition is exhausted or begins to show signs of
falling off, sell it outright to your publisher for
whatever you can get.85
Four days after his meeting with Douglas, Lawrence asked Orioli, a Florentine
bookseller and publisher, for his help.
From this point onward, the kind of contradictions I have described
only intensify. A glance at Lawrence's letters in the months from November
"Memorandum by Lawrence. 19 November 1927".
a~S ...tone. p. vin.
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1928 to January 1929 (the period in which the majority of Pansies was written)
will serve well as an overview of the astonishing range of conflicting contexts
in which money came into Lawrence's life and thoughts as a professional
writer, after the publication of the two Florentine editions of Lady Chatterley's
Lover: to Herbert Seligmann, Lawrence wrote "I'm afraid I'm not the stuff
prosperity is made out of. I expect little myself [...] and get along well enough
on what comes my way,,;86to the Brewsters, "we ought to be thankful [....] So
many people have so much less,,;87 to Maria Huxley, "Do hope the book
[Aldous Huxley's Point Counter Point] makes real money!,,;88 to Dorothy
Brett, "I've done little articles for newspapers [...] make a little money to go on
with. Anyhow, I've got all I need - and am not bothering,,;89to Seltzer, ''you
can knock something off that old debt to me [Lawrence estimated this to be
$4,000 in accumulated royalties],,;90to Brett, "I'm sick of being swindled'Y'
to the Huxleys, "If only I had 2,000 I could kill the pirates [of Lady
Chatterley's Lover),,;92 to Orioli, "the profits are just about £1,000 [for Lady
Chatterley's Lover],,;93 to Orioli again, "I think they will do my pictures in a
book at ten guineas!,,;94to Baroness Anna von Richthofen, "It seems mad to
me - but it's his money, and he'll also pay me well [...] But how crazy people
are [...] de luxe books costing 4OM.or 100M. or even 500 Marks. I hate it,,;95
to Sylvia Beach (on Lady Chatterley's Lover), "I'm sure it would be a paying
86 Letters, vol. VI, 8 November 1928, p. 607.
87 Letters, vol. VI, 8 November 1928, p. 609.
88 Letters, vol. VI, 8 November 1928, p. 610.
89 Letters, vol. vn. 23 November 1928, p. 26.
90 Letters, vol. vn, 3 December 1928, p. 38.
91 Letters, vol. vn, 10 December 1928, p. 55.
92 Letters, vol. vn, 10 December 1928, p. 57.
93 Letters, vol. vn, 14 December 1928, p. 61.
94 Letters, vol. VII, 19 December 1928, p. 71.
9:5 Letters, vol. vn, 19 December 1928, p. 74.
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thing: and Iwant the book sold, Iwant the public to get it, and not too dear
either',;96 to Charles Wilson (under the heading of "New Years Greetings to the
Willington Men"), "You've got to smash money and this beastly possessive
spirit,,;97 to Charles Lahr, "I'm glad you are Clifford Mellors: hope you've got
the spunk of the one and the money of the other: how nice!";" to Seeker (on
Pansies), "If you did publish them, Ishould like just a limited edition of 500 or
so, signed at a guinea or thereabouts, then a cheap edition, say 216, because I
should like them to be easily accessible to poorer people,,;99 to Lahr, "don't
make money - it's the ruin of a man,,;IOOto Emily King, "They will print only
500 copies at 10 guineas a copy [....] I shan't make a great deal out of it
myself'; 101 and to Pollinger, "I escape paying the govt. tax on the money for
the pictures - which is in no way a royalty".102
The problematic and contradictory situation of a writer who hates
money but needs it is shown here with painful clarity. Two major sources of
this intensified internal conflict can clearly be identified: firstly, the financial
and organisational problems involved in the process of privately publishing,
marketing and selling Lady Chatterley's Lover, and secondly, the emergence
of numerous opportunities for Lawrence to publish his books in the form of an
expensive, limited edition. These new factors, specific to Lawrence's life in
1928, combine with his typical (though fluctuating) desire to reach the public
and affeet people's ideas, and what 1have already shown to be an increasing
96 Letters. vol. vn, 19 December 1928. p. 75.
'TT Letters. vol. vu, 28 December 1928. p. 99.
911 Letters. vol. vu, 31 December 1928, p. 110.
99 Letters, vol. VII. 7 January 1929, p. 123.
100 Letters, vol. VII. 7 January 1929, p. 121.
101 Letters, vol. vu, 11 January 1929. p. 128.
102 Letters, vol. vu, 12 January 1929, pp. 130-1.
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anxiety over his and Frieda's future economic situation, to create the
irreconcilable contradictions which produced Pansies - the most violent attack
Lawrence was ever to make on capitalist society.
Perhaps the most significant factor figuring in these contradictions,
however, is that of Lawrence's involvement in the expensive edition business.
Despite having a very negative initial experience of this form of publishing
with Beaumont's publication of Bay in 1919,]03 Lawrence kept returning to it
in the last years of his life. His motive for doing so in 1925, with Reflections
on the Death of a Porcupine, is vital to an understanding of this intensely
contradictory and significant aspect of Lawrence's writing life: he told David
Jester of the Centaur Press (the publisher of Reflections), "I am glad to be
doing this book, really, not through a 'public channel'. 1 feel you are half
private: which suits me bener".'?' This is a surprising explanation for a writer
who was always so intent on reaching his "public" (a desire to which the letters
quoted above surely testify). We can see the contradiction in process, however,
in David Ellis' description of Lawrence's response to his chosen method of
publication for his book of paintings:
[...] financed by Edward Goldston, a rich antiquarian
bookseller [....] the book of paintings [...] sold in its
ordinary edition at 10 guineas and made a profit of
£2,000. Lawrence would be embarrassed to be
. associated with a book which was so dear [as the letters
quoted above illustrate] and several times in this period
stressed how anxious he was for his work to be seen by
poor people - at one point he even began exploring
schemes for publishing his pansies in cheap broadsheet
form. lOS
103 See Worthen. "D. H. Lawrence and the 'Expensive Edition Business' ", pp. 110-12.
104 The Letters of D. H. LAwrence, vol. V, ed. James T. Boulton and Lindeth Vasey
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 12 August 1925, p. 284.
lOS David Ellis, D. Hi Lawrence: Dying Game 1922-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1998). p. 458.
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An account of Lawrence's exploration of this "cheap broadsheet form" of
publication is given by Ellis.106 The final reversal of his decision to use such a
form of publication after a long period of deliberation confirms how profound
an ambivalence Lawrence felt at this point in his writing life over his
relationship with his audience.
The growth of such a complex and problematic sensibility in the
writer's attitude towards their audience is seen, by Raymond Williams, as
originating in the Romantic period. As Williams says, although the birth of the
"literary market" provided the possibility for a "raised social status", the usual
"liabilities to caprice and [...] obligations to please" were now "not liabilities to
individuals personally known, but to the workings of an institution which
seemed largely impersonal". As a consequence, the feeling of discontent with
the "public channel" became "acute and general".I07 This two-fold effect of
intensification and expansion led to what Williams calls "an important
criticism of the new kind of social relationships of art: when art is a
commodity, taste is' adequate, but when it is something more, a more active
relationship is essential".I08
106 See Ellis, D. H. Lawrence, p. 702: "DHL's interest in reaching a working-class public was
stimulated by his correspondence with Charles Wilson, a journalist and poet from the North
East, wbo bad first written to him towards the end of 1927 (vi. 229), and who was later to
invite both Joyce and Huxley to lecture to the Durham miners. In response to what seems to
have been a request from Wilson for some kind of 'message' for the miners, DHL sent him
five of his recent pansies on 28 December [....J On 11 January 1929, DHL told Davies that
Stephensen 'liked the Pansies, was pining to take a pamphlet or broadside from them, for the
working-classes' (vii. 128). DHL was attracted by the idea and on 18 Marcb, to the dismay of
his agent Pollinger ('He's crazy'), suggested that he might have some of his pansies done as 'a
broadside at 2d., for the election' - due to take place on 30 May (vii. 218). On 18 April he told
Charles Lahr, 'I have no MS here now from which to cboose an election broadside. But you
choose one, and let me know, and we can go ahead with that' (vii. 256). A month later,
however, he admitted to Kot that he felt 'hesitant about a broadside for electioneering purposes
- it's not quite my line' (vii. 282)."
107 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (1958; Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1968), pp. 50-51.
I~ Raymond Williams, Culture, p. 58. Christopher Caudwell has discussed the consequences
of these changes for art's relationsbip with society in general, defining the most explicit
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Thus, Lawrence's dissatisfaction with the "public channel" can be
understood not only in terms of his lack of success through it, but in terms of
his alienated sense of the commodification of his art: Lawrence's work was
neither appreciated in the "active" way in which he felt it should be, nor was
he even free to make his art the way he wanted it. Ironically, the medium
Lawrence chose to overcome this inadequate and impoverishing relationship
with his audience - the expensive edition - was one which both embodied the
decadent materialism so repulsive "tohim (Lawrence often felt guilty about the
expensive price and, as I quoted earlier, he thought the trade in expensive "de
luxe" editions "crazy"), and was incapable of granting him the appreciation he
so greatly desired.109 The privately printed Lady Chatterley's Lover allowed
outcome as aestheticism. Caudwell writes of a "phase of bourgeois poetry [...J that of
'commodity-fetishism' - or 'art for art's sake' -" which is "given in the false position of the
bourgeois poet as producer for the market, a position forced on him by the development of
bourgeois economy. As soon as the pessimism of Arnold and the young Tennyson, and the
even sadder optimism of Browning and Swinburne and the old Tennyson when dealing with
the contemporary scene, made it inevitable that the poet quit the contemporary scene, it was
equally inevitable that the poet should fall a victim to commodity-fetishism. This meant a
movement which would completely separate the world of art from the world of reality and, in
" doing so, separate it from the source of art itself' (Illusion and Reality: A Study of the Sources
of Poetry [1937; London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977]. p. 116). It is one of my contentions in
the following argument that Pansies arises out of a struggle with such a predominant
aestheticism. Lawrence had been attracted to "art for art's sake" as the young writer of novels
such as The White Peacock and The Trespasser, but had grown to detest it, commenting in
1925: "1 can't bear art that you can walk round and admire. A book should be either a bandit or
a rebel or a man in a crowd [.... ] I hate the actor and audience business. An author should be in
among the crowd, kicking their shins or cheering them on to some mischief or merriment [.... ]
After all, the world is not a stage [.... ] And art [...] [is] not little theatres where the reader sits
aloft and watches -Jike a god with a twenty-Lira ticket - and sighs, commiserates. condones
and smiles [..• .J whoever reads me will be in the thick of the scrimmage. and if he doesn't like
it - if he wants a safe seat in the audience - let him read somebody else" (Letters, vol. V, 22
January 1925, p. 201). Here, both the distinction drawn between a passive, consuming
aestheticism and an active, participatory art and the related contrast between a bourgeois
spectator and a man in a crowd seem to prefigure the foundations of Pansies' techniques.
Furthermore, as in Pansies, the author himself is toppled from his Romantic pedestal above
~otidian life, proletarianised and radicalised.
I Lawrence's choice of medium can perhaps be understood, however, as an attempt to
partially retrieve for the artist the world of pre-capitalist social relations. Caudwell describes
those relations, economically possible only through upper-class patronage, as "idyllic".
However: "Such an "idyllic" relation means that the poet writes Don-idyllic poetry. He still
sees himself as a man playing a social rOle [.• ..J It imposes on him the obligation to speak the
language of his paymasters or co-poets [...] the ruling class. Johnson - dependent on
subscribers - bridges the gap between the poet by status and the poet as producer. Thus poetry
remains in this sense collective. It talks a more or less current language, and the poet writes for
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Lawrence the freedom to say what he liked, liberating him from the alien,
"impersonal" constraints of the market while also allowing him - without the
intermediary of a publisher - the product of his labour. However, despite these
gains, the novel did not serve to liberate him from either censorship or his
audience's overwhelming rejection of his art. Furthermore, the lack of a
copyright on the novel allowed it to be pirated on a considerable scale, thus
actually denying Lawrence, to a substantial extent, the fruit of his labour.
It is not surprising therefore that, following the novel and out of this
whole context, Lawrence was so courageously radical in the writing of his new
poems: he had nothing to lose from being so, and must have guessed he could
gain financially from the scandal created by Lady Chatterley's Lover,
regardless of the nature of his work. Nor is it peculiar that; paradoxically, he
was unable to produce Pansies in the "cheap broadsheet form" he had been
considering: such a "public channel" was, by this stage of disillusionment,
impossible for Lawrence. Moreover, in Pansies, these deeply-felt
contradictions experienced by him are manifested at the level of production.
Produced both privately and publicly.!'? the poems peculiarly combine a
personal and direct tone with a general appeal to a wide, and particularly
English, audience. However, more crucially, there is an intensified sense of the
freedom of Lady Chatterley's Lover and a new sense of entrapment: Lady
an audience he has directly in mind, to whom perhaps he will presently read his poems and so
be able to watch lheir effect, Poetry is still for him not so much a poem - a self-subsisting
work of art - as a movement from writer to reader [.... ] Hence he realises himself as playing a
social role: inspirer of humanity or redresser of the follies of mankind. He has not yet become
a self-conscious artist" (Caudwell, p. 99-1(0). We can see how the publishing of an expensive
edition (through subscription) compares to this form of production: both possess the attraction
of a more or less known audience.
110 Although Lawrence did not know he would publish the poems using both these methods, he
evidently held both options as fairly equal possibilities while writing them: he wrote to
Pollinger, "I don't mind a bit if [Seeker] doesn't publish them", Letters, vol. VII, 7 January
1929, p. 122.
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Chatterley's Lover had only reinforced Lawrence's alienated sense of his
audience and of the "whole scheme of things". The poem ''There Is No Way
Out" is a good example of this ambivalence:
There Is No Way Out
There is no way out, we are all caged monkeys
blue-arsed with the money-bruise
and wearing our seats out sitting on money.
There is no way out, the cage has no door, it's rusted
solid.
If you copulate with the finest woman on earth
There's no relief, only a moment's sullen respite.
You're a caged monkey again in five minutes.
Therefore be prepared to tackle the cage. III
This poem embodies the overriding feeling of Pansies: the new-found
freedom of expression and relentless, positive attempt at visualising a "way
out,,112is combined with a sense of complete, maddened frustration at the
capitalist system.l13 The origins of such an unorthodox and double-edged
111 .Lawrence, Complete Poems, pp. 485-6.· . .
112 See D. H. Lawrence: A Composite Biography: Volume Three, 1925-30, ed. Edward Nehls
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), in which Rhys Davies remarks that Lawrence
once "rapped out at me: 'All you young writers have me to thank for what freedom you enjoy,
even as things are, for being able to say much that you couldn't even hint at before I appeared.
It was I who set about smashing down the barriers" (p. 275). Lawrence's sense of himself in
this passage as a writer who enhances both individual and collective freedom connects with the
powerful freedom of expression and sense of didactic intention so characteristic of the poems
he was at this time producing. .
JJ3 See D. H. Lawrence: A Composite Biography, in which Rbys Davies provides an
interesting account of this frustration during the period of Pansies' construction: "his
arraignment of the young was not so wholehearted as his fierce raging hatred of the generation
that sat in tight yet flabby ruling of the world, the moneyed and the governing classes
particularly. It was they who were rotting the world. it was they who closed themselves to the
voice of the spirit and lived only in the vulgar transaction of being worIdlily successful, of
attaining at all costs the power to grind down someone else. The young he blamed for allowing
them to do it without protest [....J he spoke of the way those elders had tried to curb him, how,
indeed. they had curbed him. 'I know I'm in a cage,' he rapped out, 'I know I'm like a monkey
in a cage. But if anyone puts a finger in my cage, I bite- and bite hard' .. (p. 273). What is
significant here is not simply the overt parallelism between these words and the language of
"There Is No Way Out", but the surrounding context which Davies provides for Lawrence's
remarks. Notably, it is "the moneyed and governing classes" who establish the "cage", and
hence it is they who possess the "power" to "grind down" and "curb" others. This
socialistically class-conscious position, unorthodox for Lawrence, is further emphasised by
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feeling, not to be found in Lady Chatterley's Lover, are made manifest in the
directly related contradictions - conscious in Lawrence, as we can see from
such poems as the one above - in the actual conditions of production of
Pansies itself: the first edition, mass-produced for the public yet capitalistic in
its mode of production; the second edition, privately printed yet socialistic in
the absence of an external profit-making publisher.l'" Although Lady
Chatterley's Lover was eventually published in both private and public
editions, the cheap Paris edition published by Titus at 60 francs was only
published as an afterthought in response to the numerous pirated editions of the
novel. Pansies, on the other hand, was conceived with two audiences equally
in mind: the private and public editions were published within weeks of each
other. This duality of intended readership is evident from the various forms of
Davies: "though he would speak with contempt and anger of the eeonomic poverty of his
childhood and the horrible dreariness that trails behind mining village life, his days in those
districts [...] seemed. as he talked, to have given him glee and satisfaction" (p. 276). In allying
himself with the "curbed" class from which he came and in expressing such antagonism to the
"ruling" classes, Lawrence here is adopting a Marxist position. Thus, although frequently
hostile to socialism, Lawrence often adopts socialistic or even Marxist standpoints, as many of
the poems indicate. This ambivalent relationship with socialist and Marxist ideas is apparent in
Lawrence's comment to Charles Lahr: "I shall ask Seeker to send review copies to the Sunday
Worker [a short-lived radical paper of 1929] -little snob. But you'll see, the socialists will hate .
me most of all. I should like to see real Labour or Socialist or red reviews of Pansies" (Letters,
vol. vu. 8 August 1929, p. 413). .
114 The term "socialistic" requires some qualification. Charles Lahr was the publisher of the
private edition of Pansies and did take a portion of the profits. However, Lawrence took a
much greater percentage of the profits than Lahr (it appears to be approximately double),
gaining £500 from the edition of 500 copies, each copy retailing at 40/-: a considerably greater
proportion of the product of his labour than he received from Seeker's public edition. In turn,
although dissatisfied with the quality of Lahr's edition (''they've made rather an awful book of
it",Letters, vol. VII, 6 August 1929, p. 407), he did not have the problems which hounded
him with Seeker and Knopf (publisher of the American public edition). These difficulties
included expurgation ("I simply don't want to come out with a bourgeois 'inoffensive'
Pansies", Letters, vol. VII, 5 April 1929, p. 242), disputes over royalties ("why should my
royalty be only ten per-cent? ..why this beautiful margin always for the publisher?", Letters,
vol. VII, 27 April 1929, p. 267), disputes over the profits from Lawrence's signatures ("I will
not merely sign money into Martin Seeker's pocket", Letters, vol. VU, 22 May 1929, p. 297),
and demands on the level of Lawrence's output ("I dont [sic] care if Knopf doesn't publish
Pansies [....] Agree to bind myself to two more books of poetry I will not", Letters, vol. VU,
31 May 1929, p. 313). With Lahr, Lawrence evidently felt more relaxed (he attempted to
persuade Lahr to take an equal share in the profits) and, although disappointed with the final
product's appearance, was grateful and "glad it's done entire" without expurgations (Letters,
vol. VII, 5 August 1929, p. 406).
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address the poems use. Some, in their calls for revolution and use of regional
dialect, are (such as the poems Lawrence sent to the Willington miners)
intended for a working-class audience, while others, such as "Let the Dead
Bury their Dead" and "How Beastly the Bourgeois Is", with their more
metaphorical language and poetic diction, seem to be aimed at a middle-class
audience who are expected to pay for the privilege of being insulted.
Thus in one sense we have the freedom of a writer who has
significantly more control over his labour and its product than ever before, and
who is attempting to address a wider audience whom he still feels has potential
for social and political action; while in another sense we have the profound and
anarchic sense of alienation lIS of a writer who is still producing his work
within a capitalistic mode of production, who is aware of the largely middle-
~!ass audience he is, in reality, reaching, and who is frustrated by their inertia.
By contrast, Lady Chatterley's Lover, not intended for a public edition and
therefore not produced with a large audience in mind, let alone a working-class
one, does not possess this alienated and alienating quality, This is the salient
characteristic of Pansies and is highly significant when it is recalled that it was
such a marked feeling of alienation which Karl Marx insisted was
indispensable from the nature of capitalist production.
For according to Marx, under capitalism, the worker does not actualise
lIS This sense of alienation can be related in part by the unresolved tension in Lawrence
between what he called the "sort of esoteric public" and the "great stupid exoteric public"
(Letters, vol. VU, 3 September 1929, p. 462). Despite his patronising contempt for the latter,
he was clearly keen on reaching ordinary people and repeatedly asked Seeker, as was usual for
commercial publishers, to produce a "cheap edition" (Letters, vol. VU, 2 August 1929, p. 402).
This, however, did not appear until April1930 (priced at 3/6 per copy), by which time
Lawrence was dead. Similarly, Lawrence tried to persuade Lahr to sell his edition at two
guineas rather than three. This was successful, Lahr eventually selling them at 401-. However,
Lawrence still felt that "Forty shillings a copy is fairly high" (Letters, vol. VII, 19 August
1929, p. 434) and his use of Seeker as a publisher, considering all the problems this entailed,
alone indicates that he wanted to reach the ..great stupid exoteric public" despite his frustration
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himself through his labour but experiences it as a "loss of reality" due to the
expropriation of both the product and activity of his labour by the capitalist.
Hence the worker's labour becomes "an object, an exterior existence" existing
"outside him", independently, as something "hostile and alien" to him, thus
becoming "a self-sufficient power opposite him.,,116Correspondingly, the "act
of production", the "productive activity itself', confronts the worker as an act
of self -estrangement: the worker is thus even alienated from his own being
which performs that activity:17 Yet more crucially, however, the worker is
alienated from others as well as himself:
What is valid for the relationship of a man to his work,
of the product of his work and himself, is also valid for
the relationship of man to other men and of their labour
and the objects of their labour. I IS
The style of Pansies, both alienated and alienating, might be read as a
product of such an experience. The consciousness of this kind of experience is,
after all, a major element in the choice of subject-matter in Pansies. The poem
"All That We Have Is Life" is a good example of this dominant consciousness:
All That We Have Is Life
All that we have, while we live, is life;
and if you don't live during your life, you are a piece of
dung.
And work is life, and life is lived inwork
unless you're a wage-slave.
While a wage-slave works, he leaves life aside
and stands there a piece of dung.
Men should refuse to be lifelessly at work.
Men should refuse to be heaps of wage-earning dung.
with it
J 16 Karl Marx. "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" (1930). Karl Marx: selected
writings. ed. David Mclellan (1977; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2nd ed., 2(00). pp. 83-
121,86-87.
JI7 Marx. p. 88.
118 Marx. p. 91.
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Men should refuse to work at all, as wage-slaves.
Men should demand to work for themselves, of
themselves, and put their life in it.
For if a man has no life in his work, he is mostly a heap
of dung.119
Not only is "All That We Have Is Life" explicitly about the alienation of the
wage-earner (he "leaves life aside"), but every aspect of the poem, typically for
Pansies, alienates its audience. From the propagandist tone to the philosophical
style (the poem is set out at the beginning, through its chain of connecting
statements, as if it were logically deducing all of its propositions) and
''unpoetic'' quality of its content, "All That We Have Is Life" is antagonistic to
its readership.
However, this technique of double alienation - the work's estrangement
of both the conditions of its own production and the "norms" of "literature"
(registered by Russian Formalism) - is only possible in Pansies as a result of
the simultaneous freedom from and imprisonment within capitalist production.
Paradoxically, the sense of alienation in Pansies is actually dependent upon the
·liberating effects of private publishing, post-Lady Chatterley's Lover. The fact
that Lawrence was now released from the fear of failing to live by his work
allows him, in Pansies, to attack the very system of which he is still a part. The
.Lawrence who produced Pansies was thus both estranged and enlightened,
both connected and isolated, both within the system and without, both
subjectively experiencing the system and objectively scrutinising it: without
both positions, moreover, such an immanent critique would have been
impossible. Hence, one moment the speaker is capable of incorporating the
reader in a general "We", and in the next, he is isolating himself while
119 Lawrence, Complete Poems. pp. 449-50.
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attacking "you" or the whole of "mankind". Hence also, the dialogue of
opposing voices which is now made possible in Lawrence's poetry: both
reactionary and revolutionary languages, as in for example "Democracy" and
"Money-Madness", and all those voices operating ideologically between them
are given space in Pansies.J20
Crucially, however, the author's unique position, both inside and
. outside the capitalist mode of production, allows the work to critique the
conditions of its own production, saying things a product of capitalism should
not say. "Nottingham's New University" is an outstanding example of the
poems' outrageous method of undermining, metaphorically, both the
conditions of their production and those of their reproduction:
Nottingham's New University
InNottingham, that dismal town
where I went to school and college,
they've built a new university
for a new dispensation of knowledge.
Built it most grand and cakeily
out of the noble loot
deri ved from shrewd cash-chemistry
.. by good Sir Jesse Boot.
Little I thought, when I was a lad
and turned my modest penny
over on Boot's Cash Chemist's counter,
that Jesse, by turning many
millions of similar honest pence
over, would make a pile
that would rise at last and blossom out
in grand and cakey style
120 It may be objected that an exception to the dialogical character of Pansies is to be found in
its tendency to allow misogynist discourses a presence without the counterbalancing
representation of feminist voices. However, although misogynist discourses are indeed
frequently found in Pansies, they too are dialogically undermined by both assertive female
voices and self-conscious male voices - the latter showing a comic bewilderment at, or an
explicit acceptance of, the women's movement and the social changes attendant on it, See, for
example, ''What Ails Thee?", "It's No Good!", "Don't Look At Me", and "The Jeune FiUe"
(Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 540, p. 541, p. 541, and pp. 564-5 respectively).
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into a university
where smart men would dispense
doses of smart cash-chemistry
in language of common sense!
That future Nottingham lads would be
cash-chemically B.Sc.
that Nottingham lights would rise and say:
-By Boots I am M.A.
From this I learn, though I knew it before
that culture has her roots
in the deep dung of cash, and lore
is a last offshoot of BootS.121
Here, metaphorically speaking, both the conditions which enabled Seeker's
edition to be published and the potential conditions which might enable it to be
republished are brutally and nonchalantly ridiculed. Not only is capitalism
itself criticised as in "Money-Madness" and "All That We Have Is Life", but
also the "literary", middle-class world of critics and readers: in short, those in
control of the work's future. If we recall both Macherey's and Williams's
notions of the commodification of literature, we can see how a poem such as
this undermines its own existence as a commodity.F' We cannot "walk round
. .
and admire" Pansies as we might with ~ product of aestheticism, thus reifying
it. Correspondingly, any "norms" or "rules" we appeal to in order to judge the
work's worth as a commodity are redundant in the face of such a hostile and
hybrid anti-genre. Furthermore, the passive relationship of the reader to the
work of art when it stands solely as a commodity is destroyed in Pansies,
through the poems' agitatory method of arousing response. As Lawrence
himself said of the poems, they are - like the flowers that share their name -
121 Lawrence, Complete Poems, p. 488-9.
122 This attack upon the reduction of literature to a commodity is especially sharp if we are
aware that Boots also owned a lending library: although Lawrence did not perhaps know this,
the depiction of "lore" as a "last offshoot of Boots" is highly apt in this respect.
88
"not merely pretty-pretty", but contain "in their fragrance an earthiness of the
humus and the corruptive earth from which they spring.,,123Unlike lyrical
poetry, which can be passively contemplated, Pansies are unpleasant and
mention everything that poetry should avoid - such as the world of politics,
from which conventional poetry must always deviate in order to be successful.
Moreover, they actually attack their audience in their anti-literary form and
content and in their "anti-middle-class", anti-capitalist propaganda, thereby
forcing readers into an "active" recognition of what is being said: after all,
these "very anti-middle-class" poems, Lawrence knew, would mainly be read
by the middle classes.
As a consequence, the critics and censors presiding over the literary
work's future reproduction (Le. its continuing existence as a commodity) are
not only ignored but attacked in advance through Pansies' revolutionary
methods. The Pansies rail against their status as commodities, both by
haranguing those who mediate their status as an exchange-value, and through
.emphasising an "active" relationship with their audience and, therefore, their
use-value. The tastefully pretty lyric and the subtle bourgeois work of art,
which attempt to encourage profound contemplation and liberal, relativist
thinking while downplaying any desire to act or make political commitments,
are critiqued both in the Pansies' form and in their content: the poems are
outspoken in language and irregular in form, and they overtly attack the
"mealy-mouthed truths,,124of the "god-damn bourgeoisie.,,12s The importance
of this kind of challenge can only be seen if we understand the political
123 Lawrence, "Foreword" to Pansies, Complete Poems, p. 423.
124 Lawrence, "Don'ts", Complete Poems, p. 458.
125 Lawrence, "Red-Herring", Complete Poems, p. 490.
89
implications of bourgeois literature. Culture, in the middle-class sense of the
word, is humorously described by Eagleton, and worth quoting at length:
To be civilized or cultivated is to be blessed with
refined feelings, well-tempered passions, agreeable
manners and an open mind. It is to behave
reasonably and moderately, with an innate sensitivity to
others' interests, to exercise self-discipline, and to be
prepared to sacrifice one's own selfish interests to the
good of the whole. However splendid some of these
prescriptions may be, they are certainly not politically
innocent. On the contrary, the cultivated individual
sounds suspiciously like a mildly conservative liberal.
It is as though BBC newscasters set the paradigm for
humanity at large. This civilized individual certainly
does not sound like a political revolutionary, even
though revolution is part of civilization too. The
word 'reasonable' here means something like 'open to
persuasion' or 'willing to compromise', as though all
passionate conviction was ipso facto irrational.
Culture is on the side of sentiment rather than passion,
which is to say on the side of the mannered middle
classes rather than the irate masses. Given the
importance of equipoise, it is hard to see why one
would not be required to counterbalance an objection to
racism with its opposite [....] Since moderation is
always a virtue, a mild distaste for child prostitution
would seem more appropriate than a vehement
..opposition to, it. And since action would seem to
. imply a fairly definitive set of choices, this version of
culture is inevitably more contemplative than
engage.126
The similarity in style between this passage and Lawrence's "The
English Are So Nice"127is not without significance. The Pansies' target of
attack is just this "version of culture" that Eagleton outlines. Pansies are, in
this sense, alienating a certain kind of audience. In many ways they are less
hostile to, and more on a level footing with (in their "unpoetic" ridiculing of
126 Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 18.
121 See Lawrence, Complete Poems, pp. 659-60. The poem opens: "The English are so nice! so
awfully nice! they're the nicest people in the world.! And what's more, they're very nice
about being nice! about your being nice as well! ! If you're not nice, they soon make you feel
it."
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literariness), a working-class readership. However, as much as Lawrence
wanted to reach "poorer people", he knew that his audience would inevitably
be predominantly from the upper and middle classes: the very people whom
Pansies attacks. So it is those readers who uphold the interests of capitalism,
and who seek to commodify the work of art, who are the target of Pansies. The
power of the poems is perhaps, therefore, to be found in the contradictory
quality of this target: an object of attack and a market to be exploited. Judging
from the lack of criticism over the last 71 years, the poems have evidently been
. more successful in attack than in capturing their niche of the poetry market:
Lawrence's Pansies have so far succeeded in warding off those individuals
who wish to make them a commodity.
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2: Living the Death of Liberal England:
Touch and Go and Aaron's Rod. 1918·1922
Lawrence's acute sense of entrapment and his hostility towards his native
country during the war, and his subsequent departure from England in 1919 for
the life, in most part, of an exile are well-known. This basic narrative, in fact,
underpins many assumptions made about Lawrence, and without a full
engagement with his work at an ideological level, it is easy to fall into the trap
of understanding this process of rejection as a straightforward abandonment of
liberal England. Familiar with the striking authoritarian politics of Lawrence's
later work, we can fail to read his writing life in solution and thus allow these
more explicit qualities to obscure a text's ideological complexity: we deny the
fact that the writing was lived through, rather than produced in an ideological
stasis. Hence, a work's most glaring feature becomes its label, and its struggles
and conflicts, which make it worthy of attention, are consequently suppressed.
This does not mean to say that we can or should avoid an analysis that
attempts to make necessary connections between a work's significations and
its contextual sphere of systematised ideologies. Historical analysis is always
fundamentally a retrospective, precipitating activity. However, we must
recognise that Lawrence and the individuals and social circles (such as the
Garsington group) with whom he associated were not living embodiments of
consistent political doctrines. Many of them, such as Bertrand Russell, were
attempting to think beyond existing world-views. They were living at a time
of acute social and political crisis in which contradictions, especially within
liberal circles, were all the time emerging. Lawrence was tom at various points
by a field of contending socio-political forces, and at no point therefore can he
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be reduced to a single one of these forces. The point is to attempt both an
understanding of a period from our inevitable vantage point in history and to
appreciate the various ideologies which are at work in any given period in
which human beings are more than passive receivers and carriers of fixed
thought-forms.
In this chapter, I aim to show that liberalism never fully relinquished its
hold upon Lawrence and that, contrary to critical orthodoxy, liberalism's
struggle with conflicting interests in the social and the individual never ceased
to be Lawrence's struggle. The tendency to envisage Lawrence as an
idiosyncratic individualist, defiantly dismissive of the major creeds and
practices of contemporary British politics, has frequently allowed his work to
evade the nets of a proper historical analysis. However, if his post-war output
is looked at closely, I believe it is possible to trace the deep and lasting effects
of the British political climate on Lawrence, without reducing his work to a
mere regurgitation of congealed ideology. Beginning with the play Touch and
Go (written in 1918, published in 1920), I aim to undertake this examination.
Touch and Go
Lawrence's numerous verbal renunciations of "that old 'advanced'
crowd"! during the latter half of the war, and his repudiation of "the social
passion and social insistence'f towards the war's end, are belied in Touch and
Go, a play which illustrates the fatality of taking what the writer says about
1 The Letters of D. H. Lawrence, vol. III, ed. James T. Boulton and Andrew Robertson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984),11 December 1916, p. 49.
2 Letters, vol. III, 26 September 1918, p, 288.
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himself for the writer himself.
Macdonald Daly has outlined the major liberal influences on Lawrence
during the war and set Touch and Go within its historical context as an
unabashed enactment of "the consolidation of liberalism, the fact of its
historical success, achieved through tactical support of a labour movement
which obeys its Ieaders't.' In doing so, Daly has focused mainly upon the
ideological correspondences between the play and the "corporatization into
trade unions" of working-class activism by a "recuperated liberalism".4
However, he also suggests, on numerous occasions, a deeper ideological
fixture of Touch and Go within the complex and contradictory web of wartime
liberal thought. For example, he notes that:
In January [1915] [Lawrence] could tentatively but
seriously draw a distinction between 'politics' and
'life' (corresponding respectively to the public and the
private spheres) which (he felt) legitimized ostensible
contradictions between community and individual
values.'
Daly is referring here to Lawrence's assertion to Lady Ottoline Morrell that "I
am no' democrat, save in politics [.... ] life itself is an affair of aristocrats"." .
Daly goes on to add that "in counterposing an Integrated public sphere to an
aggregate of merely individual wills, this still left space for open commitment
to liberal democratic values".' Considering the ambiguous position of
Lawrence's correspondent this is perhaps unsurprising: Lady Ottoline Morrell
was both an aristocrat and the patroness of a group of liberal artists and
3Macdonald Daly, "D. H. Lawrence and Labour in the Great War", Modem Language Review
89, 1994, pp. 19-38, 36.
4 Daly, p. 38. .
5 Daly, p. 22.
6 The Letters of D. H. Lawrence, vol. II, ed. George J. Zytaruk and James T. Boulton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),3 January 1915, p. 254.
7 Daly, p. 23.
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intellectuals who opposed the war. However, as Daly suggests, what is
significant about Lawrence's remarks here is that he draws a distinction
between the individual and society which is typical of traditional liberalism.
This conceptual division is continually made by Lawrence in order to
establish taxonomies that share more than a passing affinity with those formed
by liberals of this period. His conception of guild socialism on his return to
Derbyshire in December 1915 provides a conspicuous instance of this:
These men [... ] they understand mentally so horribly:
only industrialism, only wages and money and
machinery. They can't think anything else. All their
collective thinking is in these terms only. They are
utterly unable to appreciate any pure, ulterior truth:
only this industrial- mechanical- wage idea. This
they will act from - nothing else. That is why we are
bound to get something like Guild Socialism in the
long run. Which is a reduction to the lowest terms,"
For Lawrence, here, political solutions are not grounded in economic
transformation but in a mode of thinking uncontaminated by base material
issues - a "pure, ulterior truth" is the key. The way in which human beings
collectively reproduce the conditions of their existence is subsidiary, as a
politically determining factor, to the way in which they perceive their lives.
Furthermore, the two are not interrelated: economic changes do not have
repercussions on the mental life of individuals but merely involve the "lowest
terms". This is a marked proclivity of liberal thinkers in this period - the
tendency to relegate economic factors for the sake of "higher" aims, owing to
a perceived split between the political, socio-economic freedom of the
individual as a worker and the freedom of the "private" individual.
8 Letters, vol. II, 27 December 1915, p. 489.
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This is illustrated in liberal intellectuals' own response to guild
socialism. As Michael Freeden explains, liberals felt that, on the "question of
freedom", guild socialism offered as many "possibilities of oppression" as
those of "expression". For example:
[Ramsay] Muir gave guild socialism short shrift. Not
only was it hard to see how liberty could be increased
within the guild, but "it is obvious that it would not
increase the liberty of consumers" [.... ] The liberal fear
of sectionalism was here at work, coupled with distrust
for a class that had not yet enjoyed the benefits of a
liberal, rational education."
Thus, the role of producer is seen as a distinguishable element of the individual
- a distinct 'social' role. However, J. A. Hobson, a leading figure of British
left-liberalism at this time, attempted to move away from this line of thinking:
while other liberals rested content with dismissing
guild socialism for ignoring the importance of. the
consumer and, indeed, the sovereignty of the
consumer-cum-citizen [... ] Hobson had moved one
step ahead. To assert the primacy of the consumer
under present conditions misrepresented social facts
[.... ] "man, as worker, is closely associated with his
fellow man, as consumer is a detached unit."l0
This seemingly cohesive sense of the individual's relationship to his working
life, and its apparent stress upon the determining nature of the social
relationships inherent in industrial organisation for the individual's whole way
of life, are undermined, however, by Hobson's proposed solution. For his
answer is to promote "a notion of human nature liberated from industrialism",
so that "economic values would play a reduced role in personal and social
9Michael Freeden, Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought 1914-1939
. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 69. Freeden quotes from "Muir, Liberalism and Industry
(London, 1920)" (p. 55). Muir's abstract notion of the individual who abandons all connection
with work once the distinguishable role of consumer is taken on is similar, as we shall shortly
see, to Lawrence's sense of work and life as fundamentally distinct modes of being.
10 Freeden, p. 71. Freeden quotes Hobson from "'The New Industrial Revolution', CR, 118
(1920)" (p. 54).
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life", thus allowing time for the development of individuals' "other activities
.and interests"Y The relationship is, therefore, once again one-way: guild
socialism is rejected on the grounds that an empowerment of the working
classes in their industrial capacity cannot empower them in the rest of their
capacities. This mode of thought is ideologically comparable to Lawrence's
and receives one of its earliest airings in his "Study of Thomas Hardy", a text
written in 1914:
Work is, simply, the activity necessary for the
production of a sufficient supply of food and shelter:
nothing more holy than that. It is the producing of the
means of self-preservation. Therefore it is obvious that
it is not the be-all and the end-all of existence. We
work to provide means of subsistence, and when we
have made provision, we proceed to live. But all work
is only the making provision for that which is to
follow.12
What distinguishes this argument as a liberal rather than a Marxist theorisation
of labour is that it (typically for Lawrence) forms part of a critique of
. industrialism rather than industrial capitalism. As Lawrence makes clear, he
conceives all labour as alienating regardless of its specific historical and
material nature: "The dream of every man is that in the end he shall have to
work no more. The joy of every man is, when he is released from his labour
[ ],,13 A . H b ... .. gam, compare 0 son.
in line with Hobson's total, organic approach, work
was to undergo two transformations. It was to reflect
"the freedom of pleasurable production" as a sphere of
self-chosen activity in which physical, emotional and
rational aspects of human personality were to be
invested. But it was not the be-all and end-all of
personality which, precisely due to its release from the
11 Freeden, p. 72.
12 D. H. Lawrence, Study of Thomas Hardy [1936] and Other Essays, ed. Bruce Steele,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 34.
13 Lawrence, Study, p. 35.
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oppression of mechanical thraldom, could increasingly
engage in the non-industrial side of human life.14
The key point here is that neither Hobson nor Lawrence historicise labour. For
Hobson too, "industrial work could not, on the whole, be made pleasurable,"
though "it could become 'tolerable and of willing acceptance' .15 This is a
vision of all industrial labour as estranged labour - a vision which omits the
real and historically distinct conditions of capitalist production within which
labour occurs. For Hobson's alternative to guild socialism is to promote "a
notion of human nature liberated from industrialism" (not industrial
capitalism) through an "organicis[t]" conception of society.l" Thus Hobson and
Lawrence's mutual assertion that work is not the "be-all and end-all" of an
individual's "existence" I "personality", although sharing an affinity with
socialism's call for the liberation of human beings from enslavement to the
industrial machine, makes no distinction, in a way typical to liberalism,
between historically distinct forms of labour. Consequently, their proposed
solutions are ahistorical arid transcendental; Lawrence turning to metaphysical
abstraction and Hobson to the illusory past of the organic society.17
Moreover, they do not perceive work as a constitutive part of a human
being's "species-being". By contrast, Karl Marx argues that "it is in the
working over of the objective world that man first really affirms himself as a
14 Freeden, p. 54. Freeden cites Hobson's "'The New Industrial Revolution'" once again and
also refers to his "Problems of a New World (London, 1921)" (p. 44).
Lawrence's method of thinking about work in 1914 is, then, no less a feature of the immediate
post-war liberal debates. Liberalism's ahistorical and transcendental analysis of labour is
evidently a familiar pattern of thought to the Lawrence of 1914.
15 Freeden, p. 53.
16 Freeden, p. 72.
17 See Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-/950 (1958; Harrnondsworth: Penguin,
1968), pp. 252-3, where Williams illustrates how the term "organic" is always used
nostalgically to posit a desired past that has never existed: "If there is one thing certain about
'the organic community', it is that it has always gone" (p. 253). It is, furthermore, "a
characteristically industrialist, or urban, nostalgia - a late version of medievalism, with its
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species-being". "This production", furthermore, "is his active species-life.
Through it nature appears as his work and reality". Thus, when labour is non-
alienated labour it is not divided from the rest of a human being's "active
species-life" as a "tolerable" chore or as simply "a means for his physical
existence"; rather, it pervades all his "free activity", his "active species-life"."
Under capitalism, however, labour is alienated labour, due to the expropriation
of the worker's product of labour by the capitalist. Marx's vision of communist
society is, therefore, historically grounded since, while it calls for the "all-
round development of the individual" and for labour to be "not only a means of
life but life's prime want", it insists that the accomplishment of these demands
is dependent upon a revolution in productive relations." Thus the transfer of
the means of production from private to collective ownership is actually seen
as the enabling force behind individual development. This is because, unlike
Lawrence's view of social relationships, Marx argues that "every relationship
in which man stands to himself, is first realized and expressed in the
. relationship with which man stands to other men"." .
Clearly no such outlook governs Touch and Go. Individual freedom is
beyond the influence of a set of social relations dominated by private and
material gain. Oliver Turton, the Lawrencian persona of the play, is adamant
about this in his attempt to subdue the miners in the final scene:
I want every man to be able to live and be free. But we
shall never manage it by fighting over the money. - If
attachments to an 'adjusted' feudal society" (pp. 252-3); a feature which makes it all the more
. conducive to appropriation from an idealist, liberal standpoint.
18 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" (1930), Karl Marx: selected
writings, ed. David Mclellan (1977; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2(00), pp. 83-
121,91.
19 Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme", Karl Marx, pp. 610-6, 615.
20 Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", p. 91.
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you want what is natural and good, I'm sure the owners
would soon agree with yoU.21
,
Here we find assumptions central to the tenets of liberalism: a faith in rational
debate as a solution to the pitfalls of capitalism, a subordination of material
issues to ethical ones, and an idealist conception of freedom as extricable from
material conditions. It is even made clear by Lawrence, in his "Preface to
'Touch and Go"', that these assumptions are intended. In this preface
Lawrence explicitly calls for "some men" to acknowledge that their material
struggle is "merely a pretext, another hollow casus belli".22 This not only
trivialises the mass exploitation of labour power by the few, but idealistically
dissociates the material world from consciousness. Furthermore, he suggests
that this acknowledgement, if obtained from "two or three living individuals"
on either side of the struggle of "Labour vs. Capitalism", could resolve social
conflict." This liberal ration~lism is only sharpened by its "distrust for a class
that had not yet enjoyed the benefits of a liberal, rational education,,24 when
Lawrence describes the majority of miners: "most miners may be pick-cum
.shovel cum ballot implements, and no more", 25 Moreover, the ethical language
of the preface, with its biblical imagery, calls for a "ere"ative suffering" in the
transition from "death to birth" which will leave the "whole great structure" of
society intact. 26 It contends that "if we could deeply believe in what we were
fighting for, then the struggle [for "new freedom, new life"] might have
dignity, beauty, satisfaction for US".27Thus, Lawrence argues for a moral and
21 Lawrence, "Touch and Go" (1920), The Plays, ed. H~s-Wilhelm Schwarze and John
Worthen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 430.
22 Lawrence, "Preface to 'Touch and Go"', The Plays, p. 367.
23 Lawrence, "Preface to 'Touch and Go'", p. 365.
24 .Freeden, p. 69.
2S Lawrence, "Preface to 'Touch and Go"', p. 365.
26 Lawrence, "Preface to 'Touch and Go"', p. 368.
27 Lawrence, "Preface to 'Toucb and Go"', p. 367.
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psychological resurrection rather than a material one; a demand which
ironically subverts its ethical claims with its blatant concern for maintaining
the fundamental material order:
we pile accident on accident. we tear the fabric of our
existence fibre by fibre, we confidently look forward to
the time when the whole great structure will come
down on our heads. Yet after all that, when we are
squirming under the debris, we shall have no more faith
or hope or satisfaction than we have now. We shall
crawl from under one cartwheel straight under
another.28
Underlying this moralistic cynicism over radical social and economic change is
a religious fatalism: "the whole business of life, at the great critical periods of
mankind. is ,thatmen should accept and be one with their tragedy". 29 Such are
the perspectives through which Lawrence introduces the themes of his play in
the preface.
The fear for the "whole material substance of life" which the labour
struggle inspires in Lawrence, and his consequent hope that the "combatants"
of either side will learn to perceive their struggles as less about material issues
and more about "a new freedom'V" points to one of the key implications of the
play: namely. that a peaceful and morally just agreement can be attained
between the members of groups with radically opposing interests, within a set
of specific power relationships. In his discussion of Touch and Go, Daly draws
out the unquestioned ideological assumptions of the play which allow
Lawrence to depict this agreement as a potentially positive political solution.
These consist of a shallow conception of social conflict as "constituted at no
deeper level than interpersonal disharmony", an ideology of "respectability"
28 Lawrence, "Preface to 'Touch and Go' ... pp. 367-8.
29 Lawrence, "Preface to 'Touch and Go''', p. 368.
30 Lawrence. "Preface to 'Touch and Go'", p. 367.
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with its "concealed but structural hierarchical assumption that the working
classes need leaders". and a belief that "strikes are simply a form of
'bullying ..• .31However. these assumptions. deflecting. as they do. attention
away from the real conditions of existence which enable the capitalist order to
be reproduced, not only pave the way for the contradictory ideology of "equity
between the different individuals and groups produced by the existing social
order".32but affirm the liberal's ethical, rationalist faith in and desire for their
agreement.
. Let us look, for example. at the words of Oliver Turton. the
(characteristically for Lawrence and appropriately for the play's politics)
classless and rootless individual who attempts to defuse the miners'
confrontation with the mine-owner, Gerald, when he lectures the miners on the
natural necessity of the focalization of power: "As for power. somebody must
have it; you know. It only rests with you to put it into the hands of the best
men, the men you really believe in".33What is significant about this "common
sense" postulate is its ideological relatedness to the network of mutually
supporting definitions which I have been describing. For instance. connected
with this "hierarchical assumption" about social relationships (highly
undemocratic relationships which are based upon workers believing in their
leaders and upon the hegemonic activity of capitalists) are transcendental
notions of choice and moralistic definitions of what constitutes a good leader:
"You can tell what people want. by the leaders they choose, do you see. You
31 Daly, p. 38.
32 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society (1976; London:
Fontana, 1988), pp. 286-7.
33 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 430.
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choose leaders whom I respect, and I'll respect you, do you see".34Firstly, the
idea that people "choose" capitalists, such as Gerald, as leaders lays bare the
liberal illusion of choice under capitalism: for who "choose[s]" a capitalist to
control their life? Secondly, to "believe in" a leader is very close to respecting
him: both terms are part of the same ethical language which, when used to
make political judgements, often dangerously attempts to visualise human
personality as finalised prior to political practice. Regardless of this, however,
what people understand as ethically correct is to be determined by capitalists
rather than by the people themselves: "You choose leaders whom I respect, and
I'll respect you". Moreover, this potent ethical content is not merely
reactionary in its support of the ideology of leadership: it is bound up with
notions of class which are scattered throughout the play.
"Respect" and "belief' are, after all, attributes which the miners and
their union leader, Job Arthur, simply do not possess or inspire in their
characterisation. Where to strike is to "bully"," to passively accept an
exploited condition is to learn and gain "respect". When social conflict is no
more than a "quarrel",36 "belief' is a reaction appropriately abstract. Thus,
working-class direct action against an undemocratic social order is already
dismissed by these class-ridden concepts - which are presented as given
requirements for acceptance into the arena of serious discussion - before it has
begun. Fundamentally, the apparent dialogue between opposing class
perspectives is undermined by the play's subtle linguistic method of
interlocking unquestioned political assumptions across characters. Even the
34 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 430.
35 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 429.
36 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 429.
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poorly characterised socialist, Willie Houghton, for example, is dismissive
of the miners in the same arrogantly class-based tenus:
Couldn't you contrive that the pits belonged to you,
instead of you belonging to the pits, like so many old
pit-ponies that stop down till they are blind, and take to
eating coal-slack for meadow-grass, not knowing the
difference. - If only you'd learn to think, I'd respect
you. As you are, I can't, not if I try my hardest. - All
you can think of is to ask for another shilling a day.
That's as far as your imagination carries you [.... ] You
can't think beyond your dinners and your 'lowance.,,37
How the miners might "contrive" their ownership of the pits is uncertain: an
imaginative feat of some proportions appears to be suggested here. Certainly it
is an "imagination" which must be sufficiently abstracted from unpleasant
material realities to ignore the "low" desires of food and money. Willie's
language here shares with Gerald's the "ideology of respectability" which
moralistically demeans concern for one's own material well-being and even
goes as far as to divorce its connection to any notion of freedom. Moreover, it
lays bare the contradiction inherent in this middle-class, ethical challenge to
industrial action: that this challenge, in spite of its appeal to "higher things", is
ultimately (if unwittingly) a defence of the m~terial well-being and profit of
capitalists. It is in this respect an ethic of the utmost practical, material and -
conventionally, though in this case Willie's goals are socialistic - self-
interested nature. Furthermore, Willie's patronisingly literary dehumanisation
of the miners mirrors Lawrence's terminology in the preface, which transforms
the miners into "implements". What is at stake here is no less than a radical
attempt to deny not only the language and belief-systems of working-class
37 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 373.
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people in a remarkably monologic dialogue, but the very reality of their
existence as human beings.
This is perhaps brought most sharply into focus through the play's
stage directions which portray the miners in an extremely negative light,
especially in contrast to the individual characters who act as their leaders.
Stage directions enable a more single-voiced and authorial representation than
is normally given through the characters' speech (which speaks for the
character as well as the author) and are therefore potentially more illuminating,
ideologically, in their descriptive judgements.
When the miners appear at the beginning of the final scene (in order to
strike in protest over the office clerks' rejected request for a wage increase)
they are stripped of all verbal eloquence and individuality: they are reduced to
a series of discordant "voices" which interrupt one another continuously with
fragments of aggressive speech, slang and inarticulate shouts. Job Arthur and
.Willie Houghton's speech, by contrast, is scattered with puns, metaphors, and
. .
biblical allusions in a calm, collected style. As a consequence, they are the
individuals who are discussing the miners' objectives: the miners themselves
are only capable of the passivity of listening and then reacting crudely through
repetitive, dogmatic, and uninspired shows of approval or derision. The stage
directions make the representation clear if it were in any doubt how we should
evaluate the miners. Here are some examples: "His words are heard through
an ugly, cold, jeering commotion,,;38 "Crowd sways and surges on the car.
OLIVER is suddenly dragged out - GERALD stands up - he too is seized
from behind - he wrestles - is torn out of his great-coat - then falls,
38 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 424.
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disappears -loud cries - Hi - hoi hoiee - all the while - the car shakes
and presses uneasily,,;39"amid a threatening scuffle,,;40"The crowd press on
GERALD - he struggles - they hit him behind the knees, force him down";41
"They force a lump of newspaper into OLIVER'S mouth, and bear down on
GERALD,,;42"The crowd surges and begins to howl- they sway dangerously
- GERALD is spread-eagled on the floor, face down";43 "The crowd had
begun to sway and heave dangerously, with a low, muffled roar [.... ] the roar
breaks into a yell, the crowd heaves,,;44"GERALD rises slowly, andfaces the
mob. They roar dully".45
Deprived of any intelligence, attractiveness, warmth or positivity of
purpose, the miners are portrayed as a destructive, negative and inhuman force.
Their acrimony is contrasted heavily with the social ideals of Willie, Oliver,
and Gerald: those ideals of "respect", belief in one's leaders and "decency"."
Moreover, not only is each of these interconnected ideals shared to varying
'extents and in various combinations between three out of the four political
standpoints offered by the play, but they are the only ideals discussed by the
play. The miners appear only to want money and power, as we can see when
Job Arthur attempts to put forward the miners' case:
[JOB ARTHUR] [... ] the others, such as Gerald
Barlow, they keep the money - and the power -
OLIVER: You see, if you wanted to arrange things so
that money flowed more naturally, so that it flowed
naturally to every man, according to his needs, I think
we could soon agree. But you don't. What you want is
39 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 424.
40 Lawrence. "Touch and Go", p. 425.
41 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 426.
42 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 426.
43 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 427.
44 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 428.
45 Lawrence. "Touch and Go", p. 428.
46 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", pp. 424. 430.
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to take it away from one set and give it to another - or
keep it yourselves.
JOB ARTHUR: We want every man to have his proper
share.
OLIVER: I'm sure I do. I want every man to be able to
live and be free. But we shall never manage it by
fighting over the money. - If you want what is natural
and good, I'm sure the owners would agree with yoU.47
The miners are only "fighting over the money", not "what is natural and
good". What exactly is "natural and good", however, is appropriately vague in
that it is not only taken for granted but the means of achieving such a state are
couched in the most indistinct and fanciful terms. For according to Oliver, the
miners only have to "want" to "arrange things" so that "money flow[s] more
naturally" in order to resolve the political crisis. How money ever "flowlsl"
"naturally" is beyond comprehension, and the idea that by simply wanting this
(highly unspecific) arrangement real change will be achieved is similarly
transcendental. Morality itself, however, as well as a recalcitrantly
uncommunicative discourse, is against the miners, or the "mob", whose
violence makes Gerald's earlier attack on Job Arthur seem mild in comparison.
For though Gerald kicks Job Arthur to the ground in Act m, scene I, shouting
"Get out! -Get out! - Vermin! -Vermin! - I'll vermin you! - I'll put my
foot through your phrases. - Get up, I say, get up and go - go",48 his ex-
lover, Anabel, manages to calm him quickly and lead him away, so that
susceptibility to female persuasion provides Gerald with an emotional
humanity denied to the miners in their "ugly. cold. jeering" anger.
Similarly, the miners share Gerald's desire for power but do not
possess the "respect" he and Willie demand and invoke, nor Oliver and
47 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 430.
48 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 421.
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Willie's desire for "decency". Consequently, power is not something that
should be entrusted to them, especially since they only want "to take it away
from one set and give it to another - or keep it [themselves]". (The fact that
the miners' strike is in sympathy with the office clerks against one man,
Gerald, seems to be strangely overlooked here. Furthermore, Gerald's identical
claim that the strike is an example of "one lot [wanting] what the other has
got" is not significantly weakened by the voice's reply that "you've got
everything,,49 since this response still operates within the morally enfeebled
sphere of economic interests.) Willie explains this, while also indicating that
straightforward incompetence is an obvious factor:
You're either going to make such a mess that we shall
never get out of it - which I don't think you will do,
for the English working-man is the soul of obedience
and order, and he'll behave himself tomorrow as if he
was at Sunday school, no matter what he does today-
No, what you'll do, Job Arthur, you'll set up another
lot of masters, such a jolly sight worse than what we've
got now. I'd rather be mastered by Gerald Barlow, if it
comes to mastering, than by Job Arthur Freer - oh
such a lot! You'll be far less free with Job Arthur for
your boss than ever you were with Gerald Barlow.
You'll be far more degraded. - In fact ... if you're
going to start killing the masters to set yourselves up
for bosses - why, kill me along with the masters. For
I'd rather die with somebody who has one tiny little
spark of decency left - though it is a little ~ark-
than live to triumph with those that have none.'
It is at this point that the miners, after telling Willie to "Shut thy face"," turn
"ugly". In doing so they prove the entire contents of Willie's speech: their
"ugliness" does not correspond to the ideal of "decent" conduct and their
"mob" violence demonstrates that they will make "a mess". Even Willie's
49 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 431.
soLawrence, "Touch and Go", pp. 423-4.
SI Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 424.
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claim that the "English working-man is the soul of obedience and order", and
will therefore "behave himself tomorrow [... ] no matter what he does today",
is confirmed in Oliver and Gerald's successful pacification of the miners and
in their acceptance of Gerald's evasion of their central contentions.
Their "threatening" behaviour, then, denies the miners access to
"decency" and "respect", yet their subsequent capitulation to authority only
seems to exacerbate these weaknesses to reveal a pathetic psychological
instability: as a collective political force they are fractured by irresolution and
unthinking submission to individual authority. This provides Oliver with a
foundation for his reemphasis of Willie's main criticisms of the miners: that
they are "bullying"S2like Gerald and yet, worse than Gerald, have no "higher
aim" than "fighting over the money". Furthermore, and yet more suggestively,
Oliver repeats one of Willie's keywords: "why can't we have the decency to
agree simply about money, just agree to dispose of it so that all men could live
their lives [my italics]".s3 "Decency" is a crucial link in the ideological chain
of bourgeois morality that the play enacts and endorses, for the term possesses
a history in Lawrence's letters which helps to unlock this chain's political
significance. It is therefore necessary to examine these letters in order to
elucidate the wider politico-social implications of the belief-systems upon
which Lawrence's play turns.
One of the earliest politically meaningful references to "decency" in
Lawrence's letters comes in October 1915 with regard to the small journal
entitled The Signature which Lawrence ran with John Middleton Murry and
Katherine Mansfield for a brief period of that year. This reference is
52 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 429.
53 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 430.
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particularly significant since it relates to a publication that Lawrence intended
to use as a means of disseminating his political/philosophical ideas.
Furthermore, the term is used in a letter to the British aristocrat and Prime
Minister's daughter-in-law, Lady Cynthia Asquith: "I think my papers are very
beautiful and very good. I feel if only people, decent people, would read them,
somehow a new era might set in. But I don't think people care.,,54What
constitutes a "decent person"? The audience Lawrence intended to reach
provides a clue.
Though Lawrence attacked the Liberal M. P., Harold Baker, in a letter
earlier that year,55he told Lady Cynthia Asquith in September, "You must be a
subscriber, and ask some of your friends, like Harold Baker and Catherine
Asquith - people who care, somewhere in their souls: Perhaps even Arthur
Balfour will read it.,,56The Rt Hon. Harold Baker, previously a barrister, was a
Liberal M. P. from 1910 to 1918, a member of the Army Council from 1914,
and the Inspector of Quartermaster General Services from 1916; Katherine
. Asquith was another of the Prime Minister's daughters-in-law; and Arthur
Balfour was the Conservative Prime Minister from 1902 to 1905. This did not
by any means constitute the entirety of Lawrence's desired readership for the .
paper yet it does denote a continued faith, despite occasional doubts during this
period,57 in both the political activity of the upper classes and the leading
S4 Letters, vol. II, 2 October 1915, p. 405.
ssSee Letters, vol. Il, 21 July 1915, p. 369: "men like Harold Baker are really no good-
they've got no going-forward in them - or has he, I might be mistaken".
S6 Letters, vol. II, 20 September 1915, p. 398.
S7 One such example is his comment later that month to William Hopkin: "I'm due to meet
Bernard Shaw and Arthur Balfour directly. But I don't think that men who have had any public
position for long will be any good" (p. 402). However, Lawrence was later, in 1918
(approximately a month before the writing of Touch and Go), to consider contacting such well-
known political figures, connected with the Independent Labour Party, as Philip Snowden
(chairman of the I.L. P. and M. P. for Blackburn), Mary Macarther, (trade union leader and
wife of William Anderson, chairman of the I. L. P. Executive) and the President of the Scottish
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figures of the establishment - even those involved in prosecuting the war to
which Lawrence was highly antagonistic. Indeed, Lawrence reiterated in a self-
consciously laudatory manner, again to Lady Cynthia Asquith: "Above all -
no, not above all - but really I want Arthur Balfour to read it. It may mean
something to him, in truth. But I don't knoW".58
However, in typical liberal style, Lawrence attempted to attract "a body
of believers,,59 across the political spectrum, even asking the socialist and
suffragist Alice Dax60and William and Sallie Hopkin," also socialists, if they
would like to subscribe to the journal. The language in which he addresses his
potential contributors/subscribers clarifies this liberal faith in uniting
individuals across classes and political beliefs (or else his desire to maximise
his readership, in which case it displays a liberal preference for the free market
over honesty of communication): to Russell, "I shall be the preacher, Murry
will be the revealer of the individual soul with respect to the big questions,
particularly he will give an account of the real freedom of the individual soul
as he conceives it, Katharine will do satirical sketches,,;62to the Hopkins, "Get
me a few people in Sheffield, will you - people who care vitally about the
freedom of the soul - a few people anywhere - but only those who really
care,,;63and to Lady Cynthia Asquith "I hope to God the new religious era is
Miners' Federation, Robert Smillie (though Smillie was relatively reactionary in comparison
with his political connections).
S8 Letters, vol. II, 22 September 1915, p. 399.
S9 Letters, vol. II, 22 September 1915, p. 399.
60 See John Worthen, The Early Years 1885-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), pp. 359-61, for a summary of Alice Dax's striking radicalism in contrast to the
conventional political milieu of Eastwood and Lawrence's smugly dismissive attitude towards
her political outlook.
61 Significantly, however, Touch and Go's Willie Houghton is based upon William Hopkin.
62 Letters, vol. II, 5 September 1915, p. 387.
63 Letters, vol. II, 14 September 1915, p. 391. As the editors state: "Hopkin was in close touch
with the left-wing intelligentsia in the Sheffield area (30 miles from Eastwood); among them
was Edward Carpenter". However, though Lawrence told Hopkin to find those of his contacts
in Sheffield who might be interested and even specifically asked him to send a leaflet to the
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starting into being r... J and that soon there will be a body of believers, in this
howling desert of unbelief and sensation".64
Though preceding Touch and Go by three years, the connections made
here in Lawrence's discussion of The Signature are the same: "decent people"
are those who, like Oliver Turton, "really believe" and who perceive freedom
primarily as an issue of the "individual soul" rather than as a state constituted
by its material circumstances. Furthermore, like the older Lawrence of the
"Preface to 'Touch and Go'", Lawrence evidently did not believe "decent
people" were likely to become a majority. Not only was The Signature
published by private subscription, but Lawrence continually emphasised that it
was not meant for "average stupidity",65 insisting that it must reach "one or
two people who care about the real living truth".66
These sentiments are perfectly compatible with the politics of
Lawrence's contribution to The Signature. The three issues of the paper which
were published contained the first three instalments of Lawrence's essay, "The
Crown", a piece. of writing explicitly denouncing democracr: In its dismissal
of the reality of the class structure and its double-barrelled attack on
socialist and anti-war campaigner Edward Carpenter, he nonetheless acknowledged that
Carpenter "is not in my line. But he may give the paper to some young creature" (Letters, vol.
11,25 September 1915, p. 401). In some aspects, however, Carpenter was in Lawrence's "line".
Emile Delavenay, for example, has shown that while Lawrence had a "preference for ethical
rather than political theory" (D. H. Lawrence and Edward Carpenter (London: Heinemann,
1971), p. 27), Carpenter's association with the "Fellowship of the New Life", a socialist
movement "founded in 1883 [... J for the purpose of 'the cultivation of a perfect character in
each and all' through the subordination of material things to spiritual", betrayed similar
idealist traits (p. 16).
64 Letters, vol. II, 22 September 1915, p. 399.
65 Letters, vol. 11,14 October 1915, p, 411.
66 Letters, vol. II, 5 September 1915, p. 386. Lawrence's scepticism of wider audiences can be
compared to his mistaken belief during this period that "there is no doubt that the government
does represent the country" (Letters, vol. II, 5 May 1916, p. 604). The idea that bourgeois
democracy reflects the majority's real desires and the absence in this statement of any
acknowledgement of the state's ideological role in formulating public opinion, suggest that
Lawrence's reaction to a wider public may be explained in part by a false equation of the state
with democracy.
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democratic and aristocratic ideals alike, the essay's appeal for a "new heaven
and a new earth,,67 appears meaningless in the face of its ambivalent and
immaterialist liberal conservative politics. Lawrence's rejection of the class
problem is in fact not only appropriate to his hopes for the paper's cross-
class/cross-political appeal to "decent people" who "care", but clearly
comparable to Oliver's perspective on money in Touch and Go:
We are all alike. The distinction between rich and poor
is purely accidental. Rich and poor alike are only, each
one, a pit-head surrounding the bottomless pit. But the
rich man, by pouring vast quantities of matter down his
void, gives himself a more pleasant illusion of
fulfilment than the poor man can get: that is all. Yet we
would give our lives, everyone of us, for this illusion.
There are no rich or poor, there are no masses and
middle classes and aristocrats. There are myriads of
framed gaps, people, and a few timeless fountains, men
and women. That is all.68
Though attacking the materialism of a capitalist consumer-orientated society,
Lawrence here, in anticipating Margaret Thatcher's notorious claim that
society is non-existent, and while displaying his disparaging attitude towards a
wider public for The Signature, again ignores the material basis upon which
greater fulfilment rests. Oliver's distinction between "life" and "money"
betrays a similar idealist politics,69 and his precarious attempt to adjudicate
between opposing political factions contains the same element of liberal tight-
rope walking as Lawrence's two-fold attack on democracy and aristocracy
here.
Lawrence's "decency", therefore, is a concept bound up with certain
. politico-philosophical, social and ethical/religious ideologies. Certainly, a
67 Lawrence, ''The Crown", Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine and Other Essays (1925),
ed. Michael Herbert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 306.
68 Lawrence, "The Crown", p. 274.
69 Lawrence, "Touch and Go", p. 430.
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politics which focuses primarily upon material issues such as class and money
is, for Lawrence, far from "decent". However, the term finds its most frequent
and explicit use in letters concerning the departure of the Liberal Prime
Minister, Herbert Asquith, in 1916. It is connected with the passing of a
nation's spirit:
We have got Lloyd George for Prime Minister. That is
a bad look-out for England. There was in Asquith the
old English decency, and the lingering love of liberty
[.... ] God alone knows where [Lloyd George] wi11land
us: there will be a very big mess. But the country at
large wanted him.70
That Lawrence places such significance on the replacement of one Liberal
Prime Minister for another illustrates both an extreme political narrow-
mindedness and a reduction of politics to the level of personality characteristic
of the growing power of the media as a major psychological tool for the
shaping of middle-class consciousness under capitalism. Also, "decency" is
equated with "liberty" and placed in opposition to "the country at large" who
rejected "decency". As a consequence, there will be "a very big mess", as
.feared by Willie in Touch anti Go and Law~ence in the play's preface. If there
is any doubt over the conservative nature of Lawrence's "decency", with its
overt fear of social conflict (he did after all predict accurately that Lloyd
George would increase the authoritarian measures of the war-time
government), Lawrence makes his meaning clear in another letter of that
period:
Oh, and do not think I blame the government, or howl
at it. The fools who howl at the government make my
blood boil. I respect the Prime Minister because I
believe in his real decency - and I think Lloyd Georges
are toads. - I must assert here again, that the war is, and
'70 Letters, vol. III, 7 December 1916, p. 48.
114
continues, because of the lust for hate and war, chiefly
hate of each other [ ] and [the people's] worship of
Ares and Aphrodite [ ] both Gods of destruction and
burning down.71
As in Touch and Go, political and social institutions are banished from debate
and the state's prosecution of the war is envisaged as a malaise of the spirit and
a loss of belief. Just as Oliver calls for the miners to recover their "decency"
and choose the leaders they "really believe in", and just as Gerald and Willie
insist on respectability in both the miners and their leaders, Lawrence here
proclaims his own "respect" and "belief' in the Prime Minister's "decency".
Moreover, the war itself, as the product of real political and economic forces,
. is obliterated, becoming a mere quality of the heart, just as for Oliver "fighting
over the money" is immaterial to the pursuit of freedom:
Peace and war lie in the heart, in the desire, of the
people - say what you will. Germany, nations - are
external material facts. The reality of peace, the reality
of war, lies in the hearts of the people: you, me, all the
rest.72
Significantly, Bertrand Russell's political treatise, Principles of Social
. Reconstruction ~ published in the very month in which Lawrence wrote the
above remarks - offers a similar level of understanding of the. war. For
Russell's brief friendship with Lawrence in 1915-6 culminated in a rift which
suggests an extreme divergence of political views. For example, Lawrence
wrote in the following month, December 1916:
I am convinced, if one is to do anything real in this
country, one must eschew all connection with
Fabianism, socialism, Cambridgism, and advancedism
of all sorts, like poison [.... ] One must go out on one's
own, unadhering. I would rather, myself, appear in the
Morning Post than anywhere: but of course it is
71 Letters, vol. III, 25 November 1916, p. 39.
72 Letters, vol. III, 25 November 1916, pp. 38-39.
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unthinkable. - I have not read Bertie Russell's book,
but I can assure you it is no good.73
However, in 1915 Lawrence had discussed with Russell much of the material
which was to form Principles with a view to lecturing together, and the
confluence of Lawrence's perspectives with those of Russell's left-Iiberalism'"
can be seen with particular acuity when we compare their interpretations of the
war. Russell, for instance, writes of war in general: "What makes war difficult
to suppress is that it springs from an impulse, rather than from a calculation of
the advantages to be derived from war".75 Russell's emphasis here on
"impulse", like Lawrence's on "desire", betrays a profound idealism.
Furthermore, Russell goes on to speak of England and Germany as "almost
mythical representatives" of "cold pride and hot envy"," depicting the
"mood?" of nations as the motivating force of history. Hence, it is no surprise
to find a rationalism comparable to that of Touch and Go when Russell
imagines a potential conflict between England and Canada in order to put
forward his case against the war: "If England and Canada have a disagreement,
it is taken as a matter of course that a settlement shall be arrived at by
discussion, not by force.,,78 Similar idealist traits are in fact to be found in
abundance: for example, when he describes a conflict between Manchester and
Liverpool as "a quarrel",79or when he calls for both England and capitalists to
admit their "responsibility" in the causes of conflicts:
73 Letters, vol. III, 11 December 1916, p. 50. The Morning Post was an extremely conservative
f,aper. .
4 Russell's book displayed a great deal of syndicalist influences yet maintained, particularly
with regard to the war, a definite adherence to certain fundamental liberal tenets.
7S Bertrand Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916) (London: Routledge, 1997),
~.55.
6 Russell, p. 59.
77 Russell, p. 60.
78 Russell, p. 73.
79 Russell, p. 73.
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It never occurs to them that by opposing changes
without considering whether they are just, the
capitalists share the responsibility for the class war.
And in exactly the same way England shares the
responsibility for Germany's war. If actual war is ever
to cease there will have to be political methods of
achieving the results [... ] and nations will have
voluntarily to admit adverse claims which appear just
in the judgment of neutrals. [my italics] 80
That people in positions of power will "admit" this "inwardly?" is
Russell's first hope. Realisation of the necessity to surrender power is what
Russell places a great deal of his faith in and this ideology is not only
anticipatory of Touch and Go but also of Lawrence's novel of 1922, Aaron's
Rod:
If we had realized the futility of empire, and had shown
a willingness to yield colonies to Germany without
waiting for the threat of force, we might have been in a
position to persuade the Germans that their ambitions
were foolish, and that the respect of the world was not
to be won by an imperialist pOlicy.82
Similarly, in Aaron's Rod, the Lawrencian persona, Rawdon Lilly, attempts to
make Aaron Sisson realise that he has "the need livingly to yield to a more
heroic soul, to give yourself"." Moreover, this effort is represented not merely
as a personal call but a political one: "men must submit to the greater soul in a
man, for their guidance: and women must submit to the positive power-soul in
man, for their being".84 Here, Lilly is asking for the majority of people to
"yield" any power they might have over their lives to what they recognise as a
"greater soul than theirs", 8S just as Russell hoped that those who have the
80 Russell, pp. 61-62.
81 Russell, p. 60.
82 Russell, pp. 60-61.
83 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod (1922), ed. Mara Kalnins (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 299.
84 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, pp. 298-9.
ss Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 299.
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power to exploit others' lives for their own ends will perceive the world's lack
of "respect", and "voluntarily" "yield". Thus, although Lilly is not Lawrence
mimetically realised in fiction (and the novel works well in putting Lilly's
views into radical conflict with those of other characters), Aaron's Rod
demonstrates that despite the clear bifurcation of Lawrence and Russell's
politics from mid-1915 onwards, they were still both deeply embroiled with
liberal ideological problems.
Aaron's Rod
For not only is Aaron's Rod's concluding conservatism tainted with
liberal conscience in the final "Words" of Lilly, but Aaron, the novel's
eponymous hero, is struggling with the central conflicts of his time -
foregrounded in the form of a burgeoning split between the Left and the Right
in post-war European politics. That Lilly's solution to society's unsatisfactory
and destructive network of relationships is not accepted by Aaron (it is left
open .whether or not he will accept it) and that the consistency of the solution
itself is diluted by Lilly's emphasis on "free submission", not "fixed authority"
to "bully" or "force" people with,86is indicative of the novel's account of a
man tom by the increasingly explicit contradictions of his time; those of a
liberal democratic capitalism in crisis.
The paradox which is "free submission" is one which is paradigmatic
of the novel as a whole. A liberal form of dualism operates throughout the
novel, separating such concepts as freedom from security and the social from
86 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 298.
118
the individual. These modes of being are closed off from one another and
remain antinomies until their pseudo-reconciliation in the liberal conservative
paradox of "free submission". However, this dichotomising method creates the
powerful political tensions of Aaron's Rod which function on every level of
Aaron's experience, from familial/sexual relationships and friendships,
through economic questions regarding the making of a living, to problems of
political affiliation.
The first chapter, "The Blue Ball", sets the pattern for the novel
through its sophisticated politicisation of the relationships in Aaron's family,
allowing political and personal conflicts to interpenetrate one another. In this
sense, as in the novel's ending, a dichotomy is resolved: personal and political
worlds are interconnected. However, as we will discover, this union of
categories is hierarchised in favour of the personal as the determinant of the
political.
Aaron, we are told in the second paragraph, is "secretary to the Miners
Union for his colliery" and is just returning from a meeting in which he had
"heard a good deal of silly wrangling that left him nettled.,,87On his return
home he is questioned by his wife about the meeting's events and his response
is both terse and evasive. We are told that he "did not talk much, but seemed to
think about something". 88The main question at the meeting had concerned the
"throw-in", which signifies the allocation of wages by the butty (a contractor
who is paid for the coal mined by his team and who then pays the miners from
this sum). Evidently, the miners are dissatisfied with the butties' wages but are
attempting to come to an agreement with them. However, Aaron says, "they'll
87 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. S.
88 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 7.
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come out if it isn't satisfactory".89His wife's response is to fervently oppose
the miners and in the ensuing dialogue her Christian conservatism is
counteracted by Aaron's restrained and non-committal hostility to the whole
question:
"The butties won't have it, I know," she said.
He gave a short laugh, and went on with his meal
[....]
"And what are they going to do about Job Arthur
Freer? Do they want him?"
A faint smile came on her husband's face.
"Nay, I don't know what they want.-Some of 'em
want him-whether they're a majority, I don't know."
She watched him closely.
"Majority! I'd give 'em majority. They want to get
rid of you, and make a fool of you, and you want to
break your heart over it. Strikes me you need
something to break your heart over."
He laughed silently.
"Nay," he said. "I s'l1 never break my heart."
"You'll go nearer to it over that, than over anything
else: just because a lot of ignorant monkeys want a
monkey of their own sort to do the Union work, and
jabber to them, they want to get rid of you, and you eat
your heart out about it. More fool you [.... ] If you
cared about your wife and children half what you care
about your Union, you'd be a lot better pleased in the
end. But you care about nothing but a lot of ignorant
colliers, who don't know what they want except it's
just more money for themselves. Self, self, self-that's
all it is with them-and ignorance."
"You'd rather have self without ignorance?" he
said, smiling finely.
"I would, if I've got to have it. But what I should
like to see is a man that has thought for others, and
isn't all self and politics."
Her colour had risen, her hand trembled with anger
as she sewed. A blank look had come over the man's
face, as if he did not hear or heed any more. 90
Aaron's wife is portrayed here, as she is throughout the novel, as the
conservative housewife who, in response to her material position within
89 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 7.
. 90 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, pp. 7-8.
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society as an economic dependant with a family to provide for, attacks her
husband's union involvement and his self-assertive independence.
Furthermore, she is portrayed unsympathetically and ironically as self-oriented
and materialistic herself. To reinforce her representative quality as the head of
the suffocating and constrictive, materialistic family, during this scene their
children quarrel with possessive lust over the Christmas decorations and
Millicent, the eldest, smashes a blue ball after "gloating" with self-
importance'" at having obtained it for herself. That Aaron himself is not
implicated in this materialist anarchy and that Lottie, his wife, is, becomes
clear when first Millicent and then Lottie ask him to buy some Christmas tree
candles: the former insists "desperately,,92 while the latter demands "with
barren bittemess".93 When Aaron enters the market to buy the candles he is,
moreover, struck by the "violent but quiet contest" of "people struggling to
buy things". He is set apart from the scene, an outsider critically observing the
shoppers' sublimated "outlet for their feelings" of "hostility"," just as before
Aaron is psychologically disassociated from his family - a state reinforced by
his departure from them altogether in the following chapter.
Simultaneously, however, the narrative does not allow Aaron to be
divested of responsibility for his family. For in "The Blue Ball", as later in the
novel when the Frankses defend Lottie, Aaron is also perceived from his
wife's perspective. As Aaron leaves for the pub Lottie sees him: "well-dressed,
handsome-looking. She felt there was a curious glamour about him. It made
her feel bitter. He had an unfair advantage-he was free to go off, while she
91 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 10.
92 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 13.
93 Lawrence,Aaron's Rod, p. 14.
94 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 15.
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must stay at home with the children.,,95Thus, her position is given in part - and
though the novel marginalises the female voice, in the literal sense, the power
of the female makes itself felt, as we shall see, through the acts and
consciousness of the male.
However, it is clear that Aaron represents not a concrete but an abstract
freedom, his departure signifying an idealistic denial of his wife as the
embodiment of material, self-regarding values. This freedom is abstract since
he only duplicates his wife's idealist dualism. It is worthwhile examining this
dualism in order to perceive accurately how Aaron's consciousness and the
novel as a whole is permeated with such conceptual divisions.
Lottie, in her criticism of Aaron's attachment to his union, does not
perceive a connection between a concern for "money" and intelligence, nor
between "self' and a regard for "others". In this she shares an affinity with
Willie Houghton and Oliver Turton of Touch and Go who, with the liberal
conception of education which they embody and their perception of the
miners' sympathy strike as selfish "bullying", perform a similar political
function. Jonathan Ree has excellently described what the pejorative liberal
concepts of "utilitarian education" and '''modem' subjects" fundamentally
ignore:
[... ] the effective knowledge actually acquired by
earners: techniques and theories for handling the
physical world; skills in holding down a job or holding
off oppression; imagination to make unexpected
choices or to fend off threats to personal cheer or
. survival; words and concepts for settin~ and contesting
social goals and political programmes. 6
95 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 14.
96 Jonathan Ree, "Socialism and the educated working class", Socialism and the Intelligentsia
1880-1914, ed. Carl Levy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), pp. 211-8, 214.
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Such vital skills are dismissed in Lottie's attack on unionised miners as
"ignorant monkeys" since these are the kinds of knowledge which the Labour
movement was helping to foster. Furthermore, as Ree also points out, "By the
1920s there were tens of thousands of people studying philosophy in Britain,
co-ordinated by the Marxist-inspired National Council of Labour Colleges.,,97
The idealist division of practical and theoretical knowledge is an important
issue which I will return to later in my discussion of the relationship between
Lilly and Aaron.
Equally, Lottie's representation of the miners as self-interested is
historically significant. Perhaps most importantly, the formation of the Triple
Industrial Alliance in December 1915 had helped to initiate a period of
intensified struggle on a co-operative level between the Miners' Federation of
Great Britain, the National Union of Railwaymen and the National Transport
Workers' Union; a period which both saw the miners strike in sympathy with
the other unions, and saw them denied support from the more conservative
union, J. H. Thomas' National Union of Railwaymen. Moreover, on the wider
scale of class, workers' struggles frequently entailed calling for increases in
wages to keep pace with the rapid post-war increases in the standard of living.
When they did not, however, they were meant to prevent wage cuts for the
benefit of private profiteering, improve working conditions, or precipitate
major political changes, such as nationalisation and the removal of British
troops from Russia and Ireland. The miners, who are a seldom seen yet
persistent presence in Aaron's Rod, provide a good example. For instance, if
97 Ree, pp. 217-18.
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we note the major event in the mining industry of the year before the novel's
publication, 1921, we can see that Lottie's remarks are misplaced:
The colliers had expected demands for a reduction of
wages because of the trade slump, and the fall in the
cost of living from mid-winter onwards. But the
reductions demanded, in some Districts halving the
wages of certain grades, went far beyond their worst
expectation. Never in the recorded history of coal-
mining had there been a cut so drastic as this.98
Meanwhile, the Government "'compensated' the coal-owners by paying the
full standard profit up to the end of 1920 and nine-tenths of that up to the end
of the first quarter of 1921,,99- an action which could not easily be described as
socially cohesive. In contrast to the owners, however, the miners' self-concern
is bound up with the working class's concern as a whole and, since this class is
exploited under capitalism, their struggles are against all exploitation. Lottie
does not perceive this, as the wife of a union secretary whose position is more
at risk as the miners' militancy increases. Neither, therefore, does she see that
workers' economic demands set precedents for the entire working class.
Such is the. idealism and atomistic conception of the individual in
Lottie, Aaron's wife. Similarly, Aaron does not understand that his wife's
social position dictates her self-regard and material interest. He can leave his
family and enjoy the freedom he does because he is a man within a patriarchal
capitalist order. He is critical of the materialism of the world around him which
he perceives, like his wife, in the miners (he leaves their "silly wrangling" as
well as his family), but also in her and the Christmas Eve shoppers. However,
by disengaging himself from organised labour, Aaron, like Lottie, dismisses
98 R. Page Arnot, The Miners: Years of Struggle: A History of the Miners' Federation of Great
Britain (from 1910 onwards) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 296.
99 Arnot. p. 294.
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not only the importance of material life for freedom but also the practical
quality of knowledge: his journey through Europe leads him into a hierarchical
relationship in which he, the artisan, depends upon and venerates Lilly, the
artist and, for Aaron, the man of "freedom".loo
In his departure from this world of relationships, Aaron rejects both a
consumerist capitalism and a mining community with fierce economic and
political demands. The solution, however, is an ideal one and its abstraction
from the possibilities the world has to offer is revealed once Aaron finds
himself restlessly roaming around Europe, eager despite himself for social
relationships as well as individual liberty. The novel thus sets up its most
powerful themes in the first chapter: the conflict between freedom and
responsibility, spirituality and materialism, adventure and security, self and
other, ideas and their practice, relationship and individualism.
These polarities are revealed more starkly as the novel progresses. For
example, through his departure and subsequent travels, Aaron is drawn
towards notions of freedom rather than responsibility, yet he nonetheless
encounters intense ideological opposition - frequently through others,
sometimes from himself. When, for instance, Aaron hears that Lilly (a friend
he has only recently made) is to part company with him, having "had enough
of this", lOt he reacts enviously yet angrily at his friend's easy "freedom" and
insists that Lilly will "try somebody else" in "the next five minutes".102
Interestingly, having abandoned his wife with a comparably abrupt termination
of their relationship, Aaron adopts here the stereotyped reaction of the
100 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 109.
101 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 106.
102 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 107.
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housewife at her husband's potentially adulterous wanderings -and Lilly even
remarks that Aaron "talk[s] to me like a woman".I03 Thus, Aaron is placed
ironically in the position he himself placed his wife, Lottie. Aaron's jealous
accusation of infidelity is, yet more significantly, accompanied with a desire
for Lilly's "freedom". This elevated notion of "freedom" is undermined,
however, both by Aaron's own simultaneous wish for Lilly's companionship
and by the inherently bogus nature of this "freedom" as revealed by Lilly
himself.
For though Aaron recognises that Lilly, as a writer, is not bound to the
routinised life of the ordinary working individual (unlike Aaron who is "tied to
a job"), Lilly has to point out to him that "at this very moment you could buy
me up, lock, stock and barrel". Lilly is, after all, neither materially better off
than Aaron, nor less at the mercy of money - in fact, he lives a more
precarious existence as a price for his "freedom". However, what Lilly does
not comprehend in Aaron's claim that he, Lilly, has "got the advantage of me",
is that class divides the two men, providing one with a higher degree of this,
though dubious, "freedom".'?' Indeed, Lilly is dismissive, evidently perceiving
Aaron's interrogations as concerned with a "fictitious advantage" of jobs rather
than a real one. lOS Thus Lilly denies the determining role of class in an
individual's form and quality of life. Aaron, by contrast, is aware of Lilly's
unconscious acknowledgement of his "advantage" through the latter's manner
of assuming superiority in their relationship. Aaron even psychologically
corners Lilly, confronting him with the decisive question: "You believe you
103 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 105.
104 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 109.
lOS Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 110.
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know something better than me--and that you are something better than me.
Don't you?"I06 That Lilly, with his characteristic rhetorical skill, evades the
question and turns it back upon Aaron ("Do you believe it? [... ] if you don't
see it, it isn't there,,)107only makes it more evident that he does feel "better".108
Of course, when Lilly suggests to Aaron at the end of the novel that men
should "submit to the greater soul in a man", the reader is perfectly aware that
Lilly is asking Aaron to submit to him - Aaron's question, "whom shall I
submit to?", and Lilly's reply, "Your soul will tell you", together already
contain in microcosmic form the seeds of such a power relationship.l'"
Therefore, though Lilly insists that class is immaterial, he tacitly accepts it as a
determining factor in his relationships.
In Lilly and Aaron's relationship, then, responsibility and freedom
haunt one another, and the materiality of life weighs upon the ideal forms with
which both characters attempt to adorn it. Class plays a vital role in these
antagonisms because, though they are from "the same district, the same
class","? Lilly is a "literary" arti~tl11 while Aaron is a "miner's
checkweigbman" by profession.l'" only giving this up during the course of the
novel to become a wandering flautist. Their contrasting educations, however,
constitute a particularly striking factor in their frictional relationship. For
unlike Lilly; whose vocation and language indicate a high degree of formal
education, Aaron has "a curious quality of an intelligent, almost sophisticated
106 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 111.
107 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 111.
108 Although we are told at the end of this chapter, ''The War Again", that Aaron "rather
thought he did" feel "superior to his unworldly enemy" (Lilly), he does not attempt to enact
this feeling through their relationship as Lilly does (p. 121).
109 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 299.
110 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 106.
IIILawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 45.
112 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 65.
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mind, which had repudiated education". We are also informed that "on purpose
he kept the midland accent in his speech". Furthermore, he "understood
perfectly what a personification was-and an allegory. But he preferred to be
illiterate't.!" This discrepancy between Aaron and Lilly in education and
speech consequently becomes a source of conflict in terms of what constitutes
honesty and lucid, meaningful expression.
For example, Aaron insists that Lilly only gives his desire for
"amusement" "a lot of names" in order to "make out as if you were looking for
the philosopher's stone". He argues that Lilly uses "talk" to "make a man
believe you've got something he hasn't got", while all Lilly has is "a bigger
choice of words". When Lilly describes his relationship with his wife Tanny,
saying that "we are, together and apart at the same time, and free of each other,
and eternally inseparable" and that their "Nirvana[s]" are separate yet
coinciding, Aaron insists that he doesn't "understand all that word-splitting".
Fundamentally, Lilly cannot engage with Aaron's criticism but only restate his
case in his own fluent, highly literary discourse - a discourse which,
appropriately considering his reference to "the Buddhists", seems to be more
directed to himself than to Aaron.i'"
This method of negotiation between conflicting class-consciousnesses
(Lilly has exiled himself both physically and psychologically from his former
class) is historically important in that the novel's period is one of endless
negotiations over industrial conflicts between workers, union leaders,
capitalists, and the government.' In June 1917, for example, a subcommittee
established by the government and chaired by the Liberal M. P. J. Whitley
113 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p, 65.
114 Lawrence. Aaron's Rod. pp. 103-5.
128
released a report suggesting the creation of ''joint standing industrial councils
for each industry on a national basis" along with "subordinate district councils
and works' committees". These "Whitley Councils" were "to consist of equal
numbers of representatives of the employers' associations and of trade
unions". However, their "permanent functions" were to cover:
[... ] negotiations on wages and the conditions of
employment, the improvement of industrial techniques,
technical education and research, discussions on
security of earnings and employment, the prevention of
differences between the two sides of the industry, and
proposals for industrial legislation. 115
Not only, then, did the subcommittee omit any consideration of workers'
participation in management, but it naturally outlined functions for the
Councils which involved the liberal concepts of social harmony and industrial
peace. The failure of the Whitley Councils, however, "reflected the
fundamental weakness of the liberalism of their supporters-the conviction
that institutional devices could bring about a social harmony that would
eradicate conflict from human relationships't.I"
In Lilly's antagonistic relationship with Aaron, we see the former
attempt (and with some degree of success) to assume power over Aaron, and
induce him to abandon his former, highly socialised life in the working class as
a Miners' Union secretary for the pursuit of a paradoxical existence as both a
follower of Lilly and an individualist - or what Aaron describes as the "life
single".117This connects historically with such initiatives on the part of the
Liberal government of the period to create social harmony between groups of
opposing interests, through such mechanisms as the Whitley Councils, and
lIS Freeden, p. 56.
116 Freeden, p. 59.
117 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 128.
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through what Keith Middlemass hypothesises as the government's emerging
corporatism which attempted to institutionalise the labour movement in the
trade unions.i"
In the context of this political climate, Aaron's movement away from
an immersion in social relationships (through his marriage and his trade union
role) towards an individualism based on a hierarchical, cross-class relationship
with the expert rhetorician, Lilly, reflects the "divide and rule" method
intrinsic to corporatism and the "the Whitley spirit", which was in a major
sense "a vehicle for 'philanthropic employers to break up the solidarity of the
union and to create a special community of interest between themselves and
the workers in their factories'r!'? Also, the neglect of the material basis to all
human relationships which marks the abstract political solution offered by
Lilly at the novel's end possesses a clear affinity with the Councils' blindness
to the opposition between workers' and employers' material interests. Thus,
one of Lilly's roles is to help transform Aaron's life and consciousness,
disrupting his strong sense of rootedness in a collectivist culture and seducing
118 See Keith Middlemass, Politics in Industrial Society: The experience of the British system
since /911 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979), pp. 120-173, for an historical account of the
various ways in which this corporatism manifested itself in the period from 1917 to 1922.
Middlemass argues that, in the arena of industrial politics, Lloyd George "shifted away from
Liberal radicalism towards a corporatism best described as the creation [of] [ ... ] a triangular
collaboration in which employers' organisations and TUC [Trades Union Congress] should
make themselves representative of their members and in return receive recognition as estates
by government" (p. 151). This "collaboration" had a significant effect on the channels of class
consciousness: "the very divergent philosophies of industrial reality held at the end of the war
by NCEO [National Confederation of Employers' Organisations] and TUC tended, in the
circumstances of the 1920s, and through the process of institutionalisation itself, to become
increasingly compatible. Class conflict did not disappear [... ] but organisations emerged which
had a vested interest in its accommodation" (p. 162). In other words, the conventional channels
of fundamentally opposing interests converge, through the institutional mechanisms, into one
of containment - an approach which leaves the balance of power between the classes
unaltered. In such a political climate, does Lilly attempt to dissolve the class consciousness of
Aaron and affiliate him to the ideology of his own domination and that of Lilly's own, more
~owerful class?
19 Freeden, p. 58.
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him with an individualism which tears him away from the oppressed social
groups of women and the working class.
In class terms, the idea of the individual artist is a powerful one in the
novel, and it is seen initially as a direct alternative to the practical and social
creativity which Aaron's work as a checkweighman and union secretary afford
him - for Aaron abandons this to become a flautist. However, the character of
Lilly represents the novel's attempt to fuse these apparently very different
skills into the individual. This results in an appropriation of both manual and
intellectual forms of labour into the middle-class Lilly, who desires complete
self-sufficiency in the face of a threatening world of political forces, the
sources of which are paradoxically both in the state and in Bolshevism,
anarchism, and the growing radicalism of women, as the chapter "XX
Settembre" makes violently clear. Hence, when Aaron has lost "proper control
of himself',120 both physically through influenza and constipation, and
psychologically through the delirium of mental breakdown, Lilly takes on the
role of nurse and religious saviour, domestic and philosopher. This gathering
of traditionally working-class and female roles into the bourgeois, artistic, and
"independent" individual is depicted in all its insidious details:
He put on the kettle, and quietly set cups and plates
on a tray. The room was clean and cosy and pleasant.
He did the cleaning himself, and was as efficient and
inobtrusive a housewife as any woman. While the
kettle boiled, he sat darning the socks which he had
taken off Aaron's feet when the flautist arrived, and
which he had washed. He preferred that no outsider
should see him doing these things. Yet he preferred to
do them himself, so that he should be independent of
outside aid.121
120 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 91.
121 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 98.
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The "indomitable stillness" with which Lilly darns Aaron's socks does not
indicate any utopian harmony between Lilly's class and the classes whose
roles he has appropriated. It does not imply a personal revolution of the kind
which, on a microcosmic level, collapses the various divisions of labour in
Lilly's particular class society. For no women exist in this world other than
symbolically through Lilly, whose feeling of shame in enacting the role of a
housewife is indicated in his preference that "no outsider should see him" and
whose ideal woman is the "efficient" and "inobtrusive" housewife.122
Similarly, the working class are most explicitly represented here in the form of
the sick Aaron who can only convalesce in the hands of Lilly, as "his
patient".123Rather, this "indomitable stillness" is the rigidly controlled surface
of self-imposed calm (there is simultaneously "a tension" in his "knitted"
brow)124in the act of asserting "individual authority" over "the mass, the
mob".125As we can see from Lilly's solipsistic philosophising in this scene,
though he has appropriated the roles of other classes and attempted to reconcile
manual and intellectual labour, he has nonetheless failed to unite the kind of
social creativity which Aaron had earlier possessed with the individual role of
the bourgeois artist. This is because Lilly has condemned people for yielding
to what he abstractly calls "the mob power", which includes both conservative
122 Steven Vine has given a brief account of the various ways in which both Lilly and Aaron
adopt conventionally feminine roles (see his "Introduction" to Aaron's Rod, pp. xv-xxxvi).
However, though Vine perceives the ambivalence of this feature of the novel as "not an
elimination of woman, but a usurpation of her traditional powers" (p. xxx), he does not
distinguish between the use of these powers to undermine Aaron (particularly, as Iexplained
earlier, vis-a-vis Lottie) and Lilly's absorption of them as both a symbolic method of male self-
reinforcement, and a form of subordination of women as an actual social group. Moreover, his
notion that "Aaron's Rod [... ] feminizes man not in neurasthenic disempowerment, but in
metaphoric re-empowerment" (pp. xxx-xxxi) marginalises this latter subordinative role for
Lilly.
123 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 96.
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forces such as "the nation, lloyd George and Northcliffe and the police and
money,,126and - by implication through his recommendation of "a bit of
healthy individual authority,,127- the "mass" in Raymond Williams's sense of
the word, meaning "other people".128This leads Lilly into a release of racist
vitriol at "Europeans, Asiatics, Africans" who are "craven and cringing" in
their "individual quick" and a eulogy on the merits of "the true blood" and
"living pride" to be found in "the Aztecs and the Red Indians [.... ] the
American races--and the South Sea Islanders--the Marquesans, the Maori
blood".129It also spills into his hostile sense of women as a social group, both
through Lilly's self-confessed obsession with his own "power,,130 and
"individual authority" in general, which makes him revile the social institution
of marriage as "Egoisme a deux", a "self-conscious egoistic state" between two
people, and through his revulsion at "the millions and billions of people" of the
world which makes the thought of having children with a woman a repulsive
fear of adding "my quota to the mass".131
Aaron, however, can still offer opposition to Lilly at this point in the
novel. Indeed, we are told that "there was a profound hostility between them",
and that "Lilly's skilful housewifery always irritated Aaron" since it was "so
self-sufficient". However:
[... ] most irritating of all was the little man's
unconscious assumption of priority. Lilly was actually
unaware that he assumed this quiet predominance over
others. He mashed the potatoes, he heated the plates, he
warmed the red wine, he whisked the eggs into the
milk pudding, and served his visitor like a housemaid.
126 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 96.
127 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 97.
128 Raymond Williams, Culture, p. 289.
129 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 97.
130 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 96.
131 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 99.
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But none of this detracted from the silent assurance
with which he bore himself, and with which he seemed
to domineer over his acquaintance.P''
Lilly thus adopts the role of the subordinate unconsciously in order to obtain
power over his guest: the appropriation of a lower class role is used to maintain
or even strengthen the pre-established hierarchy. Nonetheless, though Aaron
goes on to argue with Lilly and temporarily fallout with him, it is suggested
that this important insight into Lilly's psychology is due to be pacified. For we
are told that the "hostility is not antipathy".133 Furthermore, the previous
chapter had already shown Aaron shift partly into consent with Lilly over his
sense of an abstract opposition between the individual and the "mass". For
Aaron and Lilly's attack on "sacred children, and sacred motherhood" not only
cuts the male off from the female but the individual from the "millions and
billions of people" which children "grow up into".134
Thus what is steadily being rejected here, primarily by Lilly through his
hatred of the "mass", his repudiation of social purpose and creativity, and his
emphasis on "individual authority" as essential to both personal and political
relationships, is collective ideas as a whole - and though these may often be
superficially used, with insidiously effective power, by a nation-state intent on
war, they are on the whole oppositional to "bourgeois culture". For as
Raymond Williams has explained, '''working-class culture'" is "the basic
collective idea, and the institutions, manners, habits of thought, and intentions
which proceed from this", whereas "bourgeois culture" is "the basic
individualist idea" in all these respects. He summarises: "working-class culture
132 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 106.
133 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 106.
134 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 100.
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[ ... J is primarily social (in that it has created institutions) rather than individual
(in particular intellectual or imaginative work)".135Lilly then, as a now-
middle-class producer of "intellectual or imaginative work", tries to sever
Aaron from the "masses and groups", the "mass-consciousness" and "mass-
activity",136and attract him to his ideal of the "sacred and holy individual".137
Furthermore, he attempts this deceptively (and ironically) through the adoption
of oppressed social groups' practical skills.
So it is then that Aaron and Lilly move into yet more politically
tumultuous waters as society and the individual become further polarised; that
is, both characters, through their relationship, turn towards an idealist
conception of social harmony paradoxically based on individualist notions of
human agency. While Lilly believes in and acts from a sense of the importance
of "individual authority" in human relationships, Aaron - after briefly
returning to his wife in "More Pillar of Salt" - begins to conceive of "sheer,
finished singleness" as the "only way to final, living unison".138
That this conception of relationship offers no harmony but, rather, a
perilous balancing of opposites, has already been reflected in Lilly's argument
with Aaron over the war, in which the two characters are set against one
another at the poles of the liberalism with which they are struggling. For the
antagonism between the ideal of individual liberty, and the socio-economic
demands of capitalism which is represented in this altercation, is at the heart of
the centrifugal forces of liberalism - forces which the war exacerbated to an
unsustainable level.
m Raymond Williams, Culture, pp. 313-14.
136 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 119.
137 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 282.
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Lilly vociferously defends one half of this equation by setting up an
opposition between the conflated and heralded concepts of the individual and
freedom on the one hand and "all masses and groups" on the other, which are
culled together, regardless of political standpoint, as a "horrible heap", a
"swarm" of "nightmare and nullity". Conversely, Aaron, in his virtual
acceptance of the necessity of the war, embodies both the "mass-psyche"
which Lilly damns and the material pragmatism of the capitalist nation-state:
"It's the wide-awake ones that invent the poison gas, and use it. Where should
we be without it?".139Aaron's analysis of the "face of things" contrasts heavily
with Lilly's bold idealism which opposes the war from the "sacred" nature of
individual liberty, rejecting any "mass-activity" against it. This brings sharply
into focus the fissuring of liberalism during the war over such issues as
conscription and the Defence of the Realm Act.
As Freeden has shown, a "schism in liberal opinion" was created over
conscription. From a moderate liberal position, for example, "curtailment of
liberty was necessary for national survival, but in order to preserve liberty,
popular submission should as far as possible 'be that of enlightened free-will,
not that of mechanical compulsion"'. However, as perhaps is clear from this
passage's affinity with Lilly's untenable, oxymoronic ideal of "free
submission", liberals tended to fallon either side of this contradiction in their
philosophy, either insisting that "serving the flag" had priority over individual
freedom (it "had always been considered by liberals to be a fundamental
citizen duty"), or condemning the Liberal government for its attack on liberty.
139 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 119.
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For· the latter group of liberals, "the Liberal government was no longer the
liberal government'V''"
In Lilly and Aaron's discussion of the war, the polarised values of a
divided liberal capitalism enter in the form of a violent altercation. Lilly,
representative of self-possession, the "individual", and the "spirit", turns
furiously on Aaron, whose hard-headed and nihilistic acceptance of the
"machines of war" and "men and nations" as they are, lead him to welcome the
use of "poison gas".'?' Consequently, the economic imperatives of a capitalist
nation-state are, through Aaron, seen in direct contradiction to the reigning
political ideals of liberal democracy as embodied in Lilly: individual freedom
is an ideological illusion within the reality of an unfree social system.
Moreover, what survives this dialogue, through Lilly's growing ideological
power over Aaron, is the notion that the freedom of the "sacred and holy
individual" can be preserved without recourse to "mass-activity". For just as
"all masses and groups" are equated with the armed violence of imperialist
capitalism in "The War Again", the individual is set up on a pedestal against
all "bullying" in "The Broken Rod".142This final separation of the individual
from her inescapably social existence leaves Lilly, like liberalism itself in the
post-war years, in a political no-man's land: he is neither able to attack the
capitalist and state exploitation of miners by supporting their campaign for
nationalisation (since he detests all "mass-activity", though apparently he is
unable to bear the bullying of individualsl); nor able to defend state
prosecution of the war for the expansion of British capitalism (since he loathes
140 Freeden, pp. 21-22.
141 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, pp. 119-20.
142 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 282.
137
all "bullying" even on behalf of a system based on individualism).
Furthermore, Lilly's professed desire to "break the old forms",143
through the opaque, spiritualistic ploy of facing "the world as we've made it
[... ] our own souls as we find them" and taking "the responsibility", leads him
into something of a quandary since his notion of the "old forms" conflates
politically opposed social groups and institutions, including "sacred
motherhood" and "money". Consequently, as the novel progresses (or retreats),
his new conception takes on more and more of an ideal form which, in its
transcendence of material and social life, ironically acquiesces in the
perpetuation of many of those "old forms". Meanwhile, though Aaron acts as a
fissuring device in his row with Lilly over the war, his contempt for mass
consumerism and, as the early chapters indicate, his loss of faith in the labour
movement, lead him to sympathise with Lilly's idealist rejection of the
material world in all its contemporary forms. The seeds of this rejection are _
sown early in the novel in the bohemians' discussion over the nationalisation
of the mines and Bolshevist revolution.
The characters of Jim Bricknall, a former army officer and a "sort of
socialist [... ] a red-hot revolutionary of a very ineffectual sort",I44 and his
fiance, Josephine Ford, an artist and also an advocate of Bolshevist revolution,
who feature prominently in this discussion, act as representatives of material
disorder and psychological malaise. They are symbolic figures whom Lilly and
Aaron must later reject in order to find a potentially satisfying state of being
and relationship. What is especially significant about them is that they provide
143 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 120.
144 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod. p. 73.
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a voice, like the miners of the second chapter, "The Royal Oak", both for
immediate contemporary history and for social being and material life.
Aaron and Lilly, however, are at best indifferent to this voice. When,
for instance, Jim enquires of Aaron "What do you make of the miners?",
Aaron's absurdly non-committal response is not without humour: "I don't
make anything of them". More amusingly, Aaron is seemingly unconcerned
and even ignorant of his former co-workers' current and widely-publicised
struggle - that is, for nationalisation - and its purposes:
"Do you think they'll make a stand against the
government?"
"What for?"
"Nationalisation. "
"They might, one day."
"Think they'd fight?"
"Fight?"
"Yes."
Aaron sat laughing.
"What have they to fight for?,,145
As a former "secretary to the Miners Union for his colliery" who, in the first
chapter of the novel, discusses a potential industrial action with his wife,
Aaron is eccentrically playful here, and yet simultaneously removed from and
hostile to the materialist politics which he has left behind: his apparently
amused indifference is indicative of a profound disillusionment with his class
interests. It is not so much that he does not want to engage with those interests,
but that he has ceased to be able to engage with them - he has after all "only
just left" his fellow miners, "for good".146
Aaron's "rather indifferent" tone, however, is not politically indifferent.
The miners' "silly wrangling" which had "nettled" him in the opening scene is
143 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 59.
146 Lawrence. Aaron's Rod, p. 60.
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part of his judgement here also: "They'll do a lot of cavilling". Josephine, on
the other hand, wishes that the miners would "make a bloody revolution". The
effect of this is to stun the others and polarise response. A "symbol of young
disaster", Josephine insists that "I don't believe in revolutions that aren't
bloody", that she would "love it", and in a "real fight" would "love" "getting
killed". This is accompanied by Jim's "luscious" voice, exclaiming "What
price machine guns at the end of the Strand! That's a day to live for, what?",
Clariss's "deep laugh" and Tanny's comment that a "bloody revolution" would
"be rather fun". In contrast, Julia reacts "hysterically", crying "I should be
frightened", while Robert questions the idea both on the grounds of its
violence and of a vague personal sense of it, like the Great War, "work[ingJ
out rather stupid and unsatisfying". Lilly identifies the difference between the
First World War and a "civil war" with a typically depoliticising metaphor: a
revolution is "pulling the house down". ]47 By implication, however, this
metaphor recognises that the Great War was part of "the house". This
recognition reminds us of the novel's opening:
[... J the War was over, and there was a sense of relief
that was almost a new menace. A man felt the violence
of the nightmare released now into the general air. Also
there had been another wrangle among the men on the
pit-bank that evening.v"
Here, the prose reflects an important perception that the wider war between
imperialist nation-states has helped to precipitate a new, internal, class conflict.
Yet the conditions of domination and anarchic competition which created the
First World War are obscured here, whereas Lilly's later metaphor both hints
at these conditions and re-directs the discussion away from the real nature of
147 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 60.
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"the house" as a system of violence and anarchy itself. The kind of
consciousness which substitutes the word "house" for capitalism is both
repressed and repressive.
Josephine and Jim's sense of the importance of the mobilisation of the
miners' economic interests for a wider political and moral struggle for
"freedom, liberty, an escape from this vile system", acts as a crucial
redefinition to counter Lilly and Aaron's idealist division of material life from
intellectual life.149 In fact, the only method Lilly possesses of dismissing this
synthesis is through his domestication of political discourse (a similar
manoeuvre to Oliver Turton's description of the miners' dispute in Touch and
Go as a "quarrel") which allows him to pretend that "the house" "pall[s]" on
him.150 1 say "pretend", for throughout the novel Lilly affirms his ideals of
individual freedom and an escape from "bullying", both of which entail a
rigorous attack on the present system of material organisation, or what Lilly
simply calls "money". This is shown most forcefully through Aaron, who both
agrees with Lilly that "the house" inspires a lack of interest rather than hatred,
and who gradually falls more into an ideological line with Lilly. For Aaron,
like Lilly, is bitterly hostile to bourgeois materialism and its attendant ideals of
security, respectability and the family. For example, Aaron comes into conflict
with the bourgeois Frankses and their friends in "Novara" when they accuse
Lilly of failing to write "with any eye to the market". Aaron responds by
affirming "the spirit" in Lilly which "move[s] him dead against the market"
and by insisting on his own individualistic belief in "chance": "I believe, if 1
go my own way, without tying my nose to a job, chance will always throw
149 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 60.
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something in my way".151Notably, these words are spoken after the dialogue
in which Aaron shows envy towards Lilly for his "freedom" from the orthodox
labour of a 'job". Similarly, when Aaron is accused of being "pretty selfish, to
marry a woman and then expect her to live on very little indeed, and that
always precarious, just because you [... ] believe in Providence", Aaron's
matter-of-fact way of stating that his wife has "no right" to "security" and
"provision" if he himself does not, represents a repudiation of the family,
. responsibility and the other which has already been agreed upon between
Aaron and Lilly in their discussion of "sacred motherhood".152
Thus, the pair's agreement that "the house" bores them seems
contradictory in the light of the anti-bourgeois sentiments which necessarily
accompany their ideals: for if Aaron desires freedom he must also oppose what
he calls the "money we live for" and which the bourgeois accepts and
idolises.153Furthermore, the irony of Aaron and Lilly's acceptance of the
economic system in "Talk" is supplemented by the fact that the language they
use for their ·political desires is identical to Josephine's. For Josephine's
affirmation of "freedom, liberty, [and] an escape from this vile system" sounds
strikingly similar to Lilly's terms - the difference is, that Lilly and Aaron want
political and spiritual change without any disruptive material transformation.
Thus material questions become, for the pair, such a reduced sphere of interest
that the economic system in which "the money" is what "we live for" is only to
be altered by ceasing to be interested in it altogether: by individuals allowing it
to "pall" on them. As a consequence, the "violence of the nightmare" of early
lSI Lawrence: Aaron's Rod, pp. 142-3.
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twentieth-century capitalism, which is desublimated in Josephine as a
revolutionary "symbol of young horror", forces Aaron and Lilly into a political
and philosophical comer. For Lilly and Aaron cannot choose "the house", yet,
simultaneously, they cannot choose its destruction. They reject the ideology of
security on a personal level for the sake of a precarious freedom for themselves
and their spouses, yet they will not risk the uncertainty of destabilising the
system upon which such barren notions of freedom and security rest. They
desire a superior moral universe based on liberty, but do not desire the socio-
material transformation upon which such a world would be based. They reject
"cavilling", "bullying" and "wrangling", but in their acceptance of the material
status quo which is "the house", they agree to its systematised "bullying". In
short, their ideological position is in such turmoil that the ideal plane is the
only refuge in which to continue their partnership in political thought.
This ideal plane is a refuge in a double sense: it is at once a haven from
thinking anything which one may feel impelled to act upon, and at the same
time an attempt to repress the memory of material history. The former is
indicated particularly forcefully in "XX Settembre" after Aaron witnesses the
Italian police clash violently with a socialist protest. His response is to use the
art of music as a cathartic instrument:
Aaron withdrew into his room. His mind and soul were
in a whirl. He sat down in his chair, and did not move
again for a great while. When he did move, he took his
flute and played he knew not what. But strange, strange
his soul passed into his instrument. Or passed half into
his instrument. There was a big residue left, to go
bitter, or to ferment into good old wine of wisdom.lS4
154 Lawrence. Aaron's Rod. p. 187.
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Here, having seen the socialists, at first "vicious" in their "demon-like set
purpose"155 and then "all cowed and hang-dog once more,,156following the
"wild and indiscriminate" attack of the "carabinieri", who rushed at them,
"beating them wildly with truncheons", Aaron "withdr[aws]" and channels his
emotional response into his flute.157The depiction of this scene, with its equal
distaste for the police and the socialists, supports Aaron's aesthetic
disengagement from the decisive political struggles of his time. With the
institutions of liberal democracy collapsing in the Italy of 1920, Aaron's
reaction is to use art as a depoliticising instrument. Insofar as he is able to do
this, his "soul" evades any consideration of political position. Insofar as he is
unable, he defends those almost obsolete institutions through a combination of
the inertia of bitterness and an illusory faith in the power of individual
"wisdom" .
The latter sense in which this ideal plane is a refuge can best be
illustrated by placing Aaron's understanding of the miners' campaign for
nationalisation in the context of social and political history. For Aaron's
cynical estimation of this campaign as a mere process of "cavilling" marks a
turning point in the novel with regard to the process of political engagement
and speculation. In the second chapter of the novel, "The Royal Oak", Aaron
had speculated on the cause of class conflict in mixed terms. While holding
that "it's money as is between the masters and us", Aaron adds that "for as
long as one holds [one end of the rope], the other will pulI".ISS These
interpretations clash ideologically in that the former recollects the material
ISS Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 183.
156 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 186.
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foundations of an existing power relationship, which involves a consciousness
of oneself as the subservient group ("money" is "between" the "masters" and
"us"), while the latter has forgotten these features, and implicitly allows for the
workers' surrender to be a positive solution to the conflict. However, Aaron's
method of political speculation, here based both on a process of remembering
one's experience in material history and on a process of overlooking it, is
significantly altered in his removal from the social milieu of the local public
house and the company of fellow miners to the middle-class circle of artists
and bohemians in London. In Aaron's notion of the miners' nationalisation
programme there is no longer any recollection of a (both personal and shared)
material history. Instead, political interpretation is based on a method of
idealism and cynicism: a mode of historical prediction which denies itself
access to both the past and the future.
For the notion of the miners' demands as "cavilling" is certainly not
based on any historical precedent of the period. To recall the deep and lasting
effects of war-time inflation:
Prices, not only of coal but of all commodities, rose
steeply during the winter of 1914-15 with the result
that in the New. Year wages demands were put
forward in several industries. In· the mining industry
changes in wages had hitherto been regulated in
Conciliation Boards where the sole factors taken
into account ... were the selling price of coal and the
volume of output. Prices of other commodities, which
made up the cost of living, had been left out of the
reckoning. In this respect the Iiving standards of the
miners had considerably worsened in the twenty years
of rising prices since the English Conciliation Board
had been set up in 1894.159
IS9 Arnot. pp. 161-2.
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Thus, the immediate past does not offer much substantiation to the claim that
miners might be expected to raise trivial objections. More importantly,
however, the campaign for nationalisation was to reveal the nature of those the
miners confronted. For the Sankey Commission, a "Committee of Inquiry" into
the coal trade set up by the government in early 1919 to pacify the miners,
exposed the appalling reality of private ownership in the mining industry."? It
emerged, for example, how "profits were immensely increased during the war
by price guarantees being fixed to ensure profits to even least paying
collieries" at the expense of both the miner and the consumer.l''' Furthermore,
evidence showed "how huge profits were concealed by the capitalisation of
reserves or other readjustments of capital".162In terms of the debate between
the proponents of nationalisation and private control, the Commission made it
clear that "nationalisation provided the only really adequate method by which
to preserve and raise the miners' standard of life, besides being the only
effective safeguard for the consumer",163 illustrated that private ownership
"was characterised by wastefulness and extravagancev.l'" and became "less of
a cold enquiry" and more of "an open trial of private capitalism in the coal-
mining industry".165
Aaron not only represses history in "Talk", therefore, but decides that
he will no longer attempt to understand the significance of future historical
events. His prediction that the miners will "do a lot of cavilling" is
160 The Inquiry examined, in particular, the miners' requests for wage increases, a reduction in
hours and nationalisation of the industry.
161 Arnot, p. 192.
162 Arnot, p. 193.
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uninterested in its own potential vindication since Aaron's confirmation that he
has "left" the miners "for good", and his "indifferent" attitude to the question
of nationalisation, betray his desire to forget even the future - that is, the future
of worldly events.166 Thus, Aaron must shift his sense of what constitutes an
effective historical indicator of the zeitgeist in order to maintain any concern
for either the past or the future. Having rejected, then, the conventional signals
of historical and political development (for Aaron, whether or not the
government nationalises the mines is unimportant), Aaron begins to use similar
historical yardsticks to Lilly. These are frequently religious, aesthetic and
philosophical, and suggest (with their reference-points being those of an
intellectual "high" culture) a new kind of 'high" politics as a substitute for the
"low", worldly politics of (both) parliaments and protests.
In order to illustrate this point, rather than offer a detailed analysis of
the novel's second half, I shall provide a brief account of how this feature of
the novel recreates itself continuously in different scenes. For the novel
possesses this tendency of repeating itself through a plethora of various scenes
and dialogues: this is, in fact, the modus operandi of Aaron's Rod. Unlike its
predecessors, Aaron's Rod is entrapped in a narrative cycle of perpetually
offering up the competing opposites of its epoch, only to abandon them
unreconciled, to seek refuge in idealism. Kangaroo (1923), similarly, adopts a
cyclical narrative procedure which is self-consciously exploited by its narrator
with defiant playfulness:
Chapter follows chapter, and nothing doing [.... ] We
can't be at a stretch of tension all the time, like the E
string on a fiddle. If you don't like the novel, don't
166 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 60.
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read it. If the pudding doesn't please you, leave it,
leave it. I don't mind your saucy plate.167
Like Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo uses this method in order repeatedly and
stubbornly to re-establish the political quandaries and sanctuaries of post-war
liberalism. Both these novels, then, tend towards a repetition rather than a
progression of these themes. Hence, a brief over-view of the latter half of
Aaron's Rod should suffice to demonstrate the novel's prevailing modus
operandi and should also be understood as an analytical paradigm for a
discussion of Kangaroo (though there is not the space for such a discussion
here).
Idealist patterns of thought, then, permeate Aaron's consciousness in
the latter half of the novel. This is particularly striking in Aaron's evolving
ideas on money, property, and class, which awkwardly attempt to over-ride
social conflicts. For example, as a reflex to his "self-conscious embarrassment"
at being chauffeured away from the Frankses in their "soft and luxurious car",
Aaron idealises third-class train travel both as more "alive" and as a stubborn
defiance of social snobbery. His rejection of "riches" here, through a connoted
anti-materialism, also appears to reject comfort in general and "money" as
"power" (it is only "a kind of numbness"): consequently, Aaron fails to
understand that money is a form of power in his current society, and thus
devalues material opposition to it.168
Similarly, later in the chapter "XX Settembre", the Italian socialists,
whose anti-nationalist march results in a violent clash with the police, are
imbued with a dehumanising, destructive purpose on a metaphysical and
167 Lawrence, Kangaroo (1923), ed. Bruce Steele (London: Penguin, 1997),
E·284.
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depoliticised level: "There was [... ] something inhuman and possessed-looking
in their foreign,' southern-shaped faces, so much more formed and demon-
. looking than northern faces".169Alongside this abstract and dualistic biological
thinking, moreover, is the implication that socialism or political protest in
general is a perverted sublimation of male sexuality - the sexualising language,
the demonisation of the men, and the emphasis upon the absence of women all
suggesting this: "There were no women-all men-a strange male, slashing
sound. Vicious it was".170This sense of radicalism as a warped form of
sexuality thus also hints at an historical role for depoliticised gender identities;
a role which Aaron later ascribes to the Florentine male.
In the following chapter, "A Railway Journey", the historico-material
grounds of class conflict are again psychologically evaded, when Aaron's seat
in the third-class carriage is taken by a "stout",171"insolent" man,l72creating
an altercation between the man and Aaron's two companions of "the upper
middle classes" (who are travelling first class).173From this spectacle Aaron -
stands moralistically aloof, seemingly ridiculing both the upper middle classes
for "hang[ing] on" to their "artificial cash superiority" (while also possessing
"an exaggerated respect for him and his life-power"),174and the lower classes
for their "insolent" and "jeering" robbery. Consequently, class conflict is
rejected as a reality founded upon concrete socio-economic conditions (''The
third class carriages were packed. For those were the early days after the war,
169 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 183.
170 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 183.
171 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod. p. 200.
172 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 201.
173 Lawrence,Aaron's Rod, p. 197.
174 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 197.
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while men still had pre-war notions and were poor"),175 paving the way for
ideas of class (such as "life-power"), morality and justice abstracted from
materially constituted social relations.
Such abstract notions of historical agency are prominent, moreover, in
the chapter "Florence", in which Aaron's personal feeling of aesthetic awe
when he enters the Piazza della Signoria is transmuted into a mythologisation
of the city and its history, its various social and economic classes liquidating
into a "town of men", whose quintessential feature is that of a "curious
individuality" without "apology and without justification". This idealist
interpretation of both history and the present diagnoses the spirit of both
Florence and the Italian Renaissance as one of "unbroken", physically potent
masculinity, while then proceeding to draw the conclusion that, though it has
generally degenerated, this formerly dominant quality is still present and could
potentially rejuvenate the forces of world-history, so depleted by the epoch of
"sweet Christendomv.V" However, the "one manly quality" of "undying, acrid
fearlessness" required for this historical purpose and perceived in this "town of
men" is paradoxically without any more substantial historical referent than the
Florentine men's "sharp, almost acrid, mocking expression, the silent curl of
the nose", and constitutes a myth of masculine power and opposition of such
an indistinct nature and agency (an "acrid unbelief') as to have no more clear a
political target than "sweet Christendom", and (by implication from the novel
as a whole) all that can possibly be contained within the idea of the established
m Lawrence, Aaron' s Rod. p. 200.
176 Lawrence, Aaron' s Rod. pp. 212-13.
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order.177Gender identities are thus to be constructed outside the fields of active
polities and world history while paradoxically changing them.
Towards the end of this important chapter, furthermore, this
transcendentalist tendency is radically extended, as property is naturalised as
an extension of the self. For when Aaron is robbed in the streets by soldiers, he
interprets it as an attack on his "life-spirit" which he had not kept "guard
over",178and sees the incident as a revelation of the "power of evil" whieh had
taken advantage of his "absolute trust" in assuming that "mankind and the life-
spirit were a playground for enkindled individuals" .179This metaphysical
language of absolutes spiritualises the material as an attribute of the soul or
"life-spirit" and, in its fundamental implications for Aaron's future way of life,
creates a rigid, non-transgressable boundary between the self and the social:
"in the midst of the deepest passion or the suddenest love, or in the throes of
greatest excitement or bewilderment [... ] the sentinel of the soul must not
sleep: no, never, not for one instant.180Thus, the individual self becomes
private property, and yet the sense of material life as morally contaminated is
removed through its spiritualisation within the self.
The individual self thus atomised, Aaron unsurprisingly agrees with
Lilly, in their discussion of female power in "High Up over the Cathedral
Square", when he advocates a position later practically embraced by Aaron in
response to his affair with the Marchesa: "in love most intensely of all,
alone"."! Moreover, with comparable abstraction, Aaron and Lily do not
177 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod. p. 213.
178 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod. p. 230.
179 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, pp. 229-30.
180 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 231.
181 Lawrence. Aaron's Rod. p. 246.
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question the Marchese and Argyle's disillusionment with "the bourgeoise['s]"
subservience to his wife,182 as a misunderstanding of the contradictions
involved in bourgeois sexual relationships: rather, it is answered with Lilly's
"metaphysical" language of male individualism.l'" Thus, Aaron's "life-spirit"
has converged yet further with Lilly's idealist philosophy which has, from the
start, analysed politics on the ideal plane of binary opposites: the character of
the psychosomatically debilitated socialist, Jim Bricknall, as a representative
(for Lilly) of the spirit of love and Christianity, being a significant example,
with respect to Lilly's various speeches on the importance of individual power.
However, as we discover in "Cleopatra but not Antony", with the self
thus privatised Aaron has no room left for relationship. Hence, with his last
attempt at a relationship with a woman, the Marchesa, Aaron idealises his own
estrangement, perceiving her as "like a priestess utterly involved in her terrible
rites" and himself as "part of the ritual only, God and victim in one".184For the
establishment of an "aloof soul" not only admits no relationship, but leads to a
Romantic division of the mind from the body -:- the Marchesa, "absolutely
gone" in an unconscious sensuality, while Aaron's "remote soul", knowing
"itself alone", pontificates upon the possible mystic motives for their sexual
. behaviour.18s Aaron thus attempts, through quasi-religious terms, both to
justify his judgement upon her as a perverted example of female sexuality, and
to rationalise his own alienation. Consequently, Aaron denies his, and the
Marchese's, socio-material power position (as males) over the Marchesa, while
the politics of her sexuality is incriminated and his own sensuality repressed.
182 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 244.
183 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 247.
184 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 273.
185 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 273.
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In "The Broken Rod", having mocked both socialism and
authoritarianism, Lilly professes a similarly mystical belief, this time in a
"sacred" individuality which can be preserved from "bullying" regardless of
socio-historical limits on freedom. However, this liberal idealism, which
separates society from the individual as two hostile actors, and (in utopian
vein) imagines the ahistorical creation (stripped of history's attendant social
and material threats to the individual) of an inviolable individuality, is rebuked
with the terrible dramatic irony of an exploding anarchist bomb. This "awful"
moment, where the material world avenges itself terribly on Lilly and Aaron's
idealism, is broadly paradigmatic of the novel as a whole, which stubbornly
refuses to successfully reconcile the contradictions of the society it represents,
despite the transcendentalist attempts of Lilly and Aaron to adjust the
individual to society and thus repress their own social alienation.186
For though, by the novel's close, Aaron has moved substantially
towards the "finished singleness" which he had considered as a coping strategy
after his final confrontation with his wife187(all he is left with in "Words" is
Lilly and his ideal of the "innennost, integral unique self'),188 this intended
"isolation" of the "soul',189does not create a politically transcendent space
from which social integration is then possible. It merely takes the most
fundamental element of liberalism,· the notion of the free individual, to its
logical conclusion - the barren transcendence of the individual into the
"silence, beyond speech" that is the idealist politics of personal relations.
186 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 282.
187 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 128.
188 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 295.
189 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 105.
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Consequently, even the politicisation of these personal relations, with
its emphasis on the relationships between men and between men and women,
is made redundant since Lilly's proposed society has neither a material basis
nor a realistic conception of power: he assumes people will "livingly"
"submit" to the "deep power-soul in the individual man".190That Lilly's talk is
mere "Words" and rests upon a set of obscure and incommunicable religious
beliefs is made evident through his emphases on "silence", the "soul", and
"isolation", and his rejection of "mental power" and "wisdom".191Thus, not
only the individualism of this politics but its celestial quality leaves it perfectly
in harmony with the debilitated liberalism of its period.192
Hence, the absurd triumph of one "element in each of the dichotomies
set up by the novel betrays the fundamental evasiveness of Lilly's proposals.
The conflicts portrayed in all their complexity are toppled, allowing personal
freedom to oust social responsibility, spirituality to overcome the material, self
to dominate other, ideas to absorb practice, and individualism and power to
form the basis of relationship. Yet the contradictions are still present. They are
contained in Pte retained liberal combination of individualism and hierarchy:
190 Lawrence, Aaron 's Rod, p. 298.
191 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 297.
192 This political transcendentalism is also reminiscent of the utopian socialism so
witheringly critiqued by Marx and Frederick Engels. Lilly, as the self-proclaimed prophet of
the new society, is not dissimilar to what Engels called the "individual man of genius", desired
by the utopian socialists, "who has now arisen and who understands the truth" (Frederick
Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, trans. Edward Aveling [London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1892], p. 7). Similarly, the binary opposites which inform so much of Lilly and
Aaron's thinking (for example, the "two urges" of "love" and "power" which Lilly speaks of to
Aaron - Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 297) resemble the utopian socialists' use of such concepts
as "absolute truth, reason, and justice" (Engels, p. 27) which, due to their inadequacy in
explaining how the materially constituted contradictions of their society may be historically
resolved, meant that they adopted the approach of "the metaphysician" who "thinks in
absolutely irreconcilable antitheses" (Engels, p. 31). As a consequence, both the utopian
socialists and Lawrence's protagonists believe that, (as Marx and Engels put it), "historical
action is to yield to their personal inventive action, historically created conditions of
emancipation to fantastic ones" (Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto" (1848), Karl
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for how can Lilly's society decide who should have liberty and who should
"submit"? One assumes that Lilly is sufficiently confident that his own "deep
power-soul" will enable him to become one of the chosen leaders/individuals
of this society, despite his lack of realisation that this faith is precarious in a
society devoid of any material organisation. Equally, liberalism's championing
of individual freedom appears awkwardly diluted in the form of a capitalism
which only allots that liberty to the few entrepreneurs who best exploit the
market (and thus myriad others). Thus, Lilly's last "Words" make a mockery
of liberal individualism by extending it to its obvious conclusions and
parodying liberalism's dismissal of its own contradictions. For if such
individualism is not to crumble into anarchy it must maintain a rigid power
structure which allows individual liberty at the top to reek the ordered havoc of
capitalistic competition at the bottom, in the form of mass unemployment and
exploitation. Such a contradictory society it is, grotesquely idealised through
Lilly's spiritualistic omission of material questions, that we see parodied at the
end of Aaron's Rod.
Simultaneously, however, beneath Lilly's continued and culminating
emphasis on the "higher self' of the "individual,earlier his "life_spirit,,193now
his "soul", there haunts a recollection of the repressed sensuousness of Lilly
and Aaron's relationship. That no form of sensuousness is any longer available
to Aaron in his new life is evident in the final dialogue of the novel. The
earlier physical, pleasurable relationship between the pair, which had brought
Aaron's convalescence about, is conspicuous by its absence. Similarly,
Marx, pp. 245-72, 268). Though "emancipation" is hardly the goal of Lawrence's characters at
the end of Aaron's Rod, utopian socialism has evident affinities with it.
193 Lawrence, Aaron's Rod, p. 120.
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Aaron's search for a relationship uncontaminated by power struggle is
forgotten and repressed by Lilly, though not by the reader of the novel, which
stretches out behind this concluding scene as a lasting reminder of the history
of violent and intense conflict which constituted and continues to constitute the
divided and antagonistic era of liberal capitalism.
In conclusion, then, in contrast to the general critical consensus upon
the bulk of Lawrence's post-war output as broadly conservative and monologic
(the popularity of the term "leadership novels" providing a crucial index), I
have tried to suggest an alternative reading of its ideological landscape by
focusing on two texts which straddle the period 1918-1922. My reason for this
focus has been to provide a detailed analysis of trans-generic,
aesthetic/ideological processes which may be understood as paradigmatic of
much of Lawrence's post-war work - including that subsequent to this period.
Though both Graham Holderness and Peter Scheckner have dissented
from the consensus'I" - Holderness, for example, seeing Touch and Go as
radically "unresolved't.I'" and Scheckner providing an account of Aaron's Rod
sensitive, to some extent, to its ideological contradictions .- their approaches
similarly deny the deep-seated liberalism of both texts, an understanding of
which, I believe, is paramount in attempting to explain the ideological nature
of Lawrence's post-war corpus. Touch and Go is, as I have shown, ultimately
constrained by conceptions of historical change, labour, class, and class
conflict which prevent it from releasing itself, in any radical sense, from the
194 By "the consensus", I mean the evaluative contempt in which these texts are held by
liberal humanist critics, such as F. R. Leavis, Frank Kermode, Graham Hough, and John
Worthen.
195 Graham Holderness, D. H. Lawrence: History, Ideology and Fiction (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1982), pp. 211-4, 213.
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problems it sets out. Aaron's Rod, however, has a far greater complexity to it
than is suggested by Scheckner's analysis, which fails fundamentally to
challenge the view of the novel as one of the "three so-called leadership
novels".196
For Lawrence's work is, in fact, riddled with an irresolvable anxiety
over (what are seen as) the mutually hostile yet legitimate demands of social
reconciliation and individual liberty, in an increasingly divided social and
political arena; and is thus consistently unable to proceed imaginatively from
the irreconcilable antitheses of post-war liberalism. This anxiety seems, on the
one hand, to be based upon a profoundly ingrained liberal idealism, which
either attempts to evade or resolve social conflict through abstraction andlor
hopeful rationalism, or which sees an abstract individual liberty as a more
worthy competitor than its diametric opposite of social responsibility. Equally,
however, and on the other hand, these texts seem unable to avoid a concern for
political and historico-material questions, and perpetually return to the same
ones (for example, those surrounding the mining industry).
As I hope to have shown, this period's work is at its most sophisticated
when this anxiety is so contained by its ambivalence as to foster the dialectical
capacity (so adept in Aaron's Rod) to illuminate both the socio-historical
inadequacy of liberalism as an emancipatory or reconciliatory mode of
thought, and the irrepressible recurrence of material life within the commonly
distinguished and elevated spheres of culture, politics and individual privacy-
by allowing both to illuminate each other. Even when this is not the case,
however, as in Touch and Go, a deeper understanding of the problematic at
196 Peter Scheckner, Class, Politics, and the Individual: A Study of the Major Works of
D. H. Lawrence (London: Associated University Presses, 1985), pp. 89-110, 89.
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stake - that of liberalism's ideological ability to superficially reconcile the
binary opposites of its own creation, while obscuring and thus maintaining the
status quo of a divisive class structure - can, I hope, be gained from a non-
reductive materialist analysis which attends both to the sociological nature of a
text and to its constitution as a form.
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3: "Is England Still a Man's Country?": Images of Englishness in
Lawrence's Late Essays
The substantial array of journalistic articles which Lawrence published during
the last years of his life have received little attention. This is most likely
because they are not perceived as worthy of intellectual discussion - their style
is not literary, their arguments not well-reasoned, their treatment of
contemporary issues often bathetic, and their politics confused. This should
not, however, be a sufficient reason to ignore this significant quantity of work
from a writer who is normally seen as both a serious, literary author and a
major contributor to the collection of works which compose the particular
phase of culture known as modernism.
In fact, from the perspective of the historical materialist critic, the
absence of analysis in this area of Lawrence's work should indicate a blind
spot in the critical conception of the 'writer's labour and the culture of which he
is perceived as being such an important member. For the very fact that
Lawrence's work is granted such a high cultural status and seriousness of
thought should lead one to question an inability or indisposition to consider the
products of his work which are not of great intellectual weight, but are of
importance in other ways: namely, in understanding the nature of working as a
writer and the highly distinct and selective formation of a cultural conception
of that writer and his labour.
Lawrence's late articles are illuminating in this sense, since they were
both vital in allowing him to eam a living as a writer in the last, difficult years
of his life, and significant in establishing a wider reception of his work through
the popular press, and thus the conception of Lawrence as a writer in his
159
contemporary period. The articles, after all, would have been widely read to an
extent that the fiction could not have been. Moreover, they are significant in
the lack of critical consideration they have received since they were written.
For this fact alone should lead one to address the question of how a writer
becomes "a writer" - that ponderously pronounced version of the term which
connotes the stubbornly persistent, Romantic conception of the
uncompromising and flamboyant artist who lives above the material world of
money and markets. This long-standing and widespread notion of the artist is
the outcome of a wider process of cultural commodification which reifies the
writer and his work, and it is with this in mind as an implicit object of critique
that the present analysis will proceed.
Part of the reductive effects of the commodification of Lawrence's
work has been the perception (usually led by the sense of him as being
predominantly a novelist) that Lawrence abandoned England emotionally as
well as physically when he left the country in 1919. However, Lawrence's late
......
. , .
essays, as with Pansies.seest: preoccupied with contemporary English 'debates .
and' offer a variety of versions of what it means to be' English. Thus,' this
analysis will focus on Lawrence's relationship with the idea of English
national identity in terms of his engagement with and use of it rather than, as
the orthodox discussion would have it, in terms of his negation of any such
concept.
For the purposes of this study, I will employ the Bakhtinian notion of
dialogue by setting two texts, which offer alternative constructions of
Englishness to that of Lawrence's, into dialogic interaction with Lawrence's
essays in order critically to illuminate the nature of his image of England.
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These two texts are George Orwell's Homage to Catalonia (1938) and Jean
Rhys's Voyage in the Dark (1934), and I have chosen them for their affinities
with, as well as their differences from, Lawrence's conception of Englishness,
with the intention of showing how similar notions of an identity can be
grounded in radically different, if not opposing, social values and criticisms.
Since Orwell's book provides an image of England which is, in certain central
ways, closer to that of Lawrence's than Rhys's, it is with Homage to Catalonia
that I will begin my dialogical analysis of Lawrence's articles.
Political England: Lawrence in George Orwell's "Sneering Civilization"
At the end of Homage to Catalonia, George Orwell describes his
impressions of England on returning from action in the Spanish Civil War.
. Orwell's sense of an anaesthetised culture, "sleeping the deep, deep sleep of
- England" forms a striking contrast to his portrayal of a Spain torn not only by
. fascism and workers' revolution but by the internecine feuds of the Republican
war eff?rt. England is a "peaceful" and parochial place, nostalgically suffused
for Orwell with the atmosphere of his childhood. Moreover, this England is
"southern England, probably the sleekest landscape in the world", and the
"industrial towns were far away, a smudge of smoke and misery hidden by the
curve of the earth's surface":
When this image of England is placed alongside Lawrence's late essay,
"Dull London",2 we can see significant connections in both writers'
representations of the nation. Both Orwell and Lawrence focus on England as
1George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (1938; London: Penguin, 1989), pp. 186-7.
2 Lawrence, "Dull London", Assorted Articles, (London: Martin Seeker, 1930), pp. 83-87.
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southern England - they begin their constructions of Englishness by recounting
train journeys from a southern port into London. Both perceive the English
national character to be inactive, unimaginative, and devoid of vitality; and
both accounts of England are given from the perspective of the worldly
traveller, disheartened by his native land's painful familiarity. However, upon
closer inspection, significant discrepancies emerge between these two
constructions of Englishness.
To begin with, Orwell's image of England is transparent as a
construction. The delusion inherent in the selectivity of its self-construction is
represented as part of its failings as a culture: for example, the polluting
"smoke" and neglected "misery" of England's northern "industrial towns" are
"hidden" from view in this particular England's self-perception.' Furthermore,
the England of Orwell's ironical vision not only relies on a myth of the present
but also draws upon anachronistic signs of political, military, economic, and
even aesthetic hegemony. It is a culture living through its past at the expense
of the present. For the hybrid collection of images that Orwell selects to depict
this England are grounded in notions of an imperialist past, a nostalgia for.the
monarchy, a history of global military power, a rural England, and an orderly,
gentle, and quiescent people:
the railway-cuttings smothered in wild flowers, the
deep meadows where the great shining horses browse
and meditate, the slow-moving streams bordered by
willows, the green bosoms of the elms, the larkspurs in
the cottage gardens; and then the huge peaceful
wilderness of outer London, the barges on the miry
river, the familiar streets, the posters telling of cricket
matches and Royal weddings, the men in bowler hats,
the pigeons in Trafalgar Square, the red buses, the blue
3 Orwell, p. 187.
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policeman - all sleeping the deep, deep sleep of
England [... .r
Orwell's England, here, is an empty cultural hieroglyph - an absurd
concoction of disparate cultural indices. Some of the images, for example,
reflect contemporary fashions (such as the "bowler hats") or arbitrary
conventions (the "red buses" and "blue policeman"), while others denote more
long-standing national pastimes connected with the age of the British Empire
(such as the "cricket matches"). Moreover, this is an England in love with its
past - a past which is in the process of being destroyed by such historical
forces as industrialism, colonial revolution, international capitalistic
competition, and social and industrial unrest. However, such an England is not
only oblivious of these forces at work within itself, but unaware or indifferent
to upheaval elsewhere (and its potential effects upon England):
It is difficult [... J to believe that anything is really
happening anywhere. Earthquakes in Japan, famines in
China, revolutions in Mexico? Don't worry, the milk
will be on the doorstep tomorrow morning, the New
Statesman will come out on Friday.s .
Part of the power of Homage to Catalonia thus arises from the threat which
. Spain (and Orwell's account of his experiences there) represents to such
complacent insouciance. For Orwell, then, England is fundamentally an
unstable entity, lacking any real existence in the present, any consciousness of
the importance of its international relationships, or any coherence as a
container of signs.
For Lawrence, on the other hand, England's past represents a lost and
glamorous era of "adventure" to be mourned. This is shown through a
4 Orwell, p. 187.
S Orwell, pp. 186-7.
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rhapsodic and nostalgic passage in "Dull London" which offers a personal
recollection of London "twenty years ago":
It used not to be so. Twenty years ago London was to
me thrilling, thrilling, thrilling, the vast and roaring
heart of all adventure. It was not only the heart of the
world, it was the heart of the world's living adventure.
How wonderful the Strand, the Bank, Charing Cross at
night, Hyde Park in the morning!"
If the two images of England are put into dialogic interaction with one another,
Orwell's construction offers a satirical critique of Lawrence's rendering of
England's former glory. For Orwell mocks the Englishness which
manufactures itself around nostalgic notions of past hegemony, whereas
Lawrence revels in such conceptions of the past and imbues them with the
grandeur of the personal and emotional. The unconscious sado-masochism
inherent in a passion for London's previous dominance as a centre of world
power is thus sublimated into a .subjective and sentimental nostalgia for the
spirit of a place. The image of the "wonderful" "Strand" is a dream-like
condensation of what would otherwise have been a political language - a way
of writing for hegemony with emotion, In contrast, Orwell's picture of an
England still absorbed in "Royal weddings" is portrayed as ridiculous and
naively oblivious to the dangers of both insularity and power; its "deep sleep"
being perhaps only interrupted by the "roar of bombs".'
The points of comparison for Orwell's England are that of a rising
fascism, an oppressive contemporary capitalism, and the potential (in Spain)
for a revolution to overthrow these oppressive forces - all of which England
ignores both in spite of its unavoidable entanglement with this political
6 Lawrence, "Dull London", p. 85.
7 Orwell, p. 187.
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landscape, and because of its complicity in political reaction. Lawrence's terms
of comparison, on the other hand, are either a fondly recalled London of
imperial power ("the heart of the world's living adventure"), or the
excitements of other dominant Western capitals: "No doubt if you stay longer
you get over it, and find London as thrilling as Paris or Rome or New York".8
Thus, although Lawrence's negative portrayal of southern England as
seamlessly "inoffensive", "dull", and "poky" resembles Orwell's uneventful
landscape, Lawrence's concerns in his attack on London and England are far
from being the political ones which motivate Orwell's," Lawrence's interest in
"Dull London" is primarily in the way in which a culture affects the
individual's spiritual vitality. The problem, therefore, of the "pervasive
anaesthetic" which fills England's "air" is one limited entirely to the
potentially damaging effects of such a cultural atmosphere upon individual
psychology.'? Lawrence's English are too "nice, safe, easy", but all they are
. lacking is purpose (the London traffic is "going nowhere"), "adventure" and
"vitality", whereas Orwell's English are lacking a sense of their (national and
". '. .
.• 'global) .social relationships which is potentially fatal.i1 Lawrence is, then, a .
victim of the very culture that Orwell satirises. "Dull LOndon" harbours under
the illusion of an England which is politically "free and individual" (though it
lacks these qualities at the level of individual psychology)12 - an illusion which
Orwell mocks in his ironic vision of the "hidden" misery of the industrial
north from the parochial consciousness of the southern English. Unlike
8 Lawrence, "Dull London", p. 84.
9 Lawrence, "Dull London", pp. 83-84.
10 Lawrence, "Dull London", p. 85.
11 Lawrence, "Dull London", pp. 85-86.
12 Lawrence, "Dull London", p. 85.
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Orwell's, then, Lawrence's version of Englishness is not self-conscious of its
mythical status as a selection of (in this case favourable) values from a much
more complex culture which can neither confirm nor deny the authenticity of
such values in the absolutist terms which such a construction of identity
requires. Furthermore, Lawrence's failure to register the global consequences
of the imperial glory glamorised in his vision of an old London is similarly
ridiculed for its socio-political narcissism through Orwell's emphasis on the
world of "earthquakes", "famines" and "revolutions" of which England is only
dimly aware.
Such are the differences between these writers' diagnoses of England's
inertia and introspection. Yet there are also significant points of comparison in
their proposed solutions to England's cultural malaise. For Lawrence's article,
"Red Trousers", addresses the idea of using "a crusade" to cure "London
dulness", such as "the Salvation Army", "Socialism or politics, freedom of
little nations, and the rest";" while Orwell's Homage is an account of the
writer's experiences in a workers' militia fighting against fascism and for
socialism (a fight which, as Orwell makes dear, is largely ignored by a
complacent England).
Lawrence's "Red Trousers" is a light-hearted piece of writing which
treats such normally weighty spheres of interest as "politics" with an irreverent
flippancy which reduces them to the level of a hobby or lifestyle choice. For
example, the "crusades" which may cure London of its dulness include both
"Votes for Women" and "tee-totalism", as if such social practices were
comparable." This comparison, however, is seemingly justified because "it is
13 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", Assorted Articles, pp. 88-93, 88-90.
14 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", pp. 88-90.
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for his leisure that man needs a crusade": IS thus, if "crusades" are merely
different leisure activities, "Votes for Women" and "tee-totalism" can be
compared in terms of how much "fun" they are as "adventures" for one's
leisure-time." Making "money", therefore, is only "an adventure to a certain
degree" because the economic world is not the field of action for a "crusade" .17
In fact, Lawrence implies that this is one of the reasons why people have such
limited options in the "world of adventure" - there is so little time outside
working life for a "crusade":
The world of adventure is pretty well used up,
especially for a man who has a wage to earn. He gets a
little tired of being spoon-fed on wireless, cinema, and
newspaper, sitting an inert lump while entertainment or
information is poured into him. He wants to do
something. IS
The world of "hobbies" ("golf, jazz, motoring")" and cultural
consumption in general is insufficient to inject the English capital with new
life, mainly owing to the domination of individuals by their labour - their
"wage to earn" - and their consequent alienation from activity once it is freely
ch?sen. Nonetheless, Lawrence suggests that, since "our flippant world takes
life with a stupid seriousness", people need to "[treat] life as a joke again, as
they did in the really great periods like the Renaissance", The absurd solution
finally offered, then, is that "a dozen men" walk though London's streets
wearing "tight scarlet trousers", "gay little orange-brown jackets" and "bright
green hats" since "it takes a lot of courage to sail gaily, in brave feathers, right
15 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", p. 91.
16 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", p. 89.
17 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", p. 91.
18 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", pp. 91-92.
19 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", p. 92.
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in the teeth of a dreary convention'V" Lawrence's perspective on England is
therefore still a bourgeoisified one, constrained by a touristic conception of
history. At one point this conception consists of the famous "sights" of
London, from "the Strand" to "Hyde Park in the morning", while at another it
consists of an innovation in national fashion which stands in for history as an
aesthetically pleasing and artificial substitute. Furthermore, Lawrence's
proposed national cure - the "Red Trousers" of Italian Renaissance fashion - is
significant in that it is indicative of a mind alien to its contemporary English
culture: the article suggests a Lawrence in exile from both his country and
modernity.
While Lawrence takes recourse to the glib notion of using alternative
clothing fashion as a remedy for English, socio-psychological illhealth, Orwell
concerns himself (and attempts to concern England) with the potentialities of
an actual revolutionary process and the struggle against fascism. Rather than
perceiving "dreary convention" as England's problem and flippant subversions
. of sartorial customs as its salvation, Orwell claims that this apathetic world
.. itself, with its immersion' in :the distractions of a "spoon-fed". culture (of
"cricket matches and Royal weddings" as well as Lawrence's "wireless,
cinema, and newspaper"), is the social disease of an increasingly bourgeois
England which obscures the need for international political and economic
struggles., The significance of these struggles is illustrated in Orwell's
portrayal of revolutionary Barcelona:
the bread-queues were often hundreds of yards long.
Yet so far as one could judge the people were contented
and hopeful. There was no unemployment, and the
price of living was extremely low; you saw very few
20 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", pp. 92-93.
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conspicuously destitute people, and no beggars except
the gipsies. Above all, there was a belief in the
revolution and the future, a feeling of havin~ suddenly
emerged into an era of equality and freedom. 1
This description of social and economic change illuminates Lawrence's
expressed fear in "Red Trousers" that, though "a crusade is a sovereign remedy
against dulness", its fulfilment may be "a greater dulness still" - and hence,
"Socialism [... ] might be dull, duller even than what we've got now".22 For
Orwell's passage suggests that this question of "dulness" is rather beside the
point: the "crusade" for a higher quality of material life is inextricably
connected with the "freedom" to begin considering "the world of adventure"
and the "crusade" against "dulness".
Moreover, the fight against fascism, which Orwell's England refuses to
involve itself in (as a capitalist nation preferring fascism to socialist
revolution), is - at the very least for Orwell - far less a frivolous "crusade"
than an attempt to prevent "serfdom" and "clerico-military" control from being
establlshed," Orwell's form of social action is thus intended to transform or at
". least influence the world of labour and economics which Lawrence's essay
"implicitly acknowledges as a problem, and yet fails to solve in its reduction of
social action to the commodified, lifestyle options offered by the "leisure" and
culture industry - the very malaise.which Orwell defines as peculiarly English
at the end of Homage. After all, "Royal weddings", those unusual occasions
tinged with aristocratic flamboyancy, are not so dissimilar from the "scarlet
trousers" of "a dozen men" walking through London's streets.
21 Orwell, p. 4.
22 Lawrence, "Red Trousers", pp. 89-90.
23 Orwell, p. 133.
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It is a typically English attitude, for Orwell, to cynically fear the worst
as Lawrence does in his suspicion that "Votes or Socialism or politics, freedom
of little nations [.... J might be dull, duller than even what we've got now".
However, Lawrence shares with Orwell a perception that being English
involves a certain kind of indifference or cynicism - though the two writers'
perceptions contain significant qualitative differences.
The prevailing version of English identity which Orwell presents is a
national character that is over-proud, "money-tainted'V' apathetic, bourgeois,
anaesthetised by personal comfort, parochial, and controlled by (and through)
hierarchy and fear: a portrait of a collective psychology which supports
Orwell's politicised identification of an ingrained cynicism in English culture.
This culture's cynicism appears to be defined by the language itself (rather
than by a notion of national character) when, early in the book, Orwell boldly
contrasts the propagandist culture of revolutionary Spain with the "hard-boiled,
sneering civilisation of the English-speaking races". He suggests that, despite
the privation of war, there was in Barcelona "a belief in the revolution and the
future, a feeling of having suddenly emerged into an era of equality and
freedom". This was reflected in such forms of signification as the Anarchist
notices in the barbers' shops "solemnly explaining that barbers were no longer
slaves",· the "coloured posters appealing to prostitutes to stop being
prostitutes", and the "revolutionary ballads of the naivest kind, all about
proletarian brotherhood and the wickedness of Mussolini". However, from the
perspective of "anyone" from the stolid and cynical world of "the English-
24 Orwell, p. 83.
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speaking races", there was "something rather pathetic in the literalness with
which these idealistic Spaniards took the hackneyed phrases of revolution'v"
Indeed, Lawrence's late essays often play with ideas of "indifference"
or nonchalance in relation to Englishness in a sense that is less suggestive of a
"dull" national character than it is comparable to Orwell's notion of a
peculiarly English sardoniclsm." In this case, Lawrence's English are less
boring than they are bored by the world which surrounds them. In the essay
"Ownership", for example, it is property (both private and national) which is
the object of indifference and ennui to the "young Englishman". 27 Such a
disengagement from questions of material ownership is portrayed, however,
not as a form of bourgeois cynicism (as in Orwell), but as a positive turn
towards a "religious" perspective which ought to be embraced.P Orwell's
"money-tainted air of England,,29 is perceived by Lawrence to be an
atmosphere inhabited by past generations which the modern "young man" has
predictably not inheritedr'"
Our fathers got a great thrill out of making money,
building their own houses, providing for their old age
and laying by 'something for the children. Children
inherit their father's leavings; they never inherit their
father's and mother's thrill [.... ] The young don't
believe in the sanctity of work, they are bored by the
thought of saving up for their children. If they do build
themselves a little house, they are tired of it in ten
minutes. They want a car to run around in, and money
to spend; but possessions, as possessions, are simply a
bore to them."
2S Orwell, p. 4.
26 Lawrence, "Ownership", Assorted Articles, pp. 52-56, 54. The articles "Ownership",
"Insouciance" (pp. 31-36), and "Master in His Own House" (pp. 57-62) all explore notions of
"indifference" or "insouciance" with regard to an idea of the nature of being English. .
27 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 54. .
28 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 55.
29 Orwell, p. 83.
30 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 54.
31 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 53.
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By contrast, Orwell's England is incurably materialistic. Its scepticism
is, furthermore, in response to attempts at radical social change rather than an
older generation's bourgeois ideals of private property and the self-made man.
Lawrence's England, however, is for him a politically progressive one which
must "face" its "change in feelings", towards a potentially dangerous apathy, in
order to make positive "changes in the world" and "[save] us from the bogey
of Bolshevism".32For Orwell, on the other hand, there is nothing remotely new
or radical about "indifference" to such issues as ownership - he sees it, in fact,
as bound up with the "money-tainted", "sneering civilisation". For example,
when Orwell describes the "air of equality" in the Spanish workers' militias as
an astounding contrast to the "political consciousness" in "most countries",
the image of England already set up is implicitly a target: "One had been in a
community, where hope was more normal than apathy or cynicism, where the
word 'comrade' stood for comradeship and not, as in most countries, for
humbug".33
What is striking and peculiar about Lawrence's essay, however, is its
. limited conception of English identity in terms of class, age and gender. For
Lawrence's orthodox Englishness is implicitly middle-class and explicitly
young and male. This can be seen in his representation of the everyday
thoughts of the "young Englishman":
I'm bored! I'm bored by making money slowly and
meagrely, I'm bored at the thought of owning my own
little bit. Why haven't I a maiden aunt who'll die and
leave me a thousand a year? Why can't I marry a rich
wife? Why doesn't somebody set me up for life?34
32 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 54-56.
33 Orwell, p. 83.
34 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 54.
172
This, Lawrence argues, is "peculiarly the attitude of the young Englishman". It
is "not riches he's after" but "independence" which signifies "not real
independence [...] but freedom from the bore of having to make a living".3s
This is a highly restricted conception of Englishness, confined to a small
stratum of the middle class - namely, its young bohemian males. Orwell's
image of England (in Homage) is also, like Lawrence's, frequently a picture of
a bourgeois nation. However, Orwell's vision is a critical one, grounded in the
concept of class conflict, unlike Lawrence's which abandons its initial
emphasis on the "serious" nature of "earning" and "property" for most people,
.. for an advocacy of political apathy to it.36In an echo of his earlier reference to
the "sneering civilisation of the English-speaking races", for example, Orwell
speaks of the absence in Aragon of "the normal motives of civilised life -
snobbishness, money-grubbing, fear of the boss, etc.", and the lack of "the
ordinary class-division of society" which had "disappeared to an extent that is
almost unthinkable in the money-tainted air of England".37Similarly, Orwell's
portrayal of the English Press as a centralised institution. almost entirely
harnessed to the inter~sts of British capital depicts middle England as a much
more property-conscious class than Lawrence's article suggests: both the
"Right-wing version" of events in Spain, and the "Left-wing version"
concealed the revolutionary nature of much of the force against General
Franco, in order to protect British investments: "And since the revolution had
to be crushed, it greatly simplified things to pretend that no revolution had
happened"."
3S Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 54.
36 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 54.
37 Orwell, p. 83.
38 Orwell, pp. 192-3.
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In short, whereas Lawrence's article represents class conflict and its
attendant opposition between "national or private ownership" as features of
society from which the Englishman is nonchalantly and religiously detaching
himself," Orwell perceives them as the very "air" of England which one has
no choice but to breathe - for Orwell's England is one enslaved by its class
system and the ruling class's material interests.
In a more vehement and personal article entitled "Insouciance",
Lawrence takes this detached position one step further: political issues such as
"ownership" are not merely worth psychologically detaching oneself from,
they are "abstract" in the first place.40 This observation, significantly, arises
from a depicted situation in which the Lawrence of the article is placed in a
comparable position to that of Orwell's awakened collective subject in the
prophetic, concluding remarks to Homage on the potential fate of the English
people: he is, as it were, awoken from "the deep, deep sleep of England"
through a conversation with two English women. For in the article Lawrence
portrays himself as one forced to emerge from his dream-like immersion
within the peaceful, rural surroundings of his hotel balcony "into the troubled
, ether of international politics":
we speak of the men mowing; how plainly one hears
the long breaths of the scythes!
But now we are tete-a-tete. We speak of cherries,
strawberries, and the promise of the vine crop. This
somehow leads to Italy, and to Signor Mussolini.
Before I know where I am, the little white-haired
lady has swept me off my balcony, away from the
glassy lake, the veiled mountains, the two men
mowing, and the cherry trees, away into the troubled
ether of international politics."
39 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 55.
40 Lawrence, "Insouciance", Assorted Articles, pp. 31-36, 35.
41 Lawrence, "Insouciance", p. 32.
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The cause of complaint in this article, for Lawrence, is that the
"abstract" world of "right and wrong, politics, Fascism, abstract liberty" too
often invades modern people's thoughts, and they consequently ignore, to their
detriment, the more immediate and "sensuous" world of "actual livingv.f For
there is, Lawrence tells us, a "deadly breach between actual living" and "this
abstract caring" about "international politics", which he scathingly dismisses:
"For everything on earth that doesn't concern her she 'cares."'. According to
Lawrence, instead of "this abstract caring", we should focus more upon "actual
living" - which is "a question mostly of direct contact" (such as the contact
between Lawrence and "the lake" or "mountains") rather than an "invisible"
Fascism with its "hypothetical Italians wear[ing] black shirts"."
Through this atomisation of human experience, the Lawrence of this
article becomes symptomatic of the very problem of Englishness which Orwell
outlines in the closing passages of Homage. What, for Lawrence, is a
perception pertaining to psychological health is, for Orwell, a cultural logic
.which threatens the nation's physical existence: Orwell fears that if England
does not awake from its "deep sleep", it will be "jerked out of it by the roar of
bombs". Lawrence's separation of an individual's field of "direct contact"
from the wider field of "international politics" which encompasses it, is
critiqued by Orwell's satirical yet pathetic portrayal of an England which is
blissfully and parochially oblivious of its own contradictions - from the
northern "misery" which is obscured from the eyes of southern prosperity, to
the material and ideological complicity in fascism and counter-revolution
which haunts a moralistic national press. Such contradictions illuminate
42 Lawrence, "Insouciance", pp. 33, 35.
43 Lawrence, "Insouciance", pp. 34-35.
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Lawrence's article in the sense that they are indicative of all individuals'
unavoidable involvement and relationship with their wider societies.
Furthermore, the experience given in Homage is one of rooting out the
"abstract" world of fascism - gaining "direct contact" with it in order to fight
against it. When put in dialogue with "Insouciance", this removal of the
boundary between immediate experience and "abstract" politics explodes
Lawrence's "English" (from Orwell's perspective) distinction between private
and public spheres, and his consequent elevation of the former over the latter:
for Orwell writes of those who are not free to make such a comfortable
distinction. Moreover, Orwell's recounted experience is both of the reality of
fascism for those who are in "direct contact" with it, and of its reality for those
who (like the parochial Englander) are, though physically far from it, in danger
of its acquaintance:
there was the question of the international prestige of
Fascism, which for a year or two past had been
haunting me like a nightmare. Since 1930 the Fascists
had won all the victories; it was time they got a beating,
it hardly mattered from whom. If we could drive
Franco andhis foreign mercenaries into the sea it might
make an immense improvement in the world situation
[ • • • . ]44
. The idea of cynically dismissing a discussion of an "invisible" fascism is, in
this context, an act of great irony. That fascism's very nature is to spread its
power internationally and to invade and control individuals' private lives
makes the concept of a division between immediate, personal experience and
"hypothetical" fascists an "abstract" one.
What ought not to be overlooked, however, is the oddly Burkean nature
44 Orwell, p. 134.
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of Lawrence's seemingly trivial statement in "Insouciance". The stance,
though seemingly apolitical, is (as supposedly apolitical positions often are) in
fact political, and can be located within a strong lineage of thinking in the
conservative tradition. This lineage arguably begins with Edmund Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), in which Burke distinguishes
between the visceral bonds of the private sphere, and the rational, political ties
which bind an individual in a social contract to a public sphere beyond his
immediate experience. In making such a distinction Burke prioritises the
personal and emotional realm over the rational, public realm in a critique of the
revolutionary ideals of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment
proclamation of "the rights of men". For example:
We begin our public affections in our families. No cold
relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our
neighbourhoods, and our habitual provincial
connections. These are inns and resting-places. Such
divisions of our country as have been formed by habit,
and not by a sudden jerk of authority, were so many
little images of the great country in which the heart
found something which it could. fill. The love to the
whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality.
Perhaps it is a sort of elemental training to those higher
and more large regards, by which alone meri come to be
. affected, as with their own concern, in the prosperity of
a kingdom so extensive as that of France. In that
general territory itself, as in the old name of provinces,
the citizens are interested from old prejudices and
unreasoned habits, and not on account of the geometric
properties of its figure."
Here Burke argues that socio-political obligations are felt through the
individual's direct, personal experience of families and neighbourhoods, rather
than consciously realised through abstract reasoning. Lawrence's argument
accords a comparable precedence to the private sphere and endows it with a
4S Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), ed. L. G. Mitchell (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 198.
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higher metaphysical authenticity: "When it comes to living, we live through
our instincts and our intuitions". Furthermore, "actual living", for Lawrence, is
"a question mostly of direct contact't." Burke defines this natural and
instinctive field of "direct contact" mainly in terms of familial relations. Here
is an extract from a further polemic against the French Revolution:
As the relation between parents and children is the first
among the elements of vulgar, natural morality, they
[the Revolutionary government's "legislators"] erect
statues to a wild, ferocious, low-minded, hard-hearted
father, of fine general feelings; a lover of his kind, but a
hater of his kindred. Your masters reject the duties of
this vulgar relation, as contrary to liberty; as not
founded in the social compact; and not binding
according to the rights of men; because the relation is
not, of course, the result of free election; never so on
the side of the children, not always on the part of the
parents."
Burke argues, furthermore, that "[the Revolutionists] despise experience as the
wisdom of unlettered men" and they have as a poor substitute "the rights of
men"." For Burke, the French assembly imposes abstract social principles or
"metaphysics" upon "human nature", which can only be understood through
" • ,,49 Th B k lik L th .expenence. . us ur e, 1 e awrence, presupposes an au entre or a
primary mode of being: that is, we are ontologically most ourselves in our
immediate, sensory, non-rational experiences. It is, then, an ironically
philosophical and rational distinction which both Burke and Lawrence are
making in their ontological hierarchy of the experiential over the rational.
Moreover, in positing an authentic mode of being or true "human
nature", Lawrence and Burke deny the provisional nature of human activities -
46 Lawrence, "Insouciance", p. 35.
47 Burke, "Appendix: Letter to a Member of the National Assembly", Reflections, pp. 251-292,
272.
48 Burke, Reflections, p. 58.
49 Burke, Reflections, p. 185.
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that they are traditions of behaviour and in that sense, however broadly,
ideological constructions. It is therefore significant to note that what in Burke's
period is a conservative tract against progressive (republican) revolution
becomes, in Lawrence's era, an argument for apathy in a time of Fascist
revolution: there is nothing natural, authentic or inherently right about one's
immediate relationships and environment and their prioritisation. On the one
hand, Burke's familial relations are, though emotional attachments also, based
on the thoroughly historical and ideological foundations of private property.
On the other hand, the experience which Lawrence uses as his central example
of "direct contact" is highly remote from the radically industrialised "actual
. living" which had become so widespread by the year of 1928 in which the
article was written. Lawrence's example is the labour of "two mowers
mowing with scythes" on the hill outside his hotel - a thoroughly abstract,
Romantic and nostalgic image of pre-industrial work rather than a typical
example of "actual living" in 1928.50 Similarly, while Burke's familial and
local relations depend upon wider political institutions which themselves were
created· through brutal upheavals (for example, through land enclosures),
Lawrence's tranquil paradise beyond the world of "abstract caring" depends
entirely for its preservation upon the fact of others "caring" sufficiently to fight
against fascism. Thus, the very "English" empiricism of Burke and Lawrence
is itself grounded in a philosophical transcendentalism saturated with
ahistorical abstractions. This irony is reinforced elsewhere in Lawrence's
articles, for example in "Dull London", where we are provided with an account
of the author's experience of a seemingly metaphysical alienation as he travels
50 Lawrence. "Insouciance". p. 31.
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into England from a mysterious point of departure: "the vivid flame of your
individual life" begins "to sink".Sl
Orwell's Homage demonstrates that abstractions might need to be
called upon if our personal lives are to continue positively or be truly
improved. In contrast to Burke, Orwell (and Jean Rbys also, as we shall later
see) illuminates the constructed nature of human relationships, and their
historical dimension, through an account of his own political intervention in
the fluid human relationships of a class-war-ridden Spain. By analysing the
parallels of thought between Lawrence and Burke, it appears that Orwell's
attack on the parochiality of Englishness not only critically exposes
Lawrence's own very "English" advocacy of insouciance but can also be read
as a critique of Lawrence's peculiar brand of philosophical conservatism - a
critique which indicates the intellectual poverty and complicity of such
conservatism in the face of fascist reaction.
The pervasive idea in both Lawrence's and Orwell's writing, however,
of an English mistrust of (and contempt for) radical social change, and that
response's corresponding shames and prejudices, may be linked with the
anachronistic and residual feeling of English pride and superiority inherited
from the era of British imperial supremacy. I mention this association since it
points towards another category of social division (like class) which throws the
two writers' Englands into contrast - namely, that of race.
Orwell seems to have this residual colonial snobbery in mind when he
defends the Spanish against the accusation from foreigners and journalists that
they were "bitterly jealous of foreign aid".s2 In this defence, Orwell describes
51 Lawrence, "Dull London", p. 85.
52 Orwell, p. 10.
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an incident in which a group of Spanish militiamen were "talking excitedly
about their experiences":
[They] were full of enthusiasm for some French troops
who had been next to them at Huesca. The French were
very brave, they said; adding enthusiastically: 'Mas
valientes que nosotros'- 'Braver than we are!' Of
course I demurred, whereupon they explained that the
French knew more of the art of war - were more
expert with bombs, machine-guns, and so forth. Yet the
remark was significant. An Englishman would cut his
hand off sooner than say a thing like that.53
In his admiration for the militiamen's modesty, Orwell implicitly criticises
what he sees as a typically English, imperialistic and military pride. This
notion of a peculiarly English pride and obstinate refusal to admit one's
inferiority in any capacity, particularly in conventionally masculine activities,
is endowed with positive value in Lawrence's essay, "On Coming Home",
which mourns the loss of a defiant British imperial power.i" When put in
dialogue, Orwell's vision of a conceited England sheds its corrosively
politicising light upon Lawrence's attempts at outlining an English pride which
both surmounts class boundaries while simultaneously attacking the English
bourgeoisie's "conceit" and "rancour" for their "impotence", and constructs an
ideal Englishness in terms of a rightful racial superiority.55 Here is Lawrence's
myth of a deservedly "proud" imperial England:
England's prestige wasn't based on money. It was
based on the, imagination of men. England was
supposed to be proud, and at the same time, free. Proud
in her freedom, and free, to a certain extent generous,
truly generous, in her pride. This was the England that
led the world. Myself, I think this was a true conception
of England at her best. This was how the other nations
'3 Orwell, pp. 10-11.
54 Lawrence, "On Coming Home", Phoenix II: Uncollected, Unpublished, and Other Prose
Works by D. H. Lawrence, ed. Warren Roberts and Harry T. Moore (1968; Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1978), pp. 250-6.
ss Lawrence, "On Coming Home", p. 256.
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accepted her: at her best. And the individual
Englishman got his certain honour, in the world, on the
strength of it.56
Orwell's distinction between the atmosphere of "equality and freedom"
in revolutionary Spain and the world of "snobbishness, money-grubbing, fear
of the boss" and "class-division" which is his England, opens up the
contradictions in Lawrence's own construction of Englishness. For the very
"pride" which Lawrence exalts is, for Orwell, based on the twin foundations of
imperial power and socio-economic hierarchy: an historical order hardly
committed to such ideals as "freedom" and "generosity", and incontestably
grounded in and dependent on the interests of "money-grubbing". Conversely,
the egalitarian and internationalist environment of Orwell's militia is alien to
the recalcitrant national pride Orwell's own Englishness expects. The
recipients of Lawrence's "pride", "freedom", and "generosity", then, are
evidently not all "Englishmen", nor all those who have contact with
Lawrence's England. This is clear from the anecdotes which Lawrence
provides to illustrate his point that the old England is lost. For example:
. A man is building a railway with nigger labour. Some
.insolent Jamaica nigger - British subject, larger than
life - brings a charge against his boss. Solemn trial by
the British, influence from the government, the
Englishman is reprimanded, and the nigger smiles and
spits in his face.
Long live the bottom dog! May he devour us all.
Same story from India, from Egypt, from China. At
home a lot of queer, insane, half-female-seeming men,
not quite men at all, and certainly not women! The
women would be far braver.57
56 Lawrence, "On Coming Home", p. 254.
57 Lawrence, "On Coming Home", p. 255.
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Though Lawrence attempts to distinguish a contemporary, false "superioriry''P
from his version of English "pride", not unlike Orwell's "snobbishness", it is
clear here that such a distinction is based on a notion of "pride" as a legitimate
"superiority" based on concrete power. For the intersection of the social
divisions of race, class and gender in this passage indicates the kind of
individuals who would not be fortunate enough to become acquainted with
English "freedom", "pride", or "generosity": anybody non-White, at the
"bottom" end of the class structure, or female. If the patronising concession to
women at the end of this passage leaves the reader in any doubt about the
gendered nature of Lawrence's Englishness, his nostalgic reference to "the old
brave, reckless, manly England" and his bold claim that there is "not a man left
inside all the millions of pairs of trousers" should suffice to dispel any hopes of
a more sophisticated notion of national identity.59
Lawrence's Englishness is in fact patently predicated on a masculinised
conception of national identity. For example, in "Ownership" the
"Englishman" is the primary focus until the article's conclusion. Just as the
'image of the young bohemian England obscures and pompously devalues a
working-class England and a poor England which may be much more
concerned with the ownership of such means of production as "land" and "coal
mines", the man's "religious" vision of England demeans the "women of
Britain" and conceals the nature of their social and material position.60 For it is
proposed at the essay's end, in a curiously patronising manoeuvre, that
England (that is, English men) deals with its problem of boredom over the
S8 Lawrence, "On Coming Home", p. 255.
59 Lawrence, "On Coming Home", p. 256.
60 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 56.
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question of ownership by "hand[ing] it allover to the women" since "the
modern excessive need of money is a female need"." This flippant suggestion
acts as an implicit denigration of the growth, within the women's movement of
the 1920s, of welfare feminism, whose fundamental focus was on social and
economic reforms.f Significantly, this deprecating reference to the women's
movement makes yet clearer the link between gender and class in Lawrence's
Englishness, since this is simultaneously an attack on working-class interests.
As Cheryl Law explains, the more middle-class, "equalitarian" feminists of the
1920s, who focused on political demands such as the extension of the franchise
rather than the socio-economic ones of the welfare feminists, "failed to
appreciate the grim reality of many working class [sic] women's lives and the
urgent necessity of release from industrial oppression" and "assum[ed] that all
women were equal in their oppression, using the term 'women' without
reference to class"." That Lawrence's contempt focuses on the "money"
component of the women's movement suggests a welding of class and gender
in this particular conception of English identity which emphasises a middle-
class and patriarchal form of Englishness.
Correspondingly, such a potent fusion of class and gender interests in
our main object of analysis (Lawrence's notion of Englishness) would suggest
the need for a double-barrelled critique. Similarly, since Lawrence also
constructs his Englishness partly by referring back to a "proud" imperial
England, more successful at racial exploitation, it would seem appropriate to
61 Lawrence, "Ownership", p. 56.
62 See Cheryl Law, "Old and New Feminism", in Suffrage and Power: The Women's
Movement 1918-1928 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 161-80, for a discussion of the
emerging welfare feminism of the 1920s and its equalitarian opponents.
63 Law, p. 176.
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place in dialogue with Lawrence's articles a text which commands a view of
English national identity as grounded in racial as well as class and gender
divisions. It is on the ftrst point rather than the latter, however, that the use of
Orwell's image of England as a critical and dialogical tool by which to expose
the constructed nature of Lawrence's late Englishness begins to become
difftcult. For while Orwell is sensitive to the political effects of class and
imperialism (and thereby race) on national identity, he is seemingly less
conscious of the processes by which such a construction of identity obscures
the divisive and alienating power of patriarchy.
This political myopia can be perceived through Orwell's early
suggestion that his "idealistic" Spain is unstable: Soviet Communism is
gradually taking its reactionary hold over the Republican war effort:
There were perhaps a thousand men at the barracks,
and a score or so of women, apart from the
militiamen's wives who did the cooking. There were
still women serving in the militias, though not very
many. In the early battles they had fought side by side
with the men as a matter of course. It is a thing that
seems natural in time of revolution. Ideas were
changing already, however. The militiamen had to be
kept out of the riding-school while the women were
drilling there, because they laughed at the women and
put them off. A few months earlier no one would have
seen anything comic in a woman handling a gun.64
To begin with, this recognition of the volatility of the world of ideas in times
of radical social conflict within a nation stands awkwardly alongside the
representation of international politics as ruptured by competing (English and
Spanish) cultures. How, for example, is such a mocking cynicism over
women's altered social position in war-time Spain different from the
64 Orwell, p. S.
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apparently peculiar political scepticism of the English? Lawrence's late essays
indicate the level of derision which faced the British women's movement of
the 1920s: how does that climate differ from the Spain which Orwell
describes? It appears that women's inferior social position and the attitudes
which reproduce such a status are so entrenched in both English and Spanish
societies as to be scarcely surprising even within a period of revolutionary
transformation in dominant values. The abolition of such social divisions is
certainly not imbued with great importance, since women's place alongside
men in the militias appears merely "natural in time of revolution", as if this
were an understandable lapse in the otherwise orthodox atmosphere of derisive
laughter limiting women's capacities outside that time. It would appear,
anyhow, that the "hard-boiled, sneering civilisation" is a more widespread and
grounded force than the notion of "Englishness" affords it, and it draws its
objects of mockery as often along the lines of gender as it does class.
It is striking, for example, that prostitution in Spain is seen as a
problem for women, not men, to struggle against - a male repudiation of
responsibility which Orwell's self-conscious and critical sense of himself as an
Englishman does nothing to attack: "Human beings were trying to behave as
human beings and not as cogs in the capitalist machine [.... ] In the streets were
coloured posters appealing to prostitutes to stop being prostitutes".6SOrwell,
moreover, appears to be a victim of his own (class-oriented) diagnosis of
Englishness as proud and prejudicial, and dismissive of political idealism,
when he describes his shame at being helped by a Spanish girl with his military
equipment:
6S Orwell, p. 4.
186
It was rather humiliating that I had to be shown how to
put on my new leather cartridge-boxes by a Spanish
girl, the wife of Williams, the other English militiaman.
She was a gentle, dark-eyed, intensely feminine
creature who looked as though her life-work was to
rock a cradle, but who as a matter of fact had fought
bravely in the street-battles of July. At this time she
was carrying a baby which was born just ten months
after the outbreak of war and had perhaps been
begotten behind a barricade."
Significantly, it is Orwell's implicit criticism of himself as an Englishman here
which creates a remarkable contrast between the author's dismantling of sexual
stereotypes (the girl's robustness, both in the "street-battles" and throughout
her war-time pregnancy, is revealed by Orwell) and his unnervingly
conventional response to the girl in emotional terms. Orwell's sense of
degradation in receiving female assistance within a traditionally masculine
sphere of activity, his dehumanising depiction of the girl as a "creature", and
his assumption that it should be anybody's "life-work [... ] to rock a cradle"
undermines the power of his implicitly self-critical revelation concerning her
real activities. Orwell's attack on Englishness, then, awkwardly suggests, and
yet fails to fully recognise, the fissuring effects of gender on national identity
in a patriarchal society. The critique itself perceives its object largely as a
masculine one: "England", to answer the question in the title of Lawrence's
essay, "is still a man's country".67
Furthermore, the ambiguity of Orwell's position in relation to his
notion of a "hard-boiled" Englishness -.a quality which suggests a shrewdness
not entirely negative - can be effectively used for an immanent critique of
Orwell's own (degendered) sense of nationhood. For Orwell emphasises an
66 Orwell, p. 12.
67 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", Assorted Articles, pp. 77-82, 77.
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English "civilisation" in opposition to an implied Spanish primitivism, and he
views the "idealistic" Spanish as "rather pathetic in the literalness" with which
they "took the hackneyed phrases of revolution". Firstly, it should be noted
that such aspects of Orwell's language, while evidently being used as a method
of exposing English political cynicism, nonetheless implicate him in his own
version of an Englishness both destructive and (in this case, racially)
patronising in its intelligence. However, the shrewdness which is a constitutive
part of such a "hard-boiled" attitude would have been potentially invaluable to
the Spanish revolutionaries in their fight against the betrayal of an insidious
Communist reaction. In other words, in his critique of political "apathy" and
scepticism of radical social change, Orwell fails to emphasise the equal
necessity of shrewdness in political consciousness - the capacity to know
one's enemies. For the Civil War's female revolutionaries, who were suffering
from the process of political reaction long before the open suppression of the
militias, such knowledge, at least with the benefit of hindsight, would have
seemed all the more exigent. Jean Rhys's novel, Voyage in the Dark (1934),
appears to me, however, to balance these not incompatible attitudes (of
shrewdness and contempt for cynicism) in a devastating depiction of an
England divided by gender, class and race. It is to this work that I will shortly
tum, in order to construct a dialogue between Rhys's Englishness, with its
expanded sense of social divisions, and the England of Lawrence's arucles."
Before doing so, however, I wish to provide a brief theoretical
discussion of the concept of national identity. The purpose of the following
comments is to come to some conclusions about Lawrence's and Orwell's
68 Jean Rhys, Voyage in the Dark (1934; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
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sense of Englishness while also reflecting upon how such conclusions colour
our understanding of nation-ness. Furthermore, in the process of this
discussion, I hope to have prepared the foundations for a final commentary on
Rhys and how her distinct sense of Englishness might be used to interpret
Lawrence's.
Nations and Individuals
Benedict Anderson writes in Imagined Communities that "something of
the nature of this political love" of one's nation "can be deciphered from the
ways in which languages describe its object: either in the vocabulary of kinship
[ ... J or that of home". He continues:
Both idioms denote something to which one is naturally
tied. As we have seen [... J in everything "natural" there
is always something unchosen. In this way, nation-ness
is assimilated to skin-colour, gender, parentage and
birth-era - all those things one cannot help. And in
these "natural ties" one senses what one might call "the
beauty of gemeinschaft". To put it another way,
precisely because such ties are not chosen, they have
about them a halo of disinterestedness.F'
Anderson goes on to draw a distinction between the concept of the nation as
ideological (for example, in the "idea of 'national interest"') which is found
largely in the fields of academia and politics, and the wider, more "ordinary"
sense of the nation as an emotional, "interestless" attachment. 70
In the foregoing analysis, we have seen both the ideological features
and the emotional qualities of the two writers' different senses of national
69 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 143.
70 Anderson, p. 144.
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identity. Anderson's claim, however, is that the experience of nation-ness "for
most ordinary people of whatever class" is based upon its "unchosen" quality;
and the power of the nation as an idea resides in its "disinterestedness" and in
the "natural" aura of its bond, not in its ideological character." Certainly, both
Lawrence's and Orwell's writing appear to register, in the contrasting ways
already demonstrated, the primarily felt nature of the experience of Englishness
as an "unchosen" identity, whether this be in the form of a soporific "apathy"
and cynicism (as in Orwell) or a feeling of futile "dulness" (as in Lawrence).
We might therefore fruitfully examine how this emotional bond is coloured
differently according to each writer's different relationship to the society
known as England. Since if national identity is largely a visceral tie, then the
actual individual relationship which the writer in question has with that nation
as a society will evidently be important.
Lawrence left England in 1919 in exasperation with the British
government's suppression of his work and its repressive war against Germany,
and thereafter lived in various locations abroad until his death, returning to
England only rarely. Lawrence can be reasonably described, then, as an exile
in his relationship to his country. The posthumously published essay of 1919
entitled "Democracy" strongly evokes the sense of an impending national
exile:
Nation is a dead ideal [.... ] England, France, Germany
- these great nations, they have no vital meaning any
more, except as great Food Committees and Housing
Committees for a throng of people whose material
tastes are somewhat in accord. No doubt they had other
meanings."
71 Anderson, p. 143-4.
72 Lawrence, "Democracy", Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence, ed. Edward
D. McDonald (London: Heinemann, 1936), pp. 699-718, 702.
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Nations have lost their "vital meaning" owing to "the great development in
collective expression in mankind" which "has been a progress towards the
possibility of purely individual expression"." Significantly, Lawrence tells the
reader that we must "drop the ideal [my italics] of England or Europe or
anywhere else".74The idea of a national or international community is, we are
told, only "a business concern masquerad[ing] as an ideal concern".75
Lawrence, though he rightly establishes a connection between the
nation state and economics, uses this insight to argue that the concept of the
nation should be nothing more than an economic one. For Lawrence, the
problem with the nation is that it has become an abstract, "automatic" ideal
superimposed on the "spontaneous" individual's "living self'.76 This argument
then leads to the claim that all collective identities, "oneness and
collectiveness", are "inferior" to "singleness" - "the true identity ... ofthe living
self': a claim which isolates the concepts of the individual and the social and
places them in mutual antagonism."
This argument is powerfully suggestive about the nature of the exile's
position in relation to his society. For Raymond Williams, "the exile is as
absolute as the rebel in rejecting the way of life of his society, but instead of
fighting it he goes away". Furthermore, most commonly:
[the exile] will remain an exile, unable to go back to the
society that he has rejected or that has rejected him, yet
equally unable to form important relationships with the
society to which he has gone [.... ] [he] is committed to
waiting: when the society changes, then he can come
73 Lawrence, "Democracy", p. 702.
74 Lawrence, "Democracy", p. 703.
7' Lawrence, "Democracy", pp. 702-3.
76 Lawrence, "Democracy", pp. 70S, 708.
77 Lawrence, "Democracy", p. 708.
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home, but the actual process of change is one in which
he is not involved.i''
We see the seeds of this process of estrangement from all society in
"Democracy". Lawrence assumes that the concept of society, whether it takes
the form of the nation or a democracy, can be isolated from the individual
"living self', and that material life is not a contentious part of the ideal sphere
of intellect and rationality. Yet, as Williams argues, "these substances are
forms of relationship which we can never finally isolate, since the organization,
throughout, is in interlocking terms".79Lawrence's separation of these terms in
"Democracy", particularly those of individual and society, marks the position
of an incipient exile. It is ironic, however, that this isolation of concepts
continues into the late essays and problematises Lawrence's position through
his return to the "ideal" notions of England and Englishness.
For it is just such a division of the individual from his society which
creates so many of the dominant features of Lawrence's later perception of
Englishness. We have already seen, in the article "Insouciance", an assumed
split between the authenticity of the individual's immediate, emotional
experiences and the inauthentic, "abstract" world of politics. However, this
appears awkwardly alongside the earlier "Democracy" since "Insouciance"
forms part of a book of articles which are embroiled in generalisations about
Englishness: "Nation" is evidently not "a dead ideal" and Lawrence's
. emotional experiences even inform the abstract generalisations he makes about
it. What is more striking, though, is that Lawrence's perceptions of Englishness
contain all the hallmarks of an individual who is estranged and in exile from
78 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (1961; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965),
fi,' 107-8.
Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution, p. 116.
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the society on which he is writing - all the characteristics of someone who has
ceased to experience England. Hence, his writing on England is full, ironically,
of metaphysical abstractions, nostalgia for the Empire, and touristic versions of
English history.
What seems clear, then, is that the division of the individual and
experiential from the rational and social, which Lawrence himself lived, is a
disabling one when Lawrence attempts to write about national identity: the
abstract or "imagined" notion of nation-ness requires the insight of emotional
experience. As an exile from England and society at large, Lawrence was,
when concerned with national identity, reduced to a highly "abstract" thinking
despite his continued emphasis upon the importance of "direct contact".
Lawrence had a positive relationship with neither England (he is not engaged
in its "process of change"), nor an alternative society (Italian society appears,
for example, in the somewhat meagre form of Renaissance fashion). His
emotional attachment to England is that of the exile - an attempt to recover a
.former relationship with the society. into which he was born, which is
necessarily doomed to the double failure of abstraction and nostalgia. The
posthumously published articles, "Return to Bestwood" and "Nottingham and
the Mining Countryside", are characteristic of this futile struggle for a lost
attachment in both their abstract proposals for socio-political change ("life"
and "beauty" are the fundamentals here) and their representation of English
history (industrial politics was apparently non-existent and Eastwood, we are
told, was "still the old England of the forest and agricultural past" in
Lawrence's youth).80
80 Lawrence, "Return to Bestwood", Phoenix II, pp. 257-66, 266, and "Nottingham and the
Mining Countryside", Phoenix, pp. 133-40, 140 and 133. See also John Worthen, "Lawrence
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While Lawrence was "alien" to his "home place", Orwell stood both
outside and within it.SI Raymond Williams writes in Orwell of Orwell's
"conscious double vision" which arose from having rejected both the English
bourgeois class to which he belonged and the imperialism of which he had
been a part.82 This "double vision" of Orwell's, as I have already shown,
entailed a radical criticism of bourgeois England and a continual
acknowledgement that he himself was implicated in that criticism as a
bourgeois Englishman. However, Williams describes Orwell's attempts to
depict and affiliate himself to a kind of ordinary England as fundamentally
flawed, since they represent "the emotions of the exile from a lost country, a
lost class".s3 The central example of Orwell's failure, for Williams, is his
representation of England as "a family with the wrong members in control" in
the essay "England Your England"." Williams argues that this is one of many
instances in which Orwell is unable to create an accurate sense of the "social
structure" and the complexity of its economic and political relationships.
Orwell consequently often resorts to the conveyance of "a climate, an
atmosphere" - "a mood" rather than "a theory"."
Although it is clearly desirable to locate the ideological features of any
emotive language, as Williams does here (and as I myself have been attempting
to do), it must be stressed that to speak of what England or Englishness is, is
not to offer "a theory" but is precisely to offer "a mood". To expect Orwell's
and Eastwood", D. H. Lawrence: centenary essays, ed. Mara Kalnins (Bristol: Bristol Classical
Press, 1986), pp. 1-18, for a good discussion of the historical inaccuracy of Lawrence's
representation of Eastwood.
81 Lawrence, "Return to Bestwood", p. 257.
82 Raymond Williams, Orwell (London: Fontana, 1971), p. 18.
83 Raymond Williams, Orwell, p. 28.
84 Orwell, "England Your England" (1941), Inside the Whale and Other Essays (1957 as
Selected Essays; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), pp. 63-90, 78.
8S Raymond Williams, Orwell, pp. 23,27.
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portraits of Englishness to be theoretically sound is perhaps to expect the
impossible. The "very middle-class image of England as a family" is evidently
a conservative formulation which can indeed be read as indicative of an exile's
striving for "a lost country"." However, as I think Homage shows, this is an
unfair summary of Orwell's "double vision" of England. For such a "double
vision" is more accurately described as that of the "self-exile" or "internal
emigre", a position which Williams himself describes:
The self-exile could, if he chose, live at ease in his
society, but to do so would be to deny his personal
reality [.... ] [he] lives and moves about in the society
. into which he was born, but rejects its purposes and
despises its values, because of alternative principles to
which his whole personal reality is committed [.... ] He
may support the principles of dissenting causes, but he
cannot join them: he is too wary of being caught and
compromised. What he has principally to defend is his
own living pattern, his own mind, and almost any
relationship is a potential threat to this.87
Orwell "could" have lived "at ease" within the England of the bourgeois
imperialist class and yet he spent his life attacking that England, frequently
through his experiences of working-class life and poverty. At one point Orwell
even deliberately became a vagrant - a positive evasion of his class, though he
inevitably remained an outsider. On the other hand, he never lived in exile
from his country or ceased to have hope for it, but was always politically
engaged with it. Furthermore, at various points he supported "dissenting
causes" such as revolutionary socialism (after his experience in Spain), yet he
could never fully commit to them: Orwell was only ever consistent in what he
opposed - capitalism, fascism, and Communism. Hence, his most powerful
attachment was, paradoxically, to the "unchosen" England into which he was
86 Raymond Williams, Orwell, p. 26.
87 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution, p. 108.
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born and that, as we have seen, he held in such contempt. Through this
negative attachment, Orwell shows us the powerfully paradoxical nature of
relationship: the strength of the bond appears to legitimise and enable criticism.
For Orwell's narrative of the Spanish Civil War is as much about attacking
England as it is about anti-fascism and his "personal" socialist principles.
Homage offers less the position of the exile, who has lost all social bond, than
that of the "internal emigre" whose bond is an incitement to assault.
Yet, to repeat, Orwell does not provide "a theory" of Englishness: we
are still given a "climate" or "atmosphere". The central images, after all, are
those of the "money-tainted air of England" and the "hard-boiled, sneering
civilisation of the English-speaking races". To evaluate these in terms of their
sophistication as theoretical formulations of a "social structure" is to miss the
point of such images of nation-ness, which is not to deny their ideological
nature. Images of national identity are abstractions which are grounded in the
emotional experience of an "unchosen" bond. As we have seen, Lawrence's
writing on England acts out the process of social isolation and exile which he
lived, through its separation of the concepts of individual and society. Orwell,
on the other hand, demonstrates, through his persistent self-criticisms and
ideologically revealing comments on his conception of gender, that the power
of his critique arises from his own implied association with, and relationship
to, its object: Orwell is against England because it is the only bond he cannot
deny, as an "internal emigre" who will not wholly leave his country. This
contradictory position of relationship and antagonism is only weakly registered
in Orwell's notion of England as "a family with the wrong members in control"
and the expression is thus a highly "middle-class" and liberal one. Yet, notably,
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Orwell draws on the "vocabulary of kinship" in a very different manner to the
way in which Lawrence uses the language of "home". While Lawrence is
"alien" to "home", Orwell is struggling with it as a "family" - and his refusal
to leave England emphasises the fact that he is not in simple exile from it. The
position of relationship and antagonism is heightened however in Homage, in
which Orwell's positive experience of an alternative society (an incipiently
socialist Spain) allows him to critique England, temporarily, from a position
external to it as well as from the point of view of an Englishman. It is the
strength of this tension in Homage, I would argue, that produces the power of
the critique of a notion of Englishness.
For Orwell makes it clear, particularly at the end of Homage, that he is
depicting a version of England, and this is indicated in the blurring of his
representation of England with the voice of what is presumably supposed to be
the typical attitudes of a bourgeois Englishman. Thus, English national identity
is transformed into the identity of the dominant socio-economic class of
England, the bourgeoisie. The other Englands, for example working-class
England, are written out of the image so that it is ostensibly a particular
version of England that we are being given - a middle-class England. This is
the England which Orwell wishes to attack: the England of which he has been
a part. Orwell's experience of Spain allows, therefore, not the portrayal of an
intricate "social structure", but the contrasting of two dominant social orders -
that of an egalitarian, working-class Spain and that of a class-ridden, bourgeois
England. Orwell thus attacks England, not as some true sociological entity, but
as its dominant class - that is, the class to which he originally belonged.
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Moreover, Orwell is critiquing this dominant class's own representation
.of England, the ways in which it mythologises itself. The myths of the proud
imperial England, the aloof, "English" political superiority, the homely, rural
Englander, and the touristic, middle-class portrait of English history and
culture as "cricket matches", "Royal weddings", and "red buses", are debunked
as cynical and self-deluding images through a narrative that reveals the
pernicious force of "money" which connects England to the rest of the world,
and leads to its apathetic collusion in the progress of fascism. Orwell is, then,
not offering a complex picture of social forces. Rather, he is exposing national
mythology while also holding up two opposing abstract conceptions of society
and asking us to make a choice: capitalism/fascism or socialism.
Of course, Orwell's position both within and outside England,
emotionally attached to English society and ideologically hostile to it, also
stimulates many of the admirable moments of self-criticism in Homage in
which Orwell criticises or exposes his own Englishness. However, as I have
. argue~, Orwell's critical sense of England as a "man's country" is not as sharp
as that of Jean Rhys' s, to which I will now turn.
This Gendered Isle: Lawrence in Jean Rhys's Other England
In emphasising the importance of individuality in the essay
"Democracy", Lawrence speaks of the "strange recognition" of the
individual's "present otherness". 88 For Lawrence, however, this appreciation
of "otherness" is incompatible with all forms of "modern democracy" since
88 Lawrence, "Democracy", p. 715.
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these are forms of material organisation concealed beneath a meretricious
language of "ideals".89Lawrence thus characteristically argues for a separation
of collective and material life from individual "being": the former should not
attempt to interfere with the latter. This way of thinking, as we have seen,
informs a substantial part of Lawrence's method in his construction of
England. Lawrence is more concerned with imagining England in terms of
individual psychology than envisioning it as a particular kind of material
society. By contrast, however, Jean Rhys illustrates in her fictional portrait of
England how a participatory democracy is vital in order to create a society in
which an individual like Anna Morgan, who is representative of so many
forms of "otherness" and oppressed identity, can live fully and without
exploitation. As Williams writes:
[... ] all human individuals are unique: it was one of the
worst results of the old individualism that in asserting
the importance of certain individuals, it moved,
consciously or unconsciously, to denying the
importance of others [.... ] If man is essentially a
learning, creating and communicating being, the only
social organization adequate to his nature is a
participating democracy, in which all of us, as unique
individuals, learn, communicate and control."
Although Lawrence argues for the "recognition" of "otherness" in
"Democracy", his images of England in the late essays, "consciously or
unconsciously", emphasise a highly middle-class and male England and, in the
process, deny the importance of the other Englands - the Englands which Rhys
movingly creates.
The thematic concerns of Lawrence and Rhys are nonetheless not
without their affinity. For while Rhys's Voyage in the Dark explores the social
89 Lawrence, "Democracy", p. 717.
90 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution, p. 118.
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position of women in England from the foreign perspective of a West Indian
immigrant named Anna, Lawrence's essay, "Is England Still a Man's
Country?", discusses English women's social status within the context of the
1920s women's movement and the pervasive male insecurity it entailed. These
two perspectives are therefore quite different from the start, since Lawrence is
beginning from an idea of the historically emerging social ascendance of
women, whereas Rhys locates her Anna within a narrative structure brutally
determined by the social disempowerment of women. Similarly, Lawrence is
addressing a new masculine perception of a radical social change in sexual
power relations, based on the sense of a history of patriarchal stability, while
Rbys is describing the experiences of a foreigner in England who finds herself
a complete outsider as a West Indian and a woman with little money.
Both Rbys's and Lawrence's accounts of women's relationship to
England as an economic entity, however, possess a degree of affinity. Anna
Morgan, of Voyage in the Dark, attempts to escape from the barren poverty of
life working for a touring company through an affair with a businessman called
Walter Jeffries. However, Anna only succeeds in travelling from the hardships
of wage labour to a prostituted life of material dependency on men. The
socially despised life of a "tart" (for the pleasure of married men) is, in other
words, the substitute for her legally and morally sanctioned economic
impoverishment: women are, on the one hand, economically powerless in the
world of labour, and both sexually exploited and socially outcast by bourgeois
sexual hypocrisy on the other.91
91 Rhys, p. 26.
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Lawrence, similarly, states the case against his male contemporaries'
insecurity by revealing part of the stark material reality for women:
If England is not a man's country, it isn't a woman's
country either. That's obvious. Women didn't make
England. And women don't run England to-day, in
spite of the fact that nine-tenths of the voices on the
telephone are female voices. Women to-day, wherever
they are, show up; and they pipe up. They are heard and
they are seen. No denying it. And it seems to get on the
men's nerves. Quite! But that doesn't prove that the
women own England and run England. They don't.
They occupy, on the whole, rather inferior jobs [.... ]92
Such a vision of female England, with its straightforward economic realism, is
not incompatible with Rhys's nation. However, the English femininity of
Lawrence's essay is adorned with the heavily sexualised and genteel clothing
of the objectified, bourgeois "lady": women "embellish" their "inferior jobs"
with "flowered voile and artificial silk stockings and a number of airs and
graces"." Just as the means by which such women afford such
"embellish[ment]" is obscured though the prose, so too is the strength of the
bond between gender and class. The contradiction between the "inferior[ity]"
of the ''job',' and the superiority of the clothing is exposed through its dialogic
confrontation with Voyage. For the women of Rhys's novel, who are 'struggling
.in such "inferior jobs" are incessantly preoccupied with their lack of good
clothes - and this obsession is shown to have its origins in an objectifying
masculine discourse. As Maudie, a friend of Anna's, comments with regard to
a boyfriend:
'Isn't it awful losing a chance like that because you
haven't got a little money? [.... ] I'm so damned shabby
and, you know, when you're shabby you can't do
anything, you don't believe in yourself. And he notices
clothes [.... ] He said to me the other day, "If there's
92 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", p. 78 ..
93 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", p. 78.
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anything I notice about a girl it's her legs and her
shoes." Well, my legs are all right, but look at my
shoes. He's always saying things like that and it makes
me feel awful.,94
Moreover, Maudie "was sure she could get him to marry her if she could
smarten herself up a bit".95 This passage thus illuminates the dissonance of
Lawrence's image of the Englishwoman, and shatters it as a patriarchal
distortion of the class position of women. Lawrence's vision of "airs and
graces", "flowered voile and artificial silk stockings" is, in the mirror of
Rbys's world, a commodifying fantasy of bourgeois femininity, rather than a
description of working women, which serves to psychologically reinforce the
class oppression of England's women.
Moreover, though Lawrence's essay is in part satirically targeting the
"blame" affixed by men to women for "usurping England" ("Do the men envy
the women these rather inferior jobs?"), both sexes are "so busy blaming one
another" that "Old England" is "forsaken"." Once again, in a manner
reminiscent of Touch and Go, socio-economic conflict is portrayed as a merely
foolish quarrel. Rbys shows the issue, however, to be beyond that of a
squabble, or even a debate: for Anna, it runs so deeply into the structure of
society that there is no situation in which she can give a voice to her suffering.
For example, when Anna considers her own clothes, she is "too sad to cry",
recognising the extent of her social isolation:
Everything makes you want pretty clothes like hell.
People laugh at girls who are badly dressed [.... ] As if
that isn't enough. But no, it's jaw, jaw and sneer, sneer
all the time. And the shop-windows sneering and
smiling in your face.97
94 Rhys, p. 136.
93 Rhys, p. 136.
96 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", pp. 77-79.
97 Rhys, p. 22.
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The mental effect on Anna of such cogitation is one of degraded desperation:
'" All right, I'll do anything for good clothes. Anything - anything for
clothes'"." Though she attempts to accept that "perhaps it will always be like
this", her fear that she will "be one of the ones with beastly lives", "without
any money", is dominant, and the next scene shows her spending Walter's gift
of money on clothes, as he requested - marking the beginning of her slide into
a prostituted life of dependency on men.99 Anna's is such an impotent life, in
short, that it could not possibly offer her the opportunity for a scenario of
mutual "blame", since such a concept assumes some kind of sexual equality
beyond socio-material relations.
More crucially, the "inferior" economic position of women is less the
contemporary social issue for Lawrence than the psychological fragility of men
who, in being too "soft and nice and comfortable", have abdicated
"responsibility" by "pretend[ing]" that women have "usurped the land".
Meanwhile, this male infirmity has created its binary opposite in the women of
England who are predominantly "hard and unkind and uncomfortable'V'" This
representation of English gender identities is, however, disassembled if placed
in dialogue with Voyage which offers actual explanations of its constructions
of identity. For example, the veneer of Vincent (a friend of Walter's), which
resembles the "soft and nice and comfortable" male of Lawrence's creation, is
depicted as the social polish of a cold, exploitative man, cynically bribing
Anna in order to ensure Walter's safety from social embarrassment, following
his abandonment of his affair with her. Anna describes Vincent's manner:
98 Rhys, p. 22.
99 Rhys, p. 23.
100 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", p. 79.
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Making his voice very kind, but the look of his eyes
was like a high, smooth, unc1imbable wall. No
communication possible. You have to be three-quarters
mad even to attempt it.IOI
The "soft and nice and comfortable" man thus appears more illusory in Rhys's
fiction, which envisions such qualities as the polite conventions of the
bourgeois English male designed to conceal his sexual manipulation of
women's class position. Similarly, Lawrence's "hard and unkind and
uncomfortable" women of England are not, when they appear in Rhys's
creation, a product of a male abdication of "responsibility". They are, rather, a
response to a male parody of "responsibility". Vincent, for example, expects
Anna to be grateful for the money given to her as payment for Walter's sexual
use of her:
'You must have known Walter would look after you.
And he'd fixed everything up [.. ;.]'
'So much every Saturday,' I said. 'Receipt-form
enclosed.'
'It's no use talking like that. You're going to be
pretty glad of it now, aren't you?'
I didn't answer.I02
. The "Englishman" here has certainly not renounced all "responsibility" for
women; rather, he cynically exploits the "responsibility" which the bias of the
socio-economic structure affords him should he wish to accept it. Through her
succession of transitory affairs with men in the novel, Anna encounters this
psychology continually since her need of both material subsistence and
affection allows her to fall prey to men in search of extra-marital sex. Rhys
thus confronts Lawrence's "comfortable" image of an enfeebled English
masculinity with a disturbing vision of the English bourgeois male as a
101 Rhys, p. 147.
102 Rhys, pp. 147-8.
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pernicious parodist of "responsibility": Voyage substitutes for Lawrence's inert
and indifferent male, an active masculine manipulation of power.
From this notion of contemporary English masculinity, however, the
myth of a true English manhood, derived from a construction of a more
authentic past, is manufactured: "The Englishman hated being bossed or
bullied [.... ] Which is a real man's spirit, and the only spirit that makes a
country a man's country".103The implication here is evidently that England is
not a "man's country" though it was and should be. This idea is based on a
constructed image of the Englishmen of the past as lovers of "freedom" and
enemies of "the boss and bully".l04 However, the modem Englishman,
Lawrence tells us, "won't mind" if his "political freedom" is "taken from him
again, after his forefathers fought so hard for it". This leads Lawrence to argue
that, though the Englishman has "political freedom", he does not possess
"economical freedom" and this is the reason for his "blaming [of] the women":
he must "tackle" the "insuperable difficulty" of "economic bondage".los
The focus has shifted, therefore, from a criticism of male bitterness
over the women's movement to the importance of male economic freedom in
the re-establishment of England as "a man's country". Voyage, on the other
hand, portrays an England which is still very much "a man's country", and in
which women are economically subordinate to and at the mercy of men's
. "economical freedom": Anna's body is bought by wealthy men. Her affections
are manipulated by the greater material power of the men she
encounters. For example, when she begins dating Walter, her emotional
103 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", p. 79.
104 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", pp. 79-80.
lOS Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man' s Country?", pp. 80-81.
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responses to him are significantly confused. When Walter asks her if her
stepmother thinks she has "disgraced the family" by "gadding about on tour",
her initial feeling of repulsion at his scarcely concealed contempt for her as a
woman of little money is counteracted by a more material sense of warmth and
comfort:
I looked at him, and he was smiling as if he were
laughing at me. I stopped talking. I thought, 'Oh God,
he's the sneering sort. I wish I hadn't come.'
But when the waiter brought in coffee and liqueurs
and shut the door [... ] and we went over to the fire, I
felt all right again. I liked the room and the red
carnations on the table and the way he talked and his
clothes - especially his clothes. It was a pity about my
clothes [.... ]106
The scene is characteristic for its representation of Anna's alternating emotions
of hatred for Walter as an individual, and the feelings of pleasure and security
stimulated by the material environment he offers her. Male "economical
freedom" in itself is not therefore, as in Lawrence's article, an issue distinct
from women's economic freedom, or a means by which men can take a
benevolent "responsibility" for the country once again. Instead, in the England
. of Rhys' s fiction the.degree of economic power which men do possess, though
they are still confined (as Lawrence points out) to the "treadmill" of alienated
labour, is inseparable from the material impotence of women, and in fact
exploits it, owing to the division of society by class.I07
Lawrence's essay, however, through its welding of masculinity with
nationality, and its sense of male political and economic freedom as
synonymous with freedom in general, evades the question of women's social
power as if it could be subsumed under the issue of men's power. The whole
106 Rhys, p. 19.
107 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", p. 80.
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problem of national economic organisation becomes an exclusively male one
rather than one for both men and women to engage with through their
complementary experiences of exploitation within the interconnected webs of
gender and class relations. Women's struggle for jobs in order to claim
economic power is perceived as minor compared to the necessity for men to
cast off their status as the alienated labourers of a capitalist economy. In fact,
women's improved status is explained as a consequence of male contempt for
labour rather than as a result of female activism: men have "push[ed]" their
jobs "over to the women" owing to their secret "hate [of] the job",108England
is therefore "a man's country" by definition since social changes only occur as
a result of male activity or inactivity. As Lawrence says in the article, "Master
in His Own House":
We may take it for granted, that wherever woman
bosses the show, it is because man doesn't want to. It is
not rapacity and pushing on the women's part. It is
indifference on the man's. Men don't really care.
Wherever they do care, there is no question of the
intrusion of women.!"
. Lawrence's England always-already belongs to Englishmen rather than
Englishwomen. The gendering of Lawrence's construction of Englishness is,
moreover. contained in his feminising of the nation when he speaks of ''the
men" of England having "forsaken her" (that is, the nation).110Thus, the
activity of being English is a masculine one, while the nation as a territory and
national property is feminised.
Rhys's novel, on the other hand, critiques both the commodification of
women and the patriarchal world of norms which women are expected to
108 Lawrence. "Is England Still a Man's Country?", p. 80.
109 Lawrence, "Master in His Own House", Assorted Articles, pp. 57-62,59-60.
110 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", pp. 78-79.
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inhabit. For example, Maudie's account of a man's flippant remark to her,
comparing the price of a woman's clothes to an abstract notion of the cost of a
woman herself, provides a brutal illustration of the transference of the socio-
economic power of men over women to the psychological reduction of female
beings to exchangeable objects of monetary value. In short, the terms of
Lawrence's essay, such as male "responsibility" or men's "forsak[ing]" of
women, are ironised as remnants of a mythical epoch of untainted patriarchal
benevolence. For Rhys identifies the commodification which such a powerful
"responsibility" entails:
'D'you know what a man said to me the other day? It's
funny, he said, have you ever thought that a girl's
clothes cost more than the girl inside them?'
'What a swine of a man!' I said.
'Yes, that's what I told him,' Maudie said. ' "That
isn't the way to talk," I said. And he said, "Well, it's
true, isn't it? You can get a very nice girl for five
pounds, a very nice girl indeed; you can get a very nice
girl for nothing if you know how to go about it. But you
can't get a very nice costume for her for five pounds"
[.... ] And then I had to laugh, because after all it's true,
. isn't it? People are much cheaper than things.'!"
This economic comparison of women with clothes enacts a homogenising and
dehumanising process in which the female is transported into the realm of
objects and valued in terms of an abstract exchange-value. In this manner,
Voyage presents a grotesque affront to Lawrence's diplomatic evasion of the
problem of women's "political" and "economical freedom". While Lawrence
evades it by absorbing it into the prioritised issue of male "freedom", Rhys
provides a horrific image of women as no more than commodities for male
purchase - an image that re-inserts the rupturing force of gender into the
111 Rhys, pp. 39-40.
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concepts of England and Englishness.
The fact that Anna's economic impotence compels her to conform to
both male conceptions of femininity and bourgeois notions of respectability
confines her to an extremely narrow code of conduct and set of norms. On the
one hand, she must be both sexually accessible and socially superior (for
example, in her clothing) in order to gain the security which only men can
provide, while on the other hand, she must obey bourgeois, patriarchal morals
on sexual behaviour. This imprisoning existence is reflected in the oppressive
"sneer" of the English people that Anna encounters and even the buildings she
enters. For example, while the socially snobbish and sexually exploitative
Walter is "the sneering sort", Walter's house at Green Street is also "sneering
faintly, sneering discreetly, as a servant would. Who's this? Where on earth did
he pick her Up?".112This "sneer" pervades the novel as an image of
Englishness, particularly masculine Englishness, and is significantly
reminiscent of Orwell's "sneering civilisation" which I read earlier as a critique
of the kind of apathy towards radical social change which Lawrence's essays
often celebrate. However, in Voyage, the image of a "sneering" England
provides a critique of the cynicism embedded in the relations of power existing
between men and women. Lawrence's late England, by contrast, employs a
conception of the nation that elevates men's social issues over women's, to the
extent of reducing the latter to a passion for "stockings" and cigarettes", and
idealises male political activity as a universal solution to social illS.113 This is
exposed in Rhys's England as a symptom of the problem rather than a
112 Rhys, p. 43.
113 Lawrence, "Is England Still a Man's Country?", p. 78.
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diagnosis of it, since her England is fissured by a conflict of interests both at
the level of social class (like Orwell's) and at the level of gender.
Furthermore, Rhys's English landscape is a homogenised one,
reminding us of Orwell and Lawrence's "sleep[y]" and "dull" southern
England. However, while Lawrence's landscape expresses a lack of
individuality and spiritual vitality in the English, and Orwell's vision is a
satirical picture of a depoliticised and nostalgic England, Rhys's homogenised
and homogenising English landscape is an aggressive one which constrains and
demands conformity to its structure. This landscape differs radically from
Orwell's and Lawrence's in that it possesses the quality of nightmare: Anna
imposes the poverty, confinement and uniformity of her existence upon her
wider social environment. For example:
'I believe this damned room's getting smaller and
smaller,' 1 thought. And about the rows of houses
outside, gimcrack, rotten-looking, and all exactly
alike.1I4
She was exactly like our landlady at Eastbourne. Was
it Eastbourne? And the shapes of the' slices of meat
were the same, and the way the cabbage was heaped
was the same, and all the houses' outside iri the street
were the same - all alike, all hideously stuck together -
and the streets going north, east, south, west, all exactly
the same.IIS
Rhys's England is the experience of those it oppresses rather than the simply
soporific and inert Englands of Orwell and Lawrence. The idealised images of
England as "peaceful", and English people as lovers of "freedom" and enemies
of the "boss and bully", are dialogically undermined through a vision of
England as experienced through the eyes of the exploited and socially outcast
114 Rhys, p. 26.
us Rhys, p. 89.
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Anna. Voyage therefore offers Orwell and Lawrence an England whose class-
based and gendered socio-economic divisions inspire cynicism towards
existing relationships as well as potential future ones. Anna herself poignantly
voices Rhys's attack on such cynicism with her utopian reflection: "Money
ought to be everybody's. It ought to be like water. You can tell that because
you get accustomed to it so quickly".1l6However, unlike Orwell's critique of a
shrewd, "hard-boiled" England, Rhys's tragic narrative suggests that such
qualities are potentially empowering. For Anna's repressed consciousness of
Walter's manipulative nature appears painfully ironic following his departure
and her subsequent demise, thus implying that a certain amount of shrewdness
is desirable in an England where, for the substantial social groups embodied in
Rhys's Anna Morgan, "dulness" is a grotesque euphemism for impoverishment
and "freedom" is others' freedom to exploit.
Rhys's novel, then, provides an image of nation-ness which sits
somewhat uncomfortably alongside Anderson's argument that "nation-ness" is
centrally about the sense of being "naturally tied" to a positively conceived,
, "unchosen" bond. For Rhys's vision of England, through the eyes of Anna,
provides a sense of national identity which is powerfully imagined through the
prisms of gender, class and race. Anderson hints that "nation-ness" has its
competitors for affiliation when he remarks that it is "assimilated to skin-
colour, gender, parentage and birth-era - all those things one cannot help".117
Nonetheless, he conceives national identity almost entirely in terms of a
sympathetic and direct relationship or bond. What I hope to have conveyed in
this chapter is how nation-ness is always imagined through the web of social
116 Rhys, p. 24.
117 Anderson, p. 143.
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relationships which the particular individual inhabits. In the case of Anna
Morgan her "unchosen" relationship to England, as a member of the British
Empire, is perceived as one of extreme antagonism and fear rather than
"kinship", and this is evidently the consequence of the fact that the various
identities which Anna occupies are those both marginalised and oppressed by
. English society. As a woman, a member of the lower classes, and an immigrant
from the edge of the British Empire, Anna is confronted with a menacing
Englishness which reduces her to the position of a servant (she is, in terms of
her socio-economic class, a prostitute). National identity is thus not merely
assimilable to but inextricably bound up with such factors as "skin-colour,
gender, parentage and birth-era" and, in addition, class - all of which are
originally "unchosen" though we may evade them all. In fact, peculiarly
(considering Anderson omits class in his list of the categories to which nation-
ness is assimilable), national identity has a greater resemblance to class than
these other formative aspects of identity in that it is much more easily evaded
owing to its cultural quality: nation-ness is indicated predominantly by
language, while class is most manifestly represented by such external, cultural
features. as accent and appearance. This is perhaps highlighted by the
doubleness of Lawrence and Orwell's respective positions in terms of these
identities. Lawrence's attachment to, yet paradoxical exile from, England, and
Orwell's disdainful, critical engagement with the imperial, upper-middle-class
England into which he was born, both suggest that there is a flexibility in the
bond that one has to one's nation - though our national identity may be
"unchosen", we can leave our country (and learn a new language) or critically
distance ourselves from it. Similarly, Lawrence moved into a literary, middle-
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class culture from working-class origins, though he never felt at home in such a
world; while Orwell abandoned his upper-middle-class career in the imperial
administration to assume the various roles of writer, socialist militiaman in the
Spanish Civil War and, for a period, vagrant, though he too could not truly
abandon his class as a formative part of his identity. It would appear, then, that
class shares with nationhood a certain degree of culturally constituted
malleability. Both nation-ness and class are certainly more evadable forms of
identity than "skin-colour, gender, parentage and birth-era", none of which are
easily avoided.
Our relationship to our nation, therefore, does not come prior to our
other social relationships through which alternative identities emerge and
become meaningful. What Rhys' s fiction shows is that the relationships into
which we are born are formative in the constitution of our sense of nation-ness,
and these relations may foster alienated as well as sympathetic bonds to nation,
and thus be competitors for our sense of belonging. In Voyage in the Dark, it is
clear that Englishness as an identity is in direct antagonism to the identities
Anna represents: one person's sense of belonging is another's social exclusion.
Anderson's vision of national identity, however, though highly sensitive to its
ideological modality, appears to deny its emotionally double-edged nature
through his emphasis on it as a "political love".
Lawrence and Orwell, by contrast, omit in their creations these other
Englands and their alternative forms of belonging and identity. Rbys's Anna
belongs neither to Lawrence's England nor even Orwell's. Orwell engages
with and critiques a self-deluding bourgeois, southern England and reveals its
self-satisfied parochiality and unsavoury connection with the seemingly
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external world of international politics. Lawrence's England, however, is the
abstract and touristic image of the national exile. Lawrence was able, to
counter David Gervais, both to ''tear himself away from the drama of
England's defacement in the hope of finding refuge in some England of the
mind", and to make "the usual association of 'Englishness' with a declining
rural way of life" - points which an essay such as "Insouciance" makes clear.!"
Lawrence's image of England is, in fact, the very cynical, middle-class
England which Orwell attacks: that is, the parochial, idealised, and
commodifying vision of the nation as a depoliticised and classless emotional
unity (occasionally fractured by superficial quarrels) - a bourgeois world of
tourist attractions and lifestyle choices. However, Orwell himself does not
critique such an image comprehensively owing to his paradoxical position both
inside and outside the England of his creation - the necessary contradiction and
cost, perhaps, of an immanent critique. Rhys, by contrast, offers those other
sides of England which Lawrence so strongly suppresses - the England of
patriarchy and the England of colonial exploitation. For Lawrence, such
Englands - representative of England's "otherness" - are a reality to be
smothered for the sake of a merely notional individuality which denies both its
own status as a typically bourgeois perspective and its inescapable social
relationships. As Williams remarks, "man is born into relationships. [However]
the abstraction of the bare human being, as a separate substance, is ordinarily
118 David Gervais, Literary Englands: Versions of 'Englishness' in Modem Writing
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 86. Though I disagree with Gervais's
comments here, his discussion of Lawrence is an illuminating one, in particular his analysis of
The First Lady Chatterley. However, Gervais (typically, for critics of Lawrence) fails to take
Lawrence's late articles into proper account, and thus is able to state that: "[Lawrence's] later
work assumed no specific English public such as we can still feel ourselves to be continuous
with" (p. 85). See Gervais, pp. 156-84, also for a comparative discussion of Evelyn Waugh and
Orwell.
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taken for granted".119 It is this abstraction, characteristic of the exile, which
suffuses Lawrence's late images of Bnglishness.F"
119 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution, p. 94.
120 I stress "late" Englishness. As Peter Brooker and Peter Widdowson point out, while
emphasising the liberal idealism and Romanticism of much of his work, Lawrence's earlier
story, "England, My England", registers the futility and tragedy of such abstraction, even
locating it at the heart of a certain liberal brand of Englishness. However, the authors
(typically, for Lawrence's critics) do not dispel the widespread assumption that Lawrence was
a stubborn anti-nationalist, a claim which this chapter should at the very least unsettle.
Nonetheless, for their brief yet brilliant analysis of Lawrence and a fascinating overview of his
contemporaries' literary Englands, see Brooker and Widdowson's essay, "A Literature for
England", Englishness: Politics and Culture 1880-1920, ed. Robert Colis and Philip Dodd
(London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 116-63.
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4: The Culture of the Death Drive: Violence, Culture and the Unconscious
in the work of Lawrence and Inter- War Psychoanalysis
Lawrence and Lawrencians have typically separated aesthetics from politics,
the personal from the socio-political, and the instinctual from the cultural.
Nowhere perhaps is this more pronounced than in their treatment (or, rather,
neglect) of Lawrence's relationship to violence. I In the first section of this
chapter I want to trace, by focusing on the Cambridge Biography of Lawrence,
the tensions and contradictions of this dualistic methodology. While
Lawrence's work frequently engages with violence as a social phenomenon
and politically symbolic act, Lawrence's biographers have shied away from
this prominent feature of his work, confining it to a personal ethic of non-
repression of the impulses,
Comparable issues are raised in the field of inter-war psychoanalysis -
particularly in the work of Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein. For their
equally determined desire intellectually to examine the glaring fact of human
destructiveness in an unprecedently violent century, led to both a split in the
school of British psychoanalysis and the alienation of psychoanalysis's liberal
lOne of the most pernicious examples of Lawrencian critics' separation of the instinctual from
the cultural in the treatment of violence is to be found in Stanley Renner, "Sexuality and the
Unconscious: Psychosexual Drama and Conflict in The Fox", DHLR 21 (3), 1989, pp. 245-73,
in which Renner accepts Lawrence's dichotomy between repressed feminine spirituality and
unconscious male instinctiveness while intellectually relishing Henry's sexual subjugation of
the virginal March through the employment of a crudely reductive, biological psychoanalytic
theory. Ironically. of course, Renner's execrable analysis (which implies that rape and sexual
murder are natural characteristics of male sexuality) is deeply implicated in the kind of cultural
brutality which Lawrence read as the exploitation of ideas for the purpose of violence. The
issue of violence, however, is certainly neglected. The extent to which critics avoid the
discussion of violence is exemplified by Carol Sklenicka, who, in her book-length study D. H.
Lawrence and the Child (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1991), neglects
to mention that Lawrence advocated, in his non-fiction, violent rituals of initiation into adult
sexuality and the violent beating of children; in one case, children of only a "few weeks old"
(see Lawrence, "Education of the People" (written between 1918 and 1920), Phoenix: The
Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence, ed. Edward D. McDonald [London: Heinemann, 1936],
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supporters, who evidently wished to protect the realm of human instincts from
an increasingly anti-humanist political culture (of war and fascism). In the
second part of this chapter, then, I will read Lawrence's own attempt to divorce
culture from the unconscious (by trying to establish a critical position outside
culture from which to critique its violence), alongside the controversial efforts
of inter-war psychoanalysis to understand destructiveness by negotiating the
problematic relation between inside and outside.f The purpose of this section,
which will handle two of Lawrence's non-fictional works, will be to explore
the ways in which the project of formulating an idealised unconscious is
doomed to failure: culture, repression and violence are inextricable from the
unconscious life. In fact, the repression of the historical materiality and cultural
nature of the instincts (the sense in which they cannot entirely evade
repression), and the severance of the impulses from the desire for knowledge
(which might challenge an oppressive cultural authority), result in the very
kind of abstraction of the unconscious from culture which constitutes cultural
violence. At the same time, I will also demonstrate the ways in which
Lawrence's writing sheds light upon psychoanalysis through its notion of
knowledge as death and its emphasis on the necessity of instinctual
. affirmation, which highlight the limits of both the earlier psychoanalysis'
Enlightenment faith in the therapeutic success of self-knowledge and the later
pp. 587·665, 639). Typically, however, Sklenicka is keen to emphasise Lawrence's distance
from such violence in his fiction and his "respect for the child" (see pp. 109-110,166).
2 Such an approach is criticised by Sklenicka, who argues that such comparisons between
Lawrence and psychoanalysis are regrettable both because Lawrence's work suffers as a
consequence (since it is "different in kind" from Freud's), and because, "technically
speaking ... there was no debate" (pp. 164-5). What I hope to illustrate, however, in the
following argument, is the fruitfulness of such a comparative analysis, not only because
Lawrence's concerns are intriguingly similar to those of inter-war psychoanalysis, but also
because such a reading allows both kinds of thought to illuminate one another. Certainly, it
would seem painfully ironic to allow a Lawrencian fear that Lawrence's work may suffer from
such a reading to inhibit criticism on such an issue as the unconscious.
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psychoanalysis' pessimistic emphasis on repression through such concepts as
the death drive.
In the third and final sections of this chapter, I want to argue that the
movement of the non-fictional work - from a critique of the concealed cultural
violence of modernity, through a moral reaction to all repression and violent
cultural conflict from an extra-cultural space, to a paradoxical return to a
brutal, authoritarian culture of the instincts and aesthetic destruction which
masquerades as an idealised unconscious - is the intellectual trajectory taken
by Lawrence's late fiction. However, while short stories, such as "The Woman
Who Rode Away", illustrate the potential in art for symbolic violence when
abstracted from the culture in which it is embedded, the earlier novel, Women
in Love - while paving the way for such abstraction - can be read as an
important reminder of the necessity of conflict and opposition to cultural
authority - an illuminating critique, that is, of psychoanalysis's attempts (such
as Klein's depressive position and Freud's dominant death drive) to produce
selves dominated by guilt and the repression of conflict.
Violence in a Vacuum: Lawrence and the Cambridge Biography
In its impressive scholarly endeavour to provide the most
comprehensive and authoritative account of Lawrence's life since his death in
1930, the recent three-volume Cambridge Biography of D. H. Lawrence has
necessarily been compelled to encounter the numerous accounts of Lawrence's
vitriolic verbal outbursts and acts of physical violence. As this was an
academic project which was attempting to restore Lawrence to po~terity in the
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aftermath of what could easily have been assumed, in the 1970s, to be his
canonic death at the hands of orthodox feminist and Marxist critics, the task
must have been an unenviable one. While the theoretical driving force behind
the Cambridge Biography remained the renovation of Lawrence's literary
credibility through the meticulous reconstruction of his personal life, the fact
of Lawrence's frequently violent temperament (including attacks on his wife,
Frieda, and vows to kill his friend, Mabel Dodge Luhan) would, for many,
have sat uneasily alongside the process of literary restoration: violence is not
culture's happiest of bed-fellows.
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to discover explanations of
Lawrence's various acts of violence in the Cambridge Biography which are
conceived in terms of the notion of an ideal selfhood beyond the instinctually
inhibitory constraints of culture.l For it is a common transcendental manoeuvre
of culture to attempt to extricate itself from the confines of its painful and
unavoidable materiality. As Lyndsey Stonebridge points out, ''the idea of
transcending culture .. .is an illusion that is sustained and enabled by culture
..itself"." This is especially evident in the post-Romantic approach adopted by
David Ellis (author of the third volume of the Cambridge Biography) in his
interpretation of Lawrence's absurd attack on his dog, "Bibbles". Ellis recounts
a narrative in which Lawrence reacts with comic jealousy and rage to the
realisation that "Bibbles", a bitch and a "small French bull terrier", has inter-
3 I should note that, both because of the period (1918-1930) to which this thesis confines itself,
and because Lawrence's concern with violence as a writer only emerges as a significant
interest in his later work, I will not be discussing here John Worthen's first volume of the
Cambridge Biography (D. Hi Lawrence: The Early Years 1885-1912 [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991]).
4 Lyndsey Stonebridge, The Destructive Element: British Psychoanalysis and Modernism
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 2.
219
bred with an Airedale, by pursuing and cursing at his dog until finally he kicks
and hurls her through the snow.! Ellis's description relies upon the first-hand
account of Knud Merrild, a Danish painter of Lawrence's acquaintance, who
describes the "'dark, mysterious forces'" which ruled Lawrence's "'fury
towards Pips [Bibbles]",.6 However, rather than distancing himself from
Merrild's ridiculously idealised account of the events, Ellis offers the reader a
bizarrely Romantic reading of Lawrence's behaviour:
[... ] for Lawrence emotional repression was an
unmitigated evil, and likely to make one ill. When he
shocked Merrild with his description of how he would
like to murder Mabel he was following his belief that
any genuine impulse [... ] needed to find expression.
Actually killing Mabel rather than merely talking about
it would have created difficulties, but if Lawrence
could come closer than most to an uninhibited living it
was because he and Frieda had for years now lived in a
way which allowed him to "be himself'. It was a long
time since he had been obliged to accept the social
restraints of. a schoolmaster's life, and he was not
therefore likely to be inhibited in his fury against
Bibbles by the presence of two friendly and financially
dependent Danes [.... ] Certainly the Bibbles episode
demonstrates that [Lawrence] was the possessor of
what Dryden called a "fiery soul".7
The kind of inverted bathos here which transforms a grotesque act of abuse into
a manifestation of sublime seltbood is hugely ironic when we consider that
Lawrence's work is often praised for its appreciation of and respect for the
otherness of animal life and its psychological excavations of the symptoms of
cultural malaise in the human treatment of animals." However, Ellis's appeal to
S David Ellis, D. H. Lawrence: Dying Game 1922-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), p. 96.
6 Ellis, p. 97. Ellis quotes from Knud Merrild, With D. H. Lawrence in New Mexico (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 541.
7 Ellis, p. 98. .
8 The 1923 poetry coIIection, Birds, Beasts and Flowers (incorporated in D. H. Lawrence,
Complete Poems (1964), ed. Vivian de Sola Pinto and F. Warren Roberts [Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1993]) is the most prominent example of such tendencies in Lawrence's work, while
Women in Love contains numerous passages in which individuals are characterised in terms of
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the literary unconscious is consistent both with what Stonebridge describes as
the widespread need for culture to transcend itself (and by this I take her to
mean culture's desire to evade its necessary materiality and social dimension-
and all of the conflicts which these entail) and with the particular task of
constructing a Lawrence who successfully survives the pitfalls of gender and
history dug out by the criticism of the 1970s. This is most clear in Ellis's
flippant remark that "actually killing Mabel rather than merely talking about it
would have created difficulties". What this obscures is the simple fact that such
extremities of violence for Lawrence were not merely personal affairs confined
to spontaneous moments in the individual's imagination: on the contrary, they
are the subject of sustained exploration in both Lawrence's fictional and non-
fictional works and, though they are obviously imagined, are realised
concretely within all the "difficulties" of the social relationships which such
acts in reality inescapably inhabit. Furthermore, such realisations are resonant
with social and political. implications - they do not appear as ideal
representations of an individualistic, "uninhibited living".
Paradoxically, the socially symbolic nature of Lawrence's engagement
with the destructive instincts implicates his work in the very problematics of
culture which Lawrencians and Lawrence himself have sought to elude. As
Linda Williams has observed of Lawrence's work:
Culture is as much the context and vehicle as the object
of his critique. Lawrence is a writer whose deep
suspicion of mental acts takes place in the text; the only
"body" these ideas have is the body olthe text. Life, for
Lawrence, inhabits and animates the book, the Word
[... ] even if it is also betrayed by it.9
the way they relate to animals.
9 Linda Ruth Williams, D. H. Lawrence (Plymouth: Northcote House, 1997), p. 32.
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That Ellis largely confines his remarks on Lawrence's relation to violence (a
profound relation which I believe is important for an understanding of his texts)
to the sphere of the individual, appears to neglect, then, Lawrence's strong
interest as a writer in the potential role of violence in the social transformation
of a culture. To say that "Lawrence's rages" can be partly explained by his
conviction that "anger did more harm in than out" is, in terms of Lawrence's
conception of his own personal conduct, probably true, but simultaneously
ignores the fact that his own writings imply a less simplistic opposition than
that between the harmful consequences of instinctual repression and the
liberatory benefits of the unimpeded unconscious, despite Lawrence's explicit
attempts to maintain such a dualism.l" Similarly, Ellis's desire to emphasise
that Lawrence's physical attacks on Frieda were due to his instinctual volatility
and were not part of a "systematic abuse" is undoubtedly true. Yet, as a
comment upon Lawrence's general use of violence in his work (which, after all,
is the only reason why such a leviathan biography has a market),II such
statements leave out a great deal. For Lawrence's writings, particularly of the
1920s (the period which Ellis largely covers), consciously and continuously
engage with and imaginatively produce acts of brutal violence - the short story
"The Woman Who Rode Away", for example, laboriously representing the
terrible process through which a white woman comes to be brutally executed by
a native American Indian tribe. Thus, what Iwant to suggest here is that too
10 Ellis, p. 98.
II Ellis himself is clear about this in his "Preface", pp. xi-xv, despite his open desire partially to
extricate Lawrence from his writing activity as an object for analysis: "The biography of a
literary figure is not solely to be judged by the light it throws on the subject's work but, for
many of us, literary value is in the end what matters most, and it is only because Lawrence is
generally considered a great writer that the degree of attention his life has received can be
justified" (p. xiv).
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narrow a focus on the writer's life in isolation from his work can easily lead to
the construction of a Romantically charged image of a volatile yet spontaneous
literary personality venomously challenging cultural orthodoxies in a kind of
literary vacuum devoid of cultural or social implications: in short, the creation
of a mythic cultural figure who stands safely outside culture while attacking it.
It is in this light, I think, significant that, in his earlier discussion of
Lawrence's homicidal feelings towards Mabel, Ellis offers little comment upon
the clearly extra-individual implications of Lawrence's perspectives on
violence:
Merrild remembered [Lawrence] saying with great
earnestness how he felt he could enjoy killing someone
and that some killings were necessary for the world at
large. When asked who would be his first victim
Lawrence replied that he would kill Mabel - cut her
throat. Feelings of this intensity are unlikely to have
been provoked merely by her refusal to put him up, and
were more probably the consequence of rumours about
the Lawrences which, Mabel admits, she and her son
began spreading [....] The gist which seemed to have
reached Lawrence's ears was that they were spongers
whom she had been forced to tum OUt.12.
Firstly these are evidently not, as Ellis later suggests, the thoughts of somebody
who is responding solely to his unconscious instincts in the manner of the truly
impulsive Romantic; they are the meditations of an individual who is
consciously exploring - and thus unavoidably affecting - his own homicidal
impulses. Secondly, the unwillingness here to engage with what is evidently
more than a quarrel over living arrangements, but a major attitude of
Lawrence's which has a marked relationship to his artistic labour, seems to
indicate a reluctance to deal with the deeply contentious social and political
12 Ellis, p. 86.
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issues which Lawrence's work raises in this area.
Mark Kinkead-Weekes, in the second volume of the Cambridge
Biography, displays a similar reservation in his treatment of Lawrence and
violence. Kinkead-Weekes, however, does not assume a selfhood outside the
social relations of a culture: rather he appears to postulate, as Ellis and
Lawrence himself (explicitly) do, a binary opposition between unconscious
instincts and culture in the sense of mental knowledge and self-consciousness.
For example, he appears to accept uncritically Lawrence's distinction, in the
essay "Education of the People", between spontaneous action or "bodily
learning" and "mind-knowledge't.P Though Kinkead-Weekes refers briefly to
rather obvious "sillinesses" which are "unlikely to go down well now", his
vague and fleeting subsequent emphasis on "a challenge, and a kind of
wisdom" and his tendency to merge Lawrence's voice with his own when
describing the text, imply a disinclination to become involved in a debate over
the highly controversial claims, which depend so greatly upon the dualism
between mind and body, made in this non-fictional work for the benefits of
violence against women and children.i"
Kinkead-Weekes's tendency to identify himself with Lawrence through
a paraphrasing of Lawrence's arguments, thus sacrificing a great deal of
critical distance, is particularly striking. In his description of Lawrence's
"Education of the People", Kinkead-Weekes writes:
The trouble begins with self-conscious modem mothers
trying to make their infants conscious of them and of
themselves, too soon, and with over-emphasis on love.
So children should be left alone as much as possible,
seized away from (s)mothering if necessary. Childhood
13 Mark Kinkead-Weekes, D. H. Lawrence: Triumph to Exile 1912-1922 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 590.
14 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 593.
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should be primarily a bodily learning, with mental
consciousness allowed to grow at its own natural
pace. IS
However, Kinkead-Weekes follows this unquestioning description of
Lawrence's argument with an equally uncritical commentary on Lawrence's
views on "bodily learning" - perspectives which do not square easily with
those above:
Moreover the volitional centres must develop - parents
should immediately take sloppy children to task, be
angry with them when they deserve it and smack their
bottom when necessary so that they can be outraged
too. For that will put fire into the backbone, that "long
sword of the vivid, proud, dark volition of man,
something primal and creative". A child needs more
than love. Why are we so afraid of anger, of an element
of danger, of fighting, when we see how wonderfully
these make other creatures vital and on the qui vive?"
The tension between these two passages appears to lie in competing notions of
authority which are founded on bipolar oppositions between instincts and
consciousness, and masculinity and femininity. For Lawrence, the dangerous
authority of a feminine and mental culture means that "children should be left
alone as much as possible". However, at the same time Lawrence insists that
parents must intervene violently with a male, bodily authority for the sake of
the child's masculine "volitional centres". This superficially clear-cut definition
of what constitutes legitimate authority in the parental relation to the child rests
on an awkward dualism between body and mind, male and female. Yet this
difficulty is masked by Kinkead-Weekes's gradually more transparent
enthusiasm for Lawrence's idiosyncratic style of essay-writing, and thus his
seeming acceptance of the hierarchical dualisms of the physical over the
IS Kinkead-Weekes, p. 590.
16 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 590.
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mental, and the male over the female, which it asserts: "away with love and
merging! Switch off the upper consciousness! Exult in your own dark
being!".17 The important tension within Lawrence's heralded male authority
between physical spontaneity and "volitional" power is thus lost, as is the
tension between a masculinising parental authority and binary gender
opposites.
It could be argued, however, that the remarks above are beside the
point. Is not the Cambridge Biography a scholarly biography rather than a
critical one? Does it need to engage critically at all with Lawrence's works?
The first point I would make here is that the Cambridge project (Cambridge
have, over the last quarter of a century, also been reproducing Lawrence's
works in an "authoritative" edition) constitutes a hugely impressive attempt to
rehabilitate Lawrence for the English literary canon (how many writers of the
twentieth century have been given such large-scale scholarly treatment?), and
therefore is already intellectually positioned in relation to Lawrence's work. In
fact, the extent to which it is silent about Lawrence's texts would appem:to be
an index of its critical approval: their literary quality does not need to be .
argued. Thus, though the biographers do occasionally offer critical opinions
and defences of the work, their hope appears to be that the life will stand in for
such criticism. This would certainly be compatible with the treatment of
Lawrence historically. As Linda Williams has remarked:
Writing about D. H. Lawrence has traditionally been
infused with a myth of the individual wrought in epic
proportions. With the exception of suicides such as
Virginia Woolf or Sylvia Plath [,',] perhaps no other
17 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 591.
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twentieth-century writer has been so strongly
interpreted through the lustre of biography. IS
Secondly, I would argue that it is this very attempt to separate the
individual life from the work, the biographical from the critical, while
privileging the former categories (despite the Cambridge Biography's own
claims to recognise the fact that "it is only because Lawrence is generally
considered a great writer that the degree of attention his life has received can be
justified"), which enacts the kind of problematic dualisms between instincts and
culture, the unconscious and the conscious, which I have been describing. For
these hierarchical dualisms lead to confusion within the biography itself since it
is dealing with a subject who is in fact a cultural figure, and it is thus
compelled to address the complex dialectic between culture and nature - a
dialectic which becomes most controversial in the discussion of violence.
So, while the biography takes account of the "hierarchical class- and
gender-thinking" of works such as Fantasia of the Unconscious." and asks
."why", in response to Lawrence's remarks in "Education of the People",
. "shouldn't girls fix machines?" if "boys can darn socks",2o'it responds to such
. wider social and cultural perspectives by explaining and justifying their
existence in terms of Lawrence's personal life. For example, we are told that "if
[Lawrence's wife, Frieda] tended to colour his whole view of woman and
gender, feminists critical of his male chauvinism should also take her, and her
18 Linda Ruth Williams, p. 1. She notes that "Lawrence's own apparent enthusiasm for living
his own life has infused the eulogies of Lawrentians" (p. 19). In addition, Williams observes
that Lawrence's anti-intellectualism was "dutifully echoed in the anonymously penned
biographical legend at the start of every Penguin edition of his work: 'Lawrence spent most of
his short life living'" (p. 20). Significantly, this emphasis on "life" over intellect is continued
in the biographical information at the beginning of each work in the more recent Penguin
edition of the Cambridge texts: "Lawrence's life may have been short, but he lived it
intensely".
19 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 660.
20 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 592.
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power over him, into account". What Kinkead-Weekes seems unclear about
here is whether or not he is judging an individual on a merely personal level or
a literary author's social views. What seems certain, however, is that the
"dynamic" and impulsive individual has primacy over the often distasteful
intellectual writer who is the reason why Kinkead-Weekes has any biographical
research to conduct in the first place. For his explanation of Lawrence's claim,
in "Education of the People", that '''men who can only hark back to woman
become automatic, static" is that it is part of Lawrence's belief that "stasis ... is
always death", whereas "it is the instability of every consummation that is
precious for him, the 'quick' in both senses, of the living moment, and the
guarantee of further life".21Therefore, Kinkead-Weekes emphasises that:
[... ] the complex chemistry of Lawrence the writer -
even putting together the need to stiffen the backbone,
exult in one's darkness, dethrone the too-uppish
woman, feel more male and more independent, find the
love of comrades, and scout ahead of the pivotal and
central woman - must have had a deeper dynamic than
could be sufficiently explained by trying to measure the
temperature of his marriage, or his potency.
We would also, in any case, have to allow for the
ways in which Frieda seems changeless by comparison:
a bit heavier or a bit thinner from time to time perhaps,
but quite unworried about dependence since she was
always so very much herself; rather the opposite of
submissive; believing herself as intelligent and creative
as he; and never acknowledging him or giving herself-
as he would say - 'finally'. To that, too, the new
. attitude is a cumulative reaction [.... ] Yet his writing
was always more than imaginative compensation, too.
There is a courage of self-inquiry, ready to face up to
his own impulses and explore wherever they led [my
italics].22
Significantly, Kinkead-Weekes's explanation of Lawrence's essay erects the
same binary oppositions of the impulsive over the mental and "dynamic"
21 Kinkead-Weekes. p. 593.
22 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 593.
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masculinity over "static" femininity as Lawrence does in his work. Ironically,
however, such divisions are confused by the fact that Lawrence's essay is also a
self-conscious act of "self-inquiry" and a mentally "imaginative" attempt to
contribute to cultural and social debates. Moreover, what is most patently
absent from the analysis here is that the instinctually dynamic Lawrence who is
being celebrated is the same Lawrence who is outlining a theory of education
which argues for husbands and fathers consciously to choose to act
spontaneously upon destructive impulses towards wives and children.
While it is clear that Kinkead-Weekes, like Lawrence, has a conception
of the relation between the instinctual life and culture which allows for the
former's capacity to act upon the latter, he does not allow for the inescapably
formative nature of culture's influence upon the instincts if we are to conceive
of their relationship as at all dialectical. This deterministic feature of his
treatment of Lawrence's work mirrors, as we shall see, Lawrence's own notion
of this relationship. However, to conclude this section, I want to illustrate how
this determinism becomes unsustainable when an attempt is made to understand
Lawrence's own violent behaviour alongside his attitudes as a writer.
This is perhaps best demonstrated by Kinkead-Weekes' s account of "the
worst instance of marital violence by Lawrence of which we have evidence".23
This violent beating of Frieda, which follows an argument (begun by her)
between the couple about a poem of Shelley's, is explained by Kinkead-
Weekes in the following manner:
[ ... J she was the aggressor. Nobody has ever asked
why she should, so suddenly, have denounced Shelley
when Katherine mentioned him; but she knew what she
was doing and what effect it might have. For she, to
23 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 319.
229
whom Lawrence read all his work, must have known
how Shelley, and specifically that poem 'To a Skylark'
(1820), occupied a crucial role in his dialectic thought.
It represented for him [... ] the extreme of mental and
spiritual consciousness as opposed to the life of the
body and the blood [.... ] Behind her onslaught, then, is
her rale that Lawrence was betraying himself, and her[...i
Leaving aside the fact that this earlier Lawrence of 1916 is more torn between
what he sees as the rival claims of the unconscious and the intellectual/spiritual
life, Kinkead-Weekes, in taking into account the likely intellectual motivations
of Lawrence's "worst instance of marital violence" undermines his general
conception of Lawrence as an impulsive individual who is best understood
outside questions of culture. Thus, despite Kinkead-Weekes's attempt to keep
the Romantic violence of the unconscious safely apart from the perversely
destructive influences of culture, his description of Lawrence's personal life
becomes contaminated by cultural violence. Much later in his biography,
Kinkead-Weekes even interprets Lawrence's "rages" as "not jealousy nor
. sadism so much as taking down the upper-class magna mater, a male worker-
bee's revolt against the big lazy Queen on whom he nevertheless depends".2s
What is perhaps most striking and disturbing about these two examples is that
they draw upon social and cultural explanations which Lawrence and the
Cambridge biographers conventionally disdain, in order to romanticise an
individualist ethic of instinctual liberation - explanations, furthermore, which
are grounded on an insidious use of the ideology of class conflict in order to
bolster a patriarchal conception of gender relations. It is notable, however, that
when the biographers address the cultural violence of Lawrence's essays they
~RJnkead-VVeekes,p.322.
~KJnkead-VVeekes.pp.518-19.
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are less enthusiastic to situate them within such ideological debates, perhaps
because their position within them is much clearer. Rather, the violence of
Lawrence's non-fiction is interpreted in the language more common to the
primary explanations of the violence of Lawrence's personal life (which,
happily for the biographers, "sometimes" involved physical violence on
Frieda's part too):26 for example, Lawrence's desire for a "spontaneous
opposition-and-relation of contraries" and a release from destructive
"repression'v"
To sum up, then, Lawrence's impulsive "life" is the means by which the
Cambridge Biography accounts for the embarrassing arguments for male
violence against women and children in the non-fiction and, in general, for the
violent behaviour of Lawrence himself. However, in contradiction to the
biographers' Lawrencian hostility to the cultural sphere, the Cambridge
Biography occasionally ransacks the world of social and cultural meanings in
order to justify further Lawrence's otherwise illiberal and uncivilised
shortcomings - literary biography too, it seems, is part of culture and the notion
of civilised values. As for the biographical treatment of Lawrence's fiction, the
general tendency of Kinkead-Weekes and Ellis to conceive of Lawrence's
relationship to the question of violence as primarily about Lawrence's ethic of
non-repression in his personal life, is to divorce that idealised personal life
from the wider social significance of Lawrence's cultural interest in the uses
and political potential of a destructive violence. This proclivity appears to
26 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 145: "their life may be stormy and occasionally violent; but it was she
who taught him to express and live out his feelings as she does, she is not afraid of him and is
sometimes violent herself and their life together is far more vital and interesting than anything
she had known before".
27 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 327.
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foster a neglect of that cultural interest in the biographical analysis of the
fiction. That Kinkead-Weekes is, for example, keen to stress that the early short
story, "The White Stocking", contains "no endorsement of violence" seems to
belie a severe discomfort with both the later Lawrence's blatant non-fictional
endorsements of violence and his clearly enthusiastic narrative explorations of
it.28 However, I will tum properly to the fiction later in this chapter. For now, I
must tum to an analysis of Lawrence's non-fictional perspectives on violence
and, in doing so, extend my discussion of the tensions within Lawrence's
dualistic conception of the relation between culture and the unconscious.
Unconscious Culture: Lawrence's "Education of the People" and
Fantasia oUhe Unconscious
In "Education of the People" (written between 1918 and 1920) and
Fantasia of the Unconscious (1922) (an essay elaborating on the ideas of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious [1921]), Lawrence speaks on several
occasions of desirable forms of both familial and social violence. However, the
issue of violence is, in both cases, discussed within the context of a highly
polemical critique of the role of culture and mental knowledge in education and
children's upbringing: culture itself is read as violence. Both "Education of the
People" (hereafter "Education") and Fantasia of the Unconscious (hereafter
Fantasia) argue that modem education brutally privileges knowledge over
"unleamedness'iP (the latter calling for the abolition of elementary
28 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 140.
29 Lawrence, "Education of the People", pp. 595-6.
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educatioru " Similarly, both works lambast modern parents for bullying their
children by forcing ideas and ideals upon them. Modem education and the
family are seen as sites of a negative and dangerous violence, education, for
example, being "psychologically barbaric" and a "terrible menace to the
existence of our race"."
It is in opposition to this pernicious modem culture of mentality and
morality, then, that Lawrence argues for a return to a more instinctual being in
which the body, power, individuality, and destructiveness are incorporated into
social and family structures at the expense of the modem dominance of mental
understanding, love, social sympathy, and the "evil" ideal.32 Thus, one form of
violence, the instinctual, is pitted against another, the violence of culture and
civilisation.33
How successful, then, is Lawrence in maintaining this opposition?
Lawrence's remarks on the Great War are a good starting-point for such a
30 Lawrence, "Fantasia of the Unconscious", Fantasia of the Unconscious and Psychoanalysis
and the Unconscious (1922 and 1921) (London: Penguin, 1971), pp. 7-195, 81.
31 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 82. .
32 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 83. .
.33 Sklenicka suggests that "Lawrence's theory counters the Western dualistic conception of
body and mind with a highly specified anatomy and physiology of the biological psyche"
(D. H. Lawrence and the Child, p. 160), and that Lawrence's "·blood consciousness'" is "not"
to be understood as "a rejection of mentality" (p. 162). Similarly, in both "Lawrence and
psychoanalysis", The Cambridge Companion to D. H. Lawrence, ed. Anne Fernihough
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 217-33, and D. H. Lawrence: The
Thinker as Poet (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), Fiona Becket argues that Lawrence "is
engaged in dismantling the Cartesian duality mindlbody" (D. H. Lawrence: The Thinker as
Poet, p. 4). However, such arguments ignore the way in which Lawrence's attempts to avoid
this dualism (for example, by acknowledging a connection between the instincts and the needs
of the social, and by arguing that all human activities and perspectives, including his own, are
necessarily bound up with morality; see Lawrence, "Education", pp. 613-15) are unsuccessful.
As we will see, Lawrence's work continually sets up oppositions between the unconscious and
culture, between the body and the mind. Thus, for example, Lawrence's effort to establish the
origins of spirituality in the physicality of this "biological psyche" is undermined by both his
sustained assault on that spiritual plane, and its conflict with a glamorised lower plane of
sensuality. Ellis, meanwhile, who perceives Lawrence's notion of a "biological psyche" as
effecting the fusion of the "Freudian distinctions between consciousness and its opposite".
nonetheless admits that Lawrence is a "dualist" whose syntheses are "frequently weak".
"unconvincing" or "non-existent" ("Lawrence and the Biological Psyche", D. H. Lawrence:
Centenary Essays, ed. Mara Kalnins (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1986), pp. 89-109).
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discussion. In "Education", for example, he asserts the need for a "physical
culture" of "pure training", "contests" and "battle", as a fundamental element
of education, which must be devoid of "mental attention", "all idea", and
"morality": a "mindless physical spontaneous Consciousness't." This culture of
battle should contrast heavily with the kinds of violence characteristic of
modem warfare, which is not "a primary physical thing" as authentic fighting
should be, but "a horrible obscene ideal process, like our last war", "a ghastly
and blasphemous translation of ideas into engines, and men into cannon-
fodder".3s The question of violence, therefore, seems to tum on the question of
its instinctual authenticity and purity. "The real fight" is experienced as a
physical "hand-to-hand contest", involving a reciprocity of pain, and the
praising of wounds and "the valour that will be killed rather than yield".36
Rather than the "monstrous", "ideal business" of death in contemporary
machine warfare, death should be "a passional consummation" - the result of
an "immediate conflict of physical men".37
Here, Lawrence critiques not only the prosthetic methods of modem
annihilation but the contradiction between the Christian values propounded by
Western democracies and those democracies' barbaric commercial and
technological warfare, and impoverishing class systems. However, Lawrence
extends this into an attack on the idealism of all progressivism. The attempts of
either Christian liberalism, socialism or communism to reform such physical
and material violence through education, "universal brotherhood" or "league-
34 Lawrence, "Education", p. 657.
3S Lawrence, "Education", pp. 657-8.
36 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 657-8.
37 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 658-9.
234
of-nations smoshiness and pappiness" will, according to Lawrence, only end
"in foul hypocrisy"." The solution does not lie in "putting an end to all
fighting" and sublimating such destructive energies into capitalistic
competition. Rather, this approach to the impulsive need to fight is viewed as
the result of a confusion over the distinction between "primal physical
conscious activity" and "ideal conscious activity": individuals' physical
impulses to fight are substituted by the "terrific conflict of ideas" of modern
warfare. Thus Lawrence's critique of the violence of the historical forces which
generated the Great War, and the liberal and left-wing internationalism which
followed it, is grounded in a dualistic conception ("a polarity of
contradistinction") of the relation of the instincts to mental consciousness -
men must have "the choice of war" but not "the choice 'of bombs and poison-
gases"."
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Lawrence's proposals for a new form of
violence which is liberated from the perverted and dangerous repression of
morality or the sublimating and abstracting processes of the mind are dependent
upon a nostalgic return to a more technologically and ideologically primitive
form of warfare. For example, Lawrence suggests that we "look on the black
eye and the bloody nose as insignia of honour, like the Germans of old",40and
that the British should immediately "destroy all guns, explosives, all poison-
gases, and all apparatus for the making of these things"." A mythologising of
the past combined with an argument for the destruction of knowledge are at
work here, and again in Lawrence's bizarre suggestion for British policy in
38 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 658-9.
39 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 655, 659.
40 Lawrence, "Education", p. 658.
41 Lawrence, "Education", p. 660.
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Ireland which proposes that the British should "take the lead" and send soldiers
to Ireland only "armed with swords and shields", trusting "the Irish to come out
with swords and shields as well".42In order to effect this, a system of "martial
training" in schools is required so that "every boy and every citizen" can fight
with a "sword and spear and shield".43 It would seem, then, that Lawrence's
authentic form of violence is not so antithetical to culture as it would first
appear. For this new, liberated form of "contest" is suffused with images of
chivalrous and honourable "hand-to-hand" combat and a globally-respected
imperial Britain - images which are grounded historically in the ideals of
medieval society and the self-mythologising requirements of the British
Empire, and which even anticipate the ideological programme of Germany's
Third Reich.
Moreover, death itself has become an ideal as a social activity. For not
only is death itself to be part of the organised battles of Lawrence's proposed
education programme, but "fighting to the death" is "the real fight", death is
"glorious", and, if it is violent, death should be "a passional climax and
. consummation"," Death is, then, invested with a kind of spiritual grandeur
which appears to be at odds with Lawrence's attack on "bullying idealism" and
the insidiousness of spirituality." Also, in psychoanalytic terms, death appears
in the form of an anti-enlightenment campaign against knowledge: for the
obliteration of the means of destruction for which Lawrence argues is also the
obliteration of knowledge and therefore an attempt to reverse the course of
42 Lawrence, "Education", p. 660.
43 Lawrence, "Education", p. 660.
44 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 658-9.
4S Lawrence, "Education", p. 595.
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human development - an act, paradoxically, of the repressive Freudian death
drive.
The correspondences between Lawrence's concerns here and the
concerns of post-war psychoanalysis are in fact substantial and worth close
examination, as both engage with the apparent contradictions between civilised
democracy's ethics and actions, and widespread anxieties over the possibility of
human progress in the face of what the historian Eric Hobsbawm has called
"the age of total war".46 If, for example, we tum to Sigmund Freud's Beyond
the Pleasure Principle (1920), we find issues at stake identical to those which
Lawrence explores. In this essay, Freud first hypothesises and explores what
would tum out to be the most controversial and contested of his concepts - the
notion of a death drive.47 This drive threatens to destroy the fundamental
principle upon which psychoanalysis is based: that the liberation of the
repressed from repression through analytical treatment is both possible and
positive. What the death drive destabilises, then, is the very distinction between
unconscious repressed and repressive culture which Lawrence's work struggles
to maintain.
Freud initially and tentatively describes this drive as dominant and as a
primary feature of all instincts, arguing that "it seems ... that an instinct is an
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the
living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external
46 Eric Hobsbawm, "The Age of Total W ar", Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century
1914-1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), pp. 21-53.
47 See Mikel L. Vause, "The Death Instinct Reflected in D. H. Lawrence's 'Love Among the
Haystacks"', Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 9 (3-4), 1988, pp. 187-9, for an interesting,
though brutally reflectionist, discussion of this concept in relation to Lawrence's work. See,
however, Linda Ruth Williams, '''A Short Way by a Long Wandering': Writing the Death
Drive", Critical Desire: Psychoanalysis and the Literary Subject (London: Edward Arnold,
1995), pp. 154-85, for a more subtle analysis of the literary (including modernist) exploration
of the notion of a death drive.
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disturbing forces ... the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.48 In
reading Lawrence alongside Freud, then, we find some illuminating
correspondences. Freud's dominant drive is "conservative" and therefore
strives for an "earlier state of things"." How such a drive could be
distinguished from its cultural conditions, however, is problematised by
Lawrence's attempt to map out an authentic instinctual life which has death as a
focal point of activity and embraces it as its "consummation". In what sense
can the death instinct ever escape contamination by the repressive forces most
"precious" to culture in order for it to be discerned as an instinct?5o
Significantly, Freud seems to arrive at his notion of the fundamentally
reactionary character of instincts through an interpretation of some clinical
analyses which appear to suggest that there existed a '''compulsion to repeat"'-
quite a different notion to that of a return to the "inanimate state" of death."
Lawrence's proposal, by comparison, for a return to a mythologised medieval
era of sword-fighting and "hand-to-hand" combat implies a similar desire to
"repeat" history and loses none of the colour of culture. Lawrence's
speculations, then, make Freud's death drive towards an "earlier state of things"
hard to imagine outside the necessarily repressive workings of a culture; while
Lawrence's own educational programme for a life of purified "mindless
physical spontaneous Consciousness" ironically resonates with the "external
disturbing forces" of Freud's repressive "civilization". The "polarity of
contradistinction" between mind and body, culture and instincts, becomes less
48 Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), On Metapsychology: The Theory
f{Psychoanalysis, ed. Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), pp. 269-338, 308-9.
Freud, pp. 313-14.
so Freud, p. 315.
SI Freud, pp. 289, 311.
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clear.
One of the most striking aspects of Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
moreover, is its own attempt to deal with these very tensions. For Freud's
profound questioning in this essay of one of the fundamental tenets of
psychoanalysis - that psychological processes are "automatically regulated"
by a dominant "pleasure principle" - inspires a reworking of the notion of
repression which was not only to fracture the British Psycho-Analytical
Society with controversy but to severely alienate the liberal interest in
psychoanalysis, owing to its unabashed engagement with the fact of human
destructiveness in the face of the unprecedented violence of the twentieth
52 F I di .century. ormer y, accor 109 to Freud's early theory (set out most
comprehensively in The Interpretation of Dreams), the pleasure principle (a
primary instinct for pleasure) dominated mental life by reducing
"unpleasurable tension".s3 This principle was counteracted by the reality
principle (a secondary process of repression) - the self-preservative force
S2 See Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner, eds., The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-45 (London:
. Tavistock/Routledge, 1991) for a comprehensive collection of the "Controversial Discussions",
between the Anna Freudians and the Kleinians, which split the British Psycho-Analytical
Society. Broadly speaking, while Klein's work registers the presence of a violent internal
culture (super-ego) of the self from the beginning of infancy, Anna Freud emphasised the
. absence of the super-ego in the child and the consequent necessity of a pedagogic function to
child analysis. Interestingly, Lawrence emphasises, like Klein, the violence of the infantile
instincts, while, like Anna Freud, arguing that the infant is a non-cultural being in need of
authority. See also Jacqueline Rose, "War in the Nursery", Why War? - Psychoanalysis,
Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 191-230, for a critical
account of the disputes which explores the inside/outside debate, and the potential relationships
between the practice of psychoanalysis, the tyrannical moral authority of the super-ego, and
Conservatism. Notably, Rose maintains a similar conception of the self, as both embedded in
culture and its laws and motivated by the need to challenge that culture, to the one which I hope
animates this chapter: "There is no simple 'outside' to the law any more than there is a simple
'outside' of sexual norms - it is the participation in and refusal of those norms which
psychoanalysis so graphically describes (take the first without the second and you get
normalization; take the second without the first and you get a euphoric but ineffective
liberationist version of Freud)" (p. 222). As we will see, in the light of Lawrence's work, the
latter form of "ineffective"liberationism can also be an aesthetically powerful capitulation to
the most psychotic of super-egos.
S3 Freud, p. 275.
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which created temporary unpleasure through the repression of dangerous
pleasures. Thus, the reality principle, though superficially opposing it, acted
fundamentally in the service of the pleasure principle' since the unhindered
pursuit of pleasure endangers the self s existence and its very ability to
continue to gain pleasure. When repression became excessive (leading to
neuroses), this could be lifted by making the patient conscious of the content of
the repressed impulse.
However, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud attempts to adapt his
theory to the world after the Great War and to the anomalous discovery in his
clinical analyses of what he calls a "'compulsion to repeat"'. This impulse
manifests itself through the repetition of a negative, distressing experience
which does not appear to square easily with Freud's pleasure principle.
Whereas conventional psychoanalytic wisdom maintained that release from
instinctual repression was experienced as pleasurable, Freud explains how the
apparent surmounting of a repression can result in unpleasure, implying that
repression itself lies elsewhere than in the earlier repressed content.54
This leads Freud radically to overhaul his theory of the instincts by
interpreting this repetition compulsion as a manifestation of the death drive
which, he hypothesises, may constitute the dominant tendency in instinctual life
rather than the pleasure principle. Furthermore, though Freud emphasises that it
is "the same higher strata and systems of the mind which originally carried out
the repression" which offer resistance to treatment," he claims nonetheless that
the "motives of the resistances, and indeed the resistances themselves" are
initially "unconscious". Repression therefore seems to occur at a deeper level
54 See Freud, p. 279.
ss Freud, p. 289.
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than Freud had previously maintained since the "higher strata" of mental
processes appear themselves to be unconscious. This ambiguity is further
enhanced by the knowledge that, as Freud tells us, the '''compulsion to repeat'"
does not produce pleasure for the repressed and unpleasure for the ego.56 The
drive itself seems to be bound and constituted by processes of repression.
Patients instinctively repeat the negative, unpleasurable experiences of their
past, in the psychoanalytic treatment of transference, as fresh experiences, not
as recollected ones.S7 This compulsion to repeat as fresh experience, and to
transfer repression to newly created sources of anxiety, which follows the
initial triumph of the repressed over the resistances of the unconscious ego,
suggests the existence of a deeper, structural form of unconscious repression
which, once drained from one instinctual location, searches out new content for
punishment.
Similarly, there are tensions in Lawrence's writing between what is
centrally an argument for a seltbood beyond the repression of ideas and ideals
and a slippage between the oppositions set up, which separate impulses from
. ethics, repressed from repressive, and the body from the mind. However, while
Freud's argument for the death drive disrupts this polarisation by bringing
repression into the field of the unconscious, Lawrence's does so, ironically,
through an attempt to extricate the unconscious self from culture - a project
which only succeeds in re-immersing that self more violently in the realm of
repression. For although the main thrust of Lawrence's proposals is that, rather
than use democratic ideals and Christian morality to conceal the existence of
the class system, there should be an explicit class framework presided over by
56 See Freud, pp. 290-1.
S7 See Freud, p. 292.
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an intuitively knowledgeable elite,58Lawrence is nonetheless unable to evade
the cultural violence which is the object of his critique.
This is not immediately transparent in an essay which, on the one hand,
assaults the "yearning love" and "aching responsibility" of the manipulative
modem mother,59the design of education to provide children with "pernicious
self-consciousness" and "imagination'V" the "'personal'" relation between
mother and child." and the "female mind"; and, on the other hand,62proposes
as solutions a "fierce" and "vigilant" parental "anger", 63an education of the
"spontaneous consciousness" provided by "mentally rather stupid" teachers,64a
"mindless", "animal" and "passional" conception of the "bond of
parenthood",65 and the "old male spirit" of "fighting to the death".66However,
this polarity between an instinctual and destructive masculine self of power and
a mental and moral feminine culture of love is radically undermined by the
hierarchy established in which the former rules over the latter. For while love,
like cultural consciousness, is instrumental to education for Lawrence, "wrath"
is at the centre of parental .authority, education, and culture in a manner which
seems to endanger the ideals of "singleness", impulsiveness, and spontaneous
morality/" This suggests that, though Lawrence explicitly affirms the liberation
of the unconscious repressed from the constraints of a repressive consciousness,
these polar terms irresistibly commingle, predicating repression as the very
S8 See Lawrence, "Education", pp. 607-8.
59 Lawrence, "Education", p. 621.
60 Lawrence, "Education", p. 626-7.
61 Lawrence, "Education", p. 625.
62 Lawrence, "Education", p. 632.
63 Lawrence, "Education", p. 648.
64 Lawrence, "Education", p. 644.
65 Lawrence, "Education", p. 647-8.
66 Lawrence, "Education", p. 658.
67 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 637-8.
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condition of the unconscious.
Fathers, for example, are encouraged to act forcefully when
counteracting the personal bond of love between mother and child we have
been discussing. Through the act of violence, of physically seizing the child
away from the mental bullying of the mother, and sending "volts of hard,
violent anger" into the child's "volitional centres", the "creature" gains its
"proud" and powerful sense of "singleness" and spontaneity in the "lower
bd" d loses i . 68Thi al violo y an Its nervous consciousness. s parent VI0ence, moreover,
should not possess any "moral or religious justification".69 However, that this
parental violence is necessary if the child is to acquire its genuine
impulsiveness seems to blur the boundary between culture and the unconscious.
After all, how authentically impulsive is an instinct which can only be gained
through a father's "fierce" beating? Similarly, to what extent does violence
without "moral or religious justification" escape moral significance or avoid the
repression of the impulses which Lawrence so greatly fears? In short, is it
possible for Lawrence's return of the repressed to evade the deeper structural
repression theorised by Freud?
Indeed, "Education" appears to reinforce the necessity of repression the
more it seeks to map out its abolition - a self-undercutting procedure which,
through its brave exploration and critique of cultural violence, risks self-
destruction. This is particularly striking in Lawrence's conclusion to
"Education" where he offers a satirical sketch of the familial and social
relations of Christian parliamentary democracy and proposes certain basic
changes to the structure of these relationships. The focus of Lawrence's
68 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 639-41.
69 Lawrence, "Education", p. 645.
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criticism is a "sliding-scale of shifted responsibility": the religious hegemony
of Christianity has made men ignominiously abdicate authority to women and
children within the family, while the rise of liberal democracy has led to ruling
class prostration in the face of an increasingly imperious "public" or working
class." Part of Lawrence's critique here is the contradictions and hypocrisies of
a Christian, liberal democracy which denies its own violations. While woman
is exonerated in Christian discourse, her actual power is confined to the private
sphere as head of the family while man dominates the social world, "slink[ing]
off to his money-making and his commercial enterprise, and feel[ing] holy-
holy-holy about it".71Similarly, while the ruling classes within a parliamentary
democracy emphasise the primacy of the "public" or the working people, the
latter's political role is confined to the "stupid and meaningless little mark" of
the vote.72 This is, however, to read Lawrence against the grain, for he
interprets these contradictions as the result of a shift of "responsibility" initiated
by idealism, and resolves them by reasserting the need for authority in the form
of aristocratic rule, a strong parental authority, and a "dethronement" of women
. from the place of excessive significance granted them by both modem
Christianity and an emergent feminism.f
This image of society is, then, the basis on which Lawrence's instinctual
life rests, in particular the violent male "wrath" of familial and social life.
Intriguingly, Lawrence has shifted alternately between a criticism of culture's
educational bullying of its children and more general attacks on the growing
status accorded (often through education) to women and working people. In
70 Lawrence, "Education", p. 661.
71 Lawrence, "Education", p. 662.
72 Lawrence, "Education", p. 663.
73 Lawrence, "Education", pp. 663-4.
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diagnosing the failings of modern parenting in its protection (or perhaps
securing?) of the authentic human impulses, Lawrence is also simultaneously
describing and denouncing the inadequacies of post-war liberal democracy in
its efforts to contain the social movements of women and working people,
labouring under an oppressive and exploitative capitalism. As a result of this
slippage between these two arguments, Lawrence's distinction between the
repressed and the repressive begins to collapse: while the parental role of
safeguarding the child's instincts is likened to that of a political dictator, the
supposedly unnatural and externally imposed growth in the social power and
education of both women and workers is, through comparison, infantalised as
the efforts of a wilful child in need of discipline.
One repressive culture of moral bullying is replaced, therefore, by
another which, rather than mentally inculcating its values into individuals,
inscribes "ideal" identities on to them by defining the field of their activity.
Culture is, after all, only problematic for Lawrence when its is in the wrong
hands. So, in a peculiar discursive twist, the social production of meanings is
the responsibility of a few male leaders who, alone, are able to perform the
"thinking, abstracting business", the majority of people not being capable of
this: the attack on mental abstraction turns out to be a highly relative one.
Furthermore, a rigid gender division is in place: men are most adept at, and
therefore should carry out, the activity of ''thinking'' and the "mechanical
business", while women should "look after the immediate personal life".74
Women should remain "central", in the family life, while "the men, the leaders,
the outriders" go "on ahead, scouting, fighting, gathering provision, running on
74 Lawrence, "Education", p. 664.
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the brink of death and at the tip of the life advance, all the time hovering at the
tip of life and on the verge of death" in the "vast womanless regions of fight
[... ] pure thought and abstracted instrumentality". 75
Thus, Lawrence does not offer, in "Education", an instinctual form of
living free from the perversions of culture, but a culture which enacts a division
of the self on a macrocosmic level, allocating certain instincts to different social
groups in a strikingly conventional manner - such normative descriptions of
gender and class being an orthodox stratagem of conservative thinking. The
dynamic, impulsive element of raw physicality is apparently allotted to the
mass of people and the "static" physical instincts of domesticity and self-
preservation to women, both having dangerously attempted to appropriate
knowledge and culture for themselves." Meanwhile the previously much-
criticised, "static" mental understanding is confined to a male elite who are the
few able to avoid its abuse. However, this elite is also still closely connected to
the instincts and, moreover, possesses the monopoly on the destructive drive as
well as the cultural production of meanings. Repression, therefore, far from
being removed, is embedded in the very class structure of the society which
Lawrence imagines. For this authoritarian elite, with its monopoly on the means
of violence and its rigid cultural definitions of social activity and power
according to normative psychological conceptions of gender and class, not only
controls identity through cultural codes inserted into everyday activity, but
inescapably represses impulses through a division of instinctual labour. This is,
firstly, because only a privileged few are in a position to define this division,
granting them knowledge and mastery of the unconscious; and, secondly,
75 Lawrence. "Education", p. 665.
76 Lawrence. "Education", p. 665.
246
because this division of the self across social groups divorces individuals from
certain instincts according to their social position, effectively separating the
instincts from one another and placing them in the conflict intrinsic to
hierarchy. Furthermore, the death drive's concentration within the hands of
Lawrence's proposed political and cultural leadership, who live on the "verge
of death" in the "womanless regions of fight" and "pure thought", can be read
as the sociological equivalent of Freud's "culture of the death instinct": moral
control of the id is granted to a small minority (reminiscent of the overweening
super-ego) who possess true knowledge of and can therefore utilise its
destructive powers.77
It now becomes clearer how the violence of Lawrence's perfect father is
implicated in the repressions of culture. For Lawrence's parental violence needs
to inculcate different impulses and desires into different sections of society, in
particular across a rigid gender division. This patterned authority necessitates a
parental role and family life, as well as a wider social system, structured by
repression. Lawrence's "Education" is less a treatise against cultural repression
than an illuminating demonstration of how the unconscious is unavoidably
repressed. For the Cambridge Biography's separation of Lawrence's
"hierarchical c1ass-and gender-thinking" from his apparent championing of the
unconscious is highly misleading, since it is this very "hierarchical" social
thought which exposes the repressive, cultural nature of Lawrence's vision of
the instincts which insidiously outlines a culture of elite male domination and
violence.
77 Freud, "The Ego and The Id" (1923), On Metapsychology, pp. 339-407,394.
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As previously suggested, Freud's attempt to understand the nature of
repression in Beyond the Pleasure Principle raises similar questions about the
supposed secondary nature of repressive psychic forces. For Freud, the
conflictual nature of the instincts - their tendency to oppose one another - leads
to the various repressions of early childhood." This suggests that repression is
a primary rather than a secondary process - it is the incompatibility of the
instincts themselves which leads to an inevitable repression. Moreover, as
previously explained, Freud's theory of the death drive attempts to theorise this
structural repression by describing how an instinctual drive can itself be
compelled to repeat a formerly repressed and unpleasurable experience rather
than rejoice in its liberation from repression. For Freud, therefore, repression
has become more profound than an assault on the instincts: it is as if the
instincts themselves are at war with one another.
This becomes clearer when Freud appears to relinquish his contention
that the death drive is the dominant principle of psychic reality. In seeking an
explanation of how life and conflict continue in spite of the death drive, Freud
attributes a properly repressive character to the death drive itself through his
incorporation of the sexual instincts within a new, larger category of the "life
instincts". The notion of repression as a secondary process aimed at specific
instinctual content now appears to be lost in the theorised conflict between
opposing instincts. While the death instinct drives the self towards death - to
die in its own manner - the sexual instincts aim to preserve life and its
conflicts." Intriguingly, Freud has returned to a similar "dualistic view of
instinctual life" to his earlier metapsychology, with the life instincts now
78 See Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", p. 279.
79 See Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", p. 313.
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working in opposition to the death instincts in a manner which makes
repression inevitable, suggesting that our difficulty lies less in our repression of
certain unconscious impulses than in our repression of the fact that we
unavoidably repress/"
Through his denial of the ne~essity of repression which only reinforces
that repression's brutality, Lawrence's essay seems to confirm Freud's
suggestion that such a denial is the very kind of abstraction which constitutes
cultural violence: we repress that we repress. However, we might also say that
the problems posed by Lawrence's text expose the paradoxical nature of
Freud's attempt to replace the pleasure principle with the death drive. For if
Lawrence's work registers the sense in which the instincts cannot escape
repression and even owe their existence to the cultural constraints against
which they rail (the essay's proposals themselves only make sense through their
opposition to their surrounding culture), then Freud's initial concept of a
repressive death drive which overrides the pleasure principle appears as a self-
explosive concept which radically undermines the foundations of its existence-
the achievement of its objective being the abolition of the conflict which it
exists to reduce. So, while Lawrence's ideal of instinctual liberation refuses to
acknowledge the repressions inherent in the conflicts of culture as the necessary
condition of all instinctual affirmation and empowerment, Freud's notion of a
dominant death drive rejects the instincts for pleasure and life which are its
condition - for the death drive to exist, there must be something to repress!
Freud's attempt to theoretically define the death drive as the dominant
psychic principle, then, while discovering culture - in the form of repression -
80 Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", p. 322.
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at work within the instinctual life, also radically undercuts itself in its
postulation of the supremacy of a drive whose goal is its own destruction:
hence, Freud returns to the notion of psychic conflict in the form of the life and
death instincts. Similarly, Lawrence's "Education", while identifying the
hidden, unconscious violence at the heart of culture, attempts to locate the
forces of social rejuvenation within an idealised unconscious, inadvertently
repeating the very idealised form of violence which it condemned - instinctual
liberation becoming an abstract and authoritarian concept when its suppresses
the repression upon which it is necessarily founded. In this light, Freud and
Lawrence offer necessary correctives to one another's arguments in their
explorations of violence; Freud emphasising the inevitability of repression,
Lawrence the inevitability of impulsive affirmation.
In Fantasia Lawrence attempts to theorise more fully the distinction
between culture and instincts by distinguishing yet further, through the use of
biological and pseudo-psychological categories, mental consciousness from the
bodily impulses. In this section, I wish to read Lawrence's critique of cultural
violence and his endorsement of impulsive violence alongside inter-war
psychoanalysis's notions of the super-ego, unconscious phantasy, and reality-
testing, with the aim of both fleshing out the cultural, moral and political nature
of Lawrence's unconscious, and highlighting his expose of the concealed social
violence of liberal democracy and its Enlightenment values (which early
psychoanalysis shared). I will begin, firstly, by exploring how Freud's concept
of the super-ego casts light on Lawrence's understanding of morality, authority
and the instincts.
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In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud draws connections between the
morality of culture, parental authority, and the unconscious through his concept
of the super-ego. In psychic reality the super-ego dominates the ego (the part of
the mind broadly associated with consciousness and reasoning) in the form of
moral conscience or "an unconscious sense of guilt".81 The morality of this
super-ego or "ego ideal" is derived from identification with the father during
the Oedipus complex, and is therefore an internalisation of the repressive forces
of both parental authority and culture (in the form of, for example, "religious
teaching, schooling and reading,,).82For Freud, morality, guilt, and culture are
present in mental life early on and become unconscious processes themselves.
The very notion of the father's authority is bound up, for the child, with
repression of the dangerous drives of Oedipality through identification, so that
all authority is cultural in the sense that it impedes and transforms impulses.
Culture is thus internalised through the introjection of parental authority, while
the instincts themselves are raised to the level of moral conscience: what
"belonged to the lowest part of the mental life" is transformed, through the
formation of the super-ego, into "what is highest in the human mind by our
scale of values" - the super-ego represents the internal reality of the id.s3
Freud then goes on to discuss the '''negative therapeutic reactionu, in
which the analysand deteriorates when the repressed content - the patient's
unconscious guilt - is made conscious." This clinging to guilt, and even
satisfaction gained from guilt through the patient's attachment to his illness,
leads Freud to suggest that the super-ego possesses "intimate relations with the
81 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 374.
82 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p, 374.
83 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", pp. 376, 389.
84 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 390.
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unconscious id" from which it has taken the destructive instincts: the super-ego
becomes a "pure culture of the death instinct". 85Guilt and violence, culture and
barbarism have become, for Freud, intimately entwined. Thus Freud argues that
guilt can actually motivate criminal behaviour and destructive tendencies, and
that "normal man is not only far more immoral than he believes but also far
more moral than he knowS".86 The ego is attacked from two angles by a
murderous id and a punitive super-ego; the super-ego's punishments generating
counter-attacks from the id which, in turn, inspire further moral violence from
the super-ego in a vicious circle of violence.87 The cycle of violence is based on
a reciprocity of destruction between the death drive and an internalised culture:
violence is always-already guilty, Freud's formulation of a "culture of the death
instinct", then, illustrates a further move towards a psychoanalytical view of the
destructive instincts as embedded in cultural phantasy.
Lawrence, in Fantasia, shares with Freud a similar interpretation of the
dangers of repression. For Freud argues that ''the more a man checks his
aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe - that is aggressive - he
becomes in his ego idear,.88 However, Lawrence takes care to distinguish the
release of aggressiveness from the more indirect, sublimated violence of
culture. For example, when discussing the issue of corporal punishment,
Lawrence states:
The only rule is, do what you really, impulsively, wish
to do. But always act on your own responsibility
sincerely. And have the courage of your own strong
emotion. They enrichen the child's sou1.89
8S Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 394.
86 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 393.
87 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 395.
88 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 395.
89 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 51.
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Nonetheless, Lawrence provides some interesting qualifications to this
statement throughout his description of the parent's role. First of all, there is a
sense of balance in Lawrence's argument which appears to sit awkwardly
alongside his idea of authentically impulsive behaviour. On the one hand, there
is an emphasis on individual autonomy and nature: "we have no desire to say
what men ought to be". There are "all kinds of ways of being", which means,
for example, that "some men must be too spiritual" while others must be "too
sensual", "too sympathetic" or "too proud". If two people despise each other's
natures, Lawrence argues, it is their responsibility to "fly at one another" if they
wish.90 Yet on the other hand, Fantasia adapts its claims for corporal
punishment according to the nature of the child in question, implying that
parental authority can help to create a balance in personality structure. For
instance, "it is no use roughly smacking a shrinking, sensitive child. And yet, if
a child is too shrinking, too sensitive, itmay do it a world of good cheerfully to
spank its posterior"." Similarly, the "good-naturedly brutal" love of the father
helps to "maintain some sort of equilibrium" between the "two modes of love",
the spiritual and the sensual, in the child.92 Rather than acting impulsively,
Lawrence's ideal father seems actually to adapt his authority and punishment
according to a particular conception of a normal mental life, evidently with the
intention of possessing as great a determining role in the formation of the
child's personality as Lawrence lambastes the mother for possessing.
So, while Lawrence delivers a devastating critique of the prosthetic
violence of Christian morality within the family (which, of course, has its
90 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 47.
91 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 50.
92 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 49.
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correspondent on the social plane in the form of the ethical self-justifications of
the Great War), he is nonetheless unable to extricate morality from his own
seemingly more honest and impulsive parental punishment. For though
Lawrence explicitly rejects all "bullying", and claims that "ideal bullying" is
"more dangerous" than "sensual bullying" which is more easily detectable, the
spontaneous parental violence which this allows Lawrence to argue for is not
secured from the "ideal" and repressive realm of which his writing is so Wary.93
This is because the very involvement of the parent in the determination of the
child's personality structure, whether language-based or otherwise, is based on
the notion that the child possesses some kind of knowledge about the authority
of the parent figure - that very knowledge which Freud sees as formative of
culture, morality and guilt in his conception of the super-ego. In other words,
for Lawrence to believe that the child can become less sympathetic or sensitive
as a consequence of parental punishment, he has also to believe that the child
internalises and acts on an authority which tells the child that it should not be
so. This internal authority cannot easily be distinguished from moral
compunction and guilt, and is more than a little reminiscent of Freud's
"dictatorial 'Thou shalt'" of the super-ego."
This slippage between Lawrence's desired and desiring id and its feared
. idealisation into an insidiously moralistic super-ego becomes more striking
when, as in "Education", Lawrence extends his psychological discussions to the
field of politics. For Lawrence argues in Fantasia that there are "few, few
people in whom the living impulse and reaction develops and sublimates into
mental consciousness". This is based, for Lawrence, on a fact of nature: "It is
93 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 52.
94 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 396.
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not the nature of most men to know and to understand and to reason very far".
Those who wish "instinctively" to possess knowledge will ask, while those who
do not should be left alone, and not have knowledge "rammed" into them."
What is interesting here, I think, is that a certain kind of authoritarian,
contemporary education is being criticised, in which knowledge is treated as a
moral commodity which must be passively absorbed by the individual, and yet
at the same time this is being replaced by a new kind of authoritarian anti-
education. In using an abstract assumption about human nature in order to
confront a specific historical stage in the growth of education, Lawrence is
prescribing in advance the extent of human capacities. This produces a tension
between a philosophy that parents and the state should leave children alone
mentally, and a belief that those very agents should intervene radically and
violently to structure the individual's unconscious according to the historically
conservative and extremely prescriptive conceptions of gender and human
nature which I discussed earlier.
However, Lawrence justifies his educational ideas with the assumption
that much knowledge is "extraneous" to an individual's "experience" and is a
repressive and "direct obstruction of his dynamic activity".96He even connects
knowledge with the death drive:
To know is to lose. When I have a finished mental
concept of a beloved, or a friend, then the love and the
friendship is dead [.... ] As soon as I have a finished
mental conception, a full idea even of myself, then
dynamically I am dead. To know is to die.97
95 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 84.
96 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 84.
97 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 72.
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Meanwhile, the education of the unconscious maintains "dynamic activity".98
Yet Lawrence himself appears to adopt an idealist conception of knowledge in
his contention that "ethical and philosophic" ideas, such as the "idea of
equality", are divorced from experience, and are therefore an imposed
repression of the unconscious and experiential knowledge." For the idea of
equality, for such vast social groups as women and workers whom Lawrence
attacks in Fantasia, has arisen from their material experience of a thoroughly
repressive socio-economic system which has its own ideologies (that is, ideas)
of how human beings should be, who should suffer its own systemic failures,
and in what manner men should be unequal. Moreover, Lawrence provides no
solution to his own problem of knowledge as an idealism of death since his
own proposals for social change only embody an alternative ideal of men as
naturally non-mental beings, an ideal which involves a system of leadership,
authority, and repression which is difficult to distinguish from the fascism
emerging in the Europe of the 1920s. Lawrence seems to argue that, since
.human beings. are different, rather than seeing that difference as a sign of
mutual dependence, we can presume that some have the right to dominate
others, exploit them, and be authorities on their unconscious. The problem with
this, of course, is that it turns against the very notion, which Lawrence supports
so emphatically, of the unconscious as "dynamic" and free from repression and
"bullying", since one individual has the power to define the range of another's
instinctive capacities. Like Freud's domineering death drive, then, which
represses knowledge to the point where it has nothing to repress, Lawrence's
anti-idealism suppresses knowledge to the point where it becomes the only
98 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 84.
99 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 85.
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knowledge left to possess - a "static" authoritarian scenario rather than a
"dynamic" site for flourishing instincts. However, Lawrence's notion of
knowledge as death is important in its suggestion that culture must repress itself
in order to perpetuate itself, since it illuminates the problem of the failure,
analysed by Freud, of some psychoanalytic treatments. For the early optimism
over the psychoanalytic procedure, of curing the patient by allowing them to
know what they repress, is problematised, in the light of Lawrence's work,
since the result of total enlightenment is the end of enlightenment itself - there
is nothing left to know.
Yet Lawrence's argument is weakened by its dependence upon a notion
of the impulses as fundamentally opposed, in most people, to mental
consciousness and knowledge. Once again, we find similar issues being tackled
by psychoanalysis. The Austrian-born, British-based psychoanalyst, Melanie
Klein, had a strong interest in the relationship between intellectual knowledge
and repression.P" Like Lawrence, Klein believed that the "imposition" of
."ready-made ideas" was damaging to the child. However, the reason for her
objection was not, as was Lawrence's, because she perceived these ideas as
initiating the inhibition of a set of impulses abstracted from mental
development. Rather, what Klein calls the "impulse for knowledge" and ''the
reality-sense" are "threatened" in "such a fashion that the child's knowledge of
reality dares not rebel" and never even "attempts to draw inferences or
conclusions, whereby it is permanently and prejudicially affected".IOI Klein,
therefore, has a wider sense of what constitutes repression than Lawrence. For
100 See John Phillips and Lyndsey Stonebridge, eds., Reading Melanie Klein (London:
Routledge, 1998) for a range of critical interpretations of Klein's work.
101 Melanie Klein, ''The Development of a Child (1921)", Contributions to Psycho-Analysis
1921-1945 (1948; London: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 13-67,34.
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Klein, repression through such educational dogmatism is inhibitory of both the
impulses and intellectual curiosity; in fact, she conceives the two as intimately
bound up. While Lawrence perceives thought as an abstract process, Klein
contends that, though such intellectual abstraction occurs and is damaging, true
thought is an uninhibited and dynamic process which is neither impeded by fear
of some overarching authority nor closed off from new insights. Consequently,
Klein argues that "honesty towards children, frank answering of all their
questions, and the inner freedom which this brings about, influence mental
development profoundly and beneficially.l'" This includes children's questions
about sex which, Klein says, should be answered truthfully if parents are to
avoid psychically inhibiting their children. By contrast, Lawrence states firmly
that children should not be told about sex before puberty and that, post-puberty,
they should be informed of the "simple and necessary facts of sex" as "briefly"
and "coldly" as possible since "to translate sex into mental ideas is vile, to
make a scientific fact of it is death".103 Instead, boys and girls should go
through a "violent" process of "initiation into true. adult consciousness" and
. .' .
"sex-life" whereby "a terrible dynamic sense of change in the very being" is
effected.l'" The purpose of this, for Lawrence, would be the secured sense of
the "mystery" of sex, since "the mass of mankind should never be acquainted
with the scientific biological facts of sex: never".lOS
This opposition between a deathly knowledge and a physically violent
yet apparently life-affirming ritual returns us to the issue of the relation
102 Klein, ''The Development of a Child (1921)", p. 31.
103 Lawrence, "Fantasia", pp. 112-3.
104 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 113.
lOS Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 113.
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between authority and repression. For Klein, knowledge can be death, but only
as a result of the intervention of a lasting sense of an inhibitory authority:
Permanent submission to the authority principle,
permanent greater or less intellectual dependency and
limitation, are based on this first and most significant
experience of authority, on the relationship between
parents and the little child. Its effect is strengthened
and supported by the mass of ethical and moral ideas
that are presented complete to the child and which form
just so many barriers to the freedom of his thought.l'"
Thus, repression of the "impulse for knowledge" arises from the presence of an
overweening parental authority which permits no contradiction. Moreover. in
Klein's later work, she argues, in an extension of Freud's notion of the super-
ego, that this imposing and violent cultural authority is always phantasised and
internalised through the infant's introjection of the parental imago into his
psychic reality, prior to the Oedipus complex and regardless of the character of
the external parents. This means that, for Klein, the violent moral punishments
of cultural authority (in the form of extreme guilt, for example) are something
.we all have to deal with and defend ourselves against. and that any further
. , '
..encroachments of authority which actually take place in external reality should
be avoided at all costS.107
Returning to Lawrence's social violence of sexual initiation rituals and
gender definition, we find an "authority principle" which attempts to disguise
106 Klein, ''The Development of a Child (1921)", pp. 35-36.
107 See Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946)", The Selected Melanie Klein. ed.
Juliet Mitchell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 176-200, 179-80. Here, Klein argues that
the death instinct is, through projective phantasy, "at once" transformed into a persecutory
anxiety and fear of death at the hands of the external objects or parents which are introjected
''to become internal persecutors". This is the origin of the super-ego. Parental authority is, then,
both always-already a threat and, as a product of phantasy, a cultural phenomenon. However, it
is also internal and a product of the instincts in the sense that it is the result of a defence
mechanism against (and thus, an indirect repression ot) the death instinct and an affirmation of
the life instinct: ''The fear of the destructive impulse seems to attach itself at once to an object
- or rather it is experienced as the fear of an uncontrollable overpowering object". See also "A
Study of Envy and Gratitude (1956)", The Selected Melanie Klein, pp. 211-29, 216. in which
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its inescapable cultural significations - the fact that it is always, like Klein's
parental authority, cultural, and therefore constitutive of such supposedly
"higher" sensibilities as conscience, and such putative abstractions as ideals and
ideology. Firstly, the construction, through ritual, of sex as a violent and
terrifying act of mysterious power is, rather than being impulsively pure,
saturated with mythologised conceptions, not only of "manhood" and
"womanhood", but of primitive religion and spiritual models of authority and
domination - for example, if most people are to be ignorant of sexual
knowledge and yet worship sex, those few who possess such knowledge
provide dangerously convenient objects for deification. Furthermore,
Lawrence's notion of a non-ideal authority reveals its own abstract nature in its
efforts to outline forms of practical education which supposedly transcend the
impedimenta of culture and ideals - the largely domestic training of women
and the pugilistic education of men are ideologically specific constructions of
gender identities. That this authority inhibits individuals, delimiting their
potential to know the full capacity of their identities, suggests that we can read
Lawrence as releasing the "dynamic" unconscious with less success than we
can interpret his work here as an attempt to re-write instinctual liberation as the
repression of the "impulse for knowledge". Certainly, such an impulse is,
though overtly allowed for by Lawrence should the child wish "instinctively" to
know, effectively denied women and the "mass of people" through the
expectations created by the social structure which Lawrence proposes. It could
be said, then, that while Lawrence is mindful of the formative effects of his
contemporary culture on the instincts, he is much less able to anticipate the
Klein speaks of the deflection of the death instinct in the form of projection as a method of
defence adopted by the ego in the service of the life instincts.
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dialectics of his own proposed impulsive culture: once a framework is
established on the basis of what we assume are our instincts, that system in turn
re-constitutes us itself in a manner which is unlikely to be identical to an entity
as amorphous and eternally re-interpretable as the unconscious drives. Hence,
Lawrence argues that, though we cannot remain at an unconscious level, we
must "start" every day from "the source", or "the blood" of the unconscious
and "travel away" from it towards consciousness - yet there is no
acknowledgement of the inescapable return journey from culture back to the
instincts. lOS
While Lawrence's Fantasia offers a portrait of the instincts as non-
mental and hostile to culture, Klein's notion of unconscious phantasy suggests
that the impulsive life is bound up with ways of knowing our environment. If,
as Klein argues, the infant projects his aggressive instincts on to his parents
who then become, through introjection, the super-ego whom the child fears
internal persecution from, then the unconscious itself is productive of culture
and its moral punishments which then incite"further transgressions in a vicious
.circle of ~iolence.l09Moreover, the instincts can only exist through the psychic
creativity which is constitutive of culture itself: Klein's notions of unconscious
projection, introjection and splitting (of the object into good and bad objects),
in order for the infant to defend itself from the self-destructiveness of the death
drive and cope with its own ambivalence towards its parents, are both
manifestations of the life instincts and ways of re-creating the external world
lOS Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 183.
109 See Klein, "The Early Development of Conscience in the Child (1933)", Contributions to
Psycho-Analysis 1921-1945, pp. 267-77, 269-70.
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internally, and are examples, therefore, of the earliest forms of imagination and
play.!'"
For Klein, furthermore, as the infant develops she begins the process of
reality-testing whereby the internal world of phantasy, with its idealisation of
authority and its corresponding delusions of omnipotence, is judged against the
external reality of its parents. Thus, the infant's process of learning about and
forming more successful ways of knowing its environment, in this process of
mediation between a subjective internal reality and the objective external
world, is deeply rooted in a process of learning to challenge authority. Klein
sees the real danger of culture as arising when the individual is so overwhelmed
by the authority of its super-ego (its introjected parental imagos) that it is
unable to perform the necessary task of reality-testing which enables it to
develop intellectually by challenging this authority. According to Klein
therefore, authority is also, like the unconscious,' always entangled in culture
and always bound up with the process of intellectual development, whether it
be ~s an inhibitory force or as an obstacle which, in being surmounted, becomes
constitutive of the act of learning. I I I The notions of unconscious phantasy and
reality-testing, then, have significant implications for Lawrence's notions of a
non-ideal authority and unconscious life.
110 See Klein, ''The Origins of Transference (1952)", The Selected Melanie Klein, pp. 201-10,
206-7. Klein argues here that ''there is no instinctual urge" which "does not involve objects.
external or internal" and that "object relations", which operate "from the beginning", are "at
the centre of emotional life" (p. 206). Since infantile phantasy is constitutive of a child's object
relations, Klein suggests an inextricable bond between, on the one hand, phantasy and the
culture of object relations, and, on the other, the instinctual life. Klein's psychic processes of
projection and introjection indeed indicate that there are no impulses which are not bound up
with phantasy and object relations.
111 See Klein, "On Observing the Behaviour of Young Infants (1952)", Envy and Gratitude
and Other Works 1946-1963 (1975; London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 94-121,112: "The infant's
growing capacity to perceive and understand the things around him increases his confidence in
his own ability to deal with and even to control them, as well as his trust in the external world.
His repeated experiences of the external reality become the most important means of
overcoming his persecutory and depressive anxieties. This, in my view, is reality-testing",
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For such contentions illuminate Lawrence's Fantasia since, as we have
seen, he can devise no method of evading the cultural violence he critiques.
While Klein's concerns resemble Lawrence's in that they are attempting to
account for the violence of culture, Klein contends not only that we cannot
evade culture, but that the process through which we become cultural beings is
necessarily violent while also being constitutive of psychic reality and
intellectual development. Furthermore, Lawrence's internecine war between
unconscious dynamism and a "static" mental consciousness appears less
plausible in the face of Klein's notion of unconscious phantasy - Lawrence's
proposed society is as much a culture which defines identities and values
certain kinds of knowledge as it is a mediated representation of instinctual
beings. In fact, Lawrence's social remedies are such rigidly definitional forms
of cultural violence, delimiting identities in an ideologically authoritarian
manner, that they resemble more the tyrannical unconscious forces of the
moralistic super-ego in a grotesque form of instinctual role-playing than they
represent the spontaneous forces of an idealised id. In this way, Lawrence's
work illustrates both how the unconscious. cannot be stripped of an
epistemological function and how authority is always embedded in the
symbolic order of culture. Fantasia's repression of Klein's "impulse for
knowledge" embodies not a return to an authentic unconscious, but the very
moral "bullying" and fixed idealism which Lawrence attempts so assiduously
to condemn. So, while Lawrence argues that knowledge obstructs the instincts,
his education defines what kinds of practical knowledge one should have
according to class and gender and, therefore, establishes a priori a set of ideal
identities. Thus knowledge is not gained through testing authority, but nor is it
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absent; rather, it is imposed through a conservative notion of natural identities.
We can, then, turn Lawrence's conception of absolute knowledge as death112 on
his own writing: first of all, by saying that Fantasia's repression of knowledge
and its attendant notion of absolute mystery determine knowledge through the
fixture of identities to as absolute an extent as the Enlightenment humanist
ideal of the attainment of complete knowledge; and secondly, by suggesting
that such a determination of knowledge, particularly in its conservative
reaction, is highly reminiscent of the death drive's compulsion to repeat.
Certainly, Lawrence's moralistic scheme of fixed identities suggests not
only a kind of living death and absolute knowledge, but (as suggested earlier in
a different sense) a kind of "culture of the death instinct": a desire to repeat or
return to earlier periods of history as a response to the violent conflicts of the
present (conflicts which we might associate with Freud's conception of the life
instincts whose goal is conflict). For example, as in "Education", Lawrence's
"womanhood" is saturated with the culture of politically conservative ideas, in
the form' of a moral outrage at the women's movement, a desire to return to a
. pre-industrial era, and a semi-religious notion of sexual segregation,I13
Similarly, Lawrence connects what he calls the "great 'unrest' of a nervous,
hysterical proletariat" with the ills of modern education.!" and argues for boys
to be brought up under a "proud, harsh, manly rule" so that they "know that at
every moment they are in the shadow of a proud, strong, adult authority" -
ideas which would certainly have found advocates amongst contemporary
conservatives, attempting to make the "mass of people", as Lawrence (perhaps
112 See, in particular, chapter 15, "The Lower Self', "Fantasia", pp. 178-95.
113 Lawrence, "Fantasia", pp. 85-87.
114 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 89.
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inadvertently, considering his' emphasis on the value of spontaneity) puts it,
. "fall into line".115Furthermore, the sophisticated ideological manoeuvrings of
culture are at work to a striking degree when Lawrence proposes that mankind
should have the burden of "responsibility", established by democracy,
displaced on to a leadership so that the "mass" can be "tree".!" Meanwhile, the
"individualistic" fighting and warfare which are advocated, and Lawrence's
frank (though modest) praise of the Great War as "not a bad beginning",
despite its "idealism", only further confirm that his idealised unconscious is
complicit, in its very denial of its own materiality and historicity, with the
ahistorical ideologies of an authoritarian conservatism.I'" For the objects of
Lawrence's critique (such as proletarian unrest), which are assumed to be
consequences of the evils of modem culture, are always stripped of their
relationship to other historical forces which include opposing forms of cultural
violence (such as capitalist exploitation). Similarly, the aspects of modernity
which Lawrence considers worthy of praise are grounded in the violent culture
which is supposed to be under attack - the Great War for example being, not a
purely instinctive human act of destruction merely adorned with the trappings
of "idealism", but the product of the conflicting material interests of imperial
capitalist nations.
Once again, we can read Lawrence's Fantasia as an exploration of the
very territory which Kleinian psychoanalysis investigates. Klein's controversial
claim that culture is always-already present in mental life, that phantasy is
present from the start of infancy, extends the range of culture to the very first
us Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 87.
116 Lawrence. "Fantasia". p. 88.
l17 Lawrence, "Fantasia". pp. 87-88.
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relationship a child has - its relationship to its parents/parental figures. What is
significant about this is that Klein's theory makes it impossible to conceive
instinctual life outside its object-relations - the infant possesses no unconscious
drives that it does not do something with in the microcosmic social dimension
of this first relationship. Thus, just as Lawrence cannot imagine a child
escaping damage from the world of ideas, Klein cannot imagine a child
escaping the violence of culture in its most primary form - the relation between
the parent and the child. What Klein does, then, is to take the idea of culture
back to its most primary form. If the fixed mental ideas of culture hurt the child
for Lawrence, the child is always-already wounded, for Klein, in its first
cultural relation with its parents. However, in trying to imagine new forms of
family, education and society which might allow the unconscious to flourish
without external repression, Lawrence does not avoid the brutal trappings of
cultural signification. This implies, in a rather Kleinian manner, that the
distinction between inside and outside does not hold. In fact, Fantasia's denial
of the conditions of its existence, the historical materiality of its deliberations
on the unconscious, is what implicates it in the violence of abstraction
characteristic of both Klein's persecutory super-ego and the prosthetic culture
of violence (the "love-tanks", for example, of Christian warfare) which
Lawrence lambastes: its attempt to find a pure inside is the very manoeuvre
which constitutes it as cultural violence.!"
118 Lawrence, "Fantasia", p. 135.
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From the Critique of Power to the Fight with Conflict:
Women and Love and "Tickets Please"
Women in Love (1920)
Women in Love is Lawrence's frrst sustained fictional engagement with
the violence of culture. Its critique of modem power relationships stretches
from industrial politics, through gender struggle, to the bohemian world of art.
At one level, its response to contemporary cultural conflict (the sweeping
criticism of modem power relations), and its location of the instinctual self
inside the conflicts of culture, raise the possibility of opposition to authority
from within culture. The challenge to the repressive hegemonic powers of
modernity is represented through the individual character of Ursula and the
social body of the colliers. In this sense the novel reads, like Klein and Freud,
the unconscious self as both embedded in culture and grounded in conflict.
Moreover, it also affirms Klein's notion of a bond between instinctual
liberation and the process of knowing about and challenging authority, while
also critiquing psychoanalysis's attempts to embrace repression such as, for
example, Freud's conception of the death drive as a repressive dictator
presiding over psychic reality and its conflicts - for the death drive to
dominate, the novel would have no historical conflict to report. At another
level, however, Women in Love is the story of a moral reaction to culture itself
and the violence in which all of its subjects are implicated. Thus, the novel's
attempt to imagine the impossible - a life which has departed from the realm of
culture with all its brutality - constitutes a repression of the history of conflict
upon which it founds its critique. The idea of an escape from, and suppression
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of, the conflict of culture is, then, a denial of the repressive power relationships
which motivated the novel's exploration of cultural violence. That such an
evasion is necessarily an acquiescence in the status quo which the novel sought
to criticise suggests that the novel, now rather like Freud's dictatorial death
drive, unravels its structural coherence by repressing the very conflict which
sustains its existence.
However, to begin with, I wish to explore how the novel represents
individuals as struggling, inevitably, within culture. Certainly, few characters
seem to be spared a complicity with a frequently insidious cultural violence.
This is strikingly clear in the novel's discussion of the destructiveness of
capital. Mr Crich's Christian philanthropy and patriarchal benevolence towards
his workers is exposed as an "infallible weapon" and a substitution "for all his
hostility" - a method of repressing the violence of the industrial capitalism he is
helping to sustain.!" Gerald Crich, who takes over and modernises his father's
mines, is "in reaction against Charity" yet is "dominated by it", rejecting
"humanitarianism't.F" For Gerald, who admits the ruthlessly violent nature of
the industrial "machine" he is operating, the "sufferings and feelings of
individuals did not matter in the least. They were mere conditions, like the
weather". l2l Gerald's notion of "the pure instrumentality of mankind", then,
which reduces human beings to "distorted" parts of a machine, is merely a new
kind of cultural violence through which Gerald represses both the humanity of
119 Lawrence, Women in Love (1920), ed. David Farmer, Lindeth Vasey and John Worthen
OLondon,Penguin, 1995),p.215.
120 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 219, 223.
121 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 223.
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people and his own positive emotions, or what Freud might call the life
instincts.122
Moreover, the sado-masochism of Gerald's sexual relationship with
Gudrun shows a man unable to escape the relations of domination integral to
that political and economic system. Gudrun perceives this early in the novel, in
the chapter "Water-Party", when she reveals the proprietorial nature of Gerald's
condemnation and concern when she runs at his cattle: '" You think I'm afraid
of you and your cattle, don't yoU?,,,.123 Sexuality and gender relations are
coloured by the world of private ownership and economic power, so that the
individual is unable to escape the violence of culture even in the conventionally
separated and idealised sphere of personal relations - an abstraction of which
Gerald himself is guilty: '''Between me and a woman, the social question does
not enter. It is my own affair" .124
Thus, Gudrun, trapped in an individualistic battle with Gerald, cannot
be in a sexual relationship where she does not dominate, and this violence too is
associated with an illuminating repression:
she felt in her soul an unconquerable desire for deep
violence against him. She shut off the fear and dismay
that filled her conscious mind. She wanted to do as she
did, she was not going to be afraid.125
, Here, Gudrun's release of impulsive, formerly unconscious, destructiveness is
bound up with a simultaneous repression of anxiety and dispiritedness which
becomes a question of conflict:
On the edge of her consciousness the question was
asking itself, automatically, "Why are you behaving in
this impossible and ridiculous fashion?" But she was
122 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 222-3.
123 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 170.
124 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 103.
12S Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 170.
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sullen, she half shoved the question out of herself. She
could not get it clean away, so she felt self-
consctous.F"
In contrast to Lawrence's non-fictional treatment of violence, Gudrun's
instinctual disruption of social convention and politeness does not escape the
confines of culture. She is "self-conscious" in her suppression of internal
conflict - her attempt, that is, to master her own ambivalence. This extends to
her art through which Gudrun attempts to achieve total knowledge of the world;
an absolutism of "high" culture which defines finally the nature or identity of
the objects placed under its rigorously scrutinising gaze. However, this cultural
authority is part of Gudrun's general attitude towards people. For example,
rather than allow herself to feel conflicting feelings towards people or accept
that they possess an unconscious which she cannot presume to be an authority
on, Gudrun, after producing an analysis of the various qualities and flaws of
Birkin, summarises Birkin as a "deadly" individual who forces "his soul" upon
Ursula without allowing her a soul of her own:
This was all so true, that Ursula felt jarred to the
bottom of her soul, with ugly distaste [.... ] Then there
started a revulsion from Gudrun. She finished life off
so thoroughly, she made things so ugly and so final. As
a matter of fact, even if it were as Gudrun said, about
Birkin, other things were true as well. But Gudrun
would draw two lines under him and cross him out like
an account that is settled. There he was, summed up,
paid for, settled, done with. And it was such a lie. This
finality of Gudrun' s, this dispatching of people and
things in a sentence, it was all such a lie.127
Hermione, an upper-class patron of the arts who is at the centre of a
circle of intellectuals and artists, wields a different kind of cultural power
which is grounded in idealist progressivism. The extent of this progressivism's
126 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 171.
127 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 263.
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attack on the destructiveness of power transforms it, itself, into an authoritarian
attempt to abolish conflict. For while Hermione argues intellectually for
equality and universal brotherhood, and is a generous and polite host, she uses
her social pleasantries and benevolent outlook as methods of controlling people
who might potentially oppose her. Her inability to admit the inherently violent
and conflictual nature of her challenge to power and authority is such that her
"obsession" to "know" becomes a sublimated method by which she can
exercise her "will" and determine, like Gudrun, the final meanings of the
people and things around her.128The critique of power, in Hermione, has
become so rigorous as to undo itself, embodying its own uncompromising
cultural authority. Hermione offers a kind of culture of the death drive, which
abstracts itself from, and represses, its inescapable social and material conflicts,
and consequently. becomes dangerously violent in its quest for control. For
example, when Birkin disagrees with Hermione's ideal of equality in
"Breadalby" he feels her "dynamic hatred and loathing, coming strong and
black out of [her] unconsciousness".129 Hermione cannot cope with others'
opposition to her or their inconsistencies (such as the "chameleon" nature of
. Birkin's dancing)13o since they threaten both her ideal world and her own
authority over what that ideal world is. Moreover, her idealist conception of
education, in its suppression of the social and material conditions of its
existence, is also a form of cultural violation: "'there can be no reason. no
excuse for education, except the joy and beauty of knowledge in itself [.... ]
Vocational education isn't education, it is the close of education' ...131Yet her
128 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 88-89.
129 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 104.
130 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 92.
131 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 85.
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own culture has as its foundation the human labour which is the product of
vocational education and training.
Women in Love, then, shows a modern world in which violence is
everywhere, and often in the least conspicuous of areas. This violence is,
however, not a purely instinctive entity, but bound up with the repressiveness
of culture. While Mr erich's and Hermione's subtle ferocity is constituted by
the fierceness of their morality, Gerald's and Gudrun's destructiveness is
grounded in alternative ideals of acquisitiveness, domination, and
individualism. These latter ideals are, significantly, not stripped of their
repressive powers or idealised as impulsive forces. While both Gudrun and
Gerald repress people in their relationships, they also repress parts of their own
selves. Both suppress their own desire for emotional connection and
relationship - Gudrun, for example, longing for kindness.132 Gerald, in desiring
to have Gudrun "at his mercy", impels himself into a relationship in which he
cannot win: for "one destroyed that the other might exist, one ratified because
the other was nulled".133Gerald's need to dominate is also a repression of the
attachment he craves - the goal of the former desire (the drive for power over
the other) is the destruction of the latter desire (the impulse for love). His love
has become so destructive as to undermine and destroy itself. Gudrun's
violence, too, is self-repressive. Her intellectual desire to finalise everything in
fixed mental images leads her to an appalling moment of nightmare in which
she feels she knows and has therefore annihilated everything, including herself:
She must always see and know and never escape. She
could never escape. There she was, placed before the
clock-face of life [.... ] She was watching the fingers
twitch across the eternal, mechanical, monotonous
132 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 465.
133 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 242, 445.
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clock-face of time. She never really lived, she only
watched. Indeed, she was like a little, twelve-hour
clock, vis-a-vis with the enormous clock of eternity
]134[....
In these ways, both Gerald and Gudrun are driven towards death (Gerald, in
fact, reaching it) by repressive cultures of violence which, in attempting to
control and define others' identities, delimit their own, so that their violent
desires become self-subverting. What is being imposed here, we might say,
through the domination of others, is an authoritarian control over the
unconscious self: to dominate others, we must dominate ourselves.
However, the characters so far discussed (Mr Crich, Gerald, Gudrun,
and Hermione) are the characters most heavily satirised by the novel. Birkin
and Ursula, by contrast, are evidently protagonists through which the novel
offers hope for a liberation from the culture of deathliness which it describes.
The question which needs to be asked of Women in Love, then, is whether
(through Birkin and Ursula) it offers any space for a critique of cultural
violence from within culture (that is, ~ immanent critique), or whether it
attempts to find a place outside culture from which to attack (perhaps with a
more purified, non-cultural form of violence) the brutality it diagnoses as
fundamental to modernity.
Certainly, Birkin is in many ways thoroughly implicated within the kind
of cultural violence I have been discussing. His intellectual battles with
Hermione are a good example of this. Though the novel satirically describes the
intellectual conversations at Breadalby as "like a rattle of small artillery, always
slightly sententious", Birkin, the Lawrencian persona of the novel, is unable to
134 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 465.
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transcend it despite his evident dislike of it.135For he too, like Hermione,
becomes violently and arrogantly intellectual when he encounters opinions he
does not concur with. In response to Hermione's claim that "we are all one, all
equal in the spirit", Birkin erupts:
"It is just the opposite, just the contrary, Hermione. We
are different and unequal in spirit - it is only the social
differences that are based on accidental material
conditions. We are all abstractly or mathematically
equal, if you like. Every man has hunger and thirst, two
eyes, one nose and two legs. We're all the same in
point of number. But spiritually, there is pure
difference and neither equality nor inequality counts. It
is upon these two bits of knowledge that you must
found a state. Your democracy is an absolute lie-your
brotherhood of man is a pure falsity, if you apply it
further than the mathematical abstraction I....] I want
every man to have his share in the world's goods, so
that I am rid of his importunity, so that I can tell him:
'Now you've got what you want-you've got your fair
share of the world's gear. Now, you one-mouthed fool,
mind yourself and don't obstruct me:,,136
Birkin, here, is "so insistent, bearing everybody down" and Gerald accuses him
of "megalomania't.F" What is significant, however, about this speech is not
only its stylistic violence, but the brutality with which it erases the social from
the sphere of the individual, as if democracy was only a question of a reified
material exchange of "goods" which does not involve social relationships and
communication. Birkin's contempt for others "spiritually" is made clear.
despite his effort to remove the issue of equality or inequality from the
problem, by his vision of society as an obstruction and others' needs as
"importunity", Birkin is, then, a figure who, though frustrated and disillusioned
with the violence of the culture he inhabits, is still complicit with it, in
13S Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 84.
136 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 103-4.
137 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 104.
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particular through his paradoxical desire to avenge a brutal modernity by
imagining it out of the sphere of his existence .
.In this passage, Women in Love illuminates the all-pervasiveness of
culture, but offers no space for a critique of its violence: rather, Birkin seems to
embody a more radical version of that cultural violence against which he rails.
A critique is given, however, through the relationship which Birkin has with
Ursula. In "Water-Party", for instance, Birkin speaks apocalyptically of
modem civilisation's death drive, or what he calls "the death-process" which is
"our real reality".138Ursula responds by insisting that Birkin, by idealising this
process as "progressive" and "as good as the beginning" of life, only "want[s]
us to be deathly". Retorting, Birkin argues that he only "want[s] us to know
what we are".139However, later in the chapter we discover that Birkin is
offering Ursula a kind of death as a solution to the tortuous "life that belongs to
death" which is modernity. 140
For Birkin wants a connection with Ursula that is not passionate or like
love, but "like death" and rebirth, through which he and Ursula can emerge
"lost" to their old selves, and "different", Strikingly, this relationship is "like
sleep" which means that Ursula must "yield" her "very identity", and that
Birkin does not want "to know" her.141What Birkin is offering here, as a cure
for a ferocious modernity, is not only an abstract solution confined to isolated
personal relations, as Raymond Williams has suggested.142but a model of
relationship which is intriguingly both cleansed of conflict and comparable to a
138 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 172.
139 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 173.
140 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 186
141 •Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 186-1.
142 See Raymond Williams, "D. H. Lawrence", The English Novel from Dickens to lAwrt'nce
(1970; St Albans: Paladin, 1974), pp. 131-49.
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return to an infantile state: '''like being born again, vulnerable as a baby that
just comes into the world",.143
What is interesting about such a hypothetical state, in this context, is
that it returns us to the Freudian notion of the individual as tom between the life
instincts and the death instincts. For Freud, the life instincts' purpose (including
Eros') is to "introduce fresh tensions", to produce conflict, while the death
instincts' objective is to create "constancy" and abolish conflict.l44 The triumph
of the death instincts therefore would be the end of conflict. For Klein,
furthermore, the super-ego itself is formed through the splitting or defusion of
the life and death instincts as a result of the infant's inability to cope with its
divided feelings of love and hate - that is, its inability to cope with conflict.
Klein argues that the death instincts then form the super-ego, which opposes the
individual's life instincts as an "agent of morality, punishment, guilt,
. repression, and protection".14S It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the
contemporary British psychoanalyst, Adam Phillips, has described the super-
ego as an "unconscious authoritarian order" which could usefully be seen as
"the saboteur of conflict".I46 For Phillips, in other words, real conflict is a
condition of democracy.147
Thus, we might read Birkin's ideal relation with Ursula as a way of
repressing conflict reminiscent of the psychoanalytic concept of the super-ego.
For Birkin wants Ursula to discover an impersonal relationship with him "that
143 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 186.
144 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", pp. 387-8.
14~ Klein, "On the Development of Mental Functioning (1958)", Envy and Gratitude, pp. 236-
46,240.
146 Adam Phillips, Equals (London: Faber and Faber, 2(02), p. 11.
147 See Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" (1921), One- Way Street and Other Writing_,
(London: Verso, 1979), pp. 132-54, for a discussion of political violence, in particular that of
the state and the contradictions produced by its attempt to extricate itself from violence and
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is beyond love, beyond any emotional relationship", and which has, as its
"root", a "naked kind of isolation".I48 Such "isolation", which is "beyond
responsibility", is the basis for a relationship which entails none of the
awkwardness of entanglement and opposition which relationships normally
involve:
"There is [... ] a final me which is stark and impersonal
and beyond responsibility. So there is a final you [.... ]
And there could be no obligation, because there is no
standard for action there, because no understanding has
been reaped from that plane. It is quite inhuman,-so
there can be no calling to book, in any form
whatsoever-because one is outside the pale of all that
is accepted, and nothing known applies. One can only
follow the impulse, taking that which lies in front, and
responsible for nothing, asked for nothing, giving
nothing, only each taking according to the primal
desire.,,149
Since, as mentioned above, both are stripped of their identities, along with their
responsibilities, an idealised id seems to be on offer here, but without the vital
conflict that that would necessarily entail. It is as if the "sleep"-like or "death"-
like quality of this new relationship involves a repression of the emotional and
assertive parts of the self which might make for conflict.
The novel, however, seems to register Birkin' s idealisation of the
unconscious here by pointing towards the culture which he draws upon to
suppress conflict. This is done through anthropomorphic symbolism as Birkin
tries to draw a comparison between a tabby's "justified" use of violence against
a wild female cat, and human sexual relatlons.F" Birkin argues that what
Ursula calls the tabby's "bossiness" and "lust for bullying" is a desire for
conflict; and Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Allen Lane. Penguin. 1970) for a
~~ilosophical investigation of the nature of political violence.
Lawrence, Women in Love. p. 145.
149 Lawrence, Women in Love. p. 146.
ISO Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 149.
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"superfine stability" and an attempt to make the wild cat "acknowledge him as
a sort of fate", since she is "promiscuous" and a "fluffy sporadic bit of
chaos".lSl Ursula, typically, undermines the purity of Birkin's impulsive ideal
here by revealing its true, cultural quality. For she shows how Birkin's relation
of mutual "primal desire" and "stable equilibrium" is in actual fact a
containment of the "chaos" and conflict which the female represents and an
"assumption of male superiority" reminiscent of the morality of biblical
patriarchy: his accidental description of the female as "like a star in its orbit"
around the male is, for Ursula, nothing less than "the old Adam" and "old dead
morality,,:S2 Moreover, the suggestion that Birkin "was almost afraid" of the
"recklessness" and "abandon" of Ursula, along with her "dangerous
thoroughness of destructivity" implies that Birkin's ideal relationship is
associated with a corresponding desire to contain what he sees as her chaotic
nature: the love and passion which Ursula offers him, for example, are potential
forms of conflict as well as threats to his ideal of a return to an impulsive,
child-like state.153 In these ways the chapter "Mino" shows how the cultural
power relations of gender inform Birkin's own subtle violence. This is made
clearer when we consider that Birkin's desire for a special relationship with
Gerald does not involve a need to curb Gerald's assertiveness or his
"destructivity" despite the fact that Gerald's violent nature far outstrips
Hermione's or Ursula's female powers.
Nonetheless, as the novel continues, the conflict which Ursula
represents is diminished as she gradually adopts the ideals of Birkin. For, like
lSI Lawrence, Women in Love, p. ISO.
152 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. ISO, 152.
1S3 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 154.
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Birkin, Ursula begins to perceive death as a "consummation" and life within the
modem, routinised industrial world as a repetitive and "mechanical" process.P'
Her "barren school-week" she sees as a "shameful" degradation compared with
death. ISS Any sense of opposition to it, however, is undermined as the abstract
notion of death from the social world which Birkin has proposed to her gains
ascendance in her perspectives. The "detestable social principle" is now
opposed to an idealised death process through which a "new union" might be
found.1S6
Similarly, Birkin's two methods of opposing a violent modem culture
are either to acquiesce in a "sensual" process of "disintegration" and "death" (a
path apparently similar to Gerald's capitalistic destructiveness which is at one
point dangerously mythologised as the "ice-destructive knowledge" of the
"strange white wonderful demons from the north") or to discover with Ursula a
state of "free proud singleness" which "submits to the yoke and leash of love";
a discovery which, as we have seen, also involves a kind of death from the
social realm. What is significant here, Ithink, is that the novel suggests that an
idealised, bodily unconscious in the form of an "inverted culture" of "mindless"
knowledge might be possible, and that, furthermore, the individual's freedom is
obstructed by the conflictual bondage of emotional contact - in short, that
relationship and society should be conceived as hostile to the individual's
"primal desire".IS7
This process, whereby the social world is aesthetically annihilated,
arguably reaches its climax in the chapter "Excurse". Following a violent
154 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 191-3.
m Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 193.
156 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 244-S.
157 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 253-4.
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argument, Birkin and Ursula are emotionally reconciled. However, this
reconciliation involves both a shift outside of the modernity the novel has so
persistently critiqued, and a suppression of the positive opposition to Birkin
which Ursula embodied. Once the "old, detestable world of tension" has
"passed away", the transcendent relationship which emerges between the
couple is exactly along the lines which Birkin had argued for: Ursula learns to
desire what Birkin desires.IS8Their interaction is "neither love nor passion",IS9
and Ursula conceives her new relationship with Birkin in the same biblical,
patriarchal terms with which she had previously criticised Birkin's version of
sexual relations:
She recalled again the old magic of the Book of
Genesis, where the Sons of God saw the daughters of
men, that they were fair. And he was one of these, one
of these strange creatures from the beyond, looking
down at her, and seeing she was fair.l60
This repression of conflict through an idealised form of unconscious death is, as
we can see here, evidently not without its cultural colouring - ironically, for
Lawrence, the culture of an earlier form of Christianity. The novel, however,
struggles to imagine a world outside culture through Birkin and Ursula's
resignation from their "responsibilities" and the "world of work".161 The
material condition on which this act of escape rests - Birkin's private income-
is suppressed by the novel. Moreover, Ursula's suggestion that it may be
impossible to abstract oneself from society in the way that Sirkin proposes (he
wants them to "wander" into "our own nowhere") is not answered by the novel
ISS Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 310.
159 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 313.
160 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 312.
161 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 315.)6.
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which almost transforms Ursula into a Birkinian persona.162 Here is a
comparison of two Ursulas:
"there is only the world [.... ] I'm so afraid that while
we are only people, we've got to take the world that's
given-because there isn't any other [.... ]"163
"I do think that one can't have anything new whilst one
cares for the old-do you know what I mean?-even
fighting the old is belonging to it.-I know, one is
tempted to stop with the world, just to fight it.-But
then it isn't worth it."
Gudrun considered herself.
"Yes," she said. "In a way, one is of the world if one
lives in it. But isn't it really an illusion, to think you
can get out of it? After all, a cottage in the Abruzzi, or
wherever it may be, isn't a new world."I64
The conflict embodied by Ursula and modernity is surpassed by Birkin and
Ursula's achievement of Birkin's ideal of a "perfected relation".165Ursula's
opposition is abandoned while Birkin's victory is insidiously acknowledged by
the text - in the form of the couple's "star-equilibrium", their non-mental,
mystic, "dark knowledge" of each other, and the "death in most marvellous
possession" which Ursula undergoes.l'" Meanwhile, the problem of the violent
conflict which modernity entails is solved by the novel's aesthetic destruction
of the modern world - its attempt to imagine a dimension, a "perfected
relation" or "nowhere" in which Birkin and Ursula can escape from the
violence of culture.
As 1have already suggested, the relation which the novel's treatment of
conflict bears to psychoanalysis is an illuminating one. For if the super-ego, as
Klein and Phillips suggest, is an "unconscious authoritarian order" which is
162 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 315.
163 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 315.
164 Lawrence, Women in Love pp.437-8.
165 'Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 316.
166 Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 316,319.
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"the saboteur of conflict", then Women in Love seems to be, to quote Freud on
the implications of the super-ego for human consciousness, "more moral than
[it] knows". For, on the one hand, the novel is an engagement and critique of
the destructive power relations of modernity. Yet on the other hand, Birkin's
various solutions to the violence of modem culture (his ideal death processes)
are implicated within a cultural violence themselves, and the novel's critique of
cultural power relations returns to haunt them. For example, Birkin's attack (in
his symbolic stoning of the moon in "Moony") on the apparently feminine
cultural ideals of fertility, love, sexuality and spirituality, whilst an attack on
female power, is itself a form of destruction: Birkin wants to strip Ursula of her
"assertive will" yet cannot keep himself from the cultural bullying of "the
Sunday school teacher" and the "preacher", and attempts to repress, rather
puritanically, the "old destructive fires" of sex.167 More strikingly however,
(considering the novel's frequently ironic attitude towards Birkin's diatribes),
Women in Love progressively undermines the reality of the conflicts it
represents by creating an abstract space outside culture to which Birkin and
Ursula can escape. This, paradoxically, leaves the relations of cultural power
intact and, in fact, reinforces them through its aesthetic denial of their concrete
significance - the challenge, for example, which the Ursula of modernity
represents to Birkin is contained and suppressed, in their supposed removal
from the cultural sphere, by the latter's reinforcement of a gender relation
suggestively coloured by allusions to the Old Testament. The critique of power,
in its idealised destruction of the social, thus becomes the moral desire to
suppress all conflict, leaving the original power relations of the status quo
167 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 251.
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untouched - since to oppose their authority is both to embody a form of hostile
power oneself (which the novel, predominantly through Birkin, condemns) and
to initiate a potentially violent cultural conflict. 168
This is most evident in the novel's repeated insistence that to oppose an
authority is merely reactive and therefore embodies fundamentally the same
idea as the authority in question. For example, the miners' radical politics is
equated with the capitalistic power of Gerald. While the miners have an
"instinct for chaos" which is manifested in their "idea of mechanical
equality",169Gerald "merely represented the miners in a higher sense when he
perceived that the only way to fulfil perfectly the will of man was to establish
the perfect, inhuman machine".170This notion of a correspondence between the
miners and capitalists is given an historical concreteness by the novel, as
Macdonald Daly has argued, with the effect of gross historical travesty: the
miners are said to have "submitted" to "all" of Gerald's ruthless reforms "with
some fatal satisfaction't.l" Rather like Ursula, who also embodies a kind of
"chaos" which Birkin must contain, the miners have an "instinct for chaos"
which is suppressed by the novel's aesthetic destruction of the historical reality
of class conflict: "chaos", then, seems to be another word for women's and
168 See John Fraser, Violence in the Arts (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974) for a
wide-ranging examination of the treatment of violence in modem art and culture, which
includes a critique of idealist assessments of violence, emphasising the impossibility of
abstracting politics from involvement in some form of violence.
169 Lawrence, Women in Love, p, 226.
170Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 228.
171 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 230. See Macdonald Daly, "D. H. Lawrence and Labour in
the Great War", Modern Language Review 89,1994, pp. 19-38,33: "The miners' fictitious
acquiescence to [the "aggressive mechanization of the mines"] represents the very real
fragmentation of liberal England, of which the productive and therefore social necessities of
war was the catalyst. In 'The Industrial Magnate', these changes are envisaged as a process
received passively in the ranks of the industrial workforce (so that it permits a summary
judgement on the degeneracy of an entire populace and legitimates demands for authoritarian
dictatorship) rather than one which was in some quarters vigorously resisted (an
acknowledgement such as that would have validated a politically more problematic declaration
of solidarity with the forces of resistance)". .
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working-class resistance to exploitation and oppression. This aesthetic
destruction of resistance, furthermore, is based on the assumption that hierarchy
and authority are necessary for society to function: "Mystic equality lies in
abstraction, not in having and doing, which are processes. In function and
process, one man, one part, must of necessity be subordinate to another".I72
Women in Love's critique of the violent cultural powers and authorities of
modernity is thus radically undermined by its own naturalising reinforcement
of those authorities (of class and gender) and its aesthetic repression of conflict.
The "chaos" represented by both the colliers and Ursula is extinguished, rather
like the anarchic, unconscious desires of the id are vanquished by a moralistic
super-ego, through the novel's moral condemnation of female "will" and
working-class "power" (or "rottenness in the Will"),173which re-emphasises the
dominant cultural authorities it sought to condemn.
If we tum to the psychoanalysis of D. W. Winnicott, such aesthetic and,
in the widest sense, anti-social destructiveness and conflict-repression take on a
heightened cultural character, and can even be identified with the kind of
prostheticised violence which, as we have seen, Lawrence's non-fiction
critiques. For Winnicott, in discussing how it might be that an infant "destroys
the world",174contends that there is a kind of "infantile magic" which acts a
form of imaginative destruction:
This is of vital importance because it is the residue of
this infantile 'unfused' destruction that may actually
destroy the world we live in and love. In infantile
magic the world can be annihilated by a closing of the
eyes and recreated by a new looking and a new phase
of needing. Poisons and explosive weapons give to
172 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 226.
173 Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 118.
174 D W W" "A . d . d Cl
. . mmcott, ggression an ItS roots", Deprivation and Delinquency, e. are
Winnicott, Ray Shepherd and Madeleine Davis (London: Tavistock, 1984), pp. 84-99,97.
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infantile magic a reality that is the very opposite of
magical.175
Such acts of what Winnicott calls "magical destruction" are reduced as the
infant comes to terms with the fact that the world exists "outside his or her
magical control". When development occurs, the infant "becomes able to be
destructive and becomes able to hate and to kick and to scream instead of
magically annihilating that world". Thus, for Winnicott, "in this way actual
aggression is seen to be an achievement" and "aggressive ideas and behaviour
take on a positive value, and hate becomes a sign of civilization".176In the light
of Winnicott's "magical destruction". then, Women in Love can be seen as
performing an aesthetic violence which overreaches its own critique of culture:
for in effect, rather than offering an authentic "perfected relation", Birkin and
Ursula's flight from the social world or "death-process", and the novel's
flattening out of social conflict, are culturally refined, solipsistic ways of
destroying "the world we live in and love". The "perfected relation" is an
abstract mental event which brutally cuts off its own potentiality for social
significance. By contrast, the passionate argumentation of Ursula and the
potent, though shadowy, presence of the miners arguably embody the forms of
aggression and conflict to which Winnicott attaches "positive value",
particularly in the sense that they do not assume superiority.
We might, then, read Women in Love as a text tom between challenging
cultural authority and fearing that that challenge may become a new form of
domination itself. However, we might also describe the novel's consequent
abstraction from culture (which, like Hermione's education, tries to conceal its
175 W" "A . d immcott, ggression an ItS roots", pp. 97-98.
176 W' . tt "A . .mmcott, ggression and ItS roots", pp. 98-99.
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own socio-material conditions) as an attempt to idealise an escape-route from
its own inescapable entanglement in the power relations of culture, and, finally,
as not only re-establishing the dominant hierarchies of modernity, but of
aesthetically destroying the conflicts integral to an intra-cultural challenge to
those authorities. If this is so, the violence with which the novel performs this
last act of destruction, and that violence's re-assertion of modern culture's
hegemonies, are the final fruits of Lawrence's first sustained fictional
exploration of the insidious ubiquity of the super-ego.
The movement from critique of power to the suppression of conflict in
Women in Love may, however, inversely shed light on the ways in which
Klein's psychoanalysis handles the issue of authority and revolt. For if
Lawrence's novel subverts its own critique of cultural power through the
aesthetic abolition of conflict, could we not describe Klein's notion of the
depressive position - particularly in its concept of art itself as reparation - as
less a successful surmounting of cultural violence through the synthesis of love
and hate, than a guilty acknowledgement of wrongdoing and an acceptance of
the rectitude of authority? After all, Klein describes the "synthesis" of
"emotions" primarily in terms of a realisation that the "destructive impulses are
directed against a loved person".177 The question arises, then, whether or not
Klein leaves any space for opposition to the oppression of authority.
Stonebridge has argued, in an interpretation which reads Klein against the
grain, that "the culture of redemption, for Klein, ultimately testifies to the
omnipresence of aggression", and that Klein offers "a version of the ego as
continually shattered into culture by the vicissitudes of anxiety". However,
177 Klein, ''The Origins of Transference (1952)", p. 203.
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Klein nonetheless uses, as Stonebridge emphasises, "that anxiety" as "the
ground for a thesis that turns on the solipsism of an ego bent on re-creating the
world in its own image", and in doing so, "comes close to endorsing a culture
of the death drive".178In other words, opposition to authority and the potential
for revolt are reduced, in Klein's hypothesis of a depressive position, to an
aesthetics whose central functions are the suppression of conflict and the
destruction of the social.179In this respect, Women in Love can be interpreted as
a fictional realisation of what Kleinian reparation might mean aesthetically and
socially. Lawrence's novel would certainly seem to raise questions about how
the individual might challenge the violence of authority in a manner which
neither falls into the trap of idealising an extra-cultural space, nor succumbs
itself to an obsessive cycle of cultural violence.
"Tickets Please" (1922)
Lawrence's short story, "Tickets Please", attempts to radicalise the
position at which Women in Love arrives. It is a bold attempt to re-formulate
cultural conflict as a dramatic battle between instinctual being and culture
itself. The story's trajectory is clearly, from its beginning, set towards an extra-
cultural space outside a perversely vicious modernity. That modernity is
embodied in the character of Annie, a Midlands tram-conductor who, like the
other "fearless young hussies", registers the emergence in war-time labour of a
new female presence and power. Lawrence characterises this, however, as an
anarchic and violent new authority:
178 Stonebridge, pp. 44-45.
179 See Michael Rustin, "A Socialist Consideration of Kleinian Psychoanalysis", New Left
Review 131, January-February 1982, pp. 71-96, for an alternative assessment of the political
implications of Klein's depressive position and her theories in general.
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[... ] they have all the sang-froid of an old non-
commissioned officer [.... ] They pounce on the youths
who try to evade their ticket-machine. They push off
the men at the end of the distance. They are not going
to be done in the eye-not they. They fear
nobody-and everybody fears them [.... ] [Annie] is
peremptory, suspicious, and ready to hit first. She can
hold her own against ten-thousand. The step of that
tram-car is her Thermopylae.P"
The sense of a violent female invasion into the conventionally male world of
the colliers is clear. Yet "Tickets Please" portrays an alternative form of
brutality whose hostile relationship to this female authority forms the subject of
the story. This antagonistic opponent to the new female labour power is
represented by the inspector, John Thomas or, "sometimes, in malice, Coddy",
who is well-known through the "scandal" over his brutal promiscuity with the
tram girls:
He flirts with the girl conductors in the morning, and
walks out with them in the dark night [.... ] Of course
the girls quit the service frequently. Then he flirts and
walks out with the new-comer: always providing she is
sufficiently attractive, and that she will consent to walk
[.... ] [Annie] watched him vanquish one girl, then
another.l'"
Both the name and the kind of behaviour point towards an impulsive way of
..being which, in its own way, becomes an intrusion into the female group of
tram- conductors.
Annie perceives John Thomas's nature and keeps him "at arm's length
for many months,,:82 However, the two meet at a fair, and John Thomas
seduces Annie with his "warm, cosy way of holding a girl" and his both
sexually and physically daring behaviour. A relationship develops in which a
180 Lawrence, "Tickets Please", England, My England and Other Stories (1922), ed. Bruce
Steele (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 34-45, 35.
181 Lawrence, ''Tickets Please", p. 36.
182 Lawrence, ''Tickets Please", p. 36.
288
strong physical rapport emerges.183 However, difficulties arise as a result of
Annie's intellectual demands on John Thomas:
But with a developing acquaintance there began a
developing intimacy. Annie wanted to consider him a
person, a man, she wanted to take an intelligent
interest in him, and to have an intelligent response.
She did not want a mere nocturnal presence [.... ] And
she prided herself that he could not leave her.
Here she made a mistake. John Thomas intended to
remain a nocturnal presence, he had no idea of
becoming an all-round individual to her. When she
started to take an intelligent interest in him and his life
and his character, he sheered of. He hated intelligent
interest. And he knew that the only way to stop it was
to avoid it. The possessive female was aroused in
Annie. So he left her.184
Hostility is initiated, then, through the kind of cultural "bullying" and female
"wilt' attacked in "Education", Fantasia and Women in Love. However, as I
indicated in my discussion of Women in Love, resistance to this "will" for
"intelligent response" and refusal to acknowledge another's personal identity or
to give oneself in "intimacy" is also a way of controlling relationship and
precluding the development of conflict. It could even be read as a way of
. repressing knowledge about the self that might be gained from such
.relationship. This is particularly striking here when John Thomas abruptly
terminates his relationship with Annie when she becomes interested in and
"possessive" of him.
However, for Annie the conflict is not at an end: she is "staggered",
indignant, miserable, and in "despair", especially when she discovers that he
"had gone away to somebody else", and plots with John Thomas's "old flames"
to avenge him.18S The story thus reaches its climax when those tram girls who
183 Lawrence, ''Tickets Please", p. 38.
184 Lawrence, "Tickets Please", pp. 38-39.
18S Lawrence, "Tickets Please", pp. 39-40.
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are his "old flames" wait in the depot for John Thomas to return from his shift
and, teasing him about his promiscuity, ask him to choose one of them finally.
He is embarrassed but is pressurised further until the girls - led by Annie -
assault him violently in order to make him choose the girl he will marry. John
Thomas's attempt to restore order with the voice of "official authority" fails, as
the girls become like Dionysian maenads, savaging him until he lies "defeated"
like "an animal".186 Significantly, while the girls become a "supernatural"
power, John Thomas is transformed into a vulnerable creature of nature,
emphasising that the violence represented is a cultural one, lacking the natural
sensitivity of John Thomas's instinctive masculinity.l'" This is reinforced also
by the "maddened" and "hysteric" quality to the girls' assault.18S
The story ends with an ironic twist when, following Annie's threats to
kill John Thomas, he chooses Annie, which leaves her with something "broken
in her" and the girls awkward and "stupefied".189"Tickets Please" concludes
therefore by exposing the brutality of the "possessive" modern woman who
requires "intelligent response" from her lovers, while showing how the
impulsive male self who scandalises the local area, represented by John
Thomas, is in reality a figure of emotional integrity. Lawrence seems to be
suggesting here that the emerging power of women, in both the education and
industry of the period, is a threat to the integrity of a more traditional and male,
unconscious way of being.
However, what is striking in this story is the way in which this most
superficial and obvious reading is disturbed by the peculiar morality of the
186 Lawrence, "Tickets Please", pp. 41-43,
187 Lawrence, "Tickets Please", p. 43.
188 Lawrence, "Tickets Please", pp. 43, 45.
189 Lawrence, ''Tickets Please", p. 45.
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tale's conclusion. The dangerous promiscuity of John Thomas is transformed at
the story's end into an oddly orthodox desire for monogamy. In this sense,
''Tickets Please" asserts both a culturally conservative morality (the man
"chooses" his wife) and a brutally instinctual attitude towards sexual relations
(the man "flirts" with numerous women). The question thus arises whether the
story achieves the non-cultural space which it requires for its critique of
cultural violence, since "Tickets Please"'s instinctual ideal only makes sense
through the re-entry of morality in the form of monogamous sexual relations.
The effect of this moral underpinning of the male unconscious self is to confuse
the binary oppositions which the story had set up. The early flirtations of John
Thomas, and his abrupt rejection of Annie, sit awkwardly alongside the rigidity
of his final moral position: if he has possessed a fidelity to Annie throughout
which her brutality has ruined, how do we square this loyalty with his own
violent exploitation of sexual relationships? The story seems to read less
convincingly as an anti-cultural defence of the spontaneous unconscious than it
"
does as an ethically reasoned defence of the rights of a dominant, even
"official", male authority to determine the course of sexual relationships
according to whim. Certainly, nobody could have reasonably assumed John
Thomas's fidelity!
"Tickets Please" could be described, then, as Lawrence's first attempt
of many to create an idealised instinctual space from which to launch a critique
of cultural violence. Significantly, however, the story seems to offer its own
kind of cultural brutality in the form of what is in fact a highly conventional
version of bourgeois gender relations which hypocritically demands its own
sexual flexibility alongside the other's loyalty, and tries to naturalise its own
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historical specificity. Culture, once more, appears to be at its most subtly
vicious when it denies itself as such.
The Death of Conflict and the Death of Demos:
Magical Destruction in Lawrence's Late Fiction
Lawrence's fiction of the 1920s continues to explore the possibility of
an extra-cultural space. A development occurs, however, from the function of
this space as merely forestalling or repressing conflict to its role in establishing
new forms of oppositional, anti-cultural authority and violence. In this sense,
"Tickets Please" is a transitional text: anew, instinctual authority is in the
process of being shaped on the basis of the suppression of cultural antagonisms,
yet the violence of this authority has yet to explicitly emerge - though I have
tried to show how it is insidiously at work. In comparison, Lawrence's late
fiction in many ways realises aesthetically the ideas of such non-fictional works
as "Education" and Fantasia. The violence of a supposedly pure unconscious
self becomes a means of social transformation or a symbolic act of retribution
against modernity. There are, however, several of Lawrence's late fictions
which deal with violence in this way, and there is not the space here to discuss
them all. I will therefore limit myself to a study of the stories, "The Woman
Who Rode Away" (1925), "The Princess" (1925), and "None of That!" (1928),
since these effectively illustrate the major changes in Lawrence's treatment of
violence in his later works.190
190 Other late fictions of Lawrence's which handle the subject of violence and its relationship
to culture and the unconscious include The Plumed Serpent, which offers a sustained
exploration of this central area of Lawrence's work, and ''The Last Laugh" and ''The Fox"
which offer, in their denouements, some of the most brutal acts of the aesthetic "magical
destruction" analysed in this chapter.
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"The Woman Who Rode Away" is the story of a woman who escapes
from the highly repressive civilisation represented by her "idealist" husband,
only to undergo, first of all, a kind of psychic death, and then finally, death
itself in the primitive Chilchui Indian culture of Mexico. This woman is an
American whose husband is an archetypal target for Lawrence's critique of the
repressiveness of modern civilisation: he is a "dynamo of energy" who runs his
own silver mines yet who, as "a man of principles" and a "good husband",
proprietorially perceives his own marriage as part of "his own works": "He was
jealous of [his wife] as he was of his silver mine: and that is saying a lot". The
unfeeling and abstract nature of the husband's perspective is, therefore, also a
violation for the woman: "He admired his wife to extinction", so that,
consequently, "her conscious development had stopped mysteriously with her
marriage, completely arrested [.... ] he never meant anything to her, physically.
Only morally he swayed her, downed her, kept her in an invincible slavery".
The woman suffers, then, under the moral repression of her husband and his
hatred of the "physical side of life" means that her bodily unconscious self is
thwarted.191
Yet her "escape" into the "lawless" landscape of Mexico is not a
conventional liberatory experience, though an apparent return to the
unconscious.!" For the woman's dream of "being free", in her own terms, is
never attained.193 First of all, early in her journey into the wilderness, she seems
to suffer what I have already described as a psychic death, suggesting that
.191 Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away" (1925), The Woman Who Rode Away and Other
Stories (1928), ed. Dieter Mehl and Christa Jansohn (London: Penguin, 1996), pp. 39-71, 40.
192Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away" pp 41 43
193 ' • , •
Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 43.
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authentic freedom might not lie in the direction which the progressive
modernity of, for example, the women's emancipation movement would
recommend:
[She lay] feeling like a woman who has died and
passed beyond. She was not sure that she had not heard
during the night, a great crash at the centre of herself,
which was the crash of her own death. Or else it was a
crash at the centre of the earth, and meant something
big and mystericus.i'"
Freedom appears here as a freedom from oneself and one's self-control. This is
reinforced when we learn soon after this that she had no "will left" of "her
own" and would have returned to the oppressive relationship of her marriage
had she had any "will".195Moreover, "female power" is aligned with the
culture from which she has escaped as a "half-childish, half-arrogant
confidence" comparable to the infantile Western domination satirised in the
description of her husband.l'"
The woman's first encounter with the Indians involves an extension of
Birkin's ideal notion of an "impersonal" form of relationship. However, this
relation is, this time, conceived explicitly in terms of domination and violation
as well as in terms of the stripping of female identity:
He looked at her with a black, bright inhuman look,
and saw no woman in her at all [.... ] She sat in her
saddle in wonder, feeling once more as if she had died.
And again he struck her horse, and jerked her badly in
the saddle.197
Here we have a new form of instinctual, "inhuman" violence to counter the
"passionate anger" and "will" of the "spoilt white woman" of Western culture.
194 Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 44.
19S Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 45.
196 Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 46.
197 Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 47.
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Yet this conflict is not upheld for any duration by the story - rather, the
primitive power of the Indian male succeeds very rapidly, not only in
psychically annihilating the cultured white woman and rendering her
"powerless", but in adding to her "supreme anger" a "slight thrill of exultation"
in her own death.198What is striking here, firstly, is that what the story first
described as a repressed unconscious (in the form of a traumatised physical
female self under a male-dominated Western culture) has now become the
repressive super-ego itself (cultured, female arrogance). Furthermore, the force
provided by the tale (a primitive, male instinctualism) has itself to adopt the
character of a repressive action - the woman, after all, undergoes a death of
"will" (partly effected by the administering of drugs) despite the
characterisation of this death as a fulfilment of desire (an "exultation" which, it
is later said, "she wanted,,).199It is difficult, in other words, for the repressive
and the repressed to be simply located; a feature which tellingly recalls the
structural nature of the repression theorised by Freud in his conception of the
death drive.
Certainly, the story does not achieve a refuge from culture. For the
violence of "The Woman Who Rode Away" is not only to be found in the
Indians' drugging, suggested rape, and (symbolically sexual) murder of the
white woman, but in the aesthetic, "magical destruction" of the conflict which
the woman embodies. For the Indians, in ignoring the humanity of the woman,
do not even perceive her "resistance" or "challenge",200 She is, for them,
comparable to a "piece of venison they were bringing home from the hunt" or
198 Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away" p 48199 ,. •
200 Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 67.
Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 51.
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"some giant, female white ant".201 In this way, the woman is also stripped of
the vitality of her sexuality in an aesthetic vision which annihilates the self's
ambivalence through a violent splitting of the instincts across social groups in a
manner reminiscent of the non-fiction discussed above. For the woman is
stripped of her potency and "will", reduced to the shell of her former sexuality
and intelligence, while the Indians are devoid of sexual instincts and degraded
to mere sexless instruments of destruction and "profound, impersonal hate,,.202
It seems impossible, then, if we read the story in the light of this Kleinian
defusion of the instincts across social groupings, to perceive ''The Woman Who
Rode Away" as a merely anthropological-style account of what it might mean
to be primitively non-repressed, since the notion of a viciously ingrained
repression seems to be built into the very structure of the story itself.203 It is
significant to note, for example, that the woman herself feels that, with the
Indians, "all the real things were kept back". 204The life and death instincts are
rigidly divided in antagonism across the borders of sex and culture: the latter
fatally defeating the former with the reactionary result of a return to
primitivism comparable to the death drive. While Klein offers, in her
formulation of the paranoid-schizoid position discussed earlier, a version of the
201 Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 49.
202 Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 66.
203 Ellis typically isolates the story from its wider cultural significations, reading it as a creative
piece of anthropology rather than fiction: in short, a "remarkable effort of imaginative
understanding" of the primitive practice of human sacrifice, which makes the reader "feel the
reasonableness of this ritual within a 'primitive' context". The story is, for Ellis, "not
principally concerned" with explaining "why" such a practice should develop, in spite of the
narrative's evident construction of an explanation. Ellis is of course more cautious when
approaching questions pertaining to Lawrence's personal life. For example, he defends
Lawrence against the charge that the tale's protagonist might be his friend Mabel, emphasising
that "what misogyny there is in the story as a whole is clearly general rather than specific, and
in any case far less important than an inwardness with 'primitive' thinking" (D. H. Lawrence,
pp. 187-9). Evidently, aesthetic violence is safe from any retributive attacks from the culture of
literary biography.
204 Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 58. See also p. 57.
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self as dynamically involved in a violent conflict with cultural authority,
Lawrence seems here to offer a nightmarish caricature of this position on a
social scale, in which society has not only fissured but ossified into two distinct
social groupings (cultured female and instinctual male), destined to a fatal
battle whereby male destructiveness annihilates the conflict represented by the
female life instincts.
Moreover, if we return to Freud's notion of the super-ego, we might say
that Lawrence shows the female self as forever fated to the role of the
enfeebled ego which has to suffer the male self s violent administration of the
devastating revenge attacks of the super-ego for the irresponsible id's violence.
For if, as Kate Millett has argued, the white woman is a kind of scapegoat in
this story for Western civilisation's guilt in the face of the devastating
processes of its colonial project,20Sthen "The Woman Who Rode Away" might
usefully be seen as representing a macrocosmic version of Freud's "culture of
the death instinct": the aesthetic, "magical destruction" of the super-ego as a
form of displaced violence upon the female ego, in revenge for the repressed
unconscious reality of the id's colonial violence. The Indians "sacrifice" the
white woman to "achieve the power" not so much for their own race, as the
story suggests, but for the ideological and cultural conscience of a repressed
Western colonialism.P" "The Woman Who Rode Away" is in this sense also an
art-work which is "more moral than [it] knows".
The story, furthermore, aestheticises the woman's death as a necessary
and positive female return to the unconscious. The woman is, for instance,
lOS See Kate Millett, "D. H. Lawrence", Sexual Politics (1971; London: Abacus, 1972), pp.
237-93,285-93.
206 Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 71.
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"under the spell of some other power", and the Indians appear to "take her will
away".207Yet this is coloured by a wider, cultural symbolism which provides a
brutal fantasy of social transformation:
Her kind of womanhood, intensely personal and
individual, was to be obliterated again, and the great
primeval symbols were to tower once more over the
fallen individual independence of woman. The
sharpness and the quivering nervous consciousness of
the highly-bred white woman was to be destroyed
again, womanhood was to be cast once more into the
great stream of impersonal sex and impersonal
passion.208
This is associated, in turn, with a gender polarity based on natural metaphors
and arbitrary yet conventional divisions between the public and private: for the
Indians, ideally, the woman is of the moon and has power over the home, while
the man is of the sun and has power over the world.209 Thus, while the story
superficially provides us with an attack on Western culture, it actually
reinforces the patriarchal conservatism which has, historically, constituted
much of that culture. Also, the return to the unconscious, which is so significant
here, is not only grounded in a stark cultural symbolism which allows the male
appropriation of the symbolic order, but is also itself split by the death drive
into a feminine repressed and a masculine repressive. Such an aesthetic, then,
rather than embracing a pristine unconscious, is structured by a more ruthless
version of the cultural violence which Women in Love had so powerfully
critiqued and yet cleared the aesthetic space for. The instincts for pleasure and
life are overruled by the instincts for repression and death, which magically
annihilate the forces which sustain and motivate them. In this way, Lawrence's
207 Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away", pp. 58-59.
:: Lawrence, ''The Woman Who Rode Away", p. 60.
See Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away", pp. 61-62.
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tale, like Freud's authoritarian death drive, undercuts itself, suggesting that
repression and pleasure, death and life, must coexist for life to maintain itself.
In ''The Princess" Lawrence gives an alternative account of his fatal
opposition between instinctive and cultural violence: predominantly, the
cultural appears as the aggressor, the "inhuman" self as the victim. Dollie
Urquhart is the daughter of a man who believes that he has "royal blood",210
and who encourages her at an early age to believe that people possess
indifferent, inner "demon" selves, and that she is a royal "demon" in a "demon"
class system, "the last of the royal race of the old people", and "the
Princess'v"! This fosters in Dollie a sense of spiritual superiority which
becomes a form of cultural violence. For example, her virginal indifference to
the male sensuality of the "cabmen and railway-porters" of Europe, her
"condescension" towards them, and the brutality of her cold "understanding"
which re-creates them as characters in a Zola novel, causes such men to react
with "volcanic phallic rage".212The "power of her spirit" (which, she fears,
does "not extend to these low people") thus provokes the "physical power" and
aggression of the Roman cabman who "longed to crush the barren blossom" of
the Princess's "sterility" with its "sexless beauty" and "authority",
Significantly, Dollie's use of the abstract power of money in such cases enables
her to protect herself: "she did not lose her head. She quietly paid out money
and turned away".213 In this way, the tale quickly sets up an antagonism
between a feminine culture, in the form of Dollie, and a masculine, physical,
210 Lawrence, "The Princess" (1925), St. Mawr and Other Stories, ed. Brian Finney (London:
Penguin, 1997), pp. 155-96, 159.
211 Lawrence, "The Princess", p. 161.
212 Lawrence, ''The Princess", pp. 162-3.
213 Lawrence, "The Princess", p. 163.
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and "phallic" impulsiveness; a hostility which is initiated by the oblivious
"sterility" of cultural provocation which cruelly inflicts its damage from behind
the wall of anaesthetised power which is money (her father, notably, sees
money as a kind of clothing by which one "cover[s]" oneself from
"aggressions'tj.i'"
Domingo Romero however, the guide at the ranch which Dollie visits in
New Mexico, has behind him a history of subjugation to such violence:
It was he who had sold the ranch itself to the
Wilkiesons, ten years before, for two thousand dollars.
He had gone away: then reappeared at the old place. He
was the son of the old Romeros, the last of the Spanish
family that had owned miles of land around San
Christobal. But the coming of the white man and the
failure of the vast flocks of sheep and the fatal inertia
which overcomes all men, at last, on the desert near the
mountains, had finished the Romero family. The last
descendants were just Mexican peasants.
Domingo, the heir, had spent his two thousand
dollars, and was working for white people."!
The story then implies that this social violence has become internalised so that
Romero's body, which is "strong with life", bears the mark of the
"meaninglessness" which such violence leaves behind. His physique is
"characteristic of the Mexicans of his own locality": "strong" and "healthy",
yet without energy or "raison d'etre". He, like the other Mexicans, only finds
such "raison d'etre" in "tum[ing] on their own selves" in "self-torture and
death-worship't.i'" Here Lawrence suggests that the cultural violence of the
"white man" has become internalised in Romero as a kind of self-destructive
death drive. Significantly, this destructiveness is constituted by repression and
culture.
214 Lawrence, ''The Princess", p. 164.
215 Lawrence, ''The Princess", p. 167.
216 Lawrence, ''The Princess", pp. 167-8.
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Yet the tale works to remove Romero from the quotidian mundanity of
both the political and cultural nature of his destructiveness. For Romero is the
"silent, aloof', impersonal male with the "spark" of "pride" and
"dauntlessness", and the "quick intelligence" typical of Lawrence's instinctual
protagonists who exist beyond the realm of culture, language and thought in
order to violently assault it. Moreover, the "spark at the middle of Romero's
eye" is not perceived by the tourists who "were not alive enough to see it". In
other words, despite Romero's self-destructiveness, he possesses a greater
degree of instinctive, physical vitality (he is not "forthcoming" in speech) than
those belonging to the Western culture which has violated him.217 Even
Romero's native landscape, which Dollie in her "recklessness" is drawn to,218is
described as "so inhuman",219 while its animal inhabitants "move about in their
wild unconsciousness'V''' aligning his world with the unconscious which had
meant destruction for ''the woman who rode away" and personal liberation for
Birkin.221 This extra-cultural position allows Romero to enact punishment upon
the specific culture of American colonialism and capitalistic enterprise in the
surrogate form of Dollie, when she provokes Romero's violence by rejecting
him shortly after her virginal curiosity had led her to a sexual encounter with
him. Dollie is thus constructed as the sexually and physically repressed white
woman (she feels vulgarised by activity and repulsed by the "strange squalor of
the primitive forest", while even her "sudden naive impulse of recklessness" is
217 Lawrence, ''The Princess", p. 168.
218 Lawrence, ''The Princess", p 171219 • •
Lawrence, ''The Princess", p. 181.
220 Lawrence, "The Princess", p. 173.
221 Significantly, the term "inhuman" is also used in relation to Gerald erich's destructiveness
(see above).
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given the repressed quality of "an obstinacy tinged perhaps with madness"),222
whose merely transitory and mentally contrived curiosity over Romero's sexual
physicality is met by the impulsive and uninhibited sexual violence of Romero,
who rapes her repeatedly. This war between physical violence and cultural
violence is emphasised by the fact that Romero's violence is intensely physical,
while the men from the Forest Service, who eventually discover him and
Dollie, kill Romero with the prostheticised violence of the shot-gun.
However, the narrative itself destabilises this dualistic reading in two
central ways. Firstly, not only is Romero's violence founded in a reaction to
the repressive forces of American colonialist capitalism and is thus culturally
constituted, but it delivers an abstract retribution which is so divorced from this
target that it resembles the kind of repressed violence which Freud characterises
as typical of morality: "Punishment must be exacted even if it does not fall
upon the guilty".223Romero's reference to the wider culture which motivates
his violence emphasises its abstraction humorously: "'You Americans,' he said;
'you always want to do a man down.' I 'I am not American,' she said, 'I am
British",.224Such violence represses the specificity of the very object which it
seeks to annihilate. Lawrence's "inhuman" male now actually enacts the kind
of prostheticised violence which Women in Love had critiqued. What was
formerly a reaction to cultural violence has become a form of such violence
itself - an idealised unconscious violence which, like fascism, attempts to
release itself from its political significations.
Secondly, the internal conflict manifested in Dollie's desire both for the
self-liberatory possibilities of Romero's "warmth" and "protection", and for
222 Lawrence, "The Princess", pp. 165.184. 171-2.
223 Freud, "The Ego and The Id", p. 386.
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self-possession and autonomy is repressed by the story itself which, following
her unpleasurable and alienated sexual experience of Romero's "terrible animal
warmth", insists that "she had willed that it should happen to her". This sense
of a conscious and sustained effort to force a sexual encounter is undermined
by the former sense of the confusion of Dollie's feelings about Romero, and the
fact that the voice which first calls Romero to her in the night appears to
emerge from an unknown, perhaps unconscious, self: "Where did her voice
come from, and whose voice was it, in the dark?,,225Similarly, Romero's claim
to have a "right" to Dollie's body (despite her refusal of him) because of her
instigation of their sexual encounter, follows the kind of abstract, rigid logic,
divorced from the dynamism normally associated with Lawrence's
understanding of the impulsive male, characteristic of the kind of cultural
violence which Lawrence observes in Enlightenment thought.226The tale,
therefore, could be read as self-repressive, since it attempts to obscure the
entanglement of the dichotomies it has set up.
Ellis suggests, in his acc~unt of the tale, that "the power and
effectiveness" of its conclusion "derives largely from an even distribution of
sympathy".227 Indeed, as Ellis argues, the reader is given an insight into
Romero's aggression, and an appreciation of Dollie's predominantly asexual
nature. However, the notion of "an even distribution of sympathy" implies an
equation of the brutality of Dollie's sexual equivocation and superior self-
containment with the violence of Romero's repeated rape. Furthermore, Ellis
himself notes that the story "works powerfully against" Dollie since "it is
224 Lawrence, "The Princess", p. 190.
225 Lawrence, "The Princess", p. 188.
226 Lawrence, "The Princess", p. 192.
227 Ellis, D. H. Lawrence, p. 199.
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Dollie who initiates the tragedy with her curiosity, and who has insufficient
knowledge to follow the rules of her own nature".228 Certainly, as Ellis
remarks, the story concludes with heavy irony: firstly, after Romero's death,
the Princess's claim that Romero had gone insane is "accepted ... without more
ado", yet the narrator informs us that "she too was now a little mad"; and
secondly, the Princess "seem[s] pleased" by reverting to her virginal self, and
marrying an elderly man.229 Yet significantly, Ellis accepts here,
unquestioningly, the text's moralistic attempt to place blame, for what is
seemingly Romero's natural violence, upon Dollie's apparently mental
contrivance of the violation of her true virginal self. Intriguingly, this reading
supports the text's own opposition between instinctual and cultural violence
while illustrating that opposition's precariousness. For not only does the
suggestion of "rules" to Dollie's "nature" connote the kind of fixed
construction of selfhood typical of the educational "idealism" criticised by
Lawrence's non-fiction, but the moral effort to locate responsibility for the
course of events undermines both the critical and aesthetic assumption of an
instinctual violence beyond ethics or responsibility (significantly, a notion
raised earlier in Lawrence's fiction - as we saw previously - by Birkin), Thus,
although Ellis argues that we understand Romero's behaviour without "finding
it attractive", the notion of Dollie as the initiator of events, suggested by both
Lawrence and Ellis, inevitably situates Romero in a morally superior
position.23o
Ironically, then, Dollie's own instinctual conflicts are suppressed by
228 Ellis, D. H. Lawrence, pp. 199-200,
~:~Lawrence, "The Princess", pp, 195-6.
Ellis, D. H. Lawrence, p. 199.
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both Lawrence and Lawrencians in order to support a highly moralistic
narrative which warns of the dangers for culture of intruding on the realm of
"wild unconsciousness": a similarly paradoxical scenario to that of Freud's
death drive, since what is repressed here is the fact of the story's repression.
The narrative's uneasiness over the dichotomy it sets up between unconscious
male self and repressed female self is, moreover, exacerbated by the clearly
cultural nature of Romero's violence, and its absurd abstraction: the avenging
of the violence of American colonialist capitalism through the rape of a smugly
refined and virginal British woman as an embodiment of the prostheticised
violence of the former's culture. Ellis's surrender to the story's binary
oppositions and its attempt to extricate itself from the political complexity of
culture, therefore, ignores the sense in which "The Princess" aestheticises the
instinctual violence of Romero with the naturalising pathos and passivity of a
fatalistic death drive, while morally condemning the female culture of Dollie as
a surrogate scapegoat for imperialist and capitalist violence. For if these
features of the story are recognised, it would seem that "The Princess", like
''The Woman Who Rode Away", could be read as a particularly ferocious act
of cultural violence itself - particularly since, in its imaginative creation of an
extra-cultural space, the tale re-imagines the historical reality of class struggle,
in grotesque parody, not only as an abstract conflict between the unconscious
and culture, but as the fantasised male rape of feminine "sterility".
"None of That!" returns to the more explicit aesthetic "magical
destruction" of "The Woman Who Rode Away" - that is, it is a psycho-
political fantasy of female/cultural death. However, strangely, considering the
latter story's notoriety and the former story's neglect, "None of That!" leaves
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little to the imagination: while ''The Woman Who Rode Away" only suggests
rape and never finally aesthetically enacts the physical violence of the death of
its protagonist (leaving the sacrificial knife suspended in the air), "None of
That!" imagines both the sexual violation and the death of its central female
character.
The story is narrated in the first person by a man who has met an old
acquaintance called Luis Colmenares, a Mexican exile, in Venice. Colmenares
tells the narrator the story of Cuesta, a bull-fighter, and Ethel Cane, a rich and
powerful American. Typically, Cuesta is the embodiment of the primitive, male
unconscious self, physical power and destructiveness, while Ethel is the white,
cultured female endowed with the violence of idealism and imagination.
However, a more explicitly political touch is added to this story: Cuesta is
linked, through the purchasing of a house, to one of "Madero's generals", many
of whom were, in reality, the political opponents of Madero, the Mexican
revolutionary leader; while Ethel is a socialist at the time.231 Psychological
identity is thus mapped on to political identity. This is most striking in
Colmenares' diagnosis of Ethel's culturally obsessive character: she is a "false
innocent", "diabolic", possessed by "terrible American energy", covetous of
(particularly, old) "'things!'" yet eventually tired by her own enthusiasms,
lustful for "the most dangerous men", especially prophets or reformers, and,
finally, " a socialist" and "no longer [... ] in love with chairs".232Through this
catalogue of psychological and political features, leftist politics is finally
aligned with obsessive psychological behaviour and fevered idealism and, as
231 Lawrence, "None of That!" (1928), The Woman Who Rode Away and Other Stories, pp.
211-29,211,215.
232 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 215.
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such, even the consumerism it conventionally disdains.
By contrast, the brutal physicality of Cuesta is invested with an
enigmatic, animal power which apparently transcends politics and language -
but which is, of course, a kind of political identity itself. For example,
Colmenares describes Cuesta as a bull-fighter who '''play[ed] with the bull and
play[ed] with death"', and as a "'a marvellous animal'" with '''melting eyes'"
which were "'not like human eyes at all''': "'when he looked at you, so strange
and cool, you felt your inside melting [.... ] He looked into the last place of you,
where you keep your courage'''. The narrator says of Colmenares, furthermore,
that "perhaps the toreador had cast a spell over him, as over so many people in
the old and the new world". Cuesta is represented, then, as a flirtatious master
of the death drive who does not look at "'you'" as a personality, but at the selfs
site of unconscious courage. Through this language of mystery and the
unconscious, even Cuesta's faults, such as his inhumanity and mental stupidity,
are redeemed. For example, Colmenares is willing to contrast a negative
cultural humanity with a positive animalistic nature (one which has obvious
bearings on the story's reading of Ethel) in order to idealise Cuesta: "'I have
often thought, if human beings had not developed minds and speech, they
would have become marvellous animals like Cuesta'", 233 Moreover, the
inarticulate quality of Colmenares' portrait of Cuesta allows Cuesta to escape
the limitations of signification and culture necessarily imposed by language:
He did not talk, was very silent. He was not clever at
all. He was not even clever enough to be a general. And
he could be very brutal and disgusting. But usually he
was quiet. But he was always something. If you were in
the room with him, you always noticed him more than
anybody, more than women or men, even very clever
233 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 212.
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people. He was stupid, but he made you physically
aware of him: like a cat in the room.234
Cuesta exists beyond the realm of culture and in the non-linguistic animal
world of the instincts.
Yet his ability to "'play with death''', with its suggestion of mastery
over the death drive, problematises Cuesta's relationship to the unconscious -
or, rather, the fact that it implies he has a relationship to it at all problematises
his apparent unconscious nature. For the notion of playing here, with its
connotation of control and mastery, suggests that Cuesta possesses a kind of
. knowledge about the unconscious destructive instincts which elevate him above
(in a power relation) the endlessly teased and humiliated bull - and, therefore,
above the animal nature ascribed to him. If Cuesta is a "'marvellous animal'"
then how is he able to maintain so easily his capacity to dominate animal life?
His role as a bull-fighter certainly appears to distance him from the world of
animal unconsciousness. There is perhaps something about the capacity to
humiliate which is fundamentally cultural. Hence, Colmenares himself insists
that Cuesta was "'not just a brute!"',23swhile Cuesta is conscious of his powers
of "'enchantment'" and imaginatively re-creates the bull-fight as a set-piece for
a mass (and masochistic) female fantasy of sexual humiliation and murder.236
Cuesta is, furthermore, implicated in cultural violence through his
treatment of Ethel. For instance, while Ethel exploits people, like Colmenares,
who are "'useful'" to her or powerful, in order to gain an indirect cultural
power (cultural, particularly because it is a power protected from the
consequences of its actions by not being directly accountable for them), Cuesta
234 Lawrence, "None of That''', pp. 212-13.
23S Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 211.
236 Lawrence, "None of That''', pp. 213, 222.
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(though not interested by Ethel's endless attempts to "'touch his imagination'''),
is "'roused'" when Ethel speaks of money, and his reward for destroying Ethel
in their battle of wills is her half her wealth. Significantly, the power which
Cuesta desires is that possessed by the Princess and her father - not so much a
material, physical power as an abstract power and tool of prostheticised
violence. For example, we are told that he was "'mean'" with his money and
that 'he was rich, he had a big hacienda, and many people like slaves worked
for him [.... ] I think he was very proud to be hacendado and padron of so many
people, with a little army of his own. I think he was proud, living like a
king.,237
The notion of imagination also raises tensions in the story between
culture and the instincts, reminiscent of those discussed earlier with regard to
Lawrence's Fantasia and Klein's conception of phantasy. On the one hand, we
are informed by Colmenares that Ethel could not "'touch his imagination [.... ]
He was utterly uninterested. He actually had no mental imagination. Talk was
just a noise to him"'.238On the other hand, however, when Cuesta talks himself
(a rare occurrence), his words suggest the possession of an alarmingly graphic
imagination:
'[Ethel] hates a man as she hates a red-hot iron. She is
as easy to embrace as an octopus, her gate is a beak.
What man would put his finger into that beak? She is
all soft with cruelty towards a man's member. A white
devil, as sacred as the communion wafer!'. But they
can't leave each other alone! He can't because she is
rich, he says: "'she is so rich and so white-skinned and
white-souled. And my member is red....239
237 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 214.
238 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 225.
239 Lawrence, "None of That!", pp. 227-8.
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Thus, while Ethel is attacked by Colmenares for wanting sex to be "'an
imaginative act"', an '''imaginative sort of bullying" which is "'death to a
man"', Cuesta's sadistic and hugely ambivalent desire for Ethel likens her to a
"'cuttle-fish'" which he wishes to cook and consume: "'Even cuttle-fish is good
when it's cooked in sauce"'.240In the light of Kleinian infantile phantasy - the
orally sadistic, destructive phantasies which Klein attributes to the infant - the
distinction between ideal and instinctual forms of violence is once again
confused: the imagination appears to be the form through which the
unconscious drives manifest themselves - a notion which problematises the
very position of Lawrence's art in relation to its idealised unconscious.i"
We might say, therefore, that the relation between repressed and
repressive in "None of That!" cannot easily be described as a straightforward
opposition between the unconscious and culture. Ethel's desire to control men,
including both Colmenares and Cuesta, through her imagination, physically
repels them while in most cases (excluding Cuesta and most Mexicans)
stimulating their minds. Thus, Ethel manifests both an extreme form of cultural
violence and repression of the sexual instincts and a capacity to liberate
repressed mental activity: Colmenares admits, for example, that "she was very
clever. She flattered me, of course. She made me feel intelligent. She drew me
out. There was her cleverness. She made me clever",.242 However, this
liberation is only an instrument of Ethel's megalomania which represses its
own and others' sexuality. In this sense, however, Ethel represents the same
kind of (cultural) power as Cuesta:
240 Lawrence, "None of Thatl", p. 227.
241 The paradox inherent in Lawrence's use of art to convey unconscious processes is one of
the themes of Linda Ruth Williams's D. Hi Lawrence,
242 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 218.
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'She was cruel to the body of a man. But she excited
his mind, his spirit [.... ] She loved to have a man
hanging around, like a servant [.... ] A man must be
absolutely her servant, and only that. That was what
she meant by the life of the imagination' .243
What kind of power is it, we might ask, which needs servants to confirm it? If it
is a power which depends upon the need to dominate others, then this would be
a highly cultural and repressive form of power which would in fact situate both
Ethel and Cuesta on the same side of the culture/unconscious divide. It would
appear, anyway, that Cuesta's authority over an "'army'" of servants "'like
slaves" shares a certain kind of political power with Ethel's control over her
male servants (though one is largely economic while the other is primarily
sexual).
The cultural quality of Cuesta's violence is further established by the
implication both that Ethel's authority is primarily personal rather than social
and that she is, like the "woman who rode away" and the Princess, "'reckless'"
and "'curious'''. Firstly, if Ethel is an "'unscrupulous'" "'devil incarnate'" in
her intimate relationships, but frightened of public situations and "'uneasy, like
one who has a bad conscience towards society, and is afraid of it''', then surely
by contrast Cuesta is the master of culture in the public spheres of bull-fighting
through the power he possesses over his (particularly female) audience.P" This
would somewhat reverse the terms - the notion of the cultural, external self of
the personality, so rigorously attacked by the story, would not incorporate Ethel
so successfully as it would Cuesta, since the latter has tapped into the female
cultural imagination more deeply and effectively than "'Rudolf Valentino,,,.24s
243 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 219.
244 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 216.
245 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 213.
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Secondly, if Ethel is "'reckless'" and "'curious"', then once again Lawrence's
narrative actually appears to exercise a moral condemnation of such
psychological disorderliness and impulsive curiosity, since Ethel, like her
predecessors in the short fiction, will be punished by the instinctual male for
her "'reckless'" inquisitiveness. Such a checking of female chaos and
impulsiveness echoes Birkin's rebuke of femininity in Women in Love, though
of course in this case the violence of that rebuke is carried out to its furthest
conclusion.
Nonetheless, the story's critique of Ethel illuminates the insidiously
abstract nature of the violence of the super-ego:
'She said, the imagination could master everything; so
long, of course, as one was not shot in the head, or had
an eye put out. Talking of the Mexican atrocities, and
of the famous case of raped nuns, she said it was all
nonsense that a woman was broken because she had
been raped. She could rise above it. The imagination
could rise above anything, that was not real organic
damage [.... ] One could even commit murder, and rise
above that.-By using the imagination, and by using
cunning, a woman can justify herself in anything, even
the meanest and most bad things. A woman uses her
imagination on her own behalf, and she becomes more
innocent to herself than an innocent child, no matter
what bad things she has done-'
'Men do that, too,' I interrupted. 'It's the modern
dodge. That's why everybody today is innocent. To the
imagination, all things are pure, if you did them
yourself.,246
It is the purpose of "None of That I" however to illustrate how mistaken Ethel is
on this issue. Moreover, this is demonstrated through a physical violence that is
not without severe moral connotations. Indeed, Cuesta possesses,
paradoxically, both an animal and a supernatural being - a dual identity which
246 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 220.
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enables him to be a moral force of retribution as well as an instinctual creature.
For although Ethel is not attracted to Cuesta as an intellectual being, she wants
to master her body which is desperately in thrall to him, and it is this servitude
which is the means by which Cuesta can both physically and morally punish
her: "'he's got something I haven't got, and he's stronger than I am, and he's
more an angel or a devil than a man, and I'm too merely human to get him",.247
Ironically, then, Cuesta becomes an idealised super-human figure, suggesting
that the unconscious which is purified of culture does not lead us to a more
authentically human and instinctual life but to the God-like role of moral arbiter
over human affairs.
Ethel- and the narrative's - idealisation of Cuesta, furthermore, recalls
Klein's notion of idealisation; a phantasy of authority as omnipotent and
omniscient which should be measured against reality by the ego, leading to an
increased knowledge about authority through the process of challenging it. In
Klein, this authority is, of course, the internal culture of the violent super-ego.
However, in contrast to the positive outcome of Klein's notion of the successful
infantile response to its own idealisation of moral authority, Cuesta represents a
form of unquestionable morality inside Ethel's psychic reality - "'more an
angel or a devil than a man"'. Cuesta is an inhibitory force in Ethel's internal
world. She is mentally de stabilised by the power which he exercises over her -
a power which is as much his repression as it is her desire. Once again,
Lawrence's female protagonist is reduced to "'hysterics'" - that is, as in "The
Princess", moral punishment and psychological illness are united.248
247 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 225.
248 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 226.
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The morality of "None of That!" is made yet clearer through
Colmenares' injunction to Ethel that she should follow her impulse towards
Cuesta, if she has one, since the body and the imagination are the same - her
imagination "'has nothing to do but to accept the fact"'.249 That the story
effectively punishes Ethel for failing to perform Colmenares' request seems to
align Lawrence's narrative, once again, with the kind of repressive morality
which so much of his work appears to oppose. For if Ethel were to do as
Colmenares suggests, she would be repressing the part of herself that recoils
from Cuesta and that attempts to relinquish her from the process of her own
self-destruction. There is, we might say, a link between Lawrence's idealised
pleasure principle here, which cuts out the reality principle, and Freud's
domineering death drive. For Ethel, absolute pleasure would be absolute death
of the self - to surrender herself to Cuesta's power would be, owing to the
latter's own megalomania, to surrender her identity. Here, the complicity
between pleasure and death, total liberation and total repression, becomes clear;
suggesting once again that the repressed and the repressing must co-exist in a
conflict which does not allow for the transcendence of a superior authority (a
conflict which reminds us of both Klein's notion of the fruitfulness of infantile
conflict and Phillips' notion of conflict as necessary for an authentic democracy
to function). By contrast, Ethel and Cuesta's conflict is a sado-masochistic one
which must end in absolute victory for one of the protagonists since both desire
mastery of the other. However, that this conflict is resolved by Cuesta's
arrangement of the gang-rape of Ethel, and her capitulation to Cuesta in the
form of suicide and a will leaving him half a million dollars, suggests that
249 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 226.
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Lawrence's narrative enacts, rather than challenges, cultural violence, and does
so in its most immunised form - through the morality of fiction.
For the choice which the narrative sets up between the violence of
modem Western culture and the violence of a primitive Mexican unconscious
masquerades as a choice between inauthentic and authentic forms of violence -
since Cuesta acknowledges his own brutality rather than sublimating it like
Ethel. However, Cuesta's violence is in fact, as I hope to have shown, a
thoroughly cultural violence, not so much in spite of its idealisation as because
of it, since the narrative idealises what results in an act of extreme barbarism.
Moreover, the story itself offers an aesthetics of moral punishment and
repression through its employment of the technique of aesthetic "magical
destruction" which not only represses the historical challenges to American
colonialist capitalism and patriarchy through its re-writing of them in terms of a
battle between an unconscious male primitivism and an idealist female culture;
but also aesthetically realises the former's physical violation and moral
punishment of the latter. The title of the story itself exposes this moral violence
since '''none of that'" was, we are told, Ethel's way of rejecting, '''like hitting a
mirror with a hammer"', the sexual advances of a man.250 In this light, the story
appears as a brutally moralistic joke against female rejection of sex - the
narrative itself gives Ethel "some of that", whether she desires it or not.
Aesthetic "magical destruction" in the late fiction, then, allows
Lawrence a safe space through which to repress the real historical conflicts of
culture and symbolically enact violently authoritarian, social and psycho-
political change. A female culture is attacked, as a surrogate scapegoat for the
250 Lawrence, "None of That!", p. 216.
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historical violence of Western liberal capitalism, and destroyed symbolically
(with an accompanying, moral violence) without the risk even of the
intellectual opposition which argument or non-fiction (such as Fantasia) would
entail. This abstract violence ironically is the very culture which Lawrence
imagines he is against - the kind of "magical control" and prostheticised
violence embodied by the war (which he despised for the mechanical
abstraction of its warfare) which is comfortably immune from any retributive
attack. The women's movement, social conflict and, paradoxically, culture
itself, are suppressed violently at the level of ideas which, in their fictional
form, seem safely secured from intellectual attack. In short, the Cambridge
Biography's reading of Lawrence and his fictional treatment of violence in
terms of his opposition to repression and sublimation appears misguided:
In both versions of [The Plumed Serpent] he is able to
express through Kate his own dismay at a violence and
cruelty in Mexico that he felt obliged to acknowledge
as part of the reality of human nature, not least because
he could identify both in himself. To repress these
impulses entirely would go against Lawrence's belief
in the evils of repression (and he was never much
interested in the convenient Freudian escape-route of
'sublimation,)2S1
That this argument is placed in the service of both theoretically supporting The
Plumed Serpent's "lottery" of capital punishment and attacking political reform
only underscores the political and cultural significance of ignoring Lawrence's
evident predilection for the sublimated violence of literary "magical control"
and "magical destruction".
To conclude, Lawrence's late fiction (like his non-fiction) shows a male
instinctual self which, through the attempted concealment of its inevitable
251 Ellis, p. 111.
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relationship (however complex) with modernity, represents a kind of super-
moral violence of retribution against culture for its ideal "bullying" and
prostheticised brutality. The repression of conflict and the use of aesthetic
forms of "magical destruction", however, offer only alternative forms of
cultural violence rather than what are commonly assumed to be eruptions from
a rarefied unconscious. The inter-war concern with human destructiveness in
the field of psychoanalysis sheds an illuminating light upon Lawrence's fiction
in its claims for the always-already guiltiness of violence and the insidious all-
pervasiveness of culture. By tracing the trajectory of these very concerns from
Women in Love to the late short stories, I hope to have shown how Lawrence's
fiction does not successfully expunge guilt and morality from its various critical
(and violent) spaces through those spaces' idealisation in the terminology of the
unconscious. In fact, Lawrence's work is testimony to the very brutality of such
attempts of the intellect to extinguish the reality of its cultural determination -
that is, the internal nature of its seemingly external relationships. However, the
origin of Lawrence's search for such an abstract, internal, and violently
counter-cultural space within the alienated psychological landscape of Women
in Love, where all forms of cultural power are pernicious, seems to imply that
guilt alone is either too much or not enough. In other words, perhaps the late
Klein's emphasis on the reparative virtues of guilt should be reassessed in the
light of Lawrence's work. Similarly, Lawrence's attempt to find a source of
opposition to the repressive violence of modernity possesses an awareness of
the necessity of conflict which Freud's totalitarian death drive does not.2S2 That
252 Certainly, Lawrence's sense of the pernicious nature of cultural violence and its repression
of the instincts do not square well with the Freud's emphasis on repression. For example, in
Freud's essay, "The Future of an Illusion" (1927), The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (London:
Vintage, 1995), pp. 685-722, Freud argues that "every civilization must be built up on coercion
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is to say, Lawrence's work suggests that the worst thing we can do is pretend
that we can renounce our own inescapable involvement in the violence of
culture: firstly, since this is a process of abstraction (of the aesthetic from the
political) which often forms its own vicious culture (such as the historical
example of fascism); and secondly, lest, in a society which has yet to purge
itself of oppressive power relations, we leave the violence of those who assume
authority in our culture unchallenged. This might be what Phillips means by his
suggestion that conflict is a condition of democracy.
and renunciation of instinct" (p. 687). What is interesting here is that both writers share a belief
in the need for political leadership by an elite, yet deny one another's central psychological
claims; Lawrence generally dismissing repression, and Freud here neglecting instinctual
fulfilment. This suggests that, in dismissing one another's psychological views, both writers'
emphases neglect the necessary conflict of instinct and repression which might make for the
democracy that both reject.
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Conclusion
In the course of this thesis I hope to have provided some new perspectives on
Lawrence's oeuvre. By combining formal analyses with a cultural materialist
approach, my aim has been to historicise Lawrence's texts while attending to
the specificity of the texts' form. The result, I believe, is a Lawrence which,
while incapable of evading the historical and material determinations of his
work, cannot be unified into a simple and coherent whole - into the
"radicalized" Lawrence of post-structuralism or the right-wing caricature of
orthodox Marxism and feminism: Lawrence's work is politically as well as
generically hybrid. The readings provided here, of largely neglected texts in
Lawrence's oeuvre, reveal a Lawrence who struggled with the central
problems of modernity in a variety of ways which cannot be reduced to a
single, general ideological position. At the same time, however, this thesis has
shown how Lawrence's work is not capable of transcending those historical
problems, as liberal humanist critics have maintained. Thus, while each chapter
shows a different writer capable of responding anew to his society through new
forms and techniques, each chapter also demonstrates how those responses are
constituted by the specific set of historical conflicts in which they intervene.
Consequently, this thesis should occupy what I perceive as a vacuum in
the field of Lawrence studies. While Lawrencian critics have largely
abandoned the realm of critical debate by channelling their efforts into the
scholarly conduits of editorial work and biography, Lawrence criticism has
been relinquished to an overly theoretical post-structuralism. In short, an
under-theorised Lawrence has been replaced by an over-theorised one; an
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abstract. ahistorical approach by an abstract. anti-formalist reading. For the
recent growth in post-structuralist readings of Lawrence has resulted in the
emergence of a version of Lawrence which deconstructs his texts to such a
degree that they appear to get lost beneath their own critical deconstruction and
begin to resemble the post-structuralist technique itself.
Robert Burden's reading of Lawrence provides a recent example of this
kind of post-structuralist interpretation, in which he transforms Lawrence's
Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo into their own radical deconstruction:
[... ] even while seeking to express a doctrinaire
masculine supremacy in reaction to the perceived
wilfulness of modem women and the general post-war
cultural disintegration, Lawrence's writing is much
more radical in its modernist experiments than the
critical consensus has noticed. Thus, it is that textual
instabilities undermine the assertions of ideology.'
Here, a tension asserts itself between a highly reactionary Lawrence whose
"textual instabilities" subvert his own polemics, and a "radical" and
experimental modernist who actively "undennine[s]" the dogmas represented
in his texts. This tension is the result of Burden's confusion of Lawrence's
texts with his own critical deconstruction of them: since the novels can be
. shown by Burden to contain "their own critique", Lawrence has therefore
"already saved the tale from himself' because of his "radical Modemism't.i In
a typically post-structuralist "radicalization" of Lawrence, the complexity of
the texts' relationship to history is completely lost amidst their theorisation as
agents of deconstruction rather than objects of it. Rather than reading the text's
absences or "instabilities" against the text's "presences", the text's absences
IRobert Burden, Radicalizing Lawrence: Critical Interventions in the Reading and Reception
~fD. H. Lawrence's Narrative Fiction (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi,2(00), pp. 19-20.
Burden, pp. 354-6.
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are mistakenfor the text itself, as if it had no "presences".
This tendency to substitute one's critical deconstruction of the text for
the text under analysis can also be seen in the critical trajectory which one of
the best-known post-structuralist critics, Anne Femihough, has taken over the
last decade. In 1993, the jacket of Femihough's D. H. Lawrence: Aesthetics
and Ideology hailed Lawrence's art criticism as "pluralistic and anti-
authoritarian" and as a "necessary antidote to his sometimes brutally
authoritarian politics and to the dogma and rigidity that pervades so many
other areas of Lawrence's thought'V However, the book itself is less sure of
this "notorious" "didacticism". For though Femihough's study does not
address Lawrence's actual aesthetic practice, the issue of whether or not the
pluralism of his art criticism is matched by a corresponding pluralism of
practice has become an "interesting question"," In a recent book review,
however, the "dogma" which "pervades so many other areas of Lawrence's
thought" has quite disappeared - Femihough celebrates "a Lawrence who
consistently challenged logocentrism rather than embodying ~t": Moreover,
Femihough argues that this pluralism, which the book under discussion views .
as typical of Lawrence's poetry, is "relevant to large parts of Lawrence's
oeuvre"." The post-structuralist desire for pluralism has become the very
totalising procedure it wished to critique, while the object of analysis,
Lawrence's texts, are indistinguishable from the theoretical approach used to
analyse them.
3 Anne Femihough, D. H. Lawrence: Aesthetics and Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993), jacket.
4 Femihough, p. 14.
S Femihough, "Blood and dirt", Times Literary Supplement, 29 August 2003, p. 8.
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By contrast, the approach of my thesis aims to offer that rare thing in
Lawrence studies: an historicised Lawrence. Yet it does so without, I hope,
reducing the formal peculiarity of Lawrence's texts to a congealed set of
historical forces, as past feminist and Marxist criticism has tended to do. It is in
these senses, then, that I perceive this thesis to inhabit a critical space which
badly requires occupation in Lawrence studies - a field which has been largely
abandoned by materialist criticism.
During the course of this project, I discovered that a wider range of
critical tools would be required in order to produce a cultural materialist
analysis which attended fully to the particularity of the text - that is, a mere
attendance to form would not suffice if I were to historicise texts whose
relation to the historical was highly mediated. The result has been a hybrid
theoretical approach, involving the use of critical tools from structuralism and
semiotics, and the use of comparative approaches (setting Lawrence's texts in
dialogue with those of other writers), theories of national identity, and
psychoanalysis. Thus, while setting out with the notion that such theoretical
approaches would not be necessary to a cultural materialist approach to
Lawrence, I came to realise that each text, in its specificity, demands specific
tools of analysis (often developed outside the Marxist tradition) before a
historical analysis can begin. For example, to examine Lawrence's treatment of
violence, one would need to examine his notion of the unconscious; and to
understand and assess the particularity of Lawrence's view of the unconscious,
one would do well to compare it to the views of the inter-war period's
psychoanalysis. Only by assessing such particularity, through comparative
analysis with a similar mode of thought preoccupied by similar historical
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problems, could one hope to illuminate the historical character of Lawrence's
exploration of the violence of modernity.
Moreover, in extending the traditional critical terrain of cultural
materialism beyond the limited sphere of class and "politics" into issues such
as national identity, violence and the unconscious, I hope to have shown the
potential within cultural materialism for a valuable contribution to debates
normally conceived as extra-historical. In this attempt, I have aimed to
illustrate not only the diversity of Lawrence's oeuvre but, centrally, the breadth
of its socio-historical engagements and the inescapable politics of those
engagements whatever their formal and linguistic manifestation. Consequently,
. Lawrence emerges here as a substantially different cultural figure from the one
with which we have become familiar: one utterly engrossed in the historical
conflicts of his society, and writing society, in a manner thoroughly unusual to
what is typically viewed as either Lawrencian or modernist; and, moreover,
one whose use of a diverse range of forms and languages did not allow him, as
is so often assumed, to avoid the politics of writing.
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